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This   thesis   aims   to   explore   the   process   of   Hamas’   political  
transformation   and   engagement   between   2003   and   2013   as   well   as   the  
implications  of  the  transition.  In  general,  conventional  scholarship  research  on  
Hamas   and   its   transition   in   politics   focuses   either   on   the   discussion   of   its  
tendency  to  violence  or  on  its  orientation  towards  moderation.  However,  both  
analyses  fail  to  capture  the  essence  of  Hamas’  political  transition  over  the  ten  
years   under   discussion.   This   thesis   argues   that   Hamas’   transition   is  
interrelated  with  its  perception  of  resistance.  That  is  to  say,  Hamas’  transition  
aimed  to  keep  its  resistance  work  intact.    
Hamas   believed   that   because   of   its   Zionist   ideology,   Israel   would  
continue  to  occupy  and  colonize  at  Palestinians’  expense.  Furthermore,  past  
negotiations   between   the   Palestinian   Authority   and   Israel   had   not   helped  
Palestinians   but   on   the   contrary,   had   intensified   the   Israeli   occupation.  
Therefore,   nothing   but   resistance   would   restore   Palestinians’   rights   and  
defend   them   against   Israel’s   aggression.   Ever   since   its   inception   in   1987,  
resistance   has   been  Hamas’   only   strategy   and   its  means   to   end   the   Israeli  
occupation.   It   is   worth   noting   that   Hamas   sophisticated   the   concept   of  
resistance  into  a  ‘resistance  project’  from  2003  onwards,  and  then  enforced  it  
after   taking   over   Gaza   in   June   2007;;   and   for   Hamas,   the   elements   of  
resistance   are   comprehensive.   In   order   to   end   Israeli   occupation,   armed  
struggle  is  its  major  tactic  but  this  includes:  the  necessity  of  the  national  unity  
of   Palestinians,   the   need   for   substantial   support   from   the   Arab   and  Muslim  
states  and  the  understanding  of  the  West.  This  thesis  argues  that  as  long  as  
the   Israeli  occupation   is   in  place,   it   is   inevitable   that  Hamas’  engagement   in  
politics  will  be  irreversible  and  its  work  on  resistance  will  continue,  irrespective  
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Introduction	  
  
1.  Research  Background  and  Motivation  
This   research   aims   to   explore   the   process   of   Hamas'   transition   in  
politics  between  2003  and  2013  and  to  attempt  to  interpret  the  implications  of  
the  transition.  Over  the  decade,  Hamas  experienced  a  remarkable  change  in  
its   practices   and   rhetoric.   Prior   to   2003,   in   the   eyes   of   Western   countries,  
Hamas  was  considered   to  be  a  spoiler,  undermining   the  peace  process  and  
aiming   to   destroy   of   Israel.   Its   suicide   bombings   and   rocket   attacks   were  
regarded  as  a  form  of  terrorism  and  its  hardline  stance  against  Israel  seemed  
to  be  clear  indications  of  this.  However,  after  its  acceptance  of  the  ceasefire  in  
June   2003,   Hamas   gradually   reduced   the   numbers   of   military   attacks   and  
considered   the   possibility   of   a   political   transformation.   This   turn   towards   a  
more  political  orientation  was  discernible.  In  addition,  its  military  tactic  did  not  
appeal  after  its  victory  in  the  Palestinian  Legislative  Council  (PLC)  election  in  
January   2006.   After   that,   Hamas   gradually   became   an   important   non-­state  
actor  in  the  Palestinian-­Israeli  conflict  and  played  an  essential  role  across  the  
Middle  East  particularly  during  the  period  between  Hamas’  take-­over  of  Gaza  
after  June  2007  and  the  Arab  Spring  (2011-­2013).  
Hamas’   leaders   demonstrated   their   willingness   to   coexist   with   Israel  
based  on  a  long-­term  truce1  in  order  to  erase  the  ‘terrorist’  stigma,  to  distance  
itself  from  the  international  militant  Islamists  and  to  be  better  accepted  within  
the   international   community.2  On   the   other   hand,  Hamas’   leaders   started   to  
articulate   their   views  on  why  at   this  moment   they   rejected   the  disarmament  
and  refused  to  recognize  Israel,  which  was  one  of  the  demands  of  the  Quartet.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1  The   long-­term   truce  was  based  on   the  condition   that   Israel  withdrew   from  the  West  Bank,  
East   Jerusalem,   the   ease   of   Gaza   and   the   right   of   return   for   Palestinian   regugees,   which  
corresponds   to   international   law   and   the   resolution   of   the   United   Nations.   Please   refer   to  
Khaled  Hroub,  Hamas:  Political  Thought  and  Practice  (Washington,  DC:  Institute  for  Palestine  
Studies,  2002),  pp.73-­78.  Khaled  Hroub,  Hamas:  A  Beginner’s  Guide   (London:  Pluto  Press,  
2006),  pp.55-­57.  
2  Hamas  leaders  often  cite  the  United  Nations  Resolution  194  in  the  General  Assembly  as  a  
principle  of  the  right  of  return  for  refugees.  Please  refer  to  Khalid  Amayreh,  ‘Hamas  debates  
the  future:  Palestine’s  Islamic  Resistance  Movement  attempts  to  Reconcile  ideological  purity  
and  political  realism’,  A  Conflicts  Forum  Monograph,  (Beirut:  November  2007),  p.8.  
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3  Hamas’  leaders  also  reiterated  that  the  reason  for  their  fight  with  Israel  was  
simply   because   of   the   Israeli   occupation   and   persecution   of   Palestinians  
instead  of   fighting   its  Jewish  background  and  Judaism.  Hence,  Hamas’  new  
stance   was   noteworthy   when   compared   with   its   previous   record   of   suicide  
bombings  during  the  al-­Aqsa  Intifada  (2000-­2005).  
In   general,  Western   scholarship  on  Hamas’   transition   in   politics  often  
leads   to   two   conflicting  and   confusing   interpretations.  One  places  emphasis  
on   Hamas’   rigid   ideology,   the   form   of   its   radicalization   and   its   record   of  
violence  based  on   intransigent   Islamic  dogma,  which   is  similar   to   that  of  al-­
Qaeda.  This  approach  brands  Hamas  as  a  terrorist  group  under  the  banner  of  
counter-­terrorism  and  also  ignores  the  evolution  of  the  organization.  Although  
Hamas   has   demonstrated   its   flexibility   and   pragmatism   in   the   social,  
educational,  political,  and   religious  dimensions,   this  approach  considers   that  
these   shifts   are   only   for   the   purpose   of   violence   or   in   preparation   for   the  
destruction   of   Israel.   For   example,   one   researcher   who   takes   this   view,  
Matthew  Levitt,  denies  the  possibility  of  Hamas’  transformation  and  concludes  
that   its  main  goal   is   to  promote  a  violent   Islamist  agenda   in  politics.4  Similar  
discourse   can   also   be   found   in   Jonathan  Schanzer’s   research.   In   his   book,  
entitled  Hamas  VS.  Fatah:  The  struggle  for  Palestine,  he  focuses  on  one  side  
of   the  conflict  between  Hamas  and  Fatah  and  attributes  Hamas’   ideology   to  
the  trend  of  ‘radical  Islam’  that  shares  common  ground  with  al-­Qaeda.5    
To   some   extent,   this   approach   to   researching   Hamas   is   not   always  
invalid   but   the   presumption   that   Hamas   is   a   terrorist   organization   does   not  
completely   grasp   Hamas’   complex   features.   According   to   this   approach,  
Hamas  is  always  regarded  as  Israel’s  antagonist  and  its  transition  serves  the  
ultimate  purpose  of  the  destruction  of  Israel.  Furthermore,  this  approach  takes  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3   The   Quartet,   set   up   in   2002,   is   an   organization   for   mediating   ‘Middle   East   peace  
negotiations   and   supporting   Palestinian   economic   development   and   institution-­building   in  
preparation  for  eventual  statehood.’  It  consists  of  the  United  Nations,  the  European  Union,  the  
United   States   and   Russia.   Please   refers   to   Office   of   the   Quartet   Representative,  
<http://www.quartetrep.org/quartet/pages/the-­quartet/>  (accessed  on  19  October  2014).  
4  Matthew  Levitt,  Hamas:  Politics,  Charity,  and  Terrorism  in  the  Service  of  Jihad  (New  Haven.  
CT:  Yale  University  Press  and  the  Washington  Institute  for  Near  East  Policy,  2006),  p.240.  
5  Jonathan   Schanzer,   Hamas   VS.   Fatah:   The   struggle   for   Palestine   (New   York:   Palgrave  
Macmillan,  2008),  pp.5-­6.  
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violence   as   Hamas’   main   resort,   which   seems   to   neglect   its   historical  
development  under  the  conditions  of  the  Israeli  occupation.  As  a  matter  of  fact,  
Hamas   is   an   integral   part   of   Palestinian   society.   Therefore,   research   on  
Hamas  and  its  transition  should  explore  the  historical,  social,  political,  cultural  
and  economic   factors   in  Palestine.   If   research   deliberately   excludes  Hamas  
from  the  context  of  Palestinian  society  and  neglects  the  repercussions  of  the  
Israeli   occupation   and   aggression   on   Palestinians   as   a   whole,   it   would   not  
possibly  provide  a  clear  description  of  Hamas’  transition  in  politics  from  2003  
to  2013.    
As   for   the   other   approach,   Hamas’   transition   is   contextualized   in   the  
Palestinian   historical,   social   and   political   background,   that   is,   it   considers  
Hamas  to  be  part  of  Palestinian  society  instead  of  linking  it  to  an  international  
terrorist  organization  or  presenting  it  as  an  exceptional  case.  Indeed  Hamas’  
violent   record   is   still   a  major   focus  of   this  approach  but   violence   is   the  only  
one  aspect  of  the  analysis  and  this  feature  should  be  examined  in  a  specific  
context.   This   approach   notes   that   Hamas   has   evolved   with   the   changing  
environment   in  order   to  adapt   to  challenges   in   the  period  of   the   first   Intifada  
(1987-­1993),   the  Oslo  Peace  Process   (1993-­2000)   and   the   al-­Aqsa   Intifada  
(2000-­2005).   Researchers   who   have   taken   this   approach   often   conduct  
interviews   with   Hamas   members   and   use   document   analysis   of   Hamas’  
leaflets  and  statements.  Sometimes,  theoretical  frameworks  are  also  adopted  
for  reviewing  Hamas’  development.  6        
In   view  of   this,   current   literature   that  adopts   this  approach  has  noticed  
Hamas’   transition   between   2003   and   2013   and   these   discussions   could   be  
roughly   divided   into   two   stages.   The   first   stage   is   Hamas’   political  
transformation.   From   the   time   of   the   ceasefire   in   June   2003   to   the   PLC  
election   in   January   2006,   Hamas   considered   suspending   its   ‘martyrdom  
operation’   (suicide   bombings)   and   simultaneously,   leaned   towards   political  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6    For  example,  Jeroen  Gunning  and  Robinson  Glenn  adopt  the  Social  movement  theory  and  
Omar  Ashour  employs   the  de-­radicalization   theory.  See  Gunning  Jeroen,  Hamas   in  politics:  
Democracy,   Religion,   Violence   (London:   Hurst,   2007);;   Glenn   Robinson,   ‘Hamas   as   Social  
Movement’   in   Quintan   Wiktorowicz,   (ed.),   Islamic   Activism:   a   social   movement   theory  
approach  (Bloomington,  IN:  Indiana  University  Press,  2004),  pp.  112-­142  and  Omar  Ashour,  
‘Hamas  and  the  Prospects  of  De-­radicalization’  Klejda  Mulaj  (ed.),  Violent  Non-­State  Actors  in  
World  Politics  (London:  Gulf  Research  Centre,  2010)  pp.157-­180.        
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integration.   Several   papers   have   indicated   that   Hamas’   transition   from   an  
unyielding   commitment   to   armed   resistance   to   political   participation   was   a  
gradual  process.7  For  example,  in  terms  of  the  acceptance  of  the  ceasefire  by  
Hamas   in   June   2003,   Beverley   Milton-­Edwards   and   Alastair   Crooke   argue  
that  the  ceasefire  was  regarded  as  a  breakthrough  during  the  al-­Aqsa  Intifada.  
This   ceasefire   implied   that   Hamas   was   willing   to   comply   with   the   first  
conditions  of   the  Road  Map   that   is,   that   ‘the  Palestinian  groups   immediately  
undertake   an   unconditional   cessation   of   violence’. 8   Jeroen   Gunning   also  
supports   this  point.  He  argues   that   the  ceasefire  probably   led   to  Hamas’  de  
facto  recognition  of  Israel  in  terms  of  the  acceptance  of  the  principle  of  power-­
sharing   with   other   Palestinian   factions.   Thus,   Hamas   took   a   pragmatic  
approach   that   was   contrary   to   its   absolutist   ideas   on   the   liberation   of   all  
Palestine.9  
The   second   stage   of   the   transition   was   that   of   Hamas’   political  
engagement.  After  Hamas  won  the  PLC  election  in  2006,  literature  tended  to  
maintain   its   focus   on   Hamas’   pragmatism   and   ability   to   adapt   to   a   new  
environment. 10   Several   scholars   argue   that   Hamas’   political   engagement  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7  See,  for  example,  Alastair  Crooke  and  Beverley  Milton-­Edwards,  ‘Costly  Choice’,  The  World  
Today,   Vol.59,   No.2   (Dec   2003),   pp.15-­17;;   Alastair   Crooke   and   Beverley   Milton-­Edwards,  
‘Elusive  Ingredient:  Hamas  and  the  Peace  process’,  Journal  of  Palestine  Studies,  Vol.  XXXIII,  
No.4  (Summer  2004),  pp.39-­52;;  Alastair  Crooke  and  Beverley  Milton-­Edwards,  ’Waving,  Not  
Drowning:   Strategic   Dimensions   of   ceasefires   and   Islamic   Movements’,  Security   Dialogue,  
Vol.   35,   No.3   (September   2004),   pp.   295-­310;;   Haim  Malka,   ‘Forcing   Choices:   Testing   the  
Transformation  of  Hamas’,  The  Washington  Quarterly,  Vol.  28,  No.4  (Autumn  2005),  pp.37-­54;;  
International  Crisis  Group,   ‘Dealing  with  Hamas’,   ICG  Middle  East  Report,   (January   2004),  
pp.1-­33;;   International   Crisis   Group,   ‘Enter   Hamas:   The   Challenges   of   Political   Integration,’  
ICG   Middle   East   Report,   (January   18,   2006);;   Jeroen   Gunning,   ‘Peace   with   Hamas?   The  
transforming  potential  of  political  participation’,   in   International  Affairs,  80  (2),   (March  2004),  
pp.233-­255;;   Khaled   Hroub,   ‘Hamas   after   Shaykh   Yasin   and   Rantisi’,   Journal   of   Palestine  
Studies,   Vol.   XXXIII,   No.4   (Summer   2004),   pp.21-­38;;   Sara   Roy,   ‘Hamas   and   the  
Transformations  of  Political   Islam   in  Palestine’,  Current  History,  Vol.  102,  No.  660   (January  
2003),  pp.13-­20.  
8  The   Road  Map   is   a   peace   initiative   proposed   by   the   Quartet   in   April   2003.   See   Alastair  
Crooke   and   Beverley   Milton-­Edwards,   ‘Waving,   Not   Drowning:   Strategic   Dimensions   of  
ceasefires  and  Islamic  Movements,’  Security  Dialogue,  Vol.35,  No.3,  op.cit.,  p.296.  
9  Jeroen  Gunning,  ‘Peace  with  Hamas?  The  transforming  potential  of  political  participation,’  in  
International  Affairs,  80  (2),  op.cit.,  pp.249-­253.  
10  See,   for  example,  Azzam  Tamimi,  Hamas:  Unwritten  Chapters   (London:  C.  Hurst,   2007);;  
Beverley   Milton-­Edwards   and   Stephen   Farrell,  Hamas:   The   Islamic   Resistance   Movement  
(Cambridge:  Polity  press,  2010);;  Michael   Irving  Jensen,  The  Political   Ideology  of  Hamas:  A  
Grassroots   Perspective   (London:   I.B   Tauris,   2009);;   Jeroen   Gunning,   Hamas   in   Politics:  
Democracy,  Religion,  Violence  (London:  Hurst,  2007);;  Sara  Roy,  Hamas  and  Civil  Society  in  
Gaza:   engaging   the   Islamist  Social  Sector   (New  Jersey:  Princeton  University  Press,   2011);;  
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reflected   its   evolution  and  moderate   inclination   in   terms  of   its   view  of   Israel  
and   the   two-­state   solution.   For   example,   the   rhetoric   involving   Hamas’  
rejection   of   Israel   had   been   changed   from   a   purely   religious   motivation   to  
political  consideration;;   that   is,  Hamas   leaders  did  not   revert   to   its  Charter   to  
underpin  religious  or   ideological  grounds  for  the  rejection  of  Israel.11  Instead,  
Hamas’  rejection  of  Israel’s  legitimacy  is  because  of  the  Israeli  occupation  at  
the   expense   of   Palestinian   rights. 12   On   the   other   hand,   Hamas   leaders  
reiterate   that   they   were   willing   to   reach   a   peaceful   coexistence   with   Israel  
provided  Israel  would  withdraw  to  the  1967  borders  which  corresponds,  in  part,  
to   the   framework  of   the   two-­state  solution.  The  approach  that  contextualizes  
Hamas’   transition   in   a   specific   context   enables   readers   to   grasp   Hamas’  
complexity  and  its  features  of  moderation  and  pragmatism  between  2003  and  
2013.  However,  apart  from  highlighting  Hamas’  approach  it  failed  to  elucidate  
why   Hamas   had   tended   towards   moderation   while   at   the   same   time  
maintaining  a  strong  belief  that  resistance  was  the  only  option  in  a  fight  for  the  
rights  that  Palestinians  had  lost  since  1948.      
It   seems   that   discussions   regarding   either   Hamas’   tendency   to  
radicalization  or   its  orientation   towards  moderation  as  outlined  above  do  not  
capture   the   process   and   implications   of  Hamas’   transition   over   the   decade;;  
and  perhaps  an  analysis  of  the  concept  of  resistance  that  Hamas  elaborated  
between  2003  and  2013  would  provide  a  further  perspective  that  counters  the  
dichotomy  between   radicalization  and  moderate   inclination   in   the  discussion  
of   Hamas’   transition   in   politics.   The   concept   of   ‘resistance’   has   been   less  
analyzed  by  current   research.  For   the  purposes  of  analysis,  scholars  should  
avoid  the  tendency  to  ascribe  negative  moral  value  to  this  concept,  or  equate  
it   with   hatred   or   terrorism,   as   Israel   and   some   western   governments   have  
indicated.  Larbi  Sadiki  argues  that  Hamas’  resistance  could  be  viewed  as  an  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Zaki  Chehab,   Inside  Hamas:  The  Untold  story  of   the  Militant   Islamic  Movement   (New  York:  
Nation  Books,  2007).  
11  In  Hamas’  charter,   the   terms,  Jew  and  Zionist   sometimes  overlap.  For  example,  article  7  
quotes  a  Hadith,   ‘The  Final  Hour  will  not  come  until  Muslims  fight  against   the  Jews  and  the  
Muslims  kill  them…’  See  ‘The  Hamas  Charter,’  in  Khaled  Hroub,  Hamas:  Political  thought  and  
practice,  op.cit.,  p.272.      
12  Khalid   Amayreh,   ‘Hamas   debates   the   future:   Palestine’s   Islamic   Resistance   Movement  
attempts   to   reconcile   ideological   purity   and   political   realism,’   A   Conflict   forum   monograph  
(Beirut:  November  2007),  pp.5-­7.  
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alternative  model.  This  model   ‘not  only  sabotages   the  Weberian   template  of  
single  monopoly,   legitimacy   and   centre   in   the   dispensation   of   violence,   but  
also  deploys   it   from  the  margins  as  part  of  a  Godly-­sanctioned  ethical  quest  
for   notions   of   sacrifice,   worship,   emancipation,   transnational   solidarity,   and  
civil   community.’ 13   He   adds   that   Hamas   provides   ‘the   explicit   ideology   of  
resistance,  and  thus  cannot  be  reduced  to,  or  confused  with,  the  misnomer  of  
radicalization.’ 14   Since   its   inception   in   1987,   Hamas   firmly   believed   that  
resistance  is  the  only  way  to  restore  Palestinians’  rights.  From  2003  to  2013,  
Hamas  often   raised   the   topic   of   resistance  publically  when   it   participated   in  
political  events.  But  less  attention  has  been  paid  to  how  Hamas  articulated  the  
concept   of   resistance   in   association   with   its   transition.   On   the   other   hand,  
since   the   1980s,   the   Muslim   Brotherhood   in   Egypt   and   Jordan   also  
participated  in  political  elections  and  transition.  As  Hamas  is  derived  from  the  
Muslim   Brotherhood   who   believe   that   Islam   is   a   comprehensive   guide  
applicable  to  different  times  and  spaces,  Hamas’  transition  could  be  said  to  be  
similar  to  that  of  the  Muslim  Brotherhood’s.  Thus,  a  conceptual  framework  of  
Islamists’  transition  may  help  to  further  examine  Hamas’  transition.  
According   to   the   background   described   above,   it   seems   that   Hamas’  
political   transition   is   related   to   its  concept  of   resistance   in   the  political  arena  
between   2003   and   2013.   Hence,   questions   related   to   Hamas’   political  
transition  (transformation  and  engagement)  are  interrelated  with  its  perception  
of  resistance  from  2003  to  2013  and  this  forms  the  main  focus  of  this  thesis.  
First  of  all,   it   is  worth  exploring   the  context   in  which  Hamas  developed  
and   employed   the   concept   of   resistance   in   the   political   field   between   2003  
and   2013.   Secondly,   the   interrelation   between   Hamas’   political   transition  
(transformation   and   engagement)   and   its   perception   of   resistance   shall   be  
further  analyzed.   In  addition,  whether  Hamas’   transition   represents  a  shift   in  
its   ideology  or  merely  a  shift   in   tactics  shall  be  explored   further.  Finally,   the  
implications  of  Hamas’  transition  in  politics  overall  shall  be  reviewed.    
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
13  Larbi  Sadiki,  ‘Reframing  resistance  and  democracy:  narratives  from  Hamas  and  Hizbullah,’  
Democratization,  Vol.17,  No.2,  2010,  pp.350-­357.  
14  Ibid.,  p.351.  
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2.  Research  Questions        
As  indicated  in  the  above  background  and  motivation  for  the  study,  this  
research  examines  questions  as  below:  
1.  How  does  Hamas  construct  and  employ  the  concept  of  resistance?    
2.  Why  and  how  is  Hamas’  political  transition  (transformation  and  engagement)  
interrelated  with  its  perception  of  resistance?    
3.  Does  the  transition  represent  a  shift  in  Hamas’  ideology  or  merely  a  shift  in  
tactics?    
4.  What  are  the  implications  of  its  political  transition  for  Hamas  overall?      
3.  Sources  and  Methodology  
Hamas’   transition   in   politics   is   mainly   examined   by   analyzing  
transcripts  of  interviews  with  Hamas  leaders’  and  members  from  2003  to  2013  
as   the   primary   source.   Since   the   al-­Aqsa   Intifada,   Hamas’   leadership   has  
been  interviewed  by  the  Western  media,  and  some  academic  journalists,15  but  
there  were   too   few  sources   to  scrutinize  adequately  how  Hamas  elaborated  
the   concept   of   resistance   in   relation   to   the   process   of   its   political  
transformation   prior   to   the   PLC   election   of   January   2006.   However,   the  
Palestinian  Information  Center  (PIC)  website  filled  the  gap.  This  website  is  run  
by  ‘an  independent  Palestinian  organization,  established  first   in  Arabic  on  1st  
December,   1997’.16  In   spite   of   this,   it   is   regarded   as   the   unofficial   Hamas  
website,17  reflecting   Hamas’   political   views.   The   website   presents   in   eight  
languages:   Arabic,   English,   French,   Turkish,   Urdu,   Russian,   Persian   and  
Indonesian.  The  Arabic  website  has  old  and  new  editions,  collecting  a   large  
number   of   Hamas   leaders’   interviews   and   official   statements.   In   the   older  
edition  of  the  website,  there  is  a  section  called:  ‘Islamic  resistance  movement,  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
15  Roger  Gaess,  ‘Interviews  from  Gaza:  What  Hamas  wants,’  Middle  East  Policy,  Vol.9,  No.4  
(December   2002),   pp.102-­115.   ‘Interview   with   Hamas’   Abd   Al-­Aziz   Rantisi   and   Ismail   Abu  
Shanab,’  Journal  of  Palestine  Studies,  Vol.  33,  No.1  (Fall,  2003),  pp.  164-­168.  
16  The  Palestinian  Information  Center,  ‘About  Us,’  
<http://english.palinfo.com/site/pages/aboutus.aspx>  (accessed  on  18  April  2013).  
17   Lori   Allen,   ‘Martyr   bodies   in   the   media:   Human   rights,   aesthetics,   and   the   politics   of  
mediation   in   the  Palestinian   intifada”,  American  Ethnologist,  Vol.  36,  No.  1  (February  2009),  
p.162.  
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Hamas’,   18   which   is   a   collection   of   documents   containing   interviews   with  
Hamas’  political  leaders,  Hamas’  official  statements  and  statistics  covering  the  
al-­Aqsa  Intifada  (2000-­2005).    
These  documents  of   interviews  could  provide   the  analysis   of  Hamas’  
political   transition   from   2003   to   2013.   From   these   documents,   we   can  
understand   why   Hamas   reiterated   the   importance   of   resistance   and   how  
Hamas  considered  the  possibility  of  political  transformation  from  2004  to  2006.  
The   PIC   has   collected   a   number   of   documents   of   chronological   interviews  
with   Hamas’   leadership   from   the  middle   of   2002   to   the   beginning   of   2006.  
Around   twelve  main   political   leaders   and   several   local   leaders   in  Gaza,   the  
West   Bank,   Lebanon   and   Syria   were   interviewed.  19  Most   interviews   were  
conducted   by   the   PIC   itself.   Some   interviews   were   collected   from   Arabic  
newspapers   and   TV   stations.20  Other   information   is   about   Hamas   leaders’  
speeches  to  its  audiences  on  important  occasions  such  as  the  anniversary  of  
the  foundation  of  Hamas  and  the  memory  of  the  al-­Aqsa  Intifada.  
This   research   mainly   traces,   and   analyzes   how   Hamas   leaders   and  
members   responded   to   and   commented   on   various   questions   in   interviews.  
The   questions   that   Hamas   leaders   and   members   were   asked   could   be  
categorized   into  general  and  specific  questions.  The  general  questions  were  
about   how   Hamas   leaders   and   members   viewed   the   al-­Aqsa   Intifada,   the  
Israeli   invasion   and   the   essence   of   Israel/Zionism   from   the   Palestinian  
historical   perspective.   On   these   general   questions,   Hamas   has   always  
defended   the   necessity   of   resistance   when   Palestinians   have   faced   large  
casualties,  sufferings  and  the  assassinations  of  Hamas’  leaders  and  members.  
As  for  the  specific  questions,  these  have  referred  to  how  Hamas  has  adapted  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
18   The   Palestinian   Information   Center,   ‘Islamic   resistance   movement:   Hamas,’  
<http://web.archive.org/web/20111214144026/http://www.palestine-­
info.com/arabic/hamas/index.htm>  (accessed  on  27  July  2014).  
19  Ahmed  Yassin,  Abdel  Aziz  Rantisi,  Ismail  Haniyeh,  Mahmud  al-­Zahar,  Mushir  al-­Masri  and  
Said  Siyam  in  Gaza.    Aziz  Dweik  and  Hassan  Yousef  in  the  West  Bank.  Abu  Marzuq,  Khalid  
Mishal,  Muhammad  Nazzal,  and  Usama  Hamdan  outside  Palestine  and  Other  local  leaders  in  
Jenin,   Nablus   Ramallah,   and   Tulkarem.   The   Palestinian   Information   Center,   ‘Topics   of  
dialogue   and   meeting’.   <http://web.archive.org/web/20131214011436/http://www.palestine-­
info.com/arabic/hamas/hewar/index.htm>  (accessed  on  27  July  2014).    
20  Al-­Hayat  (London),  Al-­Manar  (Lebanon),  Al-­Jazeera  (Qatar),  Al-­Sabil,  (Jordan),  Quds  Press  
(Palestine).  
	   11	  
to  challenges  and  opportunities  at  particular   times,  such  as   the  campaign  of  
the  U.S.-­led  War  on  Terror  in  2001,  the  appointment  of  a  Prime  Minister  in  the  
PA,   the   initiative   of   the   Road   Map,   the   ceasefire   in   2003,   the   Israeli  
disengagement   plan   in   Gaza   and   Hamas’   preparation   for   elections   in  
Palestine  since  2004.  It  could  be  observed  that  Hamas’  leaders  and  members  
responded   to   these   questions   based   on   the   concept   of   resistance.   Hamas  
believes  that  resistance  is  the  only  and  legitimate  way  to  end  the  occupation,  
but  the  way  that  Hamas  articulates  the  language  of  resistance  could  be  varied  
in   different   periods.   From   these   specific   questions,   it   is   noted   that   the  
resistance  that  Hamas  has  advocated  is  not  a  fixed  concept  but  has  evolved  
from   the   focus   on   military   expression   in   2003,   to   the   consideration   of   and  
participation  in  political  integration  and  reform  from  2004  to  2006.    
After  Hamas  won  the  PLC  election  and  formed  a  government  in  2006,  
Hamas’  transition  in  politics  has  been  widely  discussed  within  academia.  Most  
discussions  have  not  related  Hamas’  transition  to  its  resistance  discourse  but  
rather,   have   mostly   narrowed   the   arguments   to   whether   Hamas   would  
recognize   Israel   or   Islamize   Palestine.   In   fact,   the   resistance   language  
remained   vivid   when   Hamas   engaged   in   politics   from   2006   to   2013.   The  
current  edition  of  the  PIC  website  contains  a  large  number  of  copies  of  Hamas’  
interviews  throughout  this  period.  21    From  the  analysis  of  these  documents,  it  
is   noted   that   the   way   that   Hamas   responded   to,   and   justified   its   actions   to  
major  events,  such  as  the  takeover  of  Gaza  in  June  2007,  the  Israeli  war  on  
Gaza   from   December   2008   to   January   2009   and   the   Arab   Spring,   did   not  
diminish   it   focus   on   the   principle   of   resistance.   Furthermore,   as   mentioned  
before,   resistance   is   not   a   fixed   concept;;   it   is   evident   that   this   concept   of  
resistance  was  articulated  when  Hamas  clearly  elaborated  contentious  issues  
such   as   preconditions   for   negotiation   with   Israel   and   Hamas’s   view   on  
Zionism,   or   the   two-­state   and   the   one-­state   solutions.   In   a   sense,   Hamas  
interviews   on   the   PIC   website   are   the   primary   source   for   the   analysis   and  
evaluation  of  Hamas’  political  transformation  and  engagement  between  2003  
and   2013.   In   addition   to   the   PIC   website,   after   2006   several   collections   of  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
21   The   Palestinian   Information   Center,   <https://www.palinfo.com/site/pic/default.aspx>  
(accessed  on  27  July  2014).  
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Hamas’   leaders’   and   members’   interviews   from   Western   newspapers, 22  
academic   journals,23  Palestinian   websites24  and   Hamas’   Information   Office  
website,25  could  be  adopted  as  complementary  sources  for  analyzing  Hamas’  
views  on  resistance  in  relation  to  its  political  transition.  
Around   140   copies   of   Hamas’   interviews   from  websites,   newspapers  
and   journal   articles   outlined   above   have   been   collected   and   used   as   the  
primary  source  of   this   research.  The  selection  of   these  documents   is  based  
on  the  timing  of  Hamas’  response  to  crucial  events  from  2003  to  2013,  such  
as   the   ceasefire   of   June   2003,   the   announcement   of   the   Israeli  
disengagement  plan   in  2004,   the  death  of  Yasser  Arafat   in  November  2005,  
the  municipal  elections  from  2004  to  2006,  the  PLC  election  in  early  2006  and  
the   division   between   Fatah   and   Hamas   after   June   2007,   among   others.  
Examination  and  analysis  of  these  documents  reveal  how  Hamas  leaders  and  
members   evaluated   the   Israeli   occupation   as   a   whole   and   commented   on  
these  crucial  events   from  2003   to  2013.  This  provides  a  clear  chronological  
view  of  the  process  whereby  Hamas  determined  its  political   transition  before  
the   election   as   well   as   how   Hamas   has   enforced   its   political   agenda   in  
accordance  with   the   principle   of   resistance   since   coming   to   power.  Without  
scrutinizing   this   collection   of   documents,   it   is   difficult   to   assess   properly  
Hamas’  transition  in  politics  and  interpret  the  implication  of  this  transition.  
The   copies   of   Hamas’   interviews  may   be   considered   alternatively   as  
ideological   documents   or   may   risk   being   viewed   as   Hamas   propaganda.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
22  See   ‘A   conversation  with   Ismail   Haniyeh,   ‘’We   do   not   wish   to   throw   them   into   the   sea,’’  
Washington   Post   (26   February,   2006).   Abu   Marzook,   Mousa,   ‘What   Hamas   is   seeking,’  
Washington  Post  (31  January,  2006).  Mishal,  Khaled,  ‘We  will  not  sell  our  people  or  principles  
for   foreign   aid’,   The   Guardian   (31   January   2006).   Yousef,   Ahmed,   ‘Judge   Hamas   on   the  
measures  it  takes  for  its  people,’  The  Guardian,  (14  November,  2014).    
23  Mouin  Rabbani,  ‘A  Hamas  perspective  on  the  movement’s  evolving  role:  An  Interview  with  
Khalid  Mishal:  Part   I,’  Journal  of  Palestine  Studies,  Vol.  37,  No.  3   (Spring,  2008),  pp.59-­73.  
Mouin  Rabbani,   ‘A  Hamas   perspective   on   the  movement’s   evolving   role:   An   Interview  with  
Khalid  Mishal:  Part  II,’  Journal  of  Palestine  Studies,  Vol.  37,  No.  4  (Summer,  2008),  pp.59-­81.  
24  Al-­Zaytouna  Centre,  <http://www.alzaytouna.net/en/>  (accessed  on  27  July  2014),  House  
of  Wisdom,  <  http://www.howgaza.org/english/>,  Middle  East  Monitor,  
<https://www.middleeastmonitor.com/>  (accessed  on  27  July  2014),  Almonitor,  <  
http://www.al-­monitor.com/pulse/contents/authors/adnan-­abu-­amer.html>  (accessed  on  27  
July  2014).  
25  The  Islamic  Resistance  Movement  (Hamas)  Information  Office,  
<http://tinyurl.com/mousb4j>  (accessed  on  31  July  2014).  
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Hamas  leaders  have  always  insisted  that  resistance  is  the  only  way  to  attain  
victory   and   have   often   cited   Qur’anic   verses   to   encourage   Palestinians’  
steadfastness  and  patience  while  suffering  from  Israeli  aggression.  In  fact,  the  
contents  of  the  Hamas’  interviews  corresponds  with  Palestinian  historiography,  
as   opposed   to   the   prevailing   Israeli   narrative   on   the   land   of   Palestine.   The  
Israeli  narrative  comes  from  the  Israeli/Zionist  historiography  that  claims  that  
Palestine  belongs  exclusively  to  Jews  and  no  other  ethnic  group  has  the  right  
to  claim  this  land.  An  Israeli  sociologist,  Baruch  Kimmerling,  indicates  that  the  
Israeli/Zionist  historiography  has  two  distinct  features.  The  first  is  that  the  land  
of  Israel  ‘is  used  indiscriminately  for  all  historical  periods’.  With  all  due  respect  
to  Kimmerling,  there  is  no  historical  period  when  there  were  no  Jews  living  in  
the   land   since   the   Israelite   people   first   settled   there.26  The   second   is   that  
Jews  living  abroad  are  obliged  to  return  to  this  land.  The  immigration  of  Jews  
to  Palestine  from  1882  to  1939  reflects  this  vision27  and  the  creation  of  Israel  
in  1948  materialized  its  ultimate  goal.  
However,   this   Israeli/Zionist   historiography   is   completely   denied   by  
Palestinian  historiography.  As  Edward  Said  argues,  ‘Zionism  was  a  hothouse  
flower  grown  from  European  nationalism,  anti-­Semitism  and  colonialism,  while  
Palestinian  nationalism,  derived  from  the  great  wave  of  Arab  and  Islamic  anti-­
colonial   sentiment,   has   since   1967,   though   tinged   with   retrogressive  
sentiment,   been   located   within   the   mainstream   of   secular   post-­imperialist  
thought.’ 28   From   the   Palestinian   historiography,   the   Palestinian   national  
movement  since  the  1920s  has  stressed  an  ethos  of  resistance,  heroism  and  
sacrifices  against  the  project  of  Zionism  at  the  expense  of  Palestinian  rights.29  
The   idea   of   Palestinian   nationalism   has   been   integrated   into   Hamas’  
resistance  discourse,  as  its  Charter  states,  ‘Nothing  is  loftier  in  nationalism  or  
deeper   in   devotion   than   this:   If   an   enemy   invades   Muslim   territories,   then  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
26  Baruch  Kimmerling,   ‘Academic  history  caught   in   the  cross-­fire:  The  case  of   Israeli-­Jewish  
Historiography,’  History  and  Memory,  Vol.7,  No.1  (Spring-­Summer,  1995),  p.48.    
27  Ibid.,  pp.48-­49.    
28  Edward  Said,   ‘Permission   to  Narrate,’  Journal  of  Palestine  Studies,  Vol.13,  No.3   (Spring,  
1984),  p.31.  
29  Jamil   Hila,   ‘Reflections   on   contemprary   Palestine   History’   in   Ilan   Pappe   and   Jamil   Hilal  
(ed.),  Across   the  Wall:   Narratives   of   Israeli-­Palestinian  History   (London:   I.B.   Tauris,   2010),  
pp.177-­179.  
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Jihad  and  fighting  the  enemy  becomes  an  individual  duty  for  every  Muslim.’30  
In  this  sense,  Hamas’  interviews  reflecting  on  resistance,  and  its  later  political  
transition,   could   be   seen   as   a   continuation   and   evolution   of   the  Palestinian  
national   movement   and   could   be   understood   from   the   angle   of   Palestinian  
historiography.    
Another  method  used  to  enhance  and  validate  the  collection  of  Hamas  
interviews  from  the  PIC  website  is  to  conduct  fieldwork  in  Gaza.  This  would  be  
an  effective  way  of  obtaining  detailed  information  and  observing  how  Hamas  
has  incorporated  the  concept  of  resistance  into  its  political  agenda.  Currently,  
the  possible  way   into  Gaza   is   through   the  Rafah  crossing,  managed  by   the  
Egyptian  authorities.   In   early   2013,   I   prepared   for   a   fieldtrip   and  obtained  a  
certificate   of   ethical   approval   from   the   University   of   Exeter,   and   then   I  
attempted  to  apply  for  permission  to  visit  Gaza  from  the  Consulate  General  of  
Egypt   in   London   in   July   2013.   But   I   did   not   gain   approval.   In   addition,   the  
Rafah  crossing  was  closed  as  a  consequence  of   the  uncertainty  of  Egyptian  
politics   after   the   ousting   of   President   Mursi.   As   the   Rafah   crossing   is  
frequently   closed,   it   was   difficult   to   visit   Gaza   at   the   time.   As   for   the  West  
Bank,  it   is  difficult  to  contact  Hamas  leaders  and  members  in  the  West  Bank  
as  many  of  them  are  in  Israeli  jails;;  also  Hamas-­affiliated  charities  have  been  
dissolved  by  the  PA  in  Ramallah  since  2007.31  
In   spite   of   these   difficulties,   I   tried   to   find   other   ways   of   obtaining  
complementary  information  which  validated  the  collection  of  Hamas  interviews  
on   the  PIC  website.  Since   I  was  unable   to   get   access   to  Gaza   to   interview  
Hamas’   leaders   and   members,   I   sought   the   perspective   of   Palestinian  
scholars  who  are   familiar  with   issues  of  Hamas   to  enable  me   to  understand  
and  analyze  Hamas’  documents  from  the  PIC  website.  From  2011  to  2014,  I  
conducted  9  in-­depth  interviews  with  three  Palestinian  scholars  in  Exeter.  The  
purpose  of   these  was   to  discover   the   interviewees’  perspectives  on  Hamas’  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
30  Hamas  Charter  (3:12)  See  Khaled  Hroub,  Hamas:  Political  Thought  and  Practice,  appendix,  
op.cit.,  p.  274.  
31  It  is  estimated  that  2,000  Hamas  members  remains  in  Israel  jails,  including  36  elected  PLC  
members.   See   ‘Hamas   in   the   West   Bank,’   The   Economist   (3   September   2014),   <  
http://www.economist.com/blogs/pomegranate/2014/09/hamas-­west-­bank>   (accessed   on   8  
October  2014).  
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idea   of   resistance   and   the   implication   of   its   transition   into   politics.   The  
interviews  were  based  on  the  conceptual  understanding  of  Hamas’  transition  
in  politics   rather   than   involving  a  sensitive  or  a  controversial   issue   that  may  
cause  harm  to   interviewees.  Before  conducting   the   interview,   I  had  received  
formal  consents  from  interviewees  and  they  had  been  given  the  transcript  of  
the   interview   for   detailed   review.   They   were   also   given   the   option   of  
anonymity   to   avoid   any   possible   harmful   effects   on   their   security,   jobs   or  
positions.  Furthermore,  the  interviewees  were  informed  that  the  results  of  the  
interview   would   not   be   used   for   commercial   purposes,   and   also   that   the  
collected  data  would  not  be  passed  to  a  third  party,  which  might  misuse  it  and  
cause  possible  harm  to  them.    
The  other  way  to  validate  the  collection  of  Hamas  interviews  in  the  PIC  
is   to   observe   how   the   daily   life   of   Palestinians   is   affected   by   the   Israeli  
occupation  as  Hamas  always  refers  to  the  concept  of  resistance  in  response  
to  this,  and  Hamas’  political  transition  has  been  cited  as  a  means  to  end  it.  A  
number  of  scholarly  works  have  disclosed  how  Israel  denies  and  restricts  the  
fundamental   rights   of   Palestinians,   annexes   Palestinian   land   on   the   West  
Bank   and   East   Jerusalem,   besieges   Gaza,   and   treats   Palestinians   inside  
Israel   as   second-­class   citizens.32  ‘Bantustans’,   a   term   that   comes   from   the  
period  of  Apartheid   in  South  Africa,  has  been  used  to  describe   the  status  of  
Palestinians   in   occupation.   Leila  Farsakh   indicates   that   ‘Oslo   has  made   the  
Occupied   Territories   more   analogous   to   the   Bantustans   of   South   Africa’s  
apartheid.   The   Israeli   permit   or   pass   system,   the   territorial   fragmentation   of  
the   West   Bank   and   Gaza   under   the   Oslo   accords,   and   the   expansion   of  
settlements   all   contributed   to   the   creation   of   disconnected   Palestinian  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
32  Edward   Said,   ‘The   Mirage   of   Peace,   The   Nation,   (October   16,   1995),   pp.413-­420.   Ilan  
Pappe,   A   History   of   Modern   Palestine:   One   Land,   Two   People   (Cambridge:   Cambridge  
University  press,  2004).  Ilan  Pappe,  The  forgotten  Palestinians:  A  history  of  the  Palestinians  
in   Israel   (New   Haven:   Yale   University   Press,   2011).   Jad   Isaac   and   Owen   Powell,   ‘The  
transformation  of  the  Palestinian  environment,’  in  Jamil  Hila  (ed.),  Where  Now  for  Palestine?  
The  Demise  of  the  two-­state  solution  (London:  Zed  Books,  2007),  pp.144-­166.  Salem  Ajluni,  
‘The   Palestinian   Economy   and   the   Second   Intifada,’   Journal   of   Palestine   Studies,   Vol.32,  
No.3  (Spring  2003),  pp.64-­73.  Sara  Roy,   ‘Palestinian  Society  and  Economy:  The  Continued  
Denial   of   possibility,’   Journal   of   Palestine   Studies,   Vol.   30,   No.4   (Summer   2001),   pp.5-­20.  
Sara  Roy   ‘The  Palestinian-­Israeli   Conflict   and   Palestinian   Socioeconomic  Decline:   A   Place  
Denied’,  International  Journal  of  Politics,  Culture,  and  Society,  Vol.  17,  No.  3  (Spring,  2004),  
pp.365-­403.  Susan  M.  Akram,  ‘Palestinian  Refugees  and  Their  Legal  Status:  Rights,  Politics,  
and   Implications   for   a   Just   Solution’,   Journal   of   Palestine   Studies,   Vol.   31,   No.   3   (Spring  
2002),  pp.  36-­51.  
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population   reserves   that   have   the   characteristics   of   Bantustans.’ 33   In   this  
sense,   observing   how   the   Israeli   occupation   works   in   the   daily   affairs   of  
Palestinians  could  help  us  to  understand  the  background  to  and  motivation  for  
Hamas’   insistence  on  resistance   language  while  simultaneously  participating  
in  politics.  
A   trip  organized  by   the  Alternative   Information  Center   (AIC),34  a   local  
non-­governmental   organization   in   the  West   Bank,   provided   this   opportunity.  
This   organization   runs   such   trips   four   times   a   year   which   are   open   to  
researchers   and   people   who   are   concerned   about   the   Palestinian-­Israeli  
conflict.   From   13th   to   20th   October   2014,   I   participated   in   a   trip   in   order   to  
experience  and  witness  how   the   Israeli  occupation  affects  Palestinians  on  a  
daily  basis  by  attending   lectures  by   local  Palestinians  and  short   field   trips   to  
Palestinian  towns  and  villages.  Before  the  trip,  I  needed  to  register,  and  filled  
in  an  application  form  at  the  AIC’s  request.  In  this  application,  I  clearly  stated  
that  as  a  PhD  student   in  Palestine  studies  I  needed  to  participate   in   this   trip  
since   it   corresponded   with   my   field   of   research.   Furthermore,   before   I  
prepared   to   travel   to   the   West   Bank,   East   Jerusalem   and   Israel,   I   had  
consulted  my  supervisor,  who   knows   the  AIC  well,   about   safety   issues.  For  
this  trip,  I  also  obtained  another  approval  from  the  ethics  committee.    
During   this   trip,   I   attended   several   lectures35  by   Palestinian   activists  
and  scholars,  visited  two  refugee  camps,36  and  cities  where  Palestinians  live:  
Bethlehem,   Hebron,   Jerusalem,   Jaffa   and   Lod.   These   activities   provided   a  
framework  for  observing  how  the  Israeli  occupation  affects  Palestinian  society  
as   a   whole.   That   is   to   say,   the   Israeli   occupation   is   firmly   embedded   in  
Palestinian   society   and   deeply   affects   the   daily   life   of   Palestinians.  
Furthermore,  this  trip  helped  me  to  gauge  the  feelings  and  emotions  of   local  
Palestinians  regarding  the  Israeli  occupation,  which  I  could  not  experience  by  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
33  Leila   Farsakh,   ‘Independence,   Cantons,   or   Bantustans:   Whither   the   Palestinian   State,’  
Middle  East  Jorunal,  Vol.59,  No.2  (Spring  2005),  p.  245.  
34   The   Alternative   Information   Center,   <http://www.alternativenews.org/english/index.php>  
(accessed  on  9  November  2014).  
35   Lectures   include   refugee   issues,   political   prisoners,   BDS   campaign,   apartheid   system  
inside  Israel  and  the  West  Bank  and  the  reconstruction  of  Gaza  after  the  Israeli  war  on  Gaza.  
36  Aida  and  Dheisheh  refugee  camps.  
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merely   reading   newspapers   and   academic   journals.   What   interested   me  
during   this   trip  was   that   even   though  Palestinians  who   attended  workshops  
and   led   the   tour   did   not   fully   agree   with   Hamas’   political   ideology   and  
sometimes  criticized   its  practices,   they  still  considered  Hamas  as  an   integral  
part   of   Palestinian   society   and   shared   much   common   ground   with   Hamas’  
resistance  discourse   regarding   the   Israeli   occupation.37  This   account   is   very  
different   from   the   narrative   promoted   by   the   western   media   and   some  
academic   work,   which   suggests   that   Hamas   is   alienated   from   Palestinian  
society.38  
It  is  noted  that  the  purpose  of  the  trip  resonates  with  Hamas’  resistance  
discourse   to   the   problems   of   the   Israeli   occupation   include   the   suffering  
experienced   by   the   overwhelming   majority   of   Palestinians,   the   issue   of  
refugees,  the  Judaization  of  Jerusalem,  the  fragmentation  of  the  West  Bank,  
the  isolation  of  Gaza,  the  prisoner  issue  and  the  social  status  of  Palestinians  
inside  Israel.  Therefore,  the  purpose  of  the  trip  corresponded  to  Hamas’  real  
concerns,   that  are  evident   in   interviews  on   the  PIC  website;;  and   this  helped  
me  to  understand  the  motivation  behind  Hamas’  articulation  of  the  concept  of  
resistance  to  the  public  between  2003  and  2013.  
Analysis   of   Hamas’   interviews   from   2003   to   2013   collected   from   the  
PIC   website   and   other   websites   allowed   me   to   reconstruct   the   process  
whereby   Hamas   determined   to   take   part   in   political   integration   as   well   as  
enforce  its  political  agenda  with  regard  to  its  concept  of  resistance.  In  addition,  
secondary   sources   complement   the  analysis   of   this   primary   source.  English  
academic   publications   on   Hamas,   the   collection   of   articles   written   by   the  
Gazan   scholars,39  and  materials   regarding   the   historical,   political   and   socio-­
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
37  Some   lecturers   even   argue   that   the   armed   resistance   under   the   foreign   occupation   is  
legitimate  and  is  self-­defence  in  accordance  with  the  International  Law.    
38  Matthew  Levitt,  Hamas:  Politics,  Charity,  and  Terrorism  in  the  Service  of  Jihad  (New  Haven.  
CT:   Yale   University   Press   and   the   Washington   Institute   for   Near   East   Policy,   2006)   and  
Jonathan   Schanzer,   Hamas   VS.   Fatah:   The   struggle   for   Palestine   (New   York:   Palgrave  
Macmillan,  2008).      
39  See   House   of   Wisdom,   <http://www.howgaza.org/english/>   (accessed   on   27   July   2014)  
and   Al-­Zaytouna   Centre   for   Studies   and   Consultations,   <http://www.alzaytouna.net/en/>  
(accessed  on  27  July  2014).  
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economic  background  in  Palestine,  poll  surveys  and  news,  provide  a  general  
background  of  Hamas’  political  transition  from  2003  to  2013.  
4.  The  Scope  and  significance  of  the  Study  
4.1  The  Scope  
The  scope  of  this  research  is  divided  into  two  phases.  One  is  the  stage  
of  Hamas’   political   transformation   between   2003   and   2006;;   the   other   is   the  
stage   of   Hamas’   political   engagement   between   2006   and   2013.   Before  
exploring  these  two  stages,  Hamas’  transition  in  politics  could  be  analyzed  in  
light  of   the  wider  historical  context   from   the  early  1920s   to  2000.   It   is  noted  
that  Hamas’   transition   in   politics  may   be   seen   as   a   continuation   of   Hamas’  
historical   evolution   instead   of   an   abrupt   change.   Thus,   it   is   better   to  
contextualize   Hamas’   practices   and   its   features   within   a   wider   historical  
perspective.  
4.2  The  Significance  of  the  study  
Hamas’   transition   in   politics   deserves   to   be   further   researched   as  
Hamas   has   become   an   indispensable   actor   in   Palestinian   politics   and   the  
Israeli-­Palestinian   conflict   as   well.   Therefore,   analyzing   the   essence   and  
implication  of  Hamas’   transition   in  politics   is  needed   for   the   reference  of   the  
future   solution   of   Israeli-­Palestinian   conflict   as   a   whole.   Since   Hamas’  
electoral  victory  in  2006,  a  large  amount  of  literature  has  focused  on  its  shifts  
in  ideas,  its  pivotal  role  in  Palestine  and  its  impact  on  the  region  of  the  Middle  
East.   But   a   new   understanding   is   needed   of   Hamas’   features   and   its  
engagement   after   2006.   This   research   argues   that   Hamas’   political  
engagement   after   2006   is   associated   with   Hamas’   transformation   between  
2003  and  2006.  Without  examining  these  three  years,  the  analysis  of  Hamas’  
political  engagement  after  2006  is  incomplete.    
Secondly,   it   is  necessary   to   trace   the  process  of  Hamas’   transition   in  
politics   in   particular   from   the   period   of   2003   to   2006.   It   is  worth   noting   that  
Hamas’   transition   in   politics   was   related   to   the   Israeli   disengagement   from  
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Gaza   plan 40   that   essentially   changed   Hamas’   resistance   discourse   from  
armed  resistance  to  political  reform  in  2004,  and  the  death  of  Yasser  Arafat  in  
late   2005,   which   compelled   Hamas   to   embark   on   a   course   of   political  
engagement.   The   analysis   of   the   resistance   discourse   that   Hamas  
disseminated,   which   is   little   emphasized   in   other   scholarly   research,   might  
also   elucidate   the   rationale   for   Hamas’   reluctance   to   abandon   armed  
resistance   in   the   pursuit   of   national   liberation,   while   at   the   same   time  
compromising  with   Israel   in   terms  of  ceasefires  provided   that   Israel  stopped  
its  aggression  and  adhered  to  the  two-­state  solution.  
  Thirdly,  current  scholarly  literature  tends  to  delineate  Hamas’  features  
of   either   radicalization   or   moderate   inclination   for   the   analysis   of   Hamas’  
transition   in  politics.  This  research  argues  that  Hamas’   transition   into  politics  
serves   the   cause   of   its   resistance   principle,   which   aims   to   end   the   Israeli  
occupation.   In   this   respect,   the   concept   of   resistance,   Hamas   developed  
during   the   al-­Aqsa   Intifada   and   the   way   it   was   implemented   after   the   PLC  
election   in   January   2006,   provides   us  with   another   viewpoint   that   skips   the  
debate   of   radicalization   and   moderate   inclination   of   Hamas’   transition   in  
politics.  
Finally,   as   an   Islamist   movement,   the   way   that   Hamas   practices,   its  
political   ideology,  and   its  political   transformation,  are   fundamentally  different  
from   extremist   Islamists   such   as   Al-­Qaeda   and   other   Jihadist   groups.   As   a  
branch   of   the   Palestinian   Muslim   Brotherhood,   Hamas   shares   a   common  
aspiration   for   the   reform   of   Muslim   society   with   other   mainstream   Islamist  
movements  affiliated   to   the  Muslim  Brotherhood’s   ideals.   In  spite  of   the   fact  
that  Hamas  has  engaged   in  armed   resistance  against   the   Israeli  occupation  
since   its   inception   in  1987,  Hamas’   transition   into  politics   from  2003  to  2013  
demonstrates   similarity   with   the   school   of   the   Muslim   Brotherhood.   Much  
western   academic   literature   has   discussed   the   transition   of   Islamist  
movements   from   various   angles   such   as   nationalism,   democracy   and   civil  
society,   and   it   seems   that   Hamas’   transition   in   politics   could   be   observed,  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
40   The   Israeli   disengagement   plan   was   initially   announced   in   December   2003   and   was  
implemented   in   August   2005.   During   this   period,   Hamas   had   essentially   changed   its  
discourse  from  the  armed  struggle  to  the  participation  of  the  Palestinian  politics.  
	   20	  
analyzed  and  evaluated  in  this  way.  In  addition,  the  concept  of  Islamic  revival  
could  elaborate  on   the   implication  of  Hamas’   transition  since  other   Islamists  
who  work  on  politics  are  influenced  by  this  concept  as  well.    
5.  Thesis  Outline:  A  brief  description  of  each  chapter  
The  thesis  outline  and  a  brief  synopsis  of  each  chapter  are  presented  as  
follows:  
Introduction    
The  motivation  for  the  chosen  topic  is  elucidated  in  the  introduction.  The  
research  questions,  the  sources  of  materials,  the  methods  of  approaching  this  
topic  and  conducting   this   research,  and   the  significance  of   this   research  are  
also  presented.  
Part   I:   Approaching   the   transition   of   the   Islamists   and   the   study   of  
Hamas’  transition  
Apart  from  the  introduction,  this  thesis  will  be  divided  into  three  sections.  
The   first,   which   is   entitled   ‘Approaching   the   transition   of   Islamists   and   the  
study  of  Hamas’  transition’,  acts  as  the  foundation  of  the  thesis  and  includes  
the  conceptual   framework  and  a  historical   review.  The  second  part,  entitled,  
‘The   political   transformation   and   engagement’,   is   the   main   section   of   the  
thesis.  The  third  part  is  the  conclusion.  
In   the   first   two   chapters   form   the   first   part,   Chapter   One   provides   a  
conceptual   framework   of   the   Islamists’   transition   and   why   this   framework  
could  be  appropriate  to  Hamas’  transition  from  2003  to  2013.  The  chapter  will  
navigate   how   the   transition   of   Islamists   has   been   observed,   analyzed   and  
evaluated  as  well  as  helping   to  understand  Hamas’   transition  between  2003  
and  2013.    
Chapter   two   is  a  historical   review  of  how   the  concept  of   resistance   is  
perceived,   developed   and   practiced   by   Hamas   in   a   wider   historical   context  
(1920s   -­   2000).   How   Hamas’   transition   and   its   concept   of   resistance   are  
related  to  Palestinian  history  will  be  examined  in  this  chapter.  The  first  section  
uncovers   how   the   concept   of   resistance   emerged   and   developed   in   the  
periods   from   the   British   Mandate   in   Palestine   to   the   outbreak   of   the   first  
Intifada   (1920s-­1987).   The   second   section   analyzes   the   features   of  Hamas’  
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transition  in  the  new  environment  during  the  Oslo  Peace  Process  (1993-­2000),  
and  ways   in  which  Hamas  adjusted   its   tactics   to   this  adverse  condition.  The  
final   section   concludes   with   the   implication   of   Hamas’   transition   from   a  
historical  perspective.  
Part  II:  Political  transformation  and  engagement  
As  has  been  said,  Hamas’  political   transformation  and  engagement   is  
associated  with  the  concept  of  resistance.  During  the  al-­Aqsa  Intifada,  Hamas  
gradually  constructed   the  concept  of   resistance   into  a  holistic  project  known  
as  the  ‘resistance  project’.  The  resistance  project  was  not  an  actual  archive  or  
a  well-­planned  paper  in  written  form  but  Hamas  leaders  frequently  addressed  
the  public  on  why  resistance  against  the  Israeli  occupation  and  aggression  is  
indispensable.   Therefore,   the   analysis   and   evaluation   of   how   Hamas  
constructed  and  implemented  its  resistance  project  in  the  political  field  will  be  
dealt  with  in  Part  II.    
Chapter  Three,  the  first  of  the  main  parts  of  the  thesis,  will  analyze  how  
Hamas  constructed  the  resistance  project  during  the  al-­Aqsa  Intifada,  and  the  
decisive  factor  that  drove  Hamas’  Palestinian  political  integration.  The  process  
of  Hamas’  political   transformation  will   be  analyzed   in   five   sections.  The   first  
will  present  the  background  of  the  emergence  of  the  resistance  project  during  
the  al-­Aqsa  Intifada.  The  second  section  will  examine  the  main  content  of  the  
resistance  project.  The  third  section  will  articulate  the  process  of  how  Hamas  
shifted   its   tactics   from   military   operations   to   ceasefire   and   toward   possible  
political   integration   in   the   Palestinian   Authority.   The   fourth   section   will  
elaborate  how,  after  Yasser  Arafat’s  death  at  the  end  of  2004  Hamas  grasped  
the   opportunity   to   legitimatize   its   political   participation   that   was   compatible  
with   its   principle   of   resistance.   The   last   section   aims   to   elucidate   the  
implications  of  Hamas’  political  transformation.  
Chapter  Four,   the   second  main  part   of   the   thesis,   examines  how   the  
Hamas  combined  its  policy  of  resistance  with  governance  particularly  after  its  
political  split  with  Fatah  in  2007.  This  chapter  will  be  divided  into  four  sections.  
The   first   section   will   analyze   the   factors   of   the   polarization   of   Palestinian  
politics  after  Hamas  formed  a  new  government  and  the  evaluation  of  Hamas’  
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government  before  its  takeover  of  Gaza.  The  second  section  will  present  how  
Hamas   institutionalized   its   resistance  concept   in  governing  Gaza  for   the   first  
time  after  the  political  division  with  Fatah  in  June  2007.  The  third  section  will  
demonstrate  the  process  of  ways  in  which  the  Arab  Spring  enhanced  Hamas’  
confidence   in   its   resistance   and   explore   why   this   fulfilment   was   ephemeral  
after   the  military   coup   in  Egypt   in   July   2013.   The   final   section  will   evaluate  
Hamas’  overall  political  engagement  with  regard  to  its  resistance  project.  
Part  III:  Conclusion  
Part   III   is   the   conclusion   of   the   thesis.   In   this   section   the   major  
arguments  of   the  previous  chapters  will  be  summarized  and  the   findings  will  
be  presented.  In  addition,  this  section  will  indicate  potential  or  further  research  
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Part	  I	  Approaching	  the	  transition	  of	  the	  Islamists	  and	  the	  
Study	  of	  Hamas’	  transition	  
Part   I   that   is,   the   foundation   of   the   thesis,   consists   of   two   chapters.  
Chapter   One   outlines   two   main   approaches,   the   essential   and   pluralist  
approaches  to  the  conceptions  of  the  transition  of  Islamists.  This  chapter  will  
examine:   the   reasons   why   the   essentialist   approach   is   not   suitable   for  
analyzing  the  transition  of  Islamists,  how  the  pluralist  approaches  that  observe,  
analyze  and  evaluate  the  transition  of  Islamists  from  various  angles  could  help  
to  understand  Hamas’   transition.  Chapter  Two  places  Hamas’   transition  and  
its   concept   of   resistance   in   a   wider   Palestinian   historical   context   from   the  
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Chapter	  One:	  The	  Conceptual	  Framework:	  The	  transition	  of	  
Islamists	  
  
1.  Introduction:  The  transition  of  Islamists    
This   chapter   is   aimed   at   shaping   a   conceptual   framework   for   the  
transition  of   Islamists.   ‘Islamists’  are  usually  described  as  a  certain  group  of  
Muslims   who   are   anti-­modernity   and   who   espouse   a   revolutionary   idea  
regarding  a  dramatic  change  in  the  current  political  system  in  order  to  create  
an  ideal  Islamic  state.41  Islamists  started  to  occupy  the  headlines  in  the  West  
after   the   time  of   the   Iranian   revolution   in   1979.42  Since   then,   Islamists  were  
presented  as  hostile  and  intolerant,  an  image  which  contradicted  the  concepts  
of   modernity   such   as   liberalism,   democratization,   gender   equality   and  
pluralism.   The   September   11   attacks   in   2001   further   strengthened   this  
impression.   Images   of   Islamists   are   easily   connected   with   violence,  
radicalization  and  fanaticism.  As  a  matter  of  fact,  Islamists  are  not  monolithic  
and  homogenous  groups.  Instead,  Islamists  in  different  countries  have  various  
manifestations   and   have   even   experienced   different   stages   of   transition   in  
response  to  the  modernity.    
Before  discussing  the  transition  of  Islamists,  it  would  be  useful  to  offer  a  
definition  of  Islamists.  James  Piscatori,  who  specialized  in  the  subject  argues  
that  ‘Islamists  are  Muslims  who  are  committed  to  political  action  to  implement  
what  they  regard  as  an  Islamic  agenda  and  have  routinely  participated  in  most  
of   these   elections.   They   have   engaged   in   the   kind   of   tactical   political  
calculations  that  are  common  to  other  groups.’43  That  is  to  say,  Islamists  are  a  
certain  group  of  Muslims  involved  in  politics  and  not  every  Muslim  is  included  
in  this  category.  
In   general   the   argument   about   the   transition   of   Islamists   is   related   to  
whether  Islamists  have  abandoned  the  original  ideology  of  creating  an  Islamic  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
41  See   Barry   Rubin   (ed.),   Political   Islam,   Critical   concepts   in   Islamic   Studies,   Volume   1,  
Introduction  to  Political  Islam:  Ideas  and  Key  issues  (London:  Roultedge,  2007),  pp.1-­14.  
42  Ibid.,  p.2.  
43  James   Piscatori,   Islam,   Islamists,   and   the   electoral   principle   in   the  Middle   East   (Leiden:  
ISIM,  2000),  p.2.  
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state,   restoration   of   sharia   or   discussions   concerning   the   ways   Islamists  
experienced  transition.  Usually,  two  types  of  approaches,  the  essentialist  and  
the  pluralist,  represent  two  contrasting  perspectives  that  observe,  analyze  and  
evaluate  Islamists’  transitions.  The  essentialist  approach  pays  much  attention  
to  a  monolithic   level  and  assumes  that   Islamic  movements  are  homogenous  
in  essence.44  Islamists,  in  this  approach,  are  characterized  as  holding  a  belief  
in   immutability,   are   anti-­modernity   and   anti-­pluralism.   The   transition   of  
Islamists   is   incomplete   until   Islamists   abandon   their   own   ideology   and  
embrace   a   ‘universal   value’,   which   refers   to   Western   democracy,   market  
economy  and  separation  of  church  and  state.45    
Conversely,  the  pluralist  approaches  suggest  that  Islamists  could  accept  
the  concepts  of  the  modernity  through  the  transitions.46  Although  the  pluralist  
approaches  have  diverse  views  and  used  various  theories  on  the  transition  of  
Islamists,   it   seems   that   these   approaches   reveal   common   grounds.   Most  
research   in   the  pluralist  approaches  show   that   the   transition  of   the   Islamists  
took   place   within   local   and   specific   contexts;;   as   Khaled   Hroub   argues,   ‘an  
enormous   corpus   of   scholarly   literature   have   contextualized   the   rise   of  
Islamism  in  the  20th  century  but  the  key  argument  of  all   these  approaches  is  
that   Islamism   is  highly   responsive   to  contextual  conditions’.47  In   this   respect,  
the  transition  of  Islamists  is  shaped  by  a  specific  context  rather  than  by  their  
fixed   ideological   foundation.48  Following   this   contextualizing   approach,   most  
pluralists  are  inclined  to  view  the  transition  of  Islamists  as  a  modern  trend.  For  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
44  Hakan  Yavuz,  Islamic  political  identity  in  Turkey  (Oxford:  Oxford  University  Press,  2003),  p.  
17.  
45  Jeroen  Gunning,  Re-­thinking  Western  Constructs  of   Islamism:  Pluralism,  Democracy  and  
the   theory   and   Praxis   of   the   Islamic   movement   in   the   Gaza   Strip,   PhD   Thesis   (Durham:  
Centre  for  Middle  Eastern  and  Islamic  Studies,  University  of  Durham,  2000),  p.13.  
46   Unlike   the   essential   approach,   the   pluralist   approach   is   interdisciplinary   including   a  
contextualizing   approach,   constructivism,   historical   narratives,   sociological   and   political  
economy  approach,  Islamic  revival  and  Marxist  theory…etc.  See  Khaled  Hroub  (ed.),  Political  
Islam:  Context  versus  Ideology  (London:  London  Middle  East  Institute,  2010).  Hakan  Yavuz,  
Islamic  political  identity  in  Turkey  (Oxford:  Oxford  University  Press,  2003),  p.20.  Salwa  Ismail,  
Rethinking   Islamist   politics   (London:   I.B.   Tauris,   2003),   pp.   6-­7.   Tariq   Ramadan,   Radical  
Reform:  Islamic  Ethics  and  Liberation  (Oxford:  Oxford  University  Press,  2009),  pp.1-­25.  Cihan  
Tuğal,  ‘Islamism  in  Turkey:  Beyond  Instrument  and  Meaning,’  Economy  and  Society,  Vol.  31,  
No.1  (February  2002),  p.  87.  
47  Khaled  Hroub  (ed.),  Political  Islam:  Context  versus  Ideology,  op.cit.,  p.14.    
48  Ibid.,  p.9.  
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example,   Peter  Mandaville   points   out   that  modernity   paved   the  way   for   the  
emergence   of   Islamism  after   the   formation   of   the   nation-­state   in   the  Middle  
East.  He  uses  the  term  ‘New  Islamists’  referring  to  the  shift  of   Islamists  who  
gradually  accept  concepts  of  modernity  such  as  democracy,  human  rights  and  
the   rule   of   law   unlike   their   predecessors. 49   James   Piscatori   and   Dale  
Eickelman   make   a   similar   observation   and   highlight   that   Islamists   invent  
tradition  in  terms  of  making  use  of  Islamic  language  and  symbols  in  a  flexible  
interpretation  in  order  to  constitute  an  image  of  the  ideal  Muslim  Society.50  In  
their   critique   on   the   traits   of   modernity   such   as   secularization   and  
globalization,   Islamists  utilize  parts  of   the  Qur’anic  verses  and   the  Prophet’s  
sayings  to  guide  them  and  help  them  to  overcome  challenges.  
Much  of  the  literature  of  the  pluralist  approaches  addresses  the  Islamists’  
outward   displays   as   an   indication   of   transition.   Islamists   are   viewed   as   a  
modern   phenomenon,   disengaged   from   the   Islamic   tradition   and   history.  
Islamists   invent   ‘tradition’   by   exploiting   the   concepts   of   modernity   such   as  
nationalism,   democracy   and   civil   society   for   the   sake   of   their   political   and  
religious   aims.   To   some   extent,   there   is   no   denying   that   the   Islamists’  
transition   is   to   adjust   to   the   repercussions   of   modernity   formed   in   the   20th  
century.   However,   behind   the   discussion   in   some   pluralist   approaches’  
literature  of  how  Islamists  adapt  to  modernity,  lies  the  possibility  that  they  are  
inspired  and  motivated  by  the  concept  of  an  Islamic  revival.  In  this  sense,  the  
concept  of   the   Islamic  revival  may  help  us   to  gain  an   insight   into   to  why  the  
transition  matters  to  Islamists  and  how  Islamists  see  themselves  in  transition.  
In   view   of   this,   a   conceptual   framework   for   the   transition   of   Islamists  
from   the   pluralist   approaches   will   be   provided.   Before   scrutinizing   the  
transition  of  Islamists  in  the  pluralist  approaches,  the  essentialist  approach  will  
be   examined   in   order   to   explain   why   this   approach   is   not   suitable   for   the  
analysis  of  the  transition  of  Islamists.    
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
49  Peter  Mandaville,  Global  Political  Islam  (London:  Routledge,  2007),  pp.96-­103.  
50  Dale  F  Eickelman  and  James  Piscatori,  Muslim  Politics  (New  Jersey:  Princeton  University  
Press,  2004),  pp.16-­21.  
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2.  The  Essentialist  approach  to  the  transition  of  Islamists      
The  essentialist   approach   to   Islamists   plays  a   dominant   and   influential  
role   in   the   Western   media   and   academia.51  For   the   essentialist   approach,  
Islamism  as  a  reactionary  ideology  started  in  the  1930s  and  reached  a  climax  
in  the  Iranian  revolution  in  1979.  Since  then,  Islamism  has  created  uncertainty  
and   threatened  Western  civilization.52  After   the  collapse  of   the  Soviet  Union,  
several   vital   and   serious   events   involving   Islamists,   such   as   the   electoral  
victory   of   the   Islamist   FIS   in  Algeria,   terrorist   attacks   by   radical   Islamists   in  
Egypt   and   the   1993   bombing   of   the   World   Trade   Centre,   validate   the  
assumption   that   the   Islamist   is   a   menace. 53   Furthermore,   these   chaotic  
images  were  disseminated  by   the  media  as  well  as  endorsed  by   think   tanks  
and  scholars  that  delivered  the  message  that  in  essence,  Islamists  are  violent,  
reactionary   and   intolerant   of   democratic   and   free   values. 54   This   type   of  
discourse   on   Islamists   was   exacerbated   after   the   September   11   attacks   in  
2001.  With  the  global   ‘war  on  terror’  and  the  spillover  effects  of   ‘the  clash  of  
civilization’,  the  impression  that  Islamists  carry  out  terrorist  attacks  all  over  the  
world  and  are  the  biggest  threat  to  Western  civilization,  has  been  normalized.  
In   this   vein,   Islamists   whether   ‘moderate’   or   ‘radical’,   inherently   retain   the  
character  of  extremism  and  a  rejection  of  Western  values.55    
2.1  The  critique  on  the  essentialist  approach    
The   incompatibility   between   modernity   and   Islamist   is   the   recurring  
theme  in  the  essentialist  discourse.  Bernard  Lewis,  who  is  one  of  the  leading  
figures  stresses  that  freedom,  liberalism,  the  separation  of  religion  and  politics,  
and  citizenship  are  alien  concepts   to  Muslim  societies  and  absent   in   Islamic  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
51  Maria  do  Ceu  Pinto,  Political   Islam  and   the  United  States:  A  study  of  U.S  policy   towards  
Islamist  movements  in  the  Middle  East  (Reading:  Ithaca,  1999),  p.161.  
52   Barry   Rubin   (ed.),   Political   Islam:   Critical   concepts   in   Islamic   studies,   Volume   1,  
Introduction  to  Political  Islam:  Ideas  and  Key  issues,  op.cit.,  p.21.  
53  Maria  do  Ceu  Pinto,  Political   Islam  and   the  United  States:  A  study  of  U.S  policy   towards  
Islamist  movements  in  the  Middle  East,  op.cit.,  p.184.  
54  Ibid.,  p.187.  
55  Daniel  Pipes  holds  this  view.  See  Maria  do  Ceu  Pinto,  Political  Islam  and  the  United  States:  
A  study  of  U.S  policy  towards  Islamist  movements  in  the  Middle  East,  op.cit.,  p.174.  
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history  and  culture  until  westernization   in   the  19th   century.56  The  essentialist  
approach  sounds  convincing,  with  plenty  of  solid  evidences,  but  this  approach  
could  be  seen  as  a  continuation  of   the   ‘Orientalist’   tradition,  as  Edward  Said  
describes,   ‘Orientalism  as  a  Western  style   for  dominating,   restructuring,  and  
having  authority  over  the  Orient57’  and  ‘To  dignify  all  the  knowledge  collected  
during   colonial   occupation   with   the   title   ‘’contribution   to   modern   learning’’  
when  the  native  had  neither  been  consulted  nor  treated  as  anything  except  as  
pretexts  for  a  text  whose  usefulness  was  not  to  the  native…’58  It  could  be  said  
that  despite  the  fact  that  the  western  colonization  in  the  Middle  East  does  not  
actually  exist,  Ethnocentrism,  Euro-­centrism  and  Western  cultural  imperialism  
are  still  embedded  in  this  essentialist  mindset.’59  
In  this  respect,   the  essentialist  approach  might  not  be  applicable  to  the  
analysis   of   Islamists.   The   reasons   are   as   follows.   The   first   critique   on   the  
essentialist   approach   is   the   generalization   and   reduction   of   Islamists.   The  
essentialist   approach   lumps   all   Islamists   into   a   homogenous   category   even  
though   there   is   a   distinction   between   moderate   and   radical:   their   essence  
remains  the  same,  that  is,  in  a  rejection  of  the  Western  and  modern  values.60  
Emad  Eldin  Shahin  disagrees  with  this  argument.  He  states  that  it  is  true  that  
the   two   cultures   are   obviously   different,   deriving   from   two   unique   historical  
experiences  but  this  difference  might  not  lead  to  enmity  but  is  recognized  as  
diversity.61  This   observation   seems   to   be   valid.   Each   Islamic   movement   is  
unique  and  their  development  is  largely  determined  by  a  specific  context  even  
though   they   share   similar   Islamic   idioms.62  It   is   true   that   radical   and   violent  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
56  See   Bernard   Lewis,   ‘A   Historical   overview,’   in   Larry   Diamond,  Marc   Plattner   and   Daniel  
Brumberg   (ed.),   Islam   and   Democracy   in   the   Middle   East   (Baltimore:   The   John   Hopkins  
University  press,  2003),  pp.210-­214;;  Bernard  Lewis,  Faith  and  Power  Religion  and  Politics  in  
the  Middle  East  (Oxford:  Oxford  University  Press,  2010),  pp.50-­52;;  pp.63-­69.  
57  Edward  Said,  Orientalism  (London:  Routledge,  1978),  p.3.  
58  Ibid.,  p.86.  
59   Larbi   Sadiki,   The   Search   for   Arab   Democracy:   Discourses   and   Counter-­Discourses  
(London:  Hurst  &  Company,  2004),  p.61.  
60  Martin  Kramer,   ‘The  mismeasure  of   political   Islam,’   in  Martin  Kramer   (ed.),  The   Islamism  
debate  (Tel  Aviv:  Tel  Aviv  University,  1997),  pp,  161-­173.  
61   Emad   Eldin   Shahin,   Political   Ascent   contemporary   Islamic   Movements   in   North   Africa  
(Oxford:  Westview  press,  1997),  p.3.  
62  Mohammed  Ayoob,  ‘Political  Islam:  Image  and  Reality,‘  World  Policy  Journal,  Vol.  21.  No.3  
(Fall  2004),  p.2.    
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Islamists  damage  the  security  and  stability  of  the  host  country  and  terrify  the  
West   but   the   phenomenon   of   radicalization   is   not   purely   derived   from   a  
religious  ideology  as  the  essentialist  claims.  The  radicalization  of  Islamists  is  
due   to   the   deprivation,   dispossession   and   foreign   interventions   as   Francois  
Burgat   argues,   ‘the   West’s   decades-­long   unswerving   support   for   tyrannical  
dictatorships  have   fostered   in   their  populations  a  sentiment  of  deep  despair,  
favorable   to   the  most   extreme   forms   of   revolt.’  63  In   fact,   a   great   number   of  
Islamic  movements  mainly   engage   in   domestic   affairs   in   a   non-­violent   way  
and   aim   for   a   transformation   of   societies   through   constitutional   and  
incremental   means. 64   Most   Islamists   are   willing   to   reconcile   their   political  
ideology  with  the  Western  democratic  system  but  the  West  seems  to  prefer  to  
support  an  authoritarian  stance  rather  than  democratization  in  this  region  due  
to  the  geopolitical  calculations,  governed  by  the  factors  such  as  oil  reserves,  
the   security   of   Israel   and   stability   in   the   region.65  John   Esposito   notes   that  
Islamic  groups  are  various  and  flexibly   interpret   Islam  within  specific  country  
contexts,   far   from   a   monolithic   reality.66  Joel   Beinin   and   Joe   Stork   have   a  
similar   argument.   They   concur   that   Islamists,   by   and   large,   accept   the  
territorial   and   political   framework   of   existing   states   and   economic  
foundations.67  
The   second   critique   is   that   the   essentialist   approach   often   sets   up   or  
dominates  specific  agendas  in  the  academy  and  mainstream  media,  such  as  
issues  concerning  whether  Islam  is  compatible  with  modernity,  the  question  of  
Islamization  and   the  status  of  women,  minority  and  non-­Muslim,  which  often  
stir  contentious  debates.  Those  debates  are  not  less  important  than  many  that  
Islamists  have  tackled  since  1990s  but  the  problem  for  the  essentialists  is  that  
they   aim   to   target   Islamists   as   reactionary   and   inflexible   groups   rather   than  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
63  Francois  Burgat,  Patrick  Hutchinson  (transl.),  Islamism  in  the  shadow  of  al-­Qaeda  (Austin:  
University  of  Texas  Press,  2008),  p.3.  
64  Mohammed  Ayoob,  The  Many  Faces  of  Political  Islam:  Religion  and  politics  in  the  Muslim  
World,  (Michigan:  University  of  Michigan  Press,  2007),  p.17.    
65  Larbi  Sadiki,  The  Search  for  Arab  Democracy:  Discourses  and  Counter-­Discourses,  op.cit.,  
pp.354-­356.  
66  John  Esposito,   (ed.),  Political   Islam:  Revolution,  Radicalism,   or  Reform?   (London:   Lynne  
Rienner  Publishers,  1997),  p.4.    
67  Please   refer   to   Joel  Beinin,   and   Joe  Stork   (ed.),  Political   Islam  Essays   from  Middle  East  
Report  (London:  I.B.  Tauris,  1997),  p.4.  
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analyzing  Islamist  discourse  on  sensitive  agenda,  case  by  case.  For  example,  
during   the   Arab   Spring   (2011-­2013),   the   question   of   ‘Islamization’   was   a  
prominent   theme   in   the  essentialist  approach  when   the  Muslim  Brotherhood  
took   power   in   Egypt.   The   essentialists   seemed   to   indicate   that   this  
‘Islamization’  was  a  fundamental  problem  of  the  polarization  of  society  and  a  
possible  threat  to  Western  and  Israeli  stability.  But  this  type  of  analysis  seems  
to   be   cursory.   The   accurate   explanation   for   the   causes   underlying   the  
polarization  of  society,  and  whether  Islamists  actually  ‘Islamize’  the  state  were  
missed  by  the  essentialists.68    
The   third   critique   is   that   the   essentialist   ignores   the   fact   that   Islamists  
are  embedded  in  a  specific  context  and  are  an  integral  part  of  the  local  society  
and   history.   Essentialists   tend   to   believe   that   ‘Islamism’   or   ‘Islamists’   are  
transient   phases.   Like   Marxism   and   pan-­Arabism,   Islamism   as   a   certain  
ideology  may  fail  at  great  cost.69  But  they  failed  to  predict  the  outbreak  of  the  
Arab   Spring   that   brought   the   ascendancy   of   Islamists.   The   phenomenon   of  
mass   demonstrations   and   the   rise   of   Islamism   in   politics   across   the   Arab  
countries  surprised  essentialists.  This  deficiency   is  attributed   to   their  narrow  
political   history   as   power   relations  were   always   at   the   top   of   their   analysis,  
while   the  vast  majority  of  people  who   live   in   this  region  were  not   their  major  
concern. 70   As   a   result,   they   failed   to   predict   the   aspirations,   hopes   and  
expectations  of   the  people.  The   rise  of   Islamists   in  politics  might   reflect   this  
trend.  It   indicates  that  Islamists  are  not  abnormal  or  an  exception  but  are  an  
integral  part  of  their  society.  The  rise  of  the  Salafists  in  Egypt  was  also  one  of  
the  issues  that  essentialists  were  unaware  of.  The  Salafists  won  20  per  cent  
of   the  seats   in  parliament  which  surprised  many  experts  and  even   the   local  
liberal.  Shadi  Hamid  argues   that  Salafists  were  already   there  and  had  been  
for   some   time.   The   reason   why   Salafists   were   invisible   was   due   to   their  
political  quietism  during  the  Mubarak  period.  Meanwhile,   to  some  extent,   the  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
68  Shadi   Hamid   has   a   sophisticated   analysis   on   the   polarization   of   Egyptian   and   Tunisian  
politics  during  the  Arab  Spring.  See  Shadi  Hamid,  Temptation  of  power:  Islamists  and  illiberal  
democracy  in  a  new  Middle  East  (Oxford:  Oxford  University  Press,  2014),  pp.140-­205.    
69  Martin   Kramer,   ‘Fundamentalist   Islam   at   large:   The   driving   for   power,’   The   Middle   East  
Quarterly,  Vol.  III,  No.2  (June  1996),  pp.37-­49.  
70  Ilan  Pappe,  The  Modern  Middle  East:  A  social  and  cultural  history  (Oxon:  Routledge,  2014),  
pp.326-­327.  
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Egyptian  society  has  become  a  ‘Salafist’  society  as  Salafist  TV  channels  are  
the  most  popular  and  Salafist  social  activities  have  integrated  into  society.71    
In   short,   the   essentialist   approach   suggests   that   Islamists   are  
revolutionary  and   reactionary  and   that   it   is  unlikely   that   they  would   fulfill   the  
universal   values   of   democracy,   freedom   and   pluralism   due   to   their  
incompatibility  with  modernity.   In   this   sense,   there  are  no   serious  and  deep  
discussions  and  arguments  on  the  transition  of  Islamists  from  the  essentialist  
perspective.   In   contrast,   the   pluralist   approaches   usually   observe,   analyze  
and   evaluate   the   transition   of   Islamists   from   various   angles   which   reveals  
different   picture   and   even   comes   to   the   opposite   conclusion   to   the  
essentialists.   In   this   approach,   Islamists   are   not   inflexible   but   dynamic   and  
may  evolve  in  their  ideas  and  practices.    
3.  The  Pluralist  approaches  to  the  transition  of  Islamists  
Unlike  the  essentialist  approach,  the  pluralist  approaches  treat  Islamists  
as  heterogeneous  groups  rather  than  a  homogenous  group  due  to  their  long-­
term  empirical,   investigative   and   personal   observation   on   Islamists.   That   is,  
pluralists   do   not   put   all   Islamists   in   the   same   basket.   Since   the   1990s,  
Islamists   who   believe   that   modernity   is   not   contradictory   to   Islam   have  
adjusted   their   political   discourse   and   are   willing   to   align   with   non-­Islamist  
parties   and   authoritarian   regimes.   It   could   be   argued   that   the   discussion  
above   relating   to   the   transition   of   Islamists   in   the   pluralist   approaches  
revolves  around   the   topics  of   how  modernity   propelled   them   to   change  and  
how   they   adapted   to   modernity.   Under   the   umbrella   of   modernity,   the  
transition   of   Islamists   can   usually   be   observed   in   three   major   aspects:  
nationalism,   democracy   and   civil   society,   indicating   that  most   Islamists  who  
have  moved  away  from  the  violent  option  have  suspended  or  abandoned  the  
idea   of   an   Islamic   state   shaped   by   a   compulsion   to   adapt   to   modernity.72  
Apart  from  the  above  analysis,  the  concept  of  an  Islamic  revival  could  provide  
Islamists  with  an  insight  into  their  transition.  The  concept  of  an  Islamic  revival  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
71  Shadi  Hamid,  Temptation  of  power:  Islamists  and  illiberal  democracy  in  a  new  Middle  East,  
op.cit.,  p.20.  
72  Sami  Zubaida,  Beyond  Islam:  A  new  understanding  of  the  Middle  East  (London:  I.B.  Tauris,  
2011),  p.109.  
	   32	  
is  an  important  theme  in  contemporary  Islamic  movements.  The  definition  and  
principle  of  an  Islamic  revival  as  well  as  the  implications  of  an  Islamic  revival  
in  the  modern  context  for  Islamists  will  be  discussed  later.  The  next  section  is  
divided   into   four   issues,   that   is,   the  analyses  of   the   transition  of   Islamists   in  
association   with   nationalism,   democracy,   civil   society   and   the   concept   of  
Islamic  revival.  The  conceptual  framework  for  the  transition  of  Islamists  could  
also  illustrate  the  transition  of  Hamas  in  a  broader  sense.  
3.1  The  transition  of  Islamists  and  nationalism  
The   emergence   of   Islamists   in   the   1920s   originally   reacted   to   the  
concept   of   nationalism   derived   from   modernity   originating   in   the   West.  
Islamists  considered  nationalism  and  modernity  had  a  negative  implication  for  
Muslim  society  since   the   late  18th   century.73  Modernity  has  an   implication  of  
the   increasing   penetration   of   European   ideas   as   a   universal   value   that  
fragments  the  structure  of  tradition  in  Muslim  societies.  Accordingly,  traditional  
Muslim   society   has   faced   dramatic   changes   in   the   spheres   of   society,  
economic   and   politics.   The   demise   of   the  Caliphate   in   1924   as  well   as   the  
making  of  the  modern  state  in  the  Middle  East  designed  by  Britain  and  France  
brought  about   the   identity  predicament   for  Muslim  communities.   In   response  
to   this   crisis   in   the   Muslim   world,   in   1928,   Hasan   al-­Banna   founded   the  
Muslim  Brotherhood  which   is   considered   to   be   the   first   prototypical  modern  
Islamic   movement. 74   Al-­Banna   advocated   the   Islamic   reform   with   the  
combination   of   the   modern   sciences   and   technology   against   the   Western  
economic,  political  and  military  ascendancy.75  
  Unlike   the  West  where  modernity   usually   leads   to   political   democracy  
and   religious   pluralism   in   the   public   place,   modernity   in   the   context   of   the  
Muslim   society   seems   to   be  Western   domination   in   the   early   20th  Century.  
Furthermore,   the   concept   of   modernity   remained   a   negative   implication   for  
Islamists  after  independence.  To  Arab  societies,  particularly  during  the  1950s  
and   1960s,   modernity   usually   referred   to   an   experience   of   repression   and  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
73  Sami  Zubaida,  Beyond  Islam:  A  new  understanding  of  the  Middle  East,  op.cit.,  p.91.  
74  Peter  Mandaville,  Global  Political  Islam,  op.cit.,  p.49.  
75  Carrie  Rosefsky  Wickham,  The  Muslim  Brotherhood:  Evolution  an  Islamist  movement  (New  
Jersey:  Princeton  University  Press,  2013),  p.22.  
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assault   on   Islamists   and   even   Islam.76  In   this   period,   many   Arab   countries  
experienced   a   series   of   coup   d’états   that   transformed   government   and  
political   structure. 77   The   spread   of   pan-­Arab   nationalism   and   socialism  
overwhelmed   Islamism’s   concern.   As   a   result,   the   function   of   the   religious  
principle   which   sustained   the   social   order   gradually   declined   under   these  
authoritarian  regimes.78  
Paradoxically,   the   development   of   modernity   by   the   authoritarian  
regimes   contributed   to   an   Islamic   resurgence   in   the   Arab   world   during   the  
1970s   and   1980s   partly   due   to   declining   Arab   nationalism   and   socialism.79  
Although  the  secular  nationalist  leaders  were  wary  of  Islamists  who  were  seen  
as  a  potential  political  opponent,   they  continued  to  preserve  the  necessity  of  
Islam  as  a  source  of  stability  in  society.  Numbers  of  mosques  and  madrasas  
were   built   and   due   to   improved   transport,   communication   and   accessible  
books,  people  had  more  opportunity  to  learn  and  adhere  to  their  faith.80  From  
this   perspective,   modernity   for   Islamists   and   society   was   not   entirely   a  
negative  effect.  That   is   to  say,  modernity   that  used   to  be  a   foreign  notion   to  
the  Muslim  society  has  been  part  of  society.  ‘Islamic  modernity’  is  a  term  that  
Sami   Zubaida   uses   to   elaborate   this   phenomenon.   Islamic   modernity  
according  to  his  definition  ‘is  not  the  product  of  cultural   influences,   imitations  
and  invasion  form  the  West,  but  the  consequence  of  transformations  of  social  
relations,  powers  and  authorities  brought  about  by  sweeping  socio-­economic  
forces’.81      
The   acceptance   of   nationalism   in   Islamists’   discourse   reflects   the  
concept  of  Islamic  modernity.  In  the  past,  the  restoration  of  the  Caliphate  was  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
76  Tariq  Ramadan,  The  Arab  awakening:  Islam  and  the  New  Middle  East  (London:  Allen  Lane,  
2012),  pp.81-­83.  
77  Sami  Zubaida,  Beyond  Islam:  A  new  understanding  of  the  Middle  East,  op.cit.,  p.102.  
78  Ejaz  Akram,   ‘The  Muslim  world  and  Globalization:  Modernity  and   the   roots  of   conflict,’   in  
Joseph   Lumbard   (ed.),   Islam   fundamentalism   and   the   betrayal   of   tradition:   Essays   by  
Western  Muslim  scholars  (Indiana:  World  Wisdom,  2004),  p.243.  
79   Philip   Sutton   and   Stephen   Vertigans,   Resurgent   Islam:   A   Sociological   approach  
(Cambridge:  Polity  press,  2005),  p.177.  
80  Robert   Hefner   (ed.),  Remaking  Muslim   Politics:   Pluralism,   Contestation,   Democratization  
(Princeton:  Princeton  University  Press,  2005)  pp.18-­20.      
81  Sami  Zubaida,  Beyond  Islam:  A  new  understanding  of  the  Middle  East,  op.cit.,  p.5.  
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the   pressing   issue.   From   1924   to   1926,   Muslim   scholars   took   different  
perspectives   on   how   to   reshape   Islamic   political   institutions   after   the  
Caliphate. 82   This   is   because   nationalism   for   Islamists   was   a   man-­made  
invention  as  well  as  an  obstacle   to   the  unity  of  ummah.  As  a  matter  of   fact,  
this   concept   is   not   always   the   case.   The   unity   of   ummah   seems   to   be   a  
secondary   issue   for   Islamists.  On   the  one  hand,  nationalism   is  adopted  and  
elaborated   as   a   resistance   and   liberation   discourse   when   Islamists   resist  
foreign   intervention.83  On   the   other   hand,   for   most   Islamists   who   follow   the  
thought   of   the   Muslim   Brotherhood,   they   have   already   accepted   the  
framework  of   the  nation-­state  as   they  aim   to  participate   in  political  elections  
and  take  a  non-­confrontational  stance  towards  the  authoritarian  regime.    
In   sum,   Islamists   have   accepted   or   acquiesced   to   the   concept   of  
nationalism,   the  product  of  modernity.  Getting   rid  of   the  concept   is  not   their  
aim.   The   attention   could   be   focused   on   how   Islamists   reconcile   with   this  
concept   into   their   Islamic  agenda   in  order   to  engage  with  other  non-­Islamist  
groups,  the  authoritarian  regime  and  the  West.    
3.2  The  transition  of  Islamists  and  democracy  
Other   discussion   in   the   literature   of   pluralists   is   why   democracy   is  
essential   for   the   transition   of   Islamists.   From   the   essentialist   point   of   view  
Islamists  who  have  a  vision  of  the  creation  of  an  Islamic  state  in  accordance  
with  sharia  as  an  immutable  legislative  source  would  inevitably  clash  with  the  
democratic  values.  84  The  September  11  attacks  in  2001,  the  US’   invasion  of  
Iraq  in  2003  and  the  recent  ISIS  phenomenon  have  intensified  this  discourse  
while  the  assumption  has  been  challenged  by  the  pluralist  literature.    
In   the   pluralist   literature,   Islamists   do   not   always   challenge   the   status  
quo  by  force.  For  those  Islamists  who  incline  towards  political  participation  via  
election   there   is   no   major   contradiction   between   Islam   and   modern  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
82  Abdelwahab   El-­Affendi,   ‘Umma,   State   and   Movements:   events   that   shaped   the   Modern  
Debate’  in  Khaled  Hroub  (ed.),  Political  Islam:  Context  versus  Ideology,  op.cit,  pp.24-­26.  
83  Ilan  Pappe,  The  Modern  Middle  East,  op.cit.,  pp.  4-­5.    84	  Gudrun  Kramer,  ‘Islamist  Notions  of  Democracy,’  in  Joel  Beinin  and  Stork  (ed.),  Political  
Islam  essays  from  Middle  East  Report,  op.cit.,  p.71.  
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democratic   values. 85   They   believe   that   democratization   in   the   Muslim  
countries  is  crucial  to  achieving  social  justice,  human  rights,  and  sustainability  
of  economy,  polity  and  society  as  long  as  this  democratization  is  not  contrary  
to   Islamic  values.86  As  a  matter  of   fact,   the  concept  of  democracy  has  been  
elaborated   in   the  circle  of   Islamists.  Rashid  al-­Ghannushi,   the   founder  of  al-­
Nahda  party  in  Tunisia,  contends  that  democracy  is  an  intrinsic  part  of  Islam.  
He   argues   that,   ‘democracy   is   not   for   export   (from   the   West):   wholesale  
exportation   of   democracy   entails   imposing   a   whole   host   of   values   and  
practices   that  could  endanger   indigenous  values’.87  In  other  words,   Islamists  
themselves  have  a  set  of  discourses  on  democracy  that  distinctly  differs  with  
western   discourse.   When   Islamists   talk   about   democracy,   the   usage   of  
Islamic  terminology  is  imperative  and  rational  since  Muslims  believe  that  Islam  
is  not  only  a  religious  but  also  a  way  of  life,  encompassing  all  levels  of  politics,  
economics,   social   issues   and   culture,   etc.   Contrary   to   western   democracy,  
which   strictly   adheres   to   the   principle   of   secularization,   Islamic   democracy  
takes  the  view  that  the  unity  of  God  and  the  role  of  Quran  have  a  fundamental  
and  non-­negotiable  position.88  To  put  it  another  way,  Islamists  have  a  right  to  
borrow   from   non-­Muslim   ideas,   methods   and   systems   as   long   as   these  
compositions  do  not  contradict  the  principle  of  sharia.89  sharia,  the  Islamic  law,  
is   considered  an   immutable   legislative   source  based  on   the  Qur’an  and   the  
Hadith,  the  sayings  of  the  Prophet  Muhammad.  Muslim  jurists  formulated  laws  
according   to   the   principles   of   sharia,   which   is   unchangeable;;   nevertheless,  
political  systems  could  take  many  forms  symbolizing  these  spirits  that  do  not  
contravene  this  doctrine.90    	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It  seems  that  sharia  plays  a  crucial  role  when  Islamists  become  involved  
in  politics.   Islamists  believe   that  an   ideal   state   is   in  accordance  with  sharia.  
However,   in   practice,   this   is   not   always   the   case.   From   1980   onwards,   the  
mainstream  Islamist  movement  such  as  the  Muslim  Brotherhood  in  Egypt  and  
Jordan   was   inclined   to   democratic   orientation   and   started   to   participate   in  
elections.   Campaigning   for   the   application   of   sharia   was   the   top   priority   in  
their   political   agenda.  91  But   in   the   1990s   under   the   authoritarian   regime’s  
repression   they   did   not   insist   on   this   topic   and   were   inclined   to   take   a  
democratic  approach.  This  shift  of  the  Brotherhood  in  policy  was  because  the  
authoritarian   regime   was   suspicious   of   the   Brotherhood   and   launched  
massive  arrests  in  1990s.  To  protect  themselves,  the  Brotherhood  chose  not  
to  confront  the  government  and  remained  moderate.92  In  2004  and  2005,  the  
Brotherhood’s  discourse  in  Jordan  and  Egypt  underwent  a  major  shift  from  the  
original  religious  rhetoric  to  the  notion  of  a  civil  state,  good  governance,  and  
political   reform  which  was  a  breakthrough.   It   is  worth  noting   that   over   three  
decades,   the   Brotherhood   has   experienced   a   remarkable   evolution   in  
behaviour,   rhetoric   or   even   ideology   to   some  extent.   The   implementation  of  
sharia  is  rarely  heard  from  this  Islamist  discourse.93    
It   can   be   said   that   the   implementation   of   sharia   or   the   creation   of   an  
Islamic   state   is   not   the   Islamists’   pressing   concern.   Francois   Burgat   states  
that   Islamists’   rhetoric   has   been   diluted,   gradually   reconciled   with   liberal  
values  and  co-­operates  with  secularist  ideas.94  In  other  words,  gradualism  is  a  
characteristic  in  Islamists  when  they  involve  in  politics  and  society.  By  means  
of   a   ballot   box   and   non-­governmental   institutions   in   civil   society,   Islamists  
obtain   massive   assistance   from   intellectuals,   businessmen   and   grassroots  
grounds   and   they   realize   that   confrontation   with   non-­Islamists   is   fruitless;;  
most   of  which  has   changed   their   discourse   toward  democracy,   human   right  
and  rule  of  law.95    	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op.cit.,  p.71.  
92  Ibid.,  pp.87-­88.  
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Regarding   this   phenomenon   in   the   transition   of   Islamists,   Asef   Bayat  
raises   the   new   term   of   ‘Post-­Islamism’   indicating   that   Islamists   would  
experience  a  qualitative  shift  once  they  stand  firmly  in  politics.  Because  faced  
by  societal  pressure  and  their   internal  contradictions,   Islamists  may  suspend  
certain  principles  and  depart   from  the  underlying   ideological  package  toward  
integration  of  religiosity  and  rights,  faith  and  freedom,  Islam  and  liberty.96  But  
there   is   another   argument   for   the   observation   of   the   transition   of   Islamists.  
Although  most  moderate  Islamists  do  not  campaign  for  the  implementation  of  
sharia  as  an  urgent  issue,  it  does  not  mean  that  Islamists  are  entirely  remote  
from  their  original   ideology.  97  For  the  issue  of  non-­Muslim  minorities,  gender  
and  enforcement  of  hudud  (the  criminal  law  in  sharia),  Islamists  may  continue  
to  hold  ambiguous  positions.98  Shadi  Hamid  elaborates  that  this  ambiguity  of  
Islamists   on   certain   issues   is   attributed   to   the   Islamists’   orientation   toward  
illiberal  democracy.  Hamid  argues  that  Islamists  were  Islamists  for  a  reason.  
They  were  open   to  democracy,  human  rights  and  pluralism  but   they  weren’t  
liberals   in   disguise;;   the   restoration  of   society   as  a   religious  duty   toward   the  
Islamic   way   of   living   is   not   defined   in   the   framework   of   liberalism.99  Hamid  
argues   that   the   transition   of   Islamists  may   be   considered   to   be   a   tactic   for  
their   survival   and   protection   under   the   authoritarian   regime.100  As   we   saw  
during  the  Arab  Spring,  after  the  downfall  of  the  dictatorship,  the  Brotherhood  
was   not   as   cautious   as   usual   when   it   won   parliamentary   and   presidential  
elections.  The  role  of  sharia  in  the  constitution  became  the  major  contentious  
debate   between   Islamists   and   Secularists.   Apart   from   that,   Islamists-­led  
government   in   Egypt   and   Tunisia   could   not   really   bring   sustainability   to  
economic   development,   social   and   political   stability   after   revolution. 101   To  	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some  extent,  it  could  be  said  that  the  temptation  of  power,  as  Hamid  contends,  
may  distort  the  Islamist’s  democratic  credit  as  they  used  to  claim.102    
To   sum   up,   election   through   a   democratic   process   is   likely   to   be   a  
significant   impetus   for   the   Islamists’   transition   as   Islamists   have   accepted  
democracy  as  an  intrinsic  part  of  their  political  agenda.  Islamists’  discourse  on  
democracy   is  not   inflexible  and  monolithic.  The  concept  of  democracy  could  
be   easily   integrated   into   the   Islamists’   political   agenda   as   long   as   it   is   not  
contrary  to  sharia.  But  in  reality,  Islamist  discourse  has  changed  according  to  
the   local   political   climate.  When   the   authoritarian   regime   restricts   Islamists’  
activities  in  politics,  Islamists  tend  to  shift  their  policy  for  their  political  survival.  
But  when  there  is  a  regime  change  such  as  the  Arab  Spring,  they  tend  to  fulfill  
their  original  commitment  via  democratic  election.    
3.3  The  transition  of  Islamists  and  civil  society  
Another   factor   that  affects   the   Islamists’   transition   in  politics   is   the   role  
that   Islamic   civil   institutions   play   in   Muslim   society.   Islamic   civil   institutions  
have  a  long-­standing  history  and  retain  a  pivotal  role  in  providing  material  and  
spiritual   support   for   the  masses,   particularly   in   a   crisis.103  Pluralist   literature  
indicates   that   civil   society   has   already   appeared   in   the   pre-­modern  Muslim  
society.  As  for  the  essentialist  argument  that  civil  society  as  a  modern  concept  
did   not   exist   in   traditional   Muslim   society,   as   a   matter   of   fact,   non-­states  
actors   were   rather   active   and   prosperous   throughout   Islamic   history.   For  
example,  the  function  of  Islamic  scholars  (Ulama)  played  an  important  role  in  
pre-­modern  society.  Forming  a  consensus  and  a  process  of  legislation  in  civil  
society   before   the   19th   century   was   a   task   for   the   Ulama   who   were  
autonomous  and  their  authority  derived  from  society,  not  from  rulers.104  Ulama  
outside  a   state’s   control   exerted  efforts   in   applying  sharia   in   the  defense  of  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
of   the   West   and   the   factor   of   ‘deep   state’   were   other   considerations   that   the   Islamists’  
commitment  failed  to  fulfil.  
102  Shadi  Hamid,  Temptation  of  power:  Islamists  and  illiberal  democracy  in  a  new  Middle  East,  
op.cit.,  p.162.  
103  For  example,  civil  societies   in  Lebanon  and  Kuwait  support  many  Lebanese  and  Kuwaiti  
citizens   at   home   and   abroad   during   the   crisis.   See   Saad   Eddin   Ibrahim,   ‘Civil   society   and  
prospects  of  democratization  in  the  Arab  world,’  in  Augustus  Norton  (ed.),  Civil  Society  in  the  
Middle  East,  Vol.1  (Leiden:  E.J.  Brill,  1995),  p.43.  
104  Ibid.,  p.55.  
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people’s  rights.  Ahmad  Moussalli,  a  leading  expert  in  Muslim  civil  society,  has  
contended  that,  ‘when  a  legal  opinion  of  a  scholar  became  widely  accepted  in  
society,  it  became  a  part  of  the  legislative  compendium  of  the  community  that  
the  government  had  to  honor  and  fulfill.  This  is  why  Muslims  did  not  formalize  
legislative   processes   separate   from   political   authority   until   the   19th  
century…’.105  Apart   from   the   function   of   the  Ulama   in   civil   society,   various  
actors   also   contributed   to   traditional   Muslim   society.   In   the   past,   the   Sufi  
orders,  charitable  endowment  (waqf),  guild  and  merchants  associations,  non-­
Muslim   minorities,   Christian   and   Jewish,   all   co-­existed   and   had   special  
roles.106  These  non-­state   actors   enjoyed  autonomous   status   in   running   their  
internal   affairs   and   often   kept   harmonious   relations   with   the   ruler.107  In   this  
respect,   civil   society   in   Islamic   history   could   be   seen   as   a   pluralistic   and  
tolerant  society.    
But  the  traditional  form  of  civil  society  had  fragmented  since  the  late  19th  
century  due   to   the  western  penetration  of  Arab-­Muslim  society108  and  by   the  
1920s  was  deeply  affected  by  the  appearance  of  the  modern  state.109  A  top-­
down  form  of  a  modernization  largely  marginalized  long-­established  practices  
and   traditions.110  To  make  matters   worse,   from   the   1950s   to   the   1960s   the  
nationalist   regimes   that   promoted  modernization   either   banned   or   restricted  
autonomy   of   Islamic   civil   institutions   on   social   issues111  but   they   failed   to  
address  the  various  social  and  economic  problems  that  most  countries  in  the  
third  world  experienced.112  In  this  sense,  the  Islamic  movements  filled  the  gap  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
105  Ahmad   Moussalli,   ‘Modern   Islamic   fundamentalist   discourse   on   Civil   Society,   Pluralism  
and  Democracy’  in  Augustus  Norton  (ed.),  Civil  Society  in  the  Middle  East  Vol.1,  op.cit.,  p.  85  
106  Mohammad  Kamali,  Shari’ah  law:  An  Introduction  (Oxford:  Oneworld,  2008)  pp.216.-­217.  
107  Saad  Eddin  Ibrahim,  ‘Civil  Society  and  prospects  of  democratization  in  the  Arab  world,’  in  
Augustus  Richard  Norton  (ed.),  Civil  Society  in  the  Middle  East,  op.cit.,  pp.31-­32.  
108  Ibid.,  p.32.  
109  Ahmad   Moussalli,   ‘Modern   Islamic   fundamentalist   discourse   on   Civil   Society,   Pluralism  
and  Democracy’  in  Augustus  Norton  (ed.),  Civil  Society  in  the  Middle  East  Vol.1,  op.cit.,  p.87.  
110   Harmsen   Egbert,   Islam,   Civil   Society   and   social   work:   Muslim   Voluntary   Welfare  
Associations   in   Jordan   between   patronage   and   Empowerment   (Amsterdam:   Amsterdam  
University  Press,  2008),  p.  61.  
111  Saad  Eddin  Ibrahim,  ‘Civil  Society  and  prospects  of  democratization  in  the  Arab  world,’  in  
Augustus  Richard  Norton  (ed.),  Civil  Society  in  the  Middle  East,  op.cit.,  p.37.  
112   Islah   Jad,   Women   ar   the   cross-­roads:   The   Palestinian   women’s   movement   between  
Nationalism,  Secularism  and   Islamism,  PhD  Thesis   (London:  School  of  Oriental  and  African  
Studies,  2004),  p.218.  
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that  the  regime  was  unable  to  undertake,  for  example,  to  care  for  the  needy.  It  
can  be  said  that  the  Islamic  civil  institutions  play  the  same  role  as  other  non-­
Islamic  and  secular  civil  institutions  in  sustaining  the  social  order.  Islamic  civil  
institutions’  work   is  no  different   than  non-­Islamic  and  secular  civil   institutions  
since  they  share  the  same  values  of  civility  and  tolerance  as  well  as  the  roles  
of  independent  entities  compensating  for  the  deficiencies  of  the  state.113      
Islamic   civil   institutions,   whether   affiliated   to   Islamists   or   not,   may  
catalyze  Islamists’  pragmatism  and  evolution  when  they  prepare  to  participate  
in   elections.   Islamic   civil   institutions   share   the   same   values   and   aspirations  
with   Islamists.   All   believe   that   Islamic   teaching   motivates   them   to   serve   in  
society.   Hasan   al-­Banna,   the   founder   of   the  Muslim   Brotherhood,   indicates  
that   the   first   step   to   Islamic   revival   is   a   spiritual   awakening   among  
individuals.114  Therefore,   social   service   such   as   the   improvement   of   public  
health,  education  and  medical  care  could  help   individuals   to  become   ‘sound  
Muslims’. 115   This   is   not   to   say   that   Islamists   mobilize   people   in   terms   of  
providing  social  services  to  benefit  their  political  agenda.  In  fact,  social  service  
is  not  necessarily  an   instrumental  exchange.  According   to  multiple   research  
works,   Islamic   civil   institutions   enjoy   autonomy   from   Islamists’   domination.  
Islamic   civil   institutions   are   not   a   political   and   ideological   tool   utilized   by  
Islamists.116  Instead,  Islamic  civil  institutions  demonstrate  professionalism  and  
good  quality  service  to  people  from  various  backgrounds.  The  reputation  and  
credibility   of   Islamic   civil   institutions   create   a   sense   of   belonging   to   a  
community   with   an   emphasis   on   the   community’s   well-­being   and   civil  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
113  Sara  Roy,  Hamas  and  Civil  Society   in  Gaza:  engaging  the  Islamist  Social  Sector,  op.cit.,  
p.51.  
114  Richard   Mitchell,   The   Society   of   the   Muslim   Brothers   (Oxford:   Oxford   University   Press,  
1969),  p.234.    
115  Ibid.,  p.  283-­291.  
116  Sara  Roy,  Hamas   and   civil   society   in  Gaza:   engaging   the   Islamist   social   sector,  op.cit.,  
p.187.  International  Crisis  Group,  ‘Islamic  Social  Welfare  Activism  in  the  occupied  Palestinian  
Territories:  A  legitimate  target,’  ICG  Middle  East  Report,  (2  April  2003),  p.21.  Steven  Brooke,  
‘Why  do  Islamists  provide  social  services,’  Middle  East  Political  Science,  (31  January  2014),  
<http://pomeps.org/2014/01/31/why-­do-­islamists-­provide-­social-­services/>   (accessed   on   15  
May   2015).   Melani   Cammett,   ‘How   Hezbollah   helps   (and   what   it   gets   out   of   it),’   The  
Washington   Post,   (2   October   2014),   <https://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/monkey-­
cage/wp/2014/10/15/islamists-­and-­their-­charities/>  (accessed  on  15  May  2015).  
	   41	  
restoration,   rather   than  political   violence  and   radicalization.117  In   this   regard,  
the  social  service  that  the  Islamic  civil   institution  provides  may  help  Islamists  
to   realize   the   mass’   priority   needs   and   adjust   their   policy   to   meet   public  
expectation  when  they  engage  in  politics.118  
3.4  The  transition  of  Islamists  and  the  concept  of  Islamic  revival  
From  the  analysis  above,  we  can  see  that  the  transition  of  Islamists  is  a  
response  and  adaptation   to   the   repercussions  of  modernity.  For   adaptation,  
Islamists   claim   that   the   concepts   of   modernity   are   not   contradictory   to   the  
Islamic  principle.  In  a  sense,  Islamists  exploit  Islamic  reference  and  symbol  to  
legitimate  their  causes  in  politics.   It  seems  that   Islamists   invent   ‘traditions’   in  
accordance  with  political  agendas.  However,   there   is  another  way  of   looking  
at   the   Islamists’   motivation.   Building   a   just   and   sustainable   society   free   of  
corruption   is   always   the   Islamists’   vision.   To   understand   this   mindset   the  
concept  of  Islamic  revival  might  help.  The  Islamic  revival  is  considered  to  be  a  
driving   force  behind   the   Islamists’  work.  The   Islamic   revival  which   is   not   an  
innovative   idea   could   be   found   in   Islamic   tradition   and   history.   Islamists  
motivated  by  this  concept  have  confidence  in  overcoming  any  problems  they  
encounter   in   the  modern   period.   They  adopt   Islamic   principles,   such  as   the  
concept  of  tajdid  (renewal),  islah  (reform),  Ijtihad  (reasoning),  maslaha  (public  
interest),  wasatiyyah  (middle  way)  to  adapt  to  a  changing  circumstance.  The  
Islamic  revival  that  is  less  stressed  in  pluralist  literature  will  be  presented  as  a  
complementary  aspect  for  the  analysis  of  the  transition  of  Islamists.  
3.4.1  The  connotations  of  the  Islamic  revival  
From   the  mainstream   Islamists’  perspective,   revolution   that  could  bring  
chaos   and   unpredictability,   and   causing   social   and   political   turmoil   is   not   a  
suitable   option   for   Islamists.   Rather,   they   tend   to   adopt   a   gradual   and  
moderate   approach   to   reform   society.   Reform   has   religious   implications   in  
Islam.   It  can  be  said   that   the   foundation  of   Islamic  revival   is   through  reform.  	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118  Michael   Irving   Jensen,  The   political   ideology   of   Hamas:   A   grassroots   perspective   (New  
York:  I.B.  Tauris,  2009),  p.6.  
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According   to   Hadith,   the   Prophet   Muhammad   said:   ‘God   will   send   to   this  
(Muslim)  community,  every  hundred  years,  someone  or  some  people  who  will  
renew   its   religion’.119  This  Hadith  refers   to  a  significant   implication   that  when  
the   Muslim   society   is   in   crisis   and   degradation,   some  Muslim   reformer   will  
appear  and  reform  it  based  on  the  Islamic  doctrine.  Regarding  reform  in  Islam,  
two   concepts,   tajdid   and   islah,   need   elaboration.   tajdid   refers   to   renewal   or  
even  rebirth  and  regeneration;;  as  for   islah,   it   refers  to  the   idea  of   improving,  
purifying,   reconciling,   repairing   and   reforming.  120  The   notions   of   tajdjd   and  
islah  are  complementary  and  convey  the  same  idea  of  reform  whose  aim  is  a  
just  and  ethic  society.121  It  is  noted  that  reform  in  Islam  did  not  follow  a  parallel  
path   of   Christianity,   which   experienced   religious   reformation   during   the   16th  
and  17th  centuries.  Reform   in   Islam   is  not  meant   to  remove  Islamic  essence  
as  Tariq  Ramadan  states  that  if  Islam  follows  Christianity’s  path,  Islam  would  
no  longer  be  Islam.122  The  Islamic  reform  is  undertaken  in  the  name  of  ethics,  
the   acquisition   of   a   deep   knowledge   of   the   context   and   aims   to   master   all  
areas   of   understanding.123  The   purpose   of   reform   is   to   purify  Muslims’   faith  
and   correct   backwardness   in   society.   Muslim   scholars   believe   that   the  
declining  situation  in  Muslim  society  is  not  a  flaw  or  imperfection  within  Islam  
but  the  people  themselves  or  an  un-­Islamic  system  corrupts  Islam;;  therefore  a  
reformer   will   lead   the   Muslim   community   to   rectify   problems   and   remove  
falsehood  in  terms  of  restoring  Islamic  teaching.    
In   this   respect,   reform   is   the   key   to   the   Islamic   revival.   Yusuf   al-­
Qaradawi  (1926-­)  an  Egyptian  scholar  based  in  Qatar,  has  further  elaborated  
on  the  implications  of  Islamic  reform.  Before  we  look  at  his  argument,  it  would  
be  useful   to  overview  al-­Qaradawi’s  works  on  Islamic   issues.  He   is  probably  
the   most   influential   Sunni   Muslim   scholar   in   the   world   and   his   many  
publications,   translated   into   several   languages,   deal   with   various  
contemporary  Islamic  issues,  including,  Muslims  in  the  West,  the  relationship  	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between   Sunni   and   Shitte,   modernity   and   Islam,   sharia   and   life,   Palestine,  
Islamic  movements  and  Western  foreign  policy  in  the  Middle  East.  Apart  from  
that,  he  speaks  on  Al-­Jazeera  and  he  has  a  website,  Islamonline  to  spread  his  
ideas   to   an   audience   of   millions.124  However   he   was   a   controversial   figure  
when  he  sanctioned  suicide  attacks  of  Palestinians   in   Israel  even  though  he  
condemned  al-­Qaeda’s  attack  on  11th  September.125  
Islamic   revival   or   Islamic   awakening   is   a   recurring   theme   that   al-­
Qaradawi  delivers  to  the  Arab  and  Muslim  world.  He  expands  the  concept  of  
reform  on  an  individual  basis  to  the  collective  responsibility,  indicating  that  the  
mission  of  Islamists  is  the  revival  of  Islam  for  the  sake  of  Allah.126  He  refuses  
the   ideal   of   separation   of   Church   and   State   as   well   as   the   terminology   of  
Political   Islam.   Al-­Qaradawi   argues   that   the   Western   imperialists   either  
promoted  the  idea  that  Islam  has  nothing  to  do  with  politics  or  that  it  misleads  
people  into  thinking  that  Islamists  only  seek  power.  Rather,  his  emphasis  is  on  
the   idea  of   the   ‘comprehensiveness  of   Islam’   in  personal,   family,   social   and  
political  affairs.127  In   this  sense,   the  Muslim  Brotherhood  could  be  seen  as  a  
model  for  reformists  for  the  restoration  of  the  comprehensiveness  of  Islam.128  
Al-­Qaradawi  has  a  close  relation  with  the  Brotherhood  and  he  is  considered  to  
be  a  spiritual  guide  due   to  his   intellectual  and   jurisprudential   contribution.129  
Al-­Qaradawi’s  thought,  to  a  certain  extent,  guides  the  Brotherhood  and  other  
Islamists   who   are   inclined   towards   political   integration   and   democratic  
elections130  as   he   argues   that   Islamists   could   learn   skills   from   the   western  
technologies  and  political   systems  as   long  as   they  do  not   contradict   Islamic  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
124  Yusuf   al-­Qaradawi,   ‘Islam   and   Democracy,’   in   Roxanne   Euben   and  Muhammad   Qasim  
Zaman  (ed.),  Princeton  Readings  in  Islamist  Thought  texts  and  contexts  from  al  Banna  to  Bin  
Laden,  op.cit.,  p.  224.  
125  Sara  Roy,  Hamas  and  Civil  Society   in  Gaza:  engaging  the  Islamist  Social  Sector,  op.cit.,  
p.251.  Azzam  Tamimi,  Hamas:  Unwritten  Chapters,  op.  cit.,  p.52;;  pp.184-­185.  
126  Yusuf   al-­Qaradawi,   Hasan   al-­Banna   (transl.),   Priorities   of   the   Islamic   movement   in   the  
coming  phase  (Swansea:  Awakening  Publications,  2002),  p.6.  
127  Sheikh  Yusuf  al-­Qaradawi,  State  in  Islam  (Cairo:  Al-­Falah  foundation,  2004),  p.25.  
128  Ibid.,  p.25.  
129  Israel  Elad  Altman,   ‘The  Brotherhood  and  Shitte  Quesiton,’   in  Current  Trends   in   Islamist  
ideology,  Volume  9,  (Washington:  Hudson  Institute,  2009),  p.54.  
130  Sara  Roy,  Hamas  and  Civil  Society   in  Gaza:  engaging  the  Islamist  Social  Sector,  op.cit.,  
pp.58-­59.  Osama  Aburishaid,  The  Dialectic  of  Religion  and  Politics   in  Hamas’  Thought  and  
Practice,  PhD  thesis,  (Loughborough:  Loughborough  University,  2013),  p.31.  
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values.131  It  could  be  said  that  the  Islamists’  transitions  in  politics  and  towards  
moderation  is  related  to  al-­Qaradawi’s  thought.132      
3.4.2  Reconsidering  the  concept  of  the  Islamic  revival  in  the  modern  
context    
As   mentioned   before,   reform   is   the   only   way   to   achieve   the   Islamic  
revival.  Motivated  by  the  concept  of  reform  in  Islam,  Islamists  feel  obliged  to  
take   on   this   leading   role   in   Muslim   communities.   As   Islam   is   the  
comprehensive  and  ultimate  guidance,  Islamists  firmly  believe  that  they  could  
implement  Islamic  values  under  any  circumstance.  As  Tariq  Ramadan  states,  
‘this   renewal   of   religion  does  not   entail   a   change   in   the   sources,   principles,  
and   fundamentals   of   Islam,   but   only   in   the   way   the   religion   is   understood,  
implemented,  and  lived  in  different  times  or  places.’133  But  the  crucial  question  
is  how  do   Islamists  adapt   to  changing  circumstances  when   they  cannot   find  
clear   evidence   from   the   Islamic   texts?   Perhaps,   Ijtihad   could   provide   a  
solution.   Ijtihad,   which   literally   means   ‘exerting   oneself,’   promotes   a   critical  
reading  of  texts  when  Muslim  jurists  are  unable  to  locate  explicit  practices  in  
sharia.134  In   the   past,   the   person  who   has   the   ability   to   implement   Ijtihad   is  
called  Mujtahid.135  The  spirit  of  Ijtihad  contributed  to  the  early  development  of  
the   Islamic   jurisprudence,   since,   due   to   the   expansion   of   Islamic   territories,  
Muslim   scholars   could   not   find   a   text   or   evidence   in   the  Qur’an   and  Hadith  
which  offered  a  precedent  in  dealing  with  complicated  matters.  A  Muslim  jurist,  
Abu   Hanifah   (669-­767),   the   founder   of   the   Hanafi   School,   exercised   the  
principle  of  Ijtihad  by  looking  at  a  particular  issue  when  the  scriptural  sources  
failed   to   provide   a   solution.136  Therefore,   there   is   a   rule   that   when   a   jurist  
exercises   Ijtihad,   he   should   retain   the   Islamic   principles   intact   but   the  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
131  Yusuf   al-­Qaradawi,   Hasan   al-­Banna   (transl.),   Priorities   of   the   Islamic   movement   in   the  
coming  phase,  op.cit.,  p.33.  
132  Osama  Aburishaid,  The  Dialectic  of  Religion  and  Politics  in  Hamas’  Thought  and  Practice,  
op.cit.,  pp.30-­31.  
133  Ibid.,  p.12.  
134  Ibid.,  p.22.  
135  In   traditional   Islamic   perspective,  Mujtahid,   a   title   of  Muslim   jurists  who  possess  highest  
level  of  understanding  Sharia,  is  the  only  one  who  has  quality  to  exercise  Ijtihad.  Please  refer  
to  Tariq  Ramadn,   ‘Ijtihad  and  Maslaha:  The   foundations  of  Governance,’   in  Muqtedar  Khan  
(ed.),  Islamic  Democratic  Discourse  (Lanham:  Lexington  Books,  2006),  p.13.  
136  Tariq  Ramadan,  Radical  Reform,  Islamic  Ethics  and  Liberation,  op.cit.,  pp.  50-­56.  
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relationship   with   the   relevant   culture,   customs   and   social   context   could   be  
different.137    
It   is   noted   that   Ijtihad   played   an   essential   role   in   early   Islamic  
jurisprudence   up   until   the   end   of   the   9th   century.   After   that,   Ijtihad   was  
replaced  by   imitation   (taqlid)  which  became   the  mainstream   trend   in   Islamic  
jurisprudence.  That   is   to  say,  most  Muslim  jurists  did  not  exercise   Ijtihad  but  
merely   followed  the   legal  precedent   in  dealing  with  matters.  138  However,   the  
tradition  of  following  a  legal  precedent  was  questioned  in  the  modern  period;;  
and,   due   to  Western   domination   in  Muslim   society,  Muslim   scholars   look   at  
the   possibility   of   Ijtihad   to   cope   with   unprecedented   challenges.   The  
application   of   Ijtihad   in   the   modern   period   seems   to   be   a   prescription   for  
Islamists  but  there  are  contrasting  views  about  who  has  the  right  to  implement  
it.  Some  Muslim  scholars  state   that  everyone  has   the   right   to  access   Itjihad  
and   the   right   to   oppose   Ijtihad   is   solely   to   be   monopolized   by   a   special  
group.139  Other  Muslim  scholars  who  adhere   to   the   Islamic   tradition  express  
the  opposite  view,  that  the  exercise  of  Ijtihad  should  require  certain  conditions  
and  not  everyone  can  undertake  this  mission.  They  believe  that  if  Muslims  do  
not   have   a   professional   knowledge   of   sharia,   the   emancipation   of   the  
interpretation  of  Islamic  law  is  a  dangerous  thing,  which  could  lead  to  disorder  
and  fragmentation  of  Islamic  principles.140    
The   contrasting   arguments   outlined   above   reflect   the   confusion   and  
even  disaster,  experienced  by  the  circle  of   Islamists.  Reformists  such  as  the  
Muslim  Brotherhood  who  advocate  reform,  attempt  to  reconcile  the  concept  of  
modernity   with   the   Islamic   values.   They   believe   that   moderation   and  
gradualism   is   the  proper  way   to   reach  an   Islamic   revival.  Even   though   they  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
137  Ibid,  p.97.  
138  Wael  Hallaq,  ‘Was  the  Gate  of  Ijtihad  closed?’  International  Journal  of  Middle  East  Studies,  
Vol.  16,  No.1,  (March  1984),  p.3.  
139  Some  modern  Muslim  scholars  condemn  that  Muslim   jurists  dominate   the  right  of   Ijtihad,  
which  is  a  barrier  to  the  freedom  of  thought.  Therefore,  they  advocate  that  everyone  has  right  
to  exercise  Ijtihad.  Please  refer  to  Abdullahi  An-­Na’im,  ‘A  theory  of  Islam,  state  and  society,’  
in   K.   Vogt.,   L.   Larsen   and   C.   Moe   (ed.),  New   Directions   in   Islamic   Thought   (London:   I.B.  
Tauris,  2009),  p.154  and  Muqtedar  Khan,  Islamic  Democratic  Discourse,  op.cit.,  p.63.  
140  Ihsan  Yilmaz,   ‘Ijtihad  and  Tajdid  by  conduct:  The  Gulen  Movement’   in  Hakan  Yavuz  and  
John  Esposito  (ed.),  Turkish  Islam  and  the  Secular  State:  The  Gulen  Movement  (New  York:  
Syracuse  University  press,  2003),  pp.  215-­217.  
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faced   a   crackdown   by   the   local   authoritarian   government,   they   tended   to  
avoid   confrontation   with   the   government.   On   the   other   hand,   Jihadists   who  
often  overshadow  the  reformist  voice  take  the  opposite  approach.  They  do  not  
believe   in   the   value   of   democracy   and   liberalism   because   these   are   man-­
made  inventions  and  a  deviation  from  Islam.  As  Western  foreign  policy  has  a  
negative   effect   on   the   Middle   East,   they   consider   the   West   as   an   enemy.  
Therefore,   they  believe   that   Jihad   is   the  only  way   to  change   the  status  quo  
and   to   restore   the   glory   of   Islam.   Therefore,   the   Jihadists’   argument   on  
democracy,   liberalism   and   relations   with   the   West   is   incompatible   with   the  
view  of  the  reformist  Islamists.    
What  should  we  make  of  the  contrasting  approaches  between  reformists  
and   Jihadists?   Theoretically,   diversity   in   Islam   is   allowed,   with   a   specific  
condition.   Diversity   with   unity   is   a   fundamental   principle   in   Islamic  
jurisprudence.   Many   agree   that   Islam   is   one,   but   its   texts   allow   multiple  
interpretations.   In   other   words,   unity   is   a   basic   principle,   but   there   can   be  
diversity   regarding   details. 141   According   to   this   concept,   disagreements   in  
Islamic  affairs  are  grounded  in  the  spirit  of  tolerance  and  understanding.  Any  
disagreement   that   leads   to   fighting,  hatred,  and   fragmentation   in   the   Islamic  
community   is   forbidden.142  From   this   viewpoint,   some   Islamic   groups   who  
attack  other  Muslims  seem  to  violate  the  harmony  of  juristic  disagreements.143    
Yusuf   al-­Qaradawi   has   further   expanded   on   the   radical   thought   of  
Jihadists.   Isolation,   radicalization   and   ideological   orientation   of   Jihadists  
undermine   the   unity   of   Islam   and   are   obstacles   to   the   Islamic   revival.   He  
emphasizes   that   driven   by   ideology,   radical   Islamists,   have  misconceptions  
and  misjudgment  of  Islamic  affairs.144  They  tend  to  assume  that  they  are  the  
only  Muslims  who  can  interpret  Islam  but   in  fact  they  are  isolated  from  other  
Islamic   movements.   Furthermore,   al-­Qaradawi   disproves   the   assertion   that  
radical  Islamists   legitimate  their  vicious  actions  in  the  light  of  the  Qur’an  and  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
141  Mohammad  Kamali,  Shari’ah  law:  An  Introduction,  op.cit.,  p.99.  
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Hadith.  He  quotes  one  Hadith  which  rejects  radicalism:  ‘The  banner  of  Islamic  
knowledge  will  be  carried  from  one  generation  to  the  other  by  the  moderates  
who  defend   it  against   the  distortions  of  bigots,   the  claims  of   falsifier  and   the  
misinterpretation  of   the   ignorant.’145  In  other  words,  moderation   (wasatiyyah)  
or  balance  is  a  fundamental  principle  of  the  Islamic  movements.  Islamic  texts  
remind  believers  to  exercise  moderation  and  to  reject  all  kinds  of  extremism,  
such   as   excessiveness,   meticulous   religiosity   and   austerity.146  In   a   similar  
manner,   Tariq   Ramadan   shares   this   argument.   He   criticizes   some   of   the  
Islamists  who  disregard  the  principles  of   Ijtihad,  oversimplify   the  message  of  
Islam,  and  merely  imitate  or  duplicate  an  historical  model  without  considering  
and   evaluating   the   reality   of   conditions   in   their   society. 147   Following   the  
principle  of  diversity  with  unity  in  Islam,  it  can  be  argued  that  the  Islamists  who  
advocated  reform  were  able  to  make  a  clear  distinction  between  themselves  
and   the   radical   Islamists   by   claiming   that   violent   acts   are   un-­Islamic   and  
unethical  according  to  the  principle  of  the  Islamic  revival.    
Nevertheless  the  biggest  challenge  that  the  reformists  face  today  is  that  
they   failed   to   persuade   non-­Islamist   actors   about   their   Islamic   agenda.   It   is  
true   that   the   reformists  such  as   the  Brotherhood  and  other  affiliated   Islamist  
groups   driven   by   the   concept   of   the   Islamic   revival   have   endeavored   to  
accommodate   democracy,   civil   rights,   and   liberalism   in   coordination   with  
Islamic  values,  and  are  willing  to  cooperate  with  non-­Islamist  actors  and  avoid  
confrontation  with  the  authoritarian  regimes.  But  for  many  who  are  suspicious  
of  the  Islamists’  intention  the  goal  of  Islamists  is  not  the  Islamic  revival  but  an  
act  that  serves  self-­interest  or  a  hijacking  of  the  whole  country.  This  suspicion  
reached  a  peak  when  the  Brotherhood  faced  an  unprecedented  crackdown  by  
the  Egyptian  military  with  support  from  almost  all  of  liberals  after  a  coup  d’état  
in  July  2013.  Overall,  Islamist  activism  in  politics  looks  bleak.  Only  Islamists  in  
Turkey  and  Tunisia  seem  to  have  avoided  a  disturbing  scenario.  Despite  this,  
it   is   still   worth   observing   the   future   development   of   Islamists   who   are  
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motivated   by   the   concept   of   the   Islamic   revival   since   this   concept   also  
motivated  Hamas’  engagement  in  the  social  and  political  fields.    
4.  Conclusion    
As  mentioned   above,   we   have   examined   the  way   that   the   essentialist  
and   pluralist   approaches   observe,   analyze   and   evaluate   the   transition   of  
Islamists  respectively.  The  essentialist  approach,  derived  from  the  Orientalist  
tradition  places  all  Islamists  in  the  same  category.  That  is,  they  carry  a  hidden  
and  bigoted  agenda   threatening   the  security  of   the  West  and   the  stability  of  
the  host  country.  Therefore,  the  transition  of  Islamists  is  not  a  real  issue  in  this  
approach.   On   the   other   hand,   the   pluralist   approaches   contextualize   the  
Islamic   movements   through   the   accumulation   of   case   studies   with  
interdisciplinary  training  and  analyze  the  transition  of  Islamists  from  the  angles  
of   modernity.   In   addition,   the   concept   of   the   Islamic   revival   needs   to   be  
redefined  and  elaborated  in  a  modern  context  in  order  to  review  the  Islamists’  
motivation  when  they  engage  in  political  activities.  
The   conceptual   framework   for   the   Islamists’   transition   could   realize  
Hamas’  political  transition  between  2003  and  2013  as  Hamas  shares  common  
features  with  other  Islamists  who  accept  the  boundary  of  the  nation-­state,  the  
value   of   democracy,   pluralism   in   civil   society   and   driven   by   the   concept   of  
Islamic   revival.   However,   compared   with   other   Islamists   who   are   inclined  
towards  political  participation,  Hamas  could  be  considered  a  special  case.  As  
Palestine   is   under   the   Israeli   occupation,   Hamas’   transition   could   be  
interrelated   with   resistance   in   the   Palestinian   context.   The   resistance   has  
been   a   long-­term   process   since   the   creation   of   Israel   in   1948.   Before  
understanding  how  Hamas  leaned  political   transition  from  2003  to  2013,   it   is  
necessary   to   review   the   cause   for,   and   the   development   of   resistance   in   a  
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Chapter	  Two:	  Hamas’	  transition	  and	  its	  concept	  of	  resistance	  
from	  the	  Palestinian	  historical	  perspective	  
  
Hamas’   transition   in   politics   from  2003   to  2013   is   often  placed  within  
the   current   social,   economic   and   political   context.   Broadly   speaking,   this  
feature  of   transition  could  be  put   in  a  wider  historical   context  as  well.  Since  
Hamas  won  the  PLC  election  in  2006,  Israel  and  the  West  have  urged  Hamas  
to   recognise   Israel’s   right   to   exist   and   renounce   violence;;   but   Hamas   have  
always   defied   this   condition   and   stressed   the   necessity   of   resistance.   As   a  
consequence,   an   international   sanction   was   immediately   imposed   on   the  
Hamas-­led  government.  It  is  worth  noting  here,  that  Hamas’  policy  has  always  
been   to   reject   Israel’s   legitimacy;;   and   there   was   no   sign   that   Hamas’  
leadership   would   recognise   Israel   at   this   stage.   Perhaps,   in   order   to  
understand  Hamas’  stance,  it  is  necessary  to  return  to  the  history  of  Islamists  
in  Palestine  before  the  creation  of  Hamas  from  the  British  Mandate  in  1930s  
to  the  outbreak  of  the  al-­Aqsa  Intifada  in  2000.  The  course  of  modern  history  
in   Palestine   could   enable   us   to   contextualise   Hamas’   perspective   for   its  
insistence   of   resistance   toward   the   Israeli   occupation   and   its   later   political  
participation  from  2003  to  2013.    
1.  Before  the  1987  Intifada  
This   section   ‘Before   the   1987   Intifada’   will   outline   the   history   of  
Islamists   in  Palestine  and  development  of   concept  of   resistance  prior   to   the  
creation   of   Hamas   in   1987,   corresponding   to   various   phases   such   as:   al-­
Qassam   revolt   in   1935,   the  Arab   revolt   between   1936   and   1939   during   the  
British  Mandate,  the  implications  of  Nakba  after  the  creation  of  Israel  in  1948,  
the  Muslim  Brotherhood’s  activities  in  Gaza  between  1948  and  1987  and  the  
emergence  of  Islamists  in  the  occupied  territories  between  1970  and  1980.  
1.1  The  British  Mandate  (1920  -­  1948)  
After   the   collapse   of   the   Ottoman   Empire,   in   the   early   days   of   the  
British   Mandate,   Palestinians   did   not   have   a   specific   agenda   of   calling   for  
creation   of   an   Islamic   state   and   they   did   not   call   for   Jihad   against   Britain’s  
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authority.148  Instead,   the   Palestinian   a’ayan   (noble   families),   particularly   Haj  
Amin   al-­Husayni,   the   mufti   of   Jerusalem   as   a   leader,   cooperated   with   the  
British  authority  to  a  large  extent,  and  at  the  same  time,  attempted  to  change  
British  policy  in  favour  of  the  Zionists.  The  situation  in  Palestine  was  relatively  
quiet  between  November  1921  and  August  1929,  that  is,  there  was  no  major  
confrontation   between   the   Zionist   settlers   and   Palestinians   or   Palestinians  
and   the   British   authorities;;   but   after   1929   unrest   began   to   grow.149  In   the  
1930s,  the  situation  between  Palestinians  and  the  British  authority  was  tense  
due   to   the   British   pro-­Zionist   policy.   Following   the   release   of   the   Balfour  
Declaration   in   1917   and   the   end   of   World   War   I,   the   proportion   of   Jewish  
immigration   from   Europe   to   Palestine   grew   and   climaxed   between   1931   to  
1936,  which   increased   the   Jewish   population   in   Palestine   by   12   percent.150  
With   the   surge   of   Jewish   immigration   and   land   purchases,   local  Palestinian  
residents   and   political   leaders   gradually   experienced   economic   deprivation  
and   political   despair.151  In   1935,   Sheikh   Izz   ad-­Din   al-­Qassam   had   enlisted  
hundreds  of  men  against  the  British  authority  and  Jewish  settlers.  In  spite  of  
the  failure  of  his  uprising,  al-­Qassam  became  a  national  symbol  of  resistance  
and   an   inspiration   for   the   following   1936-­1939   Revolt.152  The   1930s   revolts  
still   have   profound   implication   for   Hamas.   In   memory   of   al-­Qassam’s  
resistance,  Hamas  named   the   Izz  ad-­Din  al-­Qassam  Brigades  as   its  military  
wing,  and  stressed   the   link  between   its   resistance  and   that  of  al-­Qassam   in  
the  1930s.153  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
148  Uri  M.  Kupferschmidt,  The  Supreme  Muslim  Council:   Islam  under  the  British  Mandate  for  
Palestine  (Leiden:  E.J.  Brill,  1987),  pp.  253-­254.  
149  Ilan  Pappe,  The  Rise  and  fall  of  a  Palestinian  Dynasty:  The  Husaynis  1700-­1948  (London:  
Saqi  books,  2002),  pp.  222-­226.  
150  In  1931,  the  Jewish  population  was  16  percent  of  the  total  population  in  Palestine,  while  in  
1936   the  Jewish  one  was  up   to  28  percent  of   the   total.  Please  refer   to  Samih  Farsoun  and  
Christina  Zacharia,  Palestine  and  the  Palestinians  (Colorado:  Westview  Press,  1997),  p.76.  
151  By  the  end  of  the  1930s,  40  percent  of  the  overall  spending  of  the  Jewish  Agency  was  on  
the  purchase  of  land  and  agricultural  colonization.  A  large  number  of  peasants  suffered  from  
land   loss,  which  was   a  main   cause   of   the   1936  Arab   revolt.   Please   refer   to   Ilan  Pappe,  A  
History  of  Modern  Palestine:  One  Land,  Two  People,  op.cit.,  pp.91-­98.  
152  Ted  Swedenburg,  ‘The  role  of  the  Palestinian  Peasantry  in  the  Great  Revolt  1936-­1939’  in  
Edmund   Burke   and   Ira   Lapidus   (ed.),   Islam,   Politics,   and   Social   Movements   (Berkeley:  
University  of  California  Press,  1988),  pp.  189-­190.  
153  In  Hamas’  Charter  (1:7):  ‘The  Islamic  Resistance  Movement  is  a  link  in  the  chain  of  Jihad  
against  the  Zionist  invasion.  It  is  tied  to  the  initiation  of  the  Jihad  by  the  martyr  ‘Izz  al-­Din  al-­
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It  is  noted  that  the  al-­Qassam  revolt  was  largely  attributed  to  the  cause  
of   Jewish   immigration   and   land   purchases   while   to   a   certain   degree,   al-­
Qassam  revolt  also   reflected   the  concept  of  Jihad.  al-­Qassam  studied  at  al-­
Azhar  University   in  Egypt.  Since  he  had  been  taught  by  Muhammad  Abduh,  
the   idea   of   Pan-­Islamism   as   a   force   against   the   colonialists   influenced   al-­
Qassam.154  When   al-­Qassam   stayed   in   Haifa   in   the   1920s,   he   preached   to  
the   local   people   to   be   pious   and   sound   Muslims   for   the   salvation   of  
Palestine.155  With  the  deterioration  of   the  economic  and  political  situations   in  
Palestine,   it  was  not   surprising   that  al-­Qassam  adopted  an   Islamic   resistant  
discourse,  Jihad,  as  a  way  of  defending  Islam  against  foreign  occupations.156    
In   contrast   to   al-­Qassam   revolt   at   the   grassroots   level,   there   was  
another  form  of  adopting  Islam  in  resisting  the  British  Mandate  and  the  Jewish  
settlers.  Between  the  1920s  and  1930s,  Palestinian  politics  was  managed  by  
local  a’ayan   such   as   the   al-­Husayni   and  Nashashibi   families.   Among   these  
notables,  Haj  Amin  al-­Husayni  was  a  key  figure,  leading  political  and  religious  
affairs.   In   the  1920s,  Jihad  or   resistance  was  not  a  major  option  against   the  
British   mandate   and   the   Jewish   settlers.   On   the   contrary,   Haj   al-­Husayni  
preferred  a  diplomatic  approach.  In  1921,  the  Supreme  Muslim  Council  (SMC)  
was  established  and  Haj  al-­Husayni  was  elected  as  the  President.  Facing  the  
growing  numbers  of  Jewish  immigrants,  the  SMC  raised  public  awareness  of  
Palestinian   problems   in   terms   of   seeking   solidarity   from   overseas   Muslim  
communities. 157   ‘Islamic   revival’   was   a   theme   in   the   1920s   in   the   SMC  
discourse.  The  terms  nahda  (revival)  and  ihya’  (revivification)  were  frequently  
used   in   the   early   publications   of   SMC,   terms   which   couched   an   emotional  
reflection  on  the  political  and  social  challenges.158  The  SMC’s  Islamic  revival  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Qassam’  and  his  Mujahid  brothers  in  1936.’  See  Khaled  Hroub,  Hamas:  Political  Thought  and  
Practice,  appendix,  op.cit.,  p.  271.  
154  Nels  Johnson,  Islam  and  the  politics  of  meaning  in  Palestinian  Nationalism  (Boston:  Kegan  
Paul,1982),  p.39.  
155  Ibid.,pp.39-­44.    
156  Beverley  Milton-­Edward  and  Stephen  Farrell,  Hamas:  The  Islamic  Resistance  Movement,  
op.cit.,  p.26.    
157  Uri  M.  Kupferschmidt,  The  Supreme  Muslim  Council:   Islam  under  the  British  Mandate  for  
Palestine,  op.cit.,  p.225.  
158  Ibid.,  p.226.  
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campaign  not  only   raised  awareness  of  Pan-­Islamism   in   the  1920s  but  also  
mobilized  the  masses  against  the  waves  of  Jewish  immigration.159    
While   Haj   Amin   al-­Husayni’s   non-­violent   approach   in   dealing   with  
British  authority  did  not  work  effectively,  the  year  1929  was  a  turning  point  in  
the   growing   tense   relations   between   Arabs,   Jewish   settlers   and   the   British  
Mandate.   In   August   of   that   year,   a   disturbance   in   Jerusalem   caused   the  
deaths  of  133  Jews  and  116  Arabs.160  In  the  aftermath  of  this  incident,  which  
was   accompanied   by   massive   Jewish   immigration   and   land   purchases,  
Palestinian  Muslims  felt  that  Zionists  not  only  threatened  the  al-­Aqsa  Mosque  
but  were   also   attempting   to   take   over   the   entire   territory   of  Palestine  which  
would  further  eliminate  the  presence  of  Islam  and  Arabs  in  this  territory.161  To  
stop  Zionist  activities,   the  SMC   issued  a   fatwa  along  with  a   strong   religious  
condemnation  and   the  prohibition  of   land  sales   to  Jewish  settlers.  However,  
this   order   was   ineffective   since   it   was   ignored   and   the   trend   of   land   sale  
continued.162    
The   political   failure   of   the   higher   echelons   to   convince   the   British  
authorities   to   change   pro-­Zionist   policy   is   one   factor   that   led   to   mass  
demonstrations  and  disturbances  in  the  1930s.  As  mentioned  early,  the  1935  
revolt   led  by  al-­Qassam  essentially  changed  the  form  of  resistance  from  one  
of  high  politics  to  one  of  mass  political  action.  Although  this  revolt   failed,  the  
feeling   of   resentment  was   aggravated   and   finally   broke   out   in   1936,   lasting  
until  1939.  In  1936  Haj  al-­Husayni  was  obliged  to  fall  in  line  with  the  masses  
against  the  British  Mandate.163  The  1936-­1939  Revolt  devastated  Palestine’s  
economy,  society  and  politics.  Statistically,  more  than  5,000  Palestinians  had  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
159   Musa   Budeiri   indicates   that   the   1920s   Islamic   movement   in   Palestine   assimilated   a  
nationalist   discourse;;   therefore,   it   is   difficult   to   separate   the   Islamic   discourses   from   the  
nationalist   discourse.   Please   refer   to   Musa   Budeiri,   ‘The   Palestinians:   Tensions   between  
Nationalist  and  Religious  Identities’  in  James  Jankowski  and  Israel  Gershoni  (ed.),  Rethinking  
Nationalism  in  the  Arab  Middle  East  (New  York:  Columbia  University  Press,  1997),  p.195.  
160   Basheer   Nafi,   Arabism,   Islamism   and   the   Palestine   Question,   1908-­1941   A   Political  
History  (Reading:  Ithaca,  1998),  p.95.  
161  Uri  M.  Kupferschmidt,  The  Supreme  Muslim  Council:   Islam  under  the  British  Mandate  for  
Palestine,  op.cit.,  p  241-­242.  
162  Ibid.,  pp.243-­247.  
163  Philip  Matter,   ‘The  Mufti  of  Jerusalem  and   the  politics  of  Palestine,’  Middle  East  Journal,  
Vol.  42,  No.  2  (Spring  1988),  p.235.  
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been   killed   and   over   14,000   wounded.164   Political   elites   were   exiled   from  
Palestine  which  left  a  political  vacuum  so  that  later,  Palestinians  were  unable  
to  compete  with  the  Zionist  military  forces  during  the  1947  -­  1948  War.165  
Overall,  although  Palestine  was  under   the  British  Mandate,   there  was  
no   certain   and   systematic   resistance   force   in   early   1920s.   Palestinian  
resistance   coloured   by   Islamic   discourse   had   been   grown   in   1930s   in  
response   to   the   British   policy   which   favoured   Jewish   immigration   and   land  
purchases.  Eventually,  after  1939  it  was  crushed  by  the  British  authority.  Yet,  
this   did   not   mean   that   the   force   of   politics   and   resistance   from   the   Islamic  
narrative   had   ended.   The   Muslim   Brotherhood   in   Egypt,   which   was  
considered  to  be  the  first  modern  Islamist  organization  in  the  20th  century,  had  
been  concerned  about  the  question  of  Palestine  since  the  1930s.  This  school  
of  thought  began  to  reach  Palestine  in  the  1930s,  declined  between  the  1950s  
and   the   1970s   but   incrementally   played   an   influential   role   from   the   1970s  
onwards.  
1.2  The  Muslim  Brotherhood  and  Palestine  (1930-­1948)  
According   to   Hamas’   Charter,   ‘The   Islamic   Resistance   Movement  
(Hamas)   is   one   of   the   wings   of   the   Muslim   Brotherhood   in   Palestine’. 166    
Today,  Hamas  retains  a  strong  connection  with   the  Brotherhood   in  Egypt  as  
well   as   its   political   thought,   organizational   structures   and   training.   During  
1930s  and  1940s,  the  Brotherhood  in  Egypt  paid  attention  to  the  development  
of  Palestine  for  two  main  reasons.  One  had  a  purely  religious  motivation.  To  
put  it  more  simply,  all  Muslims  are  brothers  and  when  one  brother  is  in  trouble,  
other  brothers  have  a  duty  to  relieve  his  pain.  Secondly,  as  far  as  politics  and  
economics   were   concerned,   the   Brotherhood   was   afraid   that   the   Zionists  
would   create   a   ‘Greater   Israel’   from   the   Nile   to   the   Euphrates,   which  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
164  Jamil  Hila,   ‘Reflections  on  contemporary  Palestine  History’   in   Ilan  Pappe  and  Jamil  Hilal  
(ed.),  Across   the  Wall:   Narratives   of   Israeli-­Palestinian  History   (London:   I.B.   Tauris,   2010),  
p.192.  
165  Ibid.,pp.189-­193.  
166  Hamas  Charter  (1:2)  See  Khaled  Hroub,  Hamas:  Political  Thought  and  Practice,  appendix,  
op.cit.,  p.269.  
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potentially,  constituted  a  threat   to  neighbouring  Arab  countries.167  In  the   light  
of  these  considerations,  in  August  1935,  Hassan  al-­Banna,  the  founder  of  the  
Brotherhood,   began   to   delegate   senior   members   to   spread   his   ideas   and  
show  solidarity  to  Palestine.  In  a  trip  to  Jerusalem,  Haj  al-­Husayni  welcomed  
this  delegation  and  praised   their   ideas  of  Pan-­Islamism.168  During   the  1936-­
1939  revolt  in  Palestine,  al-­Banna  did  not  appeal  for  Egyptians  to  intervene  in  
this   event   militarily   but   he   adopted   a   non-­violence   approach   such   as   the  
publication   of   articles   and   social   activities   in   order   to   promulgate   the  
significance  of  Palestine’s  questions  in  the  Egyptian  society.169  
After  the  Second  World  War,  with  its  rising  popularity  and  maturity,  the  
Brotherhood   considered   that   the   only   path   to   solving   the   questions   of  
Palestine  was  through  Jihad.  It  decided  to  form  the  first  branch  in  Jerusalem  
in  October  1945  and  later  extended  to  other  cities,  such  as  Haifa,  Hebron  and  
Gaza.170  The   Brotherhood’s   branches   in   Palestine   not   only   addressed   the  
concept   of   liberation   to   Palestinians   but   also   emphasized   Islamic   values   in  
every   aspects   of   life.171  From  December   1947   to  May   1948,   Al-­Banna   sent  
volunteers   in   three   battalions   to   Palestine.   While   these   fighters   had   small  
successes   in   guerrilla  warfare   in   the  Negev   and   the  West   Bank,   they  were  
unable   to   change   the   fate   of   Palestine   in   1948.   Meanwhile,   the   Egyptian  
government  disbanded  the  Brotherhood’s  activities  in  December  1948,  which  
ended  its  operation  in  Palestine.172    
1.3  The  1948  War  and  Nakba:  The  cause  of  resistance  
The   force   of   Islamists  was   insignificant   in   the   1948  war   although   the  
Egyptian   Brotherhood   engaged   in   the   conflict.   In   addition,   the   flame   of  
Islamists   inside   Palestine   that   had   been   extinguished   after   1939   took   no  	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171  Ibid.,  p.156.  For  example,  the  Brotherhood  engaged  in  the  social,  economic,  medical  and  
academic  fields  in  Palestine.  Transmitting  the  religious  education  was  one  of  the  major  tasks  
for  the  Brotherhood  at  that  period.  
172  Ibid.,  pp.209-­210.  
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decisive  role  in  the  1948  war.  The  result  of  the  1948  War  was  the  creation  of  
Israel  and   the  collapse  of  Palestinian  society.   In   the   Israeli  official  narrative,  
the  1948  War  was  a  miracle  since  a  little  Jewish  David  defeated  a  giant  Arab  
Goliath.   Israel   could   not   be   blamed   for   the   fact   that   during   this   war,   many  
Palestinians   had   fled   from   their   hometown.   Furthermore,   the   Jews   had  
pleaded  with  Palestinians  to  stay   in  order  to  demonstrate  their  willingness  to  
coexist.  This  narrative  also  blames   the  Arab  countries;;  and   the  Palestinians  
were  held  responsible  for  their  own  predicament  and  their  failure  was  due  to  
Arab  intransigence  toward  Zionists.173  
However,   for   Palestinians,   the   1948   War   that   had   resulted   in   the  
devastation   of   Palestinian   society   has   constructed   a   collective   memory,  
Nakba,   which   literally   means,   catastrophe,   in   almost   every   Palestinian  
mind.174  According  to  Ilan  Pappe’s  research,  the  Zionist  leaders  put  their  plan  
into  practice   for   the  expulsion  of  native  Palestinians  between  May  1948  and  
January  1949.  Over  750,000  Palestinians  which  accounted  for  more  than  half  
of   the   population   had   lost   their   homeland   because   of   the   Zionist   militant  
activities. 175   These   Palestinians   who   had   been   expelled   by   the   Zionists  
became   refugees.  They  and   later  generations  have  been  denied  a   return   to  
their   homeland   over   six   decades.   In   other   words,   Nakba   represents   the  
symbol  of  homeless  Palestinians,  the  ruination  of  society  and  disillusionment  
but  it  also  creates  an  aspiration  for  the  reconstitution  of  Palestine  and  a  claim  
to   fundamental   rights   for   many   Palestinians.176  It   can   be   argued   that   this  
collective   memory   became   a   national   identity   for   nearly   all   Palestinians,177  
regardless  of  the  political  factions  they  come  from  and  the  places  where  they  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
173   Avi   Shlaim   has   analyzed   the   traditional   Israeli   narrative   in   the   1948   war   and   then  
deconstructed  these  myths.  See  Avi  Shlaim,  ‘The  debate  about  1948’  in  Ilan  Pappe  (ed.),  The  
Israel/Palestine  Question  (London:  Routledge,  1999),  pp.172-­180.  
174   The   1948   war   at   least   caused   the   dispossession   of   around   77   to   83   percent   of   the  
Palestinians   who   originally   lived   in   Palestine   that   was   later   occupied   by   Israel   and   they  
became   refugees.   See   Ahmad   Sa’di,   ‘Catastrophe,   Memory   and   Identity:   Al-­Nakbah   as   a  
component  of  Palestinian  Identity’,  Israel  Studies,  Vol.  7,  No.2  (Summer  2002),  p.  175.  
175  Ilan   Pappe,   ‘The   1948  Ethnic   cleansing   of   Palestine,’   Journal   of   Palestine   Studies,   Vol.  
XXXVI,  No.1  (Autumn  2006),  pp.6-­20.  
176   Ahmad   Sa’di,   and   Lila   Abu-­Lughod   (ed.),   Nakba:   Palestine,   1948   and   the   claims   of  
memory  (New  York:  Columbia  University  Press,  2007),  pp.5-­9.  
177  Ibid.,  pp.4-­5.  
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live.  Hamas’  political  thought,  the  concept  of  resistance  and  its  rejection  of  the  
Israeli   legitimacy  could  be  understood  from  this  perspective  as  many  of  their  
leaders,  members  and  constituencies  are  refugees  who  have  been  denied  a  
return  to  their  homeland  since  1948.  
1.4  The  absence  of  Islamists  in  Palestine,  1948-­1967    
After   the   creation   of   Israel   in   1948,   Gaza   and   the   West   Bank   were  
respectively   managed   and   ruled   by   Egypt   and   Jordan.   The   Brotherhood’s  
resistance   in  Gaza  did  engage   in  guerrilla  operations   in  1950  against   Israel  
but   the   military   impulse   was   rather   more   nationalist   than   religious   in  
character.178  From   the   1950s   to   the   early   1960s,   Arab   nationalism   was   a  
leading  trend  throughout  the  Arab  countries.  Islamist  discourse  in  Palestinian  
politics  was  less  influential  when  the  President  of  Egypt,  Gamal  Abdel  Nasser  
(1918-­1970)  suppressed  the  Brotherhood  in  Egypt  in  1954,  which  also  forced  
the  Gazan  Brotherhood  to  turn   into  a  clandestine  organization.179  In  the  mid-­
1960s  the  Brotherhood’s  activities  in  Gaza  almost  terminated  due  to  the  effect  
of  the  execution  of  Sayyid  Qutb,  an  influential  Islamist  intellectual  in  Egypt.180  
In  short,  from  the  1950s  to  the  1960s,  Islamists  in  Gaza  was  fragmented  and  
overwhelmed  by  Arab  Nationalism.  
1.5   ‘Islamic   revival’   and  Gazan  Brotherhood   from   the   late  1960s   to   the  
1970s:  Non-­confrontational  resistance  
While   things   changed   in   the   late   1960s,   a   trend   of   ‘Islamic   revival’  
appeared  to  replace  the  Arab  Nationalism  and  this  was  due  to  the  fact  that  the  
defeat  of  the  Six-­Day  war  was  considered  to  be  a  deviation  from  the  path  of  
Islam.181  That   is  to  say,  the  failure  of   the  1967  War  was  the  consequence  of  
the  Muslim  leaders’  neglect  of  Islamic  values  by  imitating  western  nationalism  
and   socialism.   From   1969   onwards,   Islamism   seems   to   have   been   an  
alternative  solution  in  the  defense  of  foreign  interventions  and  a  challenge  in  
domestic  politics;;  whilst   in   the  occupied  territories,   the  West  Bank  and  Gaza  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
178  Ilan  Pappe,  A  History  of  Modern  Palestine:  One  Land,  Two  People,  op.  cit.,  p.148.    
179  Azzam  Tamimi,  Hamas:  Unwritten  Chapters,  op.  cit.,  p.17.  
180  Mohammed   Shadid,   ‘The  Muslim   Brotherhood  Movement   in   the  West   Bank   and  Gaza,’  
Third  World  Quarterly,  Vol.  10,  No.  2  Islam  &  Politics  (April  1988),  p.660.  
181  Yvonne  Haddad,  ‘Islamists  and  the  “Problem  of  Israel”:  The  1967  awakening,’  Middle  East  
Journal,  Vol.46,  No.2  (Spring  1992),  p.274.  
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Strip,   there   were   other   stories.   Nationalism   was   still   strong   among  
Palestinians   after   the   1967   war.   PLO   as   a   national   resistance   movement  
whose  ultimate  goal  was  the  liberation  of  Palestine  played  the  leading  role  in  
launching   guerrillas   within   the   occupied   West   Bank   and   Gaza   and   nearby  
Arab   countries.   Islamic   discourse,   as   the   source   of   resistance,  was   seldom  
heard  during  this  period.  In  the  occupied  territories,  the  Brotherhood  members  
chose   not   to   join   the   nationalist   movement   and   distanced   themselves   from  
armed  resistance  against  Israeli  occupation.    
From   the   Gazan   Brotherhood’s   perspective,   it   shared   a   similar  
sentiment   with   other   Islamists:   that   Muslims’   misery   was   attributed   to   the  
disobedience  to  Islamic  teaching.  But  they  did  not  follow  the  military  path  that  
other  Palestinians   engaged   in.   The   reason  was   that  Sheikh  Ahmad  Yassin,  
the  Brotherhood  activist  and  later  the  founder  of  Hamas,  believed  that   in  the  
1970s   the   armed   resistance   against   the   Israeli   occupation   had   not   been  
mature,   and   it   required   a   fuller   preparation   by   reconstructing   Palestinian  
society   in   the   direction   of   an   Islamic   environment. 182   Under   these  
circumstances,   Yassin   began   to   be   involved   in   Islamic   social   activities.   In  
1967  and  1973,  Yassin  set  up   two  associations,   Islamic  society  (al-­Jam’iyah  
al-­Islamiyah)   and   the   Islamic   centre   (al-­Mujamma’  al-­Islami)   in  Gaza.183  The  
purpose  of  these  organizations  was  to  preach  Islamic  values  in  the  occupied  
society.   By   doing   that,   Islamic   education   took   a   pivotal   role   in   reforming  
society   into  an   Islamic  orientation.  A   large  number  of  mosques  were  built   in  
Gaza   in   the   1970s.184  The   role   of   the   mosque   was   not   only   to   provide   for  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
182  Yassin   is   convinced   that  Palestine   could  only   be   liberated   from   the  Zionists   by  a   strong  
Islamic   society   and   this   requires   a   gradual   and   long-­term   process   of   transformation   in   the  
individual,  family  and  the  entire  community.  See  Azzam  Tamimi,  Hamas:  Unwritten  Chapters,  
op.cit.,  pp.  20-­28.  
183  Although  the  Islamic  centre  (al-­Mujamma’  al-­Islami)  was  founded  in  1973,  Yassin  could  not  
obtain   official   license   for   running   this   centre   from   the   Israeli   permission   until   1977.  Mayhib  
Sulaman,  Hamas:  mi  al-­dakhil  (Inside  Hamas)  (Gaza:  Dār  al-­sharuq,  2002),  p.13.  
184  The  Islamic  centre  was  responsible   for  40  percent  of  Mosques’  construction  and  most  of  
them  were  out  of  control  by  the  waqf  administration  in  Gaza.  See  Gleen  Robinson,  Building  a  
Palestinian  State:  The  Incomplete  Revolution  (Bloomington:  Indiana  University  press,  1997),  
p.137.  Michael  Dumper,   ‘Forty  years  without  slumbering:  Waqf  politics  and  Administration  in  
the  Gaza  Strip,  1948-­1987’,  British  Journal  of  Middle  Eastern  Studies,  Vol.20,  No.2   (1993),  
pp.185-­189.  
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worship   but   also  multifunctional   services   such  as,   teaching,   communication,  
and  social  assistance.185    
In  reviewing  the  Islamic  social  and  cultural  revival  in  Palestine  in  1970s,  
it   seems   that   the   Gazan   Brotherhood   presented   an   alternative   form   of  
resistance.   In   contrast   to   the   armed   resistance   led   by   the   PLO,   the  Gazan  
Brotherhood   believed   that   the   first   step   to   liberation   is   to   create   an   Islamic  
society   from   the   bottom.   This   concept   is   from   Hassan   al-­Banna’s   political  
doctrine.   Al-­Banna   deemed   Islam   to   be   a   comprehensive   system,  
encompassing   all   physical   and   spiritual   dimensions.   In   his   time,   Egyptian  
society  was  affected  by  Western  culture,  economy,  and  politics.  Therefore  al-­
Banna  believed  that  only  through  intellectual,  social  and  cultural  liberation  that  
real   political   independence   could   be   achieved.186  In   the   early   period   of   the  
Egyptian   Brotherhood,   Al-­Banna   promoted   Islamic   education,   and   social  
services  all  over  Egypt  in  order  to  transform  Egyptian  society  from  the  yoke  of  
Western   influence   to   the   real   Islamic   orders. 187   In   the   1970s,   the   Gazan  
Brotherhood   adhered   precisely   to   this   route   and   insisted   that   Palestine’s  
liberation   would   only   occur   when   the   Islamic   order   was   implemented.   This  
was   partially   the   reason   why   the   Gazan   Brotherhood   did   not   confront   the  
occupational  forces.188    
Another   reason   why   the   Gazan   Brotherhood   did   not   choose   armed  
resistance  in  the  occupied  territory  was  their  incompetence  in  resisting  Israel  
militarily  and  politically.  From  1967  to  1976,  the  Palestinian  armed  resistance  
and   political   movement   usually   took   place   outside   the   occupied   territories.  
Within   the   West   Bank   and   Gaza,   the   form   of   resistance   put   emphasis   on  
steadfastness   instead   of   military   operation.   Under   the   Israeli   military  
administration   between   1967   and   1981,   the   pressing   issue   for   Palestinians  
inside   the   occupied   territories  was   to   seek   a   new   sense   of   normality   and   a  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
185  Zaki  Chehab,  Inside  Hamas:  The  untold  story  of  Militants,  Martyrs  and  spies,  op.cit.,  p19.  
186  Richard  Mitchell,  The  Society  of  the  Muslim  Brothers,  op.cit.,  p.230.  
187  Ibid.,  pp.283-­291.  
188  Azzam  Tamimi,  Hamas:  Unwritten  Chapters,  op.  cit.,  p.29.  
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way   to   endure   the   Israeli   occupation. 189   Within   this   context,   the   Gazan  
Brotherhood’s  non-­confrontational  work  can  be  understood.    
Overall,   during   the   1970s,   the   Brotherhood   in   Gaza   avoided   military  
and   political   confrontation  with   Israel   and   devoted   itself   to   the   promotion   of  
Islamic   education   and   social   services.   However,   other   Palestinian   factions  
criticized  the  stance  of  ‘non-­resistance’  and  the  Brotherhood  gradually  faced  a  
challenge  from  within.  In  the  1980s,  due  to  criticism  of  its  non-­resistance  and  
the  accusation  of  collaboration  with  Israel,  the  Brotherhood  was  compelled  to  
consider  the  military  option.190    
1.6  The  emergence  of  Islamist  armed  resistance  in  Palestine  during  the  
1980s  
The   Islamists’   armed   resistance   in   Palestine   in   the   1980s   that   had  
been  precipitated  by  several   factors,  gradually  emerged.  At  a   regional   level,  
the  1979  Iranian  revolution  and  Hizbullah’s  guerrilla  operation  in  1982  against  
the  Israeli  invasion  of  Lebanon  inspired  Palestinian  Islamists’  determination  to  
struggle  with   the   Israeli  occupation.191  On   the  domestic   level,   the   role  of   the  
Likud  party  with  its  strong  Jewish  messianic  ideology192  and  the  fall  of  PLO   in  
Lebanon  in  1982  wrecked  the  national  movement  and  increased  the  voice  of  
Islamists  in  Palestine.    
The   Islamic   Jihad   with   leaders   that   had   originated   from   the   Gazan  
Brotherhood,  was   the   first  Palestinian   Islamic  organization   to   launch  attacks  
against  the  Israeli  occupation  in  the  early  1980s.  In  Gaza,  the  Brotherhood’s  
non-­confrontational  approach  was  challenged  from  within  and  criticized  by  the  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
189  Kim  Cragin,  Palestinian  Resistance  through  the  eyes  of  Hamas,  PhD  thesis  (University  of  
Cambridge,  2008),  pp.33-­49.    
190  Azzam  Tamimi   refers   to  an  accusation   that  was  made  against   the  Brotherhood   in  Gaza  
that  they  collaborated  with  the  occupation  authorities;;   therefore,   they  could  be  tolerated  and  
obtained  licensed  projects,  See  Azzam  Tamimi,  Hamas:  Unwritten  Chapters,  op.  cit.,  p.42.  
191  Hizbullah  demonstrated  its  capacity  to  confront  Israeli  forces,  enhancing  a  perception  that  
only   Islam  could  defeat   Israel.  See  Yvonne  Haddad,   ‘Islamists   and   the   “Problem  of   Israel”:  
The  1967  awakening’,  Middle  East  Journal,  op.  cit.,  p.270.  
192  Likud  leaders  declared  that  the  West  Bank  and  Gaza  an  integral  part  of  the  biblical  Land  of  
Israel  and  contended  that  Jews  had  an  inalienable  right  there.  See  Emile  Sahliyeh,  In  Search  
leadership  West  Bank  politics  since  1967  (Washington  D.C.:  The  Brookings  Institution,  1988),  
p.141.  
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Islamic   Jihad. 193   In   1983,   Yassin   considered   the   possibility   of   setting   up  
armed   branches.   He   formed   two   military   wings   called   al-­Majd   and   al-­
Mujahideen   for   the  preparation  of   collecting  weapons,  but   this  plan   failed   in  
1984  when  Yassin  and  his  members  were  arrested  by   Israel.194  Despite   the  
setback,  a  seed  of  Islamic  consciousness  for  resistance  which  was  planted  in  
the  1970s  had  bloomed  in  public  spaces.  Palestinian  Islamists  were  active  in  
religious   practice,   institution-­building   and   student   body   elections   at  
universities  in  the  1980s.195      
This   debate   concerning   armed   resistance   was   finally   resolved   when  
the   first   Intifada   broke   up   in   December   1987. 196   The   Intifada   that   was  
triggered  by  an  accident  led  to  the  creation  of  Hamas.  Azzam  Tamimi  asserts  
that  the  Intifada  was  a  gift  from  heaven  for  the  Gazan  Brotherhood  since  they  
had  been  preparing  since  1983.197  He  adds  that  the  Brotherhood  had  to  seize  
this  occasion  for  calling  resistance  in  order  to  end  the  occupation;;  otherwise,  
the  Brotherhood  would  face  demise.198  Glenn  Robinson  argues  that   the  birth  
of  Hamas  was   an   internal   coup  within   the  Gazan  Brotherhood   and   that   the  
middle-­stratum  cadres  were  able  to  take  the   lead  in  opposition  to  the  reform  
approach  espoused  by  traditional  leaderships.199  To  sum  up,  the  first  Intifada,  
to  a  great  extent,  has  inevitably  transformed  the  character  of  the  Brotherhood  
in  Gaza   from  one   of   a   social   orientation   into   a   resistance  movement   and   it  
started  to  compete  with  Fatah’s  leadership  during  this  period.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
193  Islamic  Jihad  was   founded   in   the  early  1980s  and   the   founder  of   Islamic  Jihad,  Fathi  al-­
Shiqaqi  used  to  be  a  pupil  of  Sheikh  Yassin.  Islamic  Jihad  believed  that  armed  struggle  and  
Islamization   of   Palestine   could   be   done   simultaneously.   See   Gleen   Robinson,   Building   a  
Palestinian  State:  The  incomplete  Revolution,  op.  cit.,  p.  146.      
194  Sara  Roy,  Hamas  and  Civil  Society  in  Gaza:  Engaging  the  Islamist  Social  Sector,  op.  cit.,  
p.24.  
195  Glenn  Robinson  cited  the  1984  survey,  showing  that  the  increasing  numbers  of  Palestinian  
Muslims  practiced  the  daily  prayer,  Qur’anic  recitation  and  fasting.  In  addition,  more  and  more  
college  students  tended  to  embrace  Islamism,  which  became  the  second  big  bloc  in  student  
elections   of   university.   See   Gleen   Robinson,  Building   a   Palestinian   State:   The   incomplete  
Revolution,  op.  cit.,  p.  136.      
196  Sara  Roy,  Hamas  and  Civil  Society  in  Gaza:  Engaging  the  Islamist  Social  Sector,  op.  cit.,  
p.25.  
197  Azzam  Tamimi,  Hamas:  Unwritten  Chapters,  op.  cit.,  p.52.    
198  Ibid.,  p.52.  
199  Gleen  Robinson,  Building  a  Palestinian  State:  The  incomplete  Revolution,  op.  cit.,  pp.  149-­
153.      
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This  section  does  not  chronicle  the  historical  details  of  the  development  
of   the  Brotherhood   in  Palestine  since  several  scholarly  studies  have  already  
done  that.200  This  exploration  devotes  more  space  to  the  history  of  Islamists  in  
Palestine  and  a  brief  Palestinian  history  from  the  British  Mandate  to  the  eve  of  
the  first  Intifada  because  these  critical  moments  shaped  Hamas’s  perception  
of  resistance  toward  the  Israeli  occupation,   the  Oslo  Peace  Process  and  the  
motivation   for   its   political   integration   in   the   period   between   2003-­2006.   It   is  
clear   to  see  that  Hamas,  as  an  Islamic  resistance  movement,   is   in  step  with  
al-­Qassam,  a  resistance  icon  of  the  1930s  and  it  connects  in  its  emphasis  on  
Islamic   culture,   education   and   social   services,   to   the  Egyptian  Brotherhood,  
as  an  example  of  Islamic  reform.  
The  next  section  will  address  Hamas’  position  on  the  first  Intifada,  the  
international  peace  conferences  and  the  Oslo  Peace  Process.  In  addition,  the  
way  that  Hamas  confronted  and  adapted  to  the  new  reality  will  be  highlighted.  
2.    From  the  first  Intifada  to  the  Oslo  Peace  Process  (1987-­2000)  
The   outbreak   of   the   first   Intifada   in   December   1987   led   to   the  
embodiment  of  Hamas  detached  from  the  Gazan  Muslim  Brotherhood.  Hamas,  
as  a  resistance  movement  that  was  painted  with  Islamic  reference,  gradually  
turned  into  an  alternative  force  that  was  in  competition  with  Fatah  for  seeking  
dominance   of   political   discourse   in   the   occupied   territories   during   the   first  
Intifada   and   the   Oslo   Peace   Process.   In   this   section,   a   brief   political   and  
social   background   between   1987-­1993   and   1993-­2000   will   be   presented  
chronologically.  In  particular,  the  period  of  the  Oslo  Peace  Process  attested  to  
Hamas’  conviction  that  resistance  is  the  only  way  to  end  the  Israeli  occupation.  
This   is   because   the   negotiation   failed   to   reach   Palestinians’   aspiration   of  
freedom   and   dignity   but   rather   it   fragmented   Palestinian   lands   into   cantons  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
200  Ziad  Abu  Amr  and  Khaled  Hroub  have  delineated  a  brief  history  of  the  Muslim  Brotherhood  
in   Palestine   during   the   British  Mandate.   Shaul  Mishal,   Avraham  Sela   and   Beverley  Milton-­
Edwards  have  dealt  with   the   Islamic  centre   (al-­Mujamma’  al-­Islami)   in   the  1970s.  See  Ziad  
Abu-­Amr,   Islamic   Fundamentalism   in   the   West   Bank   and   Gaza:   Muslim   Brotherhood   and  
Islamic   Jihad   (Indiana:   Indiana  University  Press,   1994),   pp.1-­3.  Shaul  Mishal   and  Avraham  
Sela,   The   Palestinian   Hamas:   Vision,   Violence,   and   Coexistence   (New   York:   Columbia  
University   Press,   2000),   pp.19-­23.   Khaled   Hroub,   Hamas:   Political   Thought   and   Practice  
(Washington:   Institute   for   Palestine   Studies,   2002),   pp.12-­25.   Beverley   Milton-­Edwards,  
Islamic  Politics  in  Palestine  (London:  Tauris  Academic  Studies,  1996),  pp.98-­101.  Jean-­Pierre  
Filiu,   ‘The   origins   of   Hamas:   Military   legacy   or   Israeli   tool?’   Journal   of   Palestine   Studies,  
Vol.41,  No.3  (Spring  2012),  pp.54-­70.  
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and  strengthened  Israeli  domination.  It  is  noted  that  Hamas  gained  invaluable  
experience   and   learned   lessons   from   this   period   when   it   constructed   its  
resistance  project  and  considered   the  applicability  of  political  participation   to  
the  PA  from  2003  to  2006.  Therefore,  it  is  necessary  to  have  a  basic  outline  of  
a   historical   review   of   the   way   Hamas   confronted   and   adapted   to   the   new  
scenario  during  the  Oslo  Peace  Process.  
2.1  The  First  Intifada  (1987  -­  1993)  
The   first   Intifada   that   could   be   seen   as   a   rather   abrupt   episode   that  
erupted   on   the   9th  December   1987   had   profound   repercussions   on   ensuing  
developments   in   Palestine,   the   rest   of   the   Middle   East   and   international  
relations,  as  well.  The   Intifada  not  only  prompted   the  creation  of  Hamas  but  
also  paved  the  way  for   international  peace  conferences  and  the  Oslo  Peace  
Process.  In  addition  to  this,   the  Intifada  was  a  turning  point   for   the  revival  of  
the  PLO,  which  had  been  marginalized  in  the  Arab  world  since  their  expulsion  
in  Lebanon   in  1982.201  The  exiled  PLO   leadership  seized   this  opportunity   to  
take  an   initiative  by  declaring   independence   in  November   1988,   and   calling  
for  a  Palestine  State  in  the  West  Bank,  Gaza  Strip  and  East  Jerusalem.  This  
declaration  was  an  historical  breakthrough  for  the  PLO.  It  replaced  the  PLO’s  
original  goal   in  1964  of   the  elimination  of   Israel,202  and  also  symbolized   that  
the   two-­state   solution   had   become   a   tangible   agenda   amongst   the   PLO  
leadership. 203   Nevertheless,   Hamas   believed   that   this   declaration   was  
equivalent   to   the   repudiation   of   resistance,   indicating   that   the   PLO   had  
compromised  with  Israel  and  the  United  States.204  
Hamas’   uncompromising   stance   towards   Israel   was   reflected   in   the  
Charter  that  was  issued  in  August  1988.  This  Charter  revealed  a  fundamental  
different   approach   to   the   declaration   of   independence  made   by   the  PLO.   It  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
201  Kahled  Hroub,  Hamas:  Political  Thought  and  Practice,  op.cit.,  p.36.  
202  Rashid  Khalidi,  The  Iron  Cage:  The  Story  of  the  Palestinian  Struggle  for  Statehood  (Oxford:  
Oneworld  Oxford,  2009),  p.154.  
203  David  Newman  and  Ghazi  Falah,  ‘Bridging  the  Gap:  Palestinian  and  Israeli  Discourses  on  
Autonomy  and  Statehood,’  Transactions  of  the  Institute  of  British  Geographers,  New  Series,  
Vol.22,  No.1  (1997),  p.119.    
204  Ziad  Abu-­Amr,  Islamic  Fundamentalism  in  the  West  Bank  and  Gaza:  Muslim  Brotherhood  
and  Islamic  Jihad,  op.cit.,  pp.73-­74.  
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aimed   to   liberate   Palestine   and   denounced   any   peace   deal   or   International  
conference   that  worked  against  Palestinian   interests.  Hamas  was  convinced  
that  peace  negotiations  were  a  betrayal  of  Islamic  belief  and  an  abandonment  
of   Palestine. 205   This   uncompromising   stance   remains   in   Hamas’   political  
thought   during   and   after   its   electoral   victory   in   2006.   Apart   from   this,   the  
Charter   courted   controversy  as   some  of   clauses   conflate   Jews  and  Zionists  
that  are  considered  to  be  anti-­semitism  or  anti-­Jewish.  For  example,  Article  7  
of  the  Charter  cites  a  narration  from  Hadith  referring  to  Jews:  ‘The  Final  Hour  
will  not  come  until  Muslims  fight  against  Jews  and  the  Muslims  kill  them,  and  
until  the  Jews  hide  behind  rocks  and  trees,  and  a  stone  or  tree  would  say:  “O  
Muslim,  servant  of  God,  there  is  a  Jew  hiding  behind  me,  come  on  and  kill  him!  
But   the   tree   of  Gharqad   would   not   say   it,   for   it   is   the   tree   of   the   Jews”.’206  
Regarding  this  dispute,  Khaled  Hroub  who  specializes  in  Hamas  indicates  that  
this   Charter   was   not   sophisticated   and   was   written   by   an   old   Muslim  
Brotherhood  member  who  was  completely  isolated  from  the  outside  world  and  
who  did  not  seek  other  Hamas  members’  consultation  and  consensus.  Hroub  
adds   that   Hamas   leaders   regretted   that   some   of   the   clauses   were   anti-­
Semitism   since   they   engaged   with   the   West   frequently.   Therefore,   Hamas  
leaders   rarely   referred   to   the   Charter   after   two   years   of   its   publication.207  
Instead,   Hamas   later   issued   documents   that   clearly   differentiated   the  
difference  between  Zionist   and   Jews,   emphasizing   its   fight   is   only   aimed  at  
Zionism  as   an   occupier   and   not   against   the   Jews  as   a   religious   and   ethnic  
group.208  
Regarding   the   reasons   of   the   emergence   of   Hamas   during   the   first  
Intifada,   there   are   possibly   two   explanations.   One   is   the   existence   of   a  
Palestinian  milieu  that  motivated  the  Muslim  Brotherhood  in  Gaza  to  create  a  
new   Islamic   organization   against   the   Israeli   occupation.   Before   the   Intifada,  
young   Islamists   in   the  Brotherhood  were  under  enormous  pressure   from  the  
Islamic  Jihad  and  other  nationalists,  who  condemned   their  passivity   towards  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
205  Khaled  Hroub,  Hamas:  Political  Thought  and  Practice,  appendix,  op.cit.,  p.  274.  
206  Ibid.,p.272.    207	  Khaled  Hroub,  Hamas:  A  Beginner’s  Guide,  op.cit.,  p.33.	  
208  Ibid,  pp.31-­34.  
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the   Israeli   occupation.   Consequently,   it   was   unlikely   that   the   Brotherhood  
would  remain  silent  as  usual  when  the  Intifada  broke  out.209  The  other  cause  
of  establishing  a  new  Islamic  resistance  movement  was  an  internal  calculation  
within  the  Brotherhood.  Ahmed  Yassin  was  cautious  about  the  unprecedented  
incident  that  may  have  been  detrimental  to  all  the  Brotherhood  organizations.  
He  did  not  want   to  drag  the  Brotherhood  into  an  uncertain  situation.  For   this  
reason,  Yassin  and  other  senior  Brotherhood  members  distinguished  Hamas  
from  the  other  socially-­oriented  organizations  such  as  the  Islamic  Society  (al-­
Jam’iyah  al-­Islamiyah)  and  the  Islamic  Centre  (al-­Mujamma’  al-­Islami).  In  this  
respect,   Hamas   was   specifically   defined   as   a   resistance   movement   with   a  
clear  goal   for   resisting   the   Israeli   occupation   in  order   to  ensure  and   restore  
the  Palestinians’  rights  and  security.210  
Admittedly,  the  Intifada  was  not  characterised  by  an  Islamic  reference  
like   the   Iranian   revolution   in   1979   but   Islamists   such   as   Hamas   and   the  
Islamic  Jihad  actively  engaged  with  demonstrations  and  strikes.  At  the  same  
time,  Islamists  were  in  competition  with  the  PLO  in  dominating  the  leading  role  
during   the   Intifada.   It   is   noted   that   the   PLO   appealed   to   Palestinian  
nationalism  and   its  aspiration   for  national   independence.  Nationalism   is  also  
an  essential  element  for  Hamas’  resistance  discourse  and  in  Hamas’  Charter,  
nationalism   is   an   integral   part   of   the   resistance.   The   divergence   between  
Hamas  and  PLO  is  that  Hamas  colours  nationalism  with  the  Islamic  reference.  
Unlike  some  foreign  Islamists  whose  vision  is  to  break  the  barriers  of  artificial  
borders   across   the   Middle   East,   Hamas   empowered   Nationalism   with   the  
Islamic   rationale.  As  Hamas’  Charter  states,   ‘Nothing   is   loftier   in  nationalism  
or  deeper   in  devotion   than   this:   If  an  enemy   invades  Muslim  territories,   then  
Jihad  and  fighting  the  enemy  becomes  an  individual  duty  for  every  Muslim.’211    
To   sum   up,   the   Gazan   Brotherhood   that   encountered   an  
unprecedented   scenario   since   the   outbreak   of   Intifada   decided   to   create  
Hamas   to   engage   the   ranks   of   resistance   in   line   with   the   Palestinian  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
209  Jeroen  Gunning,  Hamas  in  Politics:  Democracy,  Religion,  Violence,  op.  cit.,  pp.  36-­37.  
210  Ziad  Abu-­Amr,  Islamic  Fundamentalism  in  the  West  Bank  and  Gaza:  Muslim  Brotherhood  
and  Islamic  Jihad,  op.cit,  pp.66-­67.  
211   Hamas   Charter   (3:12)   See   Khaled   Hroub,   Hamas:   Political   Thought   and   Practice,  
appendix,  op.cit.,  p.  274.  
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nationalists.   Hamas   defined   its   character   of   resistance   as   Islamic   and   it  
gradually   became   an   alternative   force   in   challenging   Fatah’s   hegemonic  
political  power  during  the  Intifada  and  later,  the  Oslo  Peace  Process.212    
2.2  The  Madrid  Conference  and  Hamas    
When  referring  to  the  Oslo  Peace  Process,   it   is  necessary  to  go  back  
to  the  Madrid  Conference  in  October  1991  that  was  an  important  occasion  for  
PLO   in   the   negotiation   with   Israel.   It   can   be   said   that   without   the   Madrid  
conference,  the  Oslo  Peace  Process  could  not  possibly  have  taken  place.213  It  
is  no  wonder  that  Hamas  continued  to  deny  the  legitimacy  of  this  International  
conference  and  denounced  Palestinian  delegates  who  attended  it  214  as  they  
considered  such  peace  talks  to  be  a  conspiracy  by  the  West  and  a  betrayal  of  
Islam.215    
Prior  to  the  Oslo  Peace  Process,  the  popularity  of  Hamas  was  getting  
stronger  inside  Gaza  through  its  well-­organized  Islamic  social  welfare  system.  
In   contrast   to   this,   Fatah   faced  a   financial   crisis   and  was  unable   to   provide  
services  as  its  financial  source  was  halted  by  Gulf  States  following  its  political  
decision  for  the  support  of  Saddam  Hussein  during  the  Gulf  War   in  1990.  216  
In  view  of  the  rise  of  Hamas  and  the  crisis  of  the  PLO,  Arafat  tried  to  diminish  
Hamas’  leverage  in  the  occupied  territory  on  the  one  hand217  and  precipitated  
the  process  of  international  negotiation  on  the  other.  The  secret  talks  in  Oslo  
in   1993   can   be   seen   against   this   background.   Another   incident   that   might  
bring  about  the  secret  negotiation  was  the  mass  expulsion  of  415  Palestinians,  
mostly   from   Hamas,   to   the   Marj   al-­Zuhur,   the   Lebanese   mountain   in  
December  1992.  This  expulsion  led  to  skepticism  amongst  many  Palestinians  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
212  Rashid  Khalidi  indicates  that  Fateh  has  effectively  dominated  Palestinian  politics  since  the  
late   1960s,   and   never   really   practised   power-­sharing   with   other   factions.   Please   refer   to  
Rashid  Khalidi,  The  Iron  Cage:  The  Story  of   the  Palestinian  Struggle  for  Statehood,  op.  cit.,  
p.152.  
213  Beverley  Milton-­Edward,   ‘Political   Islam   in   Palestine   in   an   environment   of   peace,’   Third  
World  Quarterly,  Vol.  17,  No.2,  1996.  p.200.  
214  Beverley  Milton-­Edwards,  Islamic  Politics  in  Palestine,  op.cit.,  p.156.  
215  Andrea  Nüsse,  Muslim  Palestine:  The  Ideology  of  Hamas,  op.cit.,  pp.  129-­133.  
216   Shaul   Mishal   and   Avraham   Sela,   The   Palestinian   Hamas:   Vision,   Violence,   and  
Coexistence,  op.cit.,  p.89.  
217  Ibid.,  p.96  
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concerning   the   international  negotiations  under   the   framework  of   the  Madrid  
Conference.218  Apart  from  the  expulsion  in  1992  this  was  the  toughest  year  for  
Hamas   since   its   inception   because   it   was   almost   annihilated   at   this   stage.  
Israel  outlawed  Hamas  and  arrested  hundreds  of  Hamas  members;;  and  Fatah  
launched   a  major   attack   on   Hamas   in   July.   According   to   the   account   from  
Ibrahim  Ghushen,   the   former  Hamas’   spokesman,   this   crackdown   aimed   to  
crush  Hamas  in  Gaza  once  and  for  all.219    
2.3  The  Oslo  Peace  Process  (1993  -­  2000)  and  Hamas  
The  period  of  the  Oslo  Peace  Process  was  considered  to  be  a  decisive  
factor   in   determining   the   current   irreversible   Palestinian   outcomes:   the  
fragmentation  of  the  West  Bank,  the  devastation  of  the  Palestinian  economy,  
and  the  destruction  of  the  ordinary  lifestyle.220  During  this  period,  Hamas  was  
the  major  opposition   to   the  peace  process.  The  notorious  violent  and  brutal  
suicide  attacks  against  Israel  seemed  to  have  become  Hamas’  trademark  and  
the  violence  was  seen   to  be  a  huge  obstacle   to   the  peace  process.   It   is  an  
undeniable   fact   that   Hamas’   military   branch,   the   Izz   al-­Din   al-­Qassam  
Brigades,   was   responsible   for   several   grave   assaults   in   1994-­1996. 221  
However,   these   attacks   were   not   random   and   should   be   examined   in   a  
specific   and   broader   context. 222   This   section   aims   to   outline   Hamas’  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
218   Ali   Jarbawi   and   Roger   Heacock,   “The   Deportations   and   the   Palestinian-­Israeli  
Negotiations,”   Journal   of   Palestine  Studies,   Vol.   XXII,  No.3   (Spring   1993),   pp.   32-­45.  As   a  
matter  of  fact,  other  factors  also  contributed  to  the  Oslo  Process.  For  example,  the  PLO  was  
facing  financial  crisis  in  that  it  could  not  run  its  administration.  In  addition,  Arafat  saw  the  U.S  
could   play   a  major   role   in   the  Middle   East   after   the   cold   war.   In   this   way,   accepting  Oslo  
process  seems  a  political  survival  for  the  PLO.  See  Beverley  Milton-­Edward,   Islamic  Politics  
in   Palestine,   op.cit.,   p.160.   Yezid   Sayigh,   Armed   Struggle   and   the   Search   for   State:   The  
Palestinian  National  Movement  1948-­1993  (Oxford:  Oxford  University  Press,  2004),  pp.  654-­
660.  
219   Ibrahim   Ghusheh,   Hassan   Ibrahim   and   Salma   al-­Houry   (transl.),   The   Red   Minaret:  
Memoirs  of  Ibrahim  Ghusheh  (Beirut:  Al-­Zaytouna  Centre,  2013),  p.170.  
220  Sara  Roy,  ‘The  Palestinian-­Israeli  Conflict  and  Palestinian  Socioeconomic  Decline:  A  place  
Denied,’  International  Journal  of  Politics,  Culture,  and  Society,  op.cit.,  pp.  365-­403.  
221  According  to  a  statistic  from  the  website  of  Israel  Ministry  of  Foreign  Affairs,  132  Israeli  
soldiers  and  civilians  were  killed  by  bombing  attacks  from  1994  to  1996.  See  Israel  Ministry  of  
Foreign  Affairs,  ‘Suicide  and  the  Other  Bombing  attacks  in  Israel  Since  the  Declaration  of  
Principles  (Sep  1993)’,  
<http://www.mfa.gov.il/mfa/foreignpolicy/terrorism/palestinian/pages/suicide%20and%20other
%20bombing%20attacks%20in%20israel%20since.aspx>  (accessed  on  13  May  2012).  
222  Jeroen  Gunning,  Hamas  in  Politics:  Democracy,  Religion,  Violence,  op.  cit.,  p.46.  
	   67	  
evaluation  of  the  peace  process  and  to  articulate  how  Hamas  confronted  and  
then  accommodated  to  this  new  era.    
The  Oslo  accord,  namely,  the  Declaration  of  Principles  on  Interim  self-­
Government   Arrangements   (DOP),   was   signed   on   13th   September   1993   on  
the  lawn  of  the  White  House.  It  aimed  to  resolve  the  Israeli-­Palestinian  long-­
term   disputes   within   5   years   as   per   the   provisions   of   this   agreement.   The  
DOP  was  the  framework  for  basic  principles  of  interim  Palestinian  governance  
in  the  occupied  territories.  This  declaration  did  not  directly  address  the  major  
disputes   such   as   the   status   of   Jerusalem,   the   Jewish   settlements,   borders  
and  refugees.  These  crucial  issues  would  be  dealt  with  in  the  later  permanent  
status   negotiations.223  That   is   to   say,   the   DOP   was   a   nucleus   of   the   Oslo  
Peace  Process  but  the  actual  practice  of  governance  would  be  settled  through  
later  negotiations.224      
With  regard  to  the  DOP,  Hamas  was  frustrated  about  the  news  of  the  
agreement   and   worried   that   it   would   reinforce   the   Israeli   occupation   and  
fragment  Palestinian  society.  In  response  to  this  new  reality,  Hamas  claimed  
that   it  would  not  give  up   the   right  of   resistance   to   the  occupying  power  until  
liberation  was   achieved.225  Hamas’   spokesman   Ibrahim  Ghusheh   said,   ‘This  
treaty  (Oslo  accord)  is  to  be  basically  a  security  arrangement,  as  it  focuses  on  
the   building   of   a   large,   strong   and   effective   Palestinian   force,   whose   prime  
aim  was  to  stop  the  first  Intifada,  and  to  repel  any  operation  against  Israel.’226  
However,   in   view   of   the   social   context   in   1993,   the  majority   of   Palestinians  
had  the  opposite  view.  According  to  a  poll  made  by  the  Jerusalem  Media  and  
Communications   Centre   (JMCC)   after   six   days   of   the   DOP   announcement,  
showed  that  nearly  70  per  cent  of  Palestinians  agreed  with  the  decision  made  
by   the   PLO   to   a   preliminary   agreement   with   Israel.   Most   specifically,   the  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
223  Gilles  Kepel,  Pascale  Chazaleh  (transl.),  The  War  for  Muslim  Minds:   Islam  and  the  West  
(Cambridge:  The  Belknap  Press,  2004),  p.43.  
224  The  Oslo  II  signed  on  28th  September  1995  was  a  crucial  agreement  for  the  peace  process,  
defining   the   West   Bank   into   three   administrational   areas.   Edward   Said   had   predicted   the  
failure  of   the  peace  process  after   the  signing  of   the  Oslo   II  shortly.  See  Edward  Said,   “The  
Mirage  of  Peace,”  The  Nation,  (October  16,  1995),  pp.413-­420.          
225  Michael  Irving  Jensen,  The  Political  Ideology  of  Hamas:  A  Grassroots  Perspective,  op.cit.,  
pp.  21-­22.  
226   Ibrahim   Ghusheh,   Hassan   Ibrahim   and   Salma   al-­Houry   (transl.),   The   Red   Minaret:  
Memoirs  of  Ibrahim  Ghusheh,  op.cit.,  p.179.    
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proportion   in  Gaza   (72   per   cent),  which  was   considered  Hamas’   stronghold  
was  higher   than   in   the  West  Bank   (66.4  per   cent).   The  poll   also   suggested  
that  whether  the  agreement  would  strengthen  the  Israeli  occupation  and  lead  
to  internal  Palestinian  conflict,  over  55  per  cent  of  Palestinians  disagreed  with  
these  assumptions.227  It   is   clear   that  most  Palestinians  were  not   on  Hamas’  
side.  
Since  the  inception  of  the  Oslo  Process,  Hamas  lacked  public  support  
for  its  resistance  discourse.  It  also  faced  a  dilemma  when  the  principles  of  the  
Oslo  Process  were  put  into  practice  in  1994,  especially  regarding  the  security  
co-­operation  between  the  PA  and  Israel.  From  1994  to  1996,  Hamas  and  the  
Islamic  Jihad  carried  out  several  suicide  attacks228  inside  Israel,  causing  more  
than   100   Israeli   casualties. 229   These   violent   acts   enraged   Israel;;   and   it  
coordinated  with  the  PA  to  arrest  more  than  1,200  Islamists.230  What  is  worse,  
Hamas  was  placed  on  the  terrorism  list  by  the  United  States,  which  negatively  
affected   the   Arab   countries’   solidarity   with   Hamas.231  In   this   sense,   Hamas’  
popularity  took  heavy  blows  not  only  from  the  Israeli  repression  but  also  from  
Palestinian  society  and  the  Arab  countries.      
The   lowest   point   of   Hamas’   popularity   came   in   1996.   Hamas’  
resistance   discourse   including   its   tactic   of   suicide   bombings   was   not  
supported   by   the   majority   of   Palestinians   who   were   looking   for   a   brighter  
future   instead  of  constant  confrontation  with   Israel.  According   to  JMCC  poll,  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
227   The   dates   of   survey   were   from   19th   to   21st      September   in   1993.   54.6   per   cent   of  
interviewers   disagreed   that   DOP   would   strengthens   the   occupation   and   60.8   per   cent   of  
interviewers  disagreed   the  possibility  of   internal  conflict.  See  JMCC,   ‘Opinion  Poll  No.3,’  23  
September   1993   On   Palestinian   Attitudes   to   the   PLO-­Israel   Agreement  
<http://www.jmcc.org/documentsandmaps.aspx?id=503>  (accessed  on  25  October  2014).  
228  It   is   noted   that   Hamas   rejects   the   concept   of   suicide   attacks   but   calls   it   a   martyrdom  
operation.  
229  See  Israel  Ministry  of  Foreign  Affairs,  ‘Suicide  and  the  Other  Bombing  attacks  in  Israel  
Since  the  Declaration  of  Principles  (September  1993)’,  
<http://www.mfa.gov.il/mfa/foreignpolicy/terrorism/palestinian/pages/suicide%20and%20other
%20bombing%20attacks%20in%20israel%20since.aspx>  (accessed  on  13  May  2012).  
230  Michael  Irving  Jensen,  The  Political  Ideology  of  Hamas:  A  Grassroots  Perspective,  op.  cit.,  
pp.  21-­22.  
231  Khaled  Hroub,  Hamas:   Political   Thought   and  Practice,  op.cit.,   p.   245.   In   1990s,   Hamas  
political  bureau  was  stationed   in  Jordan.  Once  Hamas’  military  branch   launched  attacks  on  
Israel,   the   political   bureau   faced   huge   pressure   and   harassment   from   the   Jordanian  
government.  Finally,  in  1999  Hamas  members  in  Jordan  were  all  expelled  out  of  Jordan.  See  
Azzam  Tamimi,  Hamas:  Unwritten  Chapters,  op.  cit.,  pp.  78-­125.  
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84  per  cent  of  Palestinians  were  optimistic  about  Palestine’s   future.  Hamas’  
popularity  came  to  10  per  cent  while  Fatah  shared  38.9  per  cent  of  popularity  
in  a  poll.  232  In  addition,  Fatah’s  landslide  victory  in  the  first  PLC  election  and  
Arafat’s  election  as  the  PA’s  president   in  January  1996  further  overwhelmed  
Hamas’  resistance  discourse.  In  March  1996,  Hamas’  popularity  had  dropped  
to  the  lowest  point  of  6  per  cent.233  Yet,  after  10  years,  Hamas  recovered  from  
its   descent   to   reach   a   climax   of   popularity   in   the   PLC   election   in   2006.  
Perhaps,   three   dimensions,   armed   resistance,   political   engagement   and  
social   service   could   illustrate   how   Hamas   proved   its   resilience   in   order   to  
survive  under  the  Oslo  Peace  Process.  
2.3.1  Armed  resistance  
Armed   resistance   was   the   early   tactic   that   Hamas   responded   to   the  
repercussion  of  the  Oslo  Peace  Process  while  it  was  considered  as  a  form  of  
terrorist   act   by   the   western   media   and   countries.   In   particular,   the   armed  
resistance  reached  a  peak  in  1994  and  1996  when  Hamas  launched  several  
suicide  attacks  inside  Israel.  On  the  Israeli  Ministry  of  Foreign  Affairs  website,  
all  Hamas’   attacks   on   Israel   are   recorded   exhaustively   in   a   special   section,  
‘Hamas’   terror  war   against   Israel’.234  However,  when  we  examine   the   social  
context  of  this  period,  it  is  not  difficult  to  grasp  Hamas’  motivation  behind  them.  
The   two   events:   the   Hebron  massacre235  on   25th   February   1994   and  
the  assassination  of  Yahya  Ayyash236  on  5th  January  1996,  triggered  a  series  
of   fatal   retaliations   by   Hamas.   The  Hebron  massacre   dramatically   changed  
Hamas’  tactic  from  targeting  Israeli  soldiers  and  settlers  to  Israeli  civilians.  On  
many   occasions,  Hamas’   leadership   declared   that   these   operations  were   in  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
232  See   JMCC,   ‘Poll   No.3,’   23   September   1993   On   Palestinian   Attitudes   to   the   PLO-­Israel  
Agreement   <http://www.jmcc.org/documentsandmaps.aspx?id=503>   (accessed   on   15   May  
2012).  
233  Kim  Cragin,  Palestinian  Resistance  through  the  eyes  of  Hamas,  op.cit.,  p.159.  
234  Israel  Ministry  of  Foreign  Affairs,  Hamas  terror  war  against  Israel,  
<http://mfa.gov.il/MFA/ForeignPolicy/Terrorism/Pages/default.aspx>  (accessed  on  15  May  
2012).      
235  On  25th  February  1994,  Baruch  Goldstein,   a   Jewish   settler,   opened   fire   to  Muslims  who  
were  praying  in  Ibrahim  Mosque  in  Hebron,  causing  29  deaths  and  150  wounds.    
236  On  5th  January,  1996,  Yahya  Ayyash,  a  Hamas  military  leader,  was  assassinated  by  Israel.  
Hamas’  military  branch  launched  a  bombing  attack  in  Israel,  causing  27  Israeli  deaths  and  78  
wounds.  See  Charles  Enderlin,  Fairfield  Susan  (transl.),  Shattered  Dreams:  The  Failure  of  the  
Peace  Process  in  the  Middle  East  1995-­2002  (New  York:  Other  Press,  2003),  p.23.  
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response   to   the   killing   of   Palestinians   by   Israel   and   claimed   that   the   only  
precondition   for  stopping  the  suicide  bombings  (as  Hamas  called  martyrdom  
operation)  was  that  Israel  stopped  killing  Palestinian  children  and  civilians.237  
Clearly   this   tactic  would   not   resolve   the   problems   of   the   occupation.   These  
suicide  bombing  put  Hamas  in  an  awkward  position.  Thousands  of  members  
were   thrown   into   jail   and   affiliated   social   and   charity   organizations   were  
closed   by   the   PA, 238   which   led   to   further   tensions   and   clashes   between  
Hamas  and  the  PA.  Overall,  Hamas’  armed  resistance  was  counterproductive.  
The   PA’s   crackdown   and   Israel’s   propaganda   de-­legitimized   Hamas’  
resistance  discourse  and  affected  its  popularity.239  
2.3.2  Political  engagement    
It  is  fair  to  say  that  Hamas  misread  the  Oslo  Peace  Process;;  its  armed  
resistance   rather   harmed   its   reputation.   At   the   same   time,   Hamas   was  
marginalised   in  politics.  This   is  because  Hamas  refused   to  participate   in   the  
framework  of  the  Oslo  accords  as  a  whole.  But  in  practice,  Hamas  showed  its  
pragmatism   in   this  predicament.  Theoretically,  Hamas  should  have  opposed  
any  affiliations  with  the  Oslo  accords  including  the  governance  of  the  PA.  As  a  
matter  of  fact,   its  opposition  was  passive  and  no  aggressive.  Hamas  leaders  
were  against  the  PA  only  in  the  form  of  rhetorical  criticism  on  the  PA  security  
cooperation   with   Israel   and   policies   made   by   Arafat.240  Abdel   Aziz   Rantisi,  
who   had   been   a   senior   Hamas   leader,   once   stated   that   despite   the   PA’s  
crackdown   on   Hamas,   it   would   remain   patient   and   continue   the   struggle  
against  Israel.  In  other  words  civil  war  in  Palestine  was  never  an  option  as  it  
only  served  Israeli  interests.241    
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
237  Roger  Gaess,  ‘Interviews  from  Gaza:  What  Hamas  Wants,’  Middle  East  Policy,  Vol.9  No.4  
(December  2002),  pp.104-­105.    
238  Beverley  Milton-­Edwards,  and  Stephen  Farrell,  Hamas:  The  Islamic  Resistance  Movement,  
op.cit.,  p.79.  
239  Despite  Hamas  claim  bombing  attacks  are  not  for  suicide  but  for  martyrdom  operation,  this  
tactic   is   still   controversial   and   debatable   in   Muslim   world.   See   Azzam   Tamimi,   Hamas:  
Unwritten  Chapters,  op.  cit.,  pp.  180-­186.        
240  Kim  Cragin,  Palestinian  Resistance  through  the  eyes  of  Hamas,  op.cit.,  pp.140-­148.  
241  Michael  Irving  Jensen,  The  Political  Ideology  of  Hamas:  A  Grassroots  Perspective,  op.cit.,  
pp.  22-­23.  
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As   for   Arafat,   he   had   his   own   political   calculations.   Even   though   he  
considered   that   Hamas   and   other   opposing   forces   undermined   the   peace  
process  and  spoilt  the  relations  between  the  PA  and  Israel,  he  did  not  totally  
bow   to   Israel’s   command   to   ban   all   Hamas’   activities.   He   attempted   to  
persuade  Hamas   leaders   to  end  the  violence  against   Israel  and  encouraged  
Hamas  towards  political  integration.242  For  the  first  time,  the  PLC  election  held  
in   1996   had   created   an   opportunity   for  Hamas   to   share   political   power   and  
extend   its   influence   in   the  political  arena.  Regarding   this  election,   there  was  
an  intensive  debate  inside  Hamas  as  to  whether  the  election  was  a  legitimate  
one  to  join.  Initially,  Hamas  saw  the  political  election  as  a  way  of  propagating  
its  resistance  idea  but  in  viewing  the  essence  of  this  election,  found  that  it  was  
under  the  framework  of  the  Oslo  Peace  Process,  which  contravened  Hamas’  
principle.243  In   spite   of   this   contradiction,   some   Hamas   members   were   still  
prepared   to   run   in   the   election   but   following   a   collective   consultation  which  
was  against   joining  as  well  as  a  warning  from  other  leaders,  those  members  
finally   withdrew   from   participation. 244   This   is   not   to   say   that   Hamas   was  
essentially  against  a  concept  of  election.  In  reality,  Hamas  was  rather  active  in  
local   elections,   which   were   nothing   to   do   with   the   Peace   Process.   For  
example,   Hamas   members   won   Engineering   Union   elections   and   al-­Najah  
student  elections  in  1996.245  What  concerned  Hamas  was  that  participation  in  
the  PLC  election  would  endorse   the  Oslo  Peace  Process  and   legitimate   the  
Israeli  occupation.246  
It  seems  that  the  refusal  to  participate  in  the  PLC  elections,  the  records  
of  the  suicide  bombings  and  its  objection  to  recognising  Israel  isolated  Hamas.    
Hamas  was  considered  to  be  a  spoiler  of  the  peace  process  and  a  saboteur  of  
a   possible   coexistence   between   Palestinians   and   Israelis.   But   Hamas   did  
have  an  alternative  political  solution   for   resolving   the   Israeli  occupation.  The  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
242  Glenn  Robinson,  Building  a  Palestinian  State:  The  Incomplete  Revolution,  op.cit.,  p.192  
243  Khaled  Hroub,  Hamas:  Political  Thought  and  Practice,  op.cit.,  pp.  220-­224.  
244  Such  as   Ismail  Haniyyah   registered   in   candidate   lists   but  withdrew   the   candidacy  under  
other   members’   pressure.   See   Jeroen   Gunning,   Hamas   in   Politics:   Democracy,   Religion,  
Violence,  op.  cit.,  pp.  110-­111.  
245  See  Are  Knudsen,  ‘Crescent  and  Sword:  The  Hamas  Enigma’,  Third  World  Quarterly,  Vol.  
26,  No.8  (2005),  p.  1379.  
246  Khaled  Hroub,  Hamas:  Political  Thought  and  Practice,  appendix,  op.cit.,  pp.  225.  
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hudna,  which   is   traditionally   a   10-­year   ceasefire   in   the   Islamic   context,   is   a  
means   of   reaching   peace  with   an   enemy247;;   and  Hamas   had   proposed   this  
resolution   to   Israel  on  several  occasions.   It  was   first  presented   to   the   Israeli  
foreign  minister,  Shimon  Peres   in  March  1988  by  Mahmud  al-­Zahar.  Hamas  
raised   this   initiative  again   in  April   1994.248  This  proposal  was   to  ask   Israel’s  
withdrawal   from   Jerusalem,   the   West   Bank   and   Gaza   in   exchange   for   a  
temporary   peace.249   Israel   has   never   taken   it   seriously,   claiming   that   the  
hudna   only   bought   time   for  Hamas   to   increase   its  military   power.  However,  
when  scrutinizing  the  content  of  hudna,  it  is  interesting  to  note  that  its  initiative  
mirrored  the  spirit  of   the  UNSC  resolutions  242  and  338,  which  are  also  key  
documents  in  the  Oslo  Peace  Process.250  In  this  respect,  the  spirit  of  hudna  is  
not  contradictory  to  international  treaties  but  a  different  interpretation  of  them.  
Further,  hudna  may   imply  a  de  facto  recognition  of  Israel,  which  many  
scholarly   literatures   have   observed. 251   For   Hamas,   hudna   is   not   only   a  
ceasefire  but  also  a  significant  mechanism   in  which   to   rebuild   its  homeland.  
Many  Hamas   leaders  spoke  ambiguously   in  public  when   they  were  asked   if  
they   would   recognize   Israel.   Ismail   Abu   Shanab,   the   late   Hamas   political  
leader,  was  asked  about   the   idea  of  a   two-­state  solution   in  November  1997.  
He   indicated   that   the   destruction   of   Israel  was   not  Hamas’   agenda.  Hamas  
fought   Israel   because   of   the   occupation   at   the   expense   of   Palestinian  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
247  For   example,   the  Hudabiyya   treaty  was   a   kind   of  hudna   in   the   7th   century   between   the  
Prophet   Muhammad   and   Quraysh   in   Mecca.   Another   example   were   agreements   between  
Salah  al-­Din  al-­Ayyubi  and   the  crusade   in   the  12th  century.  See  Shaul  Mishal  and  Avraham  
Sela,  The  Palestinian  Hamas:  Visioin,  Violence,  and  Coexistence,  op.cit.,  pp.  108-­109.  
248  Khaled  Hroub,  Hamas:  Political  Thought  and  Practice,  op.cit.,  pp.  73-­77.  
249  Ibid.,  pp.  73-­77.  
250  Michael  Irving  Jensen,  The  Political  Ideology  of  Hamas:  A  Grassroots  Perspective,  op.  cit.,  
pp.  35-­36.  
251  See   Graham   Usher,   ‘The   New   Hamas:   Between   Resistance   and   Participation,’  Middle  
East  Report,  (21  August  2005).  <http://www.merip.org/mero/mero082105.html>  (accessed  on  
20  May  2012).  Beverley  Milton-­Edwards,  and  Alastair  Crooke,  ‘Elusive  Ingredient:  Hamas  and  
the  Peace  Process,’  Journal  of  Palestine  Studies,  Vol.XXXIII,  No.4  (Summer  2004),  pp.  39-­52.  
Haim   Malka,   ‘Forcing   Choices:   Testing   the   Transformation   of   Hamas,’   The   Washington  
Quarterly,  Vol  28,  No.4  (Autumn  2005),  pp.37-­54.  Jean-­François  Legrain,  ‘Hamas:  Legitimate  
Heir   of   Palestinian   Nationalism?’   in   John   L   Esposito   (ed.),   Political   Islam:   Revolution,  
Radicalism,  or  Reform?  (London:  Lynne  Rienner  Publishers,  1997),  p.173.  International  Crisis  
Group,   ‘Dealing   with   Hamas,’   ICG   Middle   East   Report,   (January   2004),   pp.1-­33.   Graham  
Usher,   ‘Hamas   Risen,’   Middle   East   Report   238   (Spring   2006),   pp.   2-­11,  
<http://www.merip.org/mer/mer238/hamas-­risen>  (accessed  on  15  May  2012).      
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rights.252  But   if   Israel   withdrew   to   the   1967   borders   based   on   the   mutual  
agreement   of   a   ceasefire,   the   fighting   would   stop.   He   added   that   ‘Israel’s  
withdrawal   from   the  occupied   territories   since  1967  was  a  good   solution   for  
both  sides.  When  we  have  our  state,  we  will  accept  the  Israelis  in  our  land  as  
a  guest  and  as  a  nationality.  Regarding  the  future  of  the  relationship  between  
Israel  and  the  Palestine,  let  the  next  generation  works  on  it.’253    
Hence,   the  suggested  hudna  could  have  been  seen  as  an  alternative  
peace   deal,   which   while   it   was   not   written   in   Hamas’   charter,   it   at   least  
showed   a   flexibility   that   was   in   accordance   with   major   international  
agreements   and   UNSC   resolutions.   Hamas   had   proposed   hudna   several  
times  but  Israel  did  not  and  does  not  believe  Hamas’  sincerity  and  viewed  this  
hudna  as  a  conspiracy  to  ultimately  destroy  Israel.254  This  skepticism  may  be  
the   root   cause   of   why   the   peace   process   had   stalled.   Many   scholars   who  
have   interviewed   the   Hamas   leadership   suggest   that   Israel   and   the  
International  society  should  engage  with  Hamas  in  terms  of  understanding  its  
point   of   view   during   the   peace   process.   If   the  United  States,   the   European  
countries   and   Israel   brought  Hamas   into   negotiations   on   the   one   hand   and  
Hamas   was   ready   to   stop   attacks   and   take   a   non-­violent   approach   on   the  
other,  it  is  possible  that  one  day  the  peace  process  might  be  activated.255              
2.3.3  Social  service  
Since  Hamas’  military  resistance  led  to  a  counterproductive  result  and  
it   failed   to   participate   in   the   political   process,   the   only   way   to   keep   its  
presence  was   to   return   to   its  work   on   civil   society   and   social   service   as   its  
predecessor   the   Muslim   Brotherhood   used   to   engage   in   during   the   1970s.  
During   the  Oslo  Process,  Hamas  promoted   its   resistance  discourse   in   terms  
of   the   creation   of   its   own   media.   Al-­Watan   was   the   first   newspaper   that  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
252  Roger  Gaess,   ‘Interview:   Ismail  Abu  Shanab,’  Middle  East  Policy,  Vol.  6,  No.1,   (January  
1998),  p.118.  
253  Ibid.,  p.118.  
254  Asaf  Maliach,  ‘Hamas’  Post-­Election  Strategy  Step-­by-­step  to  the  liberation  of  Palestine,’  
The  Institute  for  Counter-­Terrorism,  
<http://web.archive.org/web/20060507062050/http://ict.org.il/articles/articledet.cfm?articleid=5
57%20>  (accessed  on  16  May,  2012)  
255  International  Crisis  Group,  ‘Dealing  with  Hamas,’  ICG  Middle  East  Report,  (January  2004),  
p.31.  
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Hamas  published  but  it  did  not  last  long  as  it  was  closed  by  the  PA.256  Another  
newspaper,   Al-­Risala   first   issued   in   February   1997   reflected   Hamas’  
resistance  and  political  thought  concerning  the  Oslo  Process.  This  newspaper  
constantly   disclosed   how   the   Oslo   Peace   Process   negatively   affected  
Palestinian   society   such   as:   the   dispute   over   the   security   collaboration  
between  Israel  and  the  corruption,  and  the  human  rights  violation  of  the  PA.257    
Apart  from  the  media  outlets,  Islamic  grassroots  organizations  such  as  
charities,  nurseries,  hospitals,  schools  and  sports  clubs  are  considered  to  be  
the  foundation  of  social  support  for  Hamas’  resilience  since  Hamas’  popularity  
is   empowered   by   those   Islamic   social   networks.   Islamic   institutions   in   civil  
society   have   provided   multiple   social   services   for   long   periods   since   the  
1970s.  Some  organizations,   like   the   Islamic  Society  and   the   Islamic  Centre,  
which   was   founded   by   the   Gazan   Muslim   Brotherhood   offer   services   to  
masses  of  poor  and  working  class  people  that   the  PA  are  not  able  to  reach.  
These   Islamic   grassroots   organizations   are   also   reputable   for   their   highly  
trained,   well-­organized,   and   high   quality   features.   Inevitably,   these   Islamic  
institutions   became   a   pillar   of   Palestinian   society   when   tensions   were  
exacerbated   during   the   Oslo   Peace   Process   and   they   enabled   Hamas   to  
undergo  a  process  of  internal  transformation.258  
In   terms   of   the   relationship   between   the   Islamic   grassroots  
organizations   and  Hamas   in   the   peace   process,  Michael   Irving   Jensen   and  
Sara  Roy  both  indicate  that  Hamas  started  to  turn  to  social  service  in  the  late  
1990s.259  The  change  in  direction  to  the  civilian  society  could  be  analyzed  in  
the   context   of   Hamas’   declining   power   as   a   result   of   political   and   military  
setbacks.  The  crackdown  on  Hamas  and  its  weakening  military  ability  caused  
by   Israel   and   the  PA  was   the  main   reason  why  Hamas  had   toned  down   its  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
256  Wael   Abdelal,   From   the   Mosque   to   Satellite   Broadcasting:   A   historical   perspective   of  
Hamas  Media  Stategy,  PhD  thesis  (Exeter:  University  of  Exeter,  2012),  p.136-­148.  
257  Ibid.,  pp.136-­148.  
258  Sara  Roy,  Hamas  and  Civil  Society   in  Gaza:  engaging  the  Islamist  Social  Sector,  op.cit.,  
pp.186.  
259  Sara   Roy,   Failing   Peace:   Gaza   and   the   Palestinian-­Israeli   Conflict,   op.cit.,   p.187   and  
Michael   Irving   Jensen,  The  Political   Ideology  of  Hamas:  A  Grassroots  Perspective,  op.   cit.,  
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military   rhetoric  and   returned   to   the   involvement  of   civil   society.260  The  Oslo  
Peace   Process,   from   the   Islamists’   perspective,   did   not   only   change   the  
economic  and  political  structures  but  also  led  to  the  degradation  of  society  by  
Western   cultural   hegemony. 261   Therefore,   the   restoration   and   revival   of  
Palestinian  society  by  means  of  Islamic  teaching,  practice  and  ethics  became  
an  essential  mission  at  that  time.    
As   for   these   Islamic   institutions’   relations   with   Hamas,   according   to  
Sara   Roy’s   research,   it   is   an   undeniable   fact   that   parts   of   the   Islamic  
institutions   have   a   natural   relationship,   such   as   the   Islamic   Society,   the  
Islamic  Centre,  al-­Salah   Islamic   Association,  al-­Wafa  Medical   Rehabilitation  
Hospital   and   the   Islamic   University,   and   others   founded   by   the   Gazan   MB  
members.  Some  of   the  directors  and  members  were  senior  Hamas   leaders’  
relatives262  but   this  does  not   suggest   an  evil   relationship  or  manipulation  by  
Hamas. 263   Hamas’   leaders   have   denied   that   they   have   mobilized   and  
intervened   in   these  Islamic   institutions  for  political  and  military  purposes  and  
they  do  not  have  a  formal  connection  to  them.264  Roy  indicates  that  if  people  
want   to   point   out   the   kind   of   connections   that   exist   between   Hamas   and  
Islamic  institutions,  the  sharing  of  the  Islamic  values  and  principles  would  be  
their  common  ground.265    
To  sum  up,  since  the  inception  of  the  first  Intifada  in  1987,  Hamas  has  
actively  engaged   in  Palestinian  affairs  against   the   Israeli   occupation   that   rid  
them  of   the  stigma  of  non-­resistance   in   the  1980s.  However  with   the  exiled  
PLO’s  acceptance  of  a  two-­state  solution  and  the  secret  negotiation  between  	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Israel  and  the  PLO,  Hamas  was  gradually  sidelined.  The  Oslo  Peace  Process  
launched  in  1993  diminished  the  role  that  Hamas  played.  During  this  period,  
Hamas  was  not  only  weak  in  the  political  arena,  but  its  bombing  tactics  inside  
Israel   also   infuriated   Israel,   and   embarrassed   the   PA.   Arrest   and  
assassination   almost   terminated   Hamas.   In   response   to   this   crisis,   Hamas  
modified   its   tactics  by   reverting   to   the  old  path  of  serving   the  civil  society  at  
the  end  of  the  1990s.  It  is  noted  that  after  September  1997  until  the  breakout  
of   the   al-­Aqsa   Intifada   in   September   2000,   bombing   attacks   did   not   occur  
inside  Israel  except  for  the  case  in  October  29th  1998.266  The  dramatic  drop  in  
the  numbers  of  suicide  bombings  seemingly  indicated  Hamas’  pragmatism  in  
seeking  its  political  survival.  
With   regard   to   the   previous   analysis   of   armed   resistance,   political  
engagement  and  social  service  during   the  peace  process,   the   three  aspects  
suggested   interrelation   rather   than   separation.   When   Hamas   was  
marginalized  in  politics  and  its  armed  resistance  failed,  the  reversion  to  social  
service  seemed   to  be   the  only   sustainable  path   for   survival  during   the  Oslo  
Peace  Process.  On  the  one  hand  Hamas  created  its  own  medias  in  terms  of  
spreading   its   resistance   message   continuously.   On   the   other   hand,   the  
widespread   Islamic   grassroots   institutions   in   Gaza,   whether   affiliated   to  
Hamas   or   not,   have   facilitated   Hamas’   reputation   in   local   society.   What  
Hamas  could  do  was  to  wait  for  another  occasion  that  was  more  amenable  to  
its  resistance  discourse.  The  al-­Aqsa  Intifada  that  erupted  in  September  2000  
definitely  revived  Hamas’  resistance  discourse.  The  next  chapter  will  address  
how   Hamas   evaluated   the   al-­Aqsa   Intifada,   and   constructed   the   resistance  
project  in  association  with  its  political  transformation  from  2003  onwards.      
3.  Conclusion:  The  transitions  of  Islamists  in  Palestine  and  the  
concept  of  resistance  from  the  historical  perspective  
Given  the  analysis  of  the  Gazan  Muslim  Brotherhood  between  1970s  to  
1987   and   the   early   development   of   Hamas   during   the   First   Intifada   (1987-­
1993)   and   the   Oslo   Peace   Process   (1993-­2000),   Palestinian   Islamists  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
266  Israel  Ministry  of  Foreign  Affairs,  ‘Suicide  and  the  Other  Bombing  attacks  in  Israel  Since  
the  Declaration  of  Principles’  (September  1993),  
<http://www.mfa.gov.il/mfa/foreignpolicy/terrorism/palestinian/pages/suicide%20and%20other
%20bombing%20attacks%20in%20israel%20since.aspx>  (accessed  on  17  May  2013)  
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experienced  different  transitions  over  three  decades.  It  can  be  argued  that  the  
transitions   of   Islamists   was   to   protect   themselves   whilst   adapting   to   the  
dramatic  changes  in  the  socio-­economic  and  political  contexts.  In  other  words,  
were   it   not   for   its   adaptation   to   the   new  scenario,   their   survival  would   have  
been  problematic.  The  transition  of  Islamists  is  not  an  exceptional  case.  It  also  
happened   in   Egypt,   Jordan   and   Tunisia.   Shadi   Hamid   who   specialises   in  
Islamists  observed  that   the  transition  of   Islamists   in   the  1990s  demonstrated  
quite  a  different  pattern  to  that  of  the  1940s  or  1970s.  Prior  to  the  outbreak  of  
the  Arab  uprisings,   these   Islamist  parties  had  been   further  evolved   from   the  
time  of  their  presence  in  the  1990s.267  In  this  sense,  the  transition  of  Islamists  
could  be  put  in  the  historical  context.  
  From  the  historical  perspective,  the  transitions  of  Islamists  in  Palestine  
have   three   respective   phases:   the   first   in   1967,   then   1987   and   in   the   late  
1990s.  Before  the  1970s,  Islamists  in  Gaza  who  were  invisible  and  remained  
underground   in   the   political   and   social   arena   were   overshadowed   by   the  
dominant  role  of  Pan-­Arabism  across  the  Middle  East.  Until  after  the  Six-­day  
war   in  1967,   the  appearance  of   the   Islamic  Centre   in   the  1970s   founded  by  
Ahmed  Yassin,  laid  the  ground  for  the  rising  of  Islamists  in  Gaza,  which  was  
the   first   transition  of   Islamists.  This   Islamic  Centre  engaged   in  a  widespread  
social  network  by  means  of  building  mosques  and  providing  education,  sport  
and   medical   services   in   Gaza.   However   this   did   not   mean   that   the   Gazan  
Islamists   renounced   the   right  of   resistance   to   the   liberation  of  Palestine   that  
the  PLO  was  attempting   in   that   period.   From   the   Islamist’s   perspective,   the  
liberation   of   Palestine   needed   sufficient   preparation,   in   several   stages.   The  
armed  resistance  was  not  the  Gazan  Islamists’  first  concern  at  that  moment.  
Without   Islamic   awareness   or   the   underpinning   of   Islamic   surroundings   in  
society,   the   armed   resistance   was   unable   to   achieve   a   fruitful   result.   It   is  
noted   that   the   approach  Gazan   Islamists   adopted  was   one   adopted   by   the  
Muslim   Brotherhood   in   Egypt.   They   believed   that   the   first   step   toward  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
267  Shadi  Hamid,  Temptations  of  power  Islamists  and  illiberal  democracy  in  a  new  Middle  East,  
op.cit.,  p.47.  
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liberation  is  to  develop  sound  Muslims  from  an  individual  level  and  then  build  
an  Islamic  society  rather  than  resorting  to  a  guerrilla  approach.268  
The   second   transition  was   located   in   the   1980s.   In   1983   the   Islamic  
Centre   visited   the   possibility   of   armed   resistance   as   Khalid   Mishal   recalled  
that  this  year  of  1983  ‘was  an  important  milestone  in  building  a  foundation  for  
the  creation  of  Hamas  but  later  being  publicised  in  the  first  Intifada  in  1987.’269  
Since  then,  Palestinian  Islamists  in  Gaza  were  prepared  to  work  on  resistance.  
The   concept   of   resistance  materialized   in   the   announcement   of   the   birth   of  
Hamas  during  the  outbreak  of  the  first  Intifada  in  1987.270  After  the  creation  of  
Hamas,   Islamists  shifted   to  a  display  of  a  strong  militarized  character   rather  
than  a  social  dimension  by  using  the  resistance  as  a  means  to  end  the  Israeli  
occupation.   Their   position   was   straightforward:   they   refused   to   legitimize  
Israel,   and   opposed   negotiation  with   Israel;;   at   the   same   time   they   asserted  
the  armed  resistance  was  necessity  throughout  the  Oslo  Peace  Process.    
The  third  transition  of  the  Islamists  started  in  the  latter  part  of  the  Oslo  
Peace  Process  at  the  time  when  Hamas  military  and  political  powers  suffered  
from  the  double  blow  struck  by  Israel  and  the  PA.  To  save  this  crisis,  Hamas  
returned  to  its  foundations,  and  focused  on  its  role  as  a  social  network  and  a  
service   to  maintain   its  credibility   in  civil   society.  This   trend  of  moderating   its  
modus   operandi   echoes   that   of   the   Muslim   Brotherhood   in   Egypt.   The  
Egyptian  regime  considered   that   the  Brotherhood  was  a  real   threat  because  
of   its   growing   popularity   in   1990s   and   therefore,   the   regime   countered   the  
Brotherhood’s   influence   by   all   means   possible.   Shadi   Hamid   indicates   that,  
‘the   years   of   1990-­1995   saw   a   systematic   escalation   of   regime   policies  
against   mainstream   Islamists.’271  This   repression   reached   such   a   peak   that  
over  a  thousand  Brotherhood  members  were  arrested  in  1995.272  In  response,  
the  Brotherhood  chose  not  to  confront  the  regime  but  moderated  their  rhetoric  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
268  Richard  Mitchell,  The  Society  of  the  Muslim  Brothers,  op.  cit.,  pp.  233-­234.  
269  See  Mouin  Rabbani,  ‘A  Hamas  perspective  on  the  movement’s  evolving  role:  An  Interview  
with  Khalid  Mishal:  Part  I,’  Journal  of  Palestine  Studies,  op.cit,pp.68-­69.  
270  Ibid.,  p.69.  
271  Shadi  Hamid,  Temptations  of  power  Islamists  and  illiberal  democracy  in  a  new  Middle  East,  
op.cit.,  pp.90-­92.  
272  Ibid.,  p.90.  
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and  democratized  the  structure  of  the  organization.  This  is  because  under  the  
state’s  repression,  it  would  have  been  naïve  for  them  to  outline  the  dream  of  
‘an   Islamic   state’   and   to   raise   an   unrealistic   Islamic   agenda   when   their  
fundamental   liberties   were   being   denied. 273   In   this   context,   what   the  
Brotherhood   was   able   to   do   was   to   be   patient   and   to   wait   for   a   more  
favourable   time.   This   pattern   was   typical:   In   the   late   1990s   Hamas   was  
inclined   towards   moderation.   The   vision   of   liberation   and   resistance   was  
hardly  enforced  when  masses  of  their  members  and  supporters  were  arrested  
by   Israel  and   the  PA  and   its  popularity  had  come   to   its   lowest  point.  Under  
these   circumstances,  moderation   seemed   to   be   the   only   feasible   option   for  
self-­protection.  
Nevertheless,  these  transitions  of  the  Islamists  and  moderation  in  Gaza  
did   not   mean   that   there   was   a   fundamental   change   in   Hamas’   ideology.  
Whether   the  Gaza  Brotherhood,  or  Hamas,   their  position  remains   the  same.  
Both  perceive  Israel  as  an  illegitimate  entity  that  has  usurped  Palestinian  land  
and  deprived  Palestinians  of  fundamental  rights  since  the  day  of  its  creation  in  
1948.   They   consider   that   Israel   should   pay   the   price   for   the   ensuing  
oppression,  dispossession,  and  colonization  of  Palestinian  society  since  1948,  
and   that   therefore,   the   effective  way   for   Hamas   to   proceed   is   to   undertake  
resistance   instead  of  negotiation.   It   could  be  argued   that  Hamas’   resistance  
not   only   includes   the   implication   of  military   action   but   also   consists   of   non-­
violent  elements.  Returning   to   the   level  of  civil  society   for  Hamas   in   the   late  
1990s  seemed  to  be  for  the  preparation  of  resistance  similar  to  that  engaged  
by  its  predecessor  the  Gazan  Muslim  Brotherhood  between  1970s  and  1980s.  
As  the  time  was  not  on  its  side,  the  only  thing  that  Hamas  could  do  was  wait  
for   another   opportunity.   Eventually   the   outbreak   of   the   al-­Aqsa   Intifada  
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Part	  II	  The	  political	  transformation	  and	  engagement	  
  
Part   II,   which   is   the  main   body   of   this   thesis  will   be   divided   into   two  
Chapters.   Chapter   3   will   analyze   how   Hamas   constructed   the   resistance  
project  during   the  al-­Aqsa   Intifada  and   the  circumstances   in  which   it   started  
the  political  integration  in  early  2004.  Chapter  4  will  discuss  and  evaluate  how  
Hamas,   as   an   elected   government,   promoted   the   resistance   project   as   a  
national  agenda  after  the  PLC  election  in  January  2006  and  also,  the  way  that  
Hamas  implemented  this  agenda  in  Gaza  after  the  political  split  with  Fatah  in  
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Chapter	  Three:	  Analysis	  of	  Hamas’	  political	  transformation	  
(2003-­‐2006)	  
  
As   the   previous   chapter   discussed,   the   only   strategy   that   Hamas  
insisted  upon   in  order   to  end   the   Israeli  occupation  during   the  Oslo  Process  
was  resistance.    But  resistance  did  not  always  imply  a  military  dimension,  for  
example,  when  Hamas  experienced  huge  crackdowns  imposed  by  both  Israel  
and  the  PA  when,  at  the  same  time,  it  was  losing  the  public’s  support.  In  the  
late  1990s,  Hamas  tended  to  distance  itself  from  confrontation  with  Israel  and  
instead,  became  involved  in  social  welfare.  However,  with  the  outbreak  of  the  
al-­Aqsa   Intifada,  Hamas  again   called   for   armed   resistance   including   suicide  
bombings   with   popular   support.   This   armed   resistance   was   a   distinctive  
feature  of  Hamas  in  the  beginning  of  the  al-­Aqsa  intifada.  As  a  matter  of  fact,  
Hamas  did  not   always   insist   on   the  armed   resistance.  From  2003  onwards,  
Hamas   gradually   decreased   the   frequency   of   the   armed   struggle   and  
considered  the  possibility  of  the  political  integration.  
Generally,  this  shift  is  regarded  as  a  response  to  external  challenges  in  
order   to  keep  the  organization   intact.  However,   the  way  Hamas   itself   looked  
upon   this   political   transformation   attracts   less   attention   from   Western  
scholarship.  At   the  outbreak  of   the  al-­Aqsa   Intifada,  Hamas  highlighted  and  
addressed   the   reasons   why   resistance   was   necessary   and   important,   to  
Palestinian   audiences   and   Arab   countries.   Resistance   has   always   been  
Hamas’  major  strategy;;  armed  struggle  is  inevitable  since  it  believes  that  it  is  
the  only  way  to  liberate  Palestine,  from  the  river  to  the  sea.  However,  with  the  
passage   of   time,   Hamas   realized   that   armed   resistance   that   had   failed   to  
correspond   to   the  external  challenges  had  come   to  a  deadlock.  Therefore   it  
began   to   rephrase   and   elaborate   the   concept   of   resistance   in   a   more  
sophisticated  way.    
Usually,  Hamas’  shift  from  armed  resistance  to  political  participation  is  
attributed   to   the   electoral   victory   of   the   PLC   in   January   2006.   In   particular,  
there   are   plenty   of   arguments   and   debates   regarding   Hamas’   political  
	   82	  
engagement  after  its  takeover  of  Gaza.274  However,  to  realize  Hamas’  political  
engagement  after   2006,   it   is   necessary   to  go  back   to   the  period  of   2003   to  
2006.  This  phase  was  significant  and  essential  for  understanding  how  Hamas  
elaborated   the   concept   of   resistance   and   started   its   political   participation  
during  the  al-­Aqsa  Intifada.    
This   chapter   will   analyze   the   crucial   factors   that   determined   Hamas’  
tactical  shift  from  military  confrontation  to  political  integration  and  how  Hamas  
responded,   and   adapted   to,   these   changes   by   articulating   its   resistance   in  
chronological  order.  This   is  because  Hamas’  political   transformation  was  an  
incremental   process   not   an   abrupt   change.   Tracing   this   chronological   order  
may   provide   a   delicate   insight   into   the   process   of   why   and   how   Hamas  
changed   its   tactic   from   uncompromising   armed   resistance   to   political  
participation   from   2003   to   2006.      Before   scrutinizing   various   factors   that  
determined  Hamas’  political  transformation,  the  socio-­economic  context  in  the  
period   of   the   al-­Aqsa   Intifada   should   be   mapped   out   in   order   to   provide   a  
backdrop  to  Hamas’  political  transformation.    
1.  The  socio-­economic  context  in  the  al-­Aqsa  Intifada    
Since  the  inception  of  its  foundation  in  1987,  Hamas  has  aimed  at  the  
end   of   the   Israeli   occupation   through   resistance.   During   the   Oslo   Peace  
Process,   Hamas   launched   several   suicide   bombings   inside   Israel   between  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
274  Beverley  Milton-­Edwards,  ‘The  Ascendance  of  Political  Islam:  Hamas  and  consolidation  in  
the  Gaza  Strip,’  Third  World  Quarterly,  Vol.29,  No.8  (2008),  pp.1585-­1599.  Beverley  Milton-­
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2010).  Baudouin  Long,   ‘The  Hamas  agenda:  How  has   it  changed?’  Middle  East  Policy,  Vol.  
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1994   and   1996;;   but   this   tactic   was   not   supported   by   the   majority   of  
Palestinians.  Many   of  Hamas’  members  were   arrested   in   the   crackdown  by  
the   PA   and   Israel.   What   is   worse   is   that   Hamas’   popularity   dropped   to   its  
lowest   point.   To   avoid   further   political   and   social   alienation,   it   is   noted   that  
Hamas  had  a  tendency  to  de-­radicalize  and  demilitarize   in   the   late  period  of  
the  Oslo  Peace  Process.  The  record  of  suicide  bombings  was  almost  absent  
from   1998   to   2000   before   the   outbreak   of   the   al-­Aqsa   Intifada.275  Sara  Roy  
observes  that  at  the  end  of  the  Oslo  period  ‘Hamas  was  away  from  political-­
military  action   to  social-­cultural   reform,  and  political   violence  was  slowly  but  
steadily   being   abandoned   as   a   form   of   resistance   and   as   a   strategy   for  
defeating   the   occupier’.276  However   the   process   of   Hamas’   de-­radicalization  
had  been  dramatically  halted  with  the  outbreak  of  the  al-­Aqsa  Intifada.  Hamas  
seized  this  opportunity  to  raise  the  flag  of  resistance  again.  The  Israeli  military  
operation   and   the   exacerbated   socio-­economic   context   further   ignited   its  
determination   to   resist.   Unlike   the   period   of   the  Oslo   Peace   Process   when  
Hamas’   resistance   was   unattractive,   it   has   been   said   that   this   time   the  
resistance   message   resonated   with   the   Palestinian   society.   Perhaps   the  
motivation  for  Hamas’  return  to  armed  resistance  and  its  resistance  message  
accepted   by   the   majority   of   Palestinians   could   be   placed   in   the   socio-­
economic  context  of  the  al-­Aqsa  Intifada.  Without  understanding  the  context,  it  
would  be  difficult  to  understand  why  Hamas  changed  its  tone  from  arguing  the  
necessity   of   suicide   bombings   (Hamas   calls   it   the   martyrdom   operation)   to  
accepting  the  ceasefire  in  2003  and  its  political  integration  since  2004.    
The  outbreak  of   the  al-­Aqsa   Intifada  on  28th  September  2000  can  be  
attributed   to   an   unleashing   of   deep   anger,   feelings   of   dispossession,   and  
deprivation   felt   by   Palestinians   over   the   previous   seven   years   (1993   -­  
2000).277  During  the  al-­Aqsa  Intifada,  the  context  of  Palestine  can  roughly  be  
divided   into   three   stages.   Firstly,   there  was   radicalization   of   the  Palestinian  
society   in   the   first   two   and   a   half   years   (28th   September,   2000   –   June   29th  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
275  The   suicide   bombings   conducted   by  Hamas   only   occurred   once,   on   29th  October   1998.  
See  Rashmi  Singh,  Appendix  B  in  Hamas  and  suicide  terrorism,  Multi-­causal  and  multi-­level  
approaches,  (London:  Routledge,  2011),  pp.138-­139.  
276  Sara  Roy,  Hamas  and  Civil  Society  in  Gaza:  Engaging  the  Islamist  Social  Sector,  op.cit.,  p.  
85.  
277  Ibid.,  p.191.  
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2003).  This  confrontational  model  was  as  follows:  The  Israeli  army  attacked  or  
assassinated  Palestinian  militants  and  civilians  and  later  Palestinian  militants  
exploded  bombs   in   Israeli  settlements,  checkpoints  and   inside   Israel  by  way  
of   retaliation.   In  response,   the   Israeli  authorities   launched  a  massive  military  
operation  resulting  in  the  reoccupation  of  Palestinian  territories,  the  demolition  
of   Palestinian   houses   and   the   PA’s   infrastructures,   until   the   appeal   by  
International  society,  particularly  the  United  Sates.278  The  second  stage  was  a  
parallel  of  negotiation  and  confrontation  from  the  period  of  hudna  (ceasefire)  
on   29th   June,   2003   to   the   death   of   Yasser   Arafat   on   11th  November,   2004.  
During   this   stage,  with   the  efforts  of   the   International   society,   especially   the  
Quartet’s  coordination  and  the  unilateral  ceasefire  on  the  Palestinian  side,  the  
casualties  were  lower  than  previous  years  while  Israel  continued  carrying  out  
its  assassination  policy  on  Hamas  and  other  Palestinian  factions.279  The  final  
stage  was  the  period  of  relative  moderation  starting  from  the   inauguration  of  
Mahmud  Abbas  as  the  PA  President  in  January  2005  to  the  Hamas  victory  in  
the  PLC  election  in  2006.  
With  regard  to  the  flashpoint  of  the  eruption  of  the  al-­Aqsa  Intifada,  this  
is  attributed  to  Ariel  Sharon’s  visit  to  haram  al-­Sharif  on  28th  September  2000  
where  the  al-­Aqsa  Mosque  is  located.  This  is  considered  to  be  the  third  holiest  
place  in  Islam  while  at  the  same  time,  Jews  believe  it  to  be  the  Temple  Mount  
that  was  destroyed  by  the  Roman  Empire  in  70  AD.  There  is  no  denying  that  
Ariel  Sharon’s  visit  was  a  form  of  provocation  to  the  Palestinians.  Afterwards,  
demonstrations  erupted  over   the  West  Bank  and  Gaza  and  gradually   turned  
into  uprising.  On  the  other  hand,  this  Intifada  outbreak  could  be  interpreted  as  
the  result  of  Israel’s  continued  occupation  since  the  Oslo  Peace  Process280  or  
the   failure   of   transition   to   Palestinian   statehood. 281   The   Oslo   accord   was  
initiated  in  September  1993  and  affiliated  accords  were  signed  in  the  ensuing  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
278  Regarding  the  details  of  Israeli  military  operations,  please  refer  to  Michele  Esposito,   ‘The  
al-­Aqsa   Intifada:  Military   operations,   suicide   attacks,   assassinations,   and   losses   in   the   first  
four  years,’  Journal  of  Palestine  Studies,  Vol.34,  No.  2  (Winter  2005),  pp.85-­97.  279	  Two  Hamas’  co-­founders,  Ahmad  Yassin  and  Abdel  Aziz  Rantisi  were  assassinated  by  
Israel  on  22nd  March  and  17th  April,  2004.	  	  	  
280  Sara  Roy,  ‘The  Palestinian-­Israeli  conflict  and  Palestinian  Socioeconomic  decline:  A  place  
denied,’  International  Journal  of  politics,  Culture,  and  Society,  op.cit.,  p.366.  
281  Nigel  Parsons,  The  politics  of   the  Palestinian  Authority   from  Oslo   to  Al-­Aqsa   (New  York:  
Routledge,  2005),  p.279.  
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years.   However,   after   seven   years   had   passed,   these   agreements   did   not  
fulfill   the   promise   of   the   creation   of   an   independent   sovereign   state   in   the  
West   Bank   and   Gaza;;   on   the   contrary,   the   Oslo   framework   served   Israeli  
domination.282    
During   the   Oslo   period,   for   the   first   time   Palestinians   had   their   own  
autonomous   administration   in   the   occupied   territory,   that   is,   the   Palestinian  
Authority;;   but   according   to   the  Oslo   II  Accords,   the  West  Bank  was  divided  
into  three  areas.  The  PA  only  possessed  complete  civil  and  security  affairs  in  
Area  A,  which  accounted  for  18  per  cent  of  the  West  Bank.  In  addition  to  this,  
the  socio-­economic  condition  during  the  Oslo  period  was  undermined  by  the  
Israeli  policy  and  the  incompetence  of  the  PA.  The  Israeli  closure  policy  was  
the  main  reason  why  the  viability  of  Palestinian  economics  was  damaged,  that  
is,   it   incurred  a   ‘restriction  on  movement  of  goods,   labor  and  people  across  
internal   and   external   borders   and   within   the  West   Bank   and   Gaza’.283  The  
expansion   of   Jewish   settlements,   the   confiscation   of   Palestinian   lands   and  
geographic   fragmentation   in   the   West   Bank   and   Gaza   further   worsened  
Palestinian   economic   growth.284  As   for   the   PA,   to   some   degree   it   played   a  
complicit   role   in   this  difficult  situation.   Its   lack  of   transparency,  accountability  
and   co-­operation   with   Israel   were   at   the   expense   of   Palestinian   rights.285  
Economically,   the   PA   could   not   create   a   viable   economic   environment.  
Instead,  new  Palestinian  elites  and   the  problem  of   nepotism  amongst   those  
close   to   Yasser   Arafat   emerged   with   the   monopoly   of   the   economy.   As   a  
result,  the  majority  of  the  poor  were  even  more  excluded  from  resources  than  
they   were   before   Oslo. 286   Apart   from   the   socio-­economic   factors,   the  
stagnation  of  the  political  negotiation  between  the  PA  and  Israel  was  another  
cause   for   the  outbreak  of   the  al-­Aqsa   Intifada.   In  March  2000  before   the  six  
months   of   the   al-­Aqsa   Intifada   had   elapsed,   many   Palestinians   considered  
that   violence  was   a   valid   option   as   the   political   negotiations   between   Israel  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
282  Sara  Roy,  ‘The  Palestinian-­Israeli  conflict  and  Palestinian  Socioeconomic  decline:  A  place  
denied,’  International  Journal  of  politics,  Culture,  and  Society,  op.cit.,p.366.  
283  Ibid.,  p.367.  
284  Ibid.,  pp.  369-­370.  
285  Sara  Roy,  ‘Palestinian  Society  and  Economy:  The  Continued  Denial  of  possibility,’  Journal  
of  Palestine  Studies,  op.cit.,  pp,  7-­13.  
286  Ibid.,  p.7.  
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and  the  PA  did  not  have  any  concrete  result.287  In  this  respect,  the  outbreak  of  
the   al-­Aqsa   Intifada   could   be   seen   as   the   chronic   consequence   of   the  
accumulation  of  dissatisfaction,  frustration,  and  grievance  among  Palestinians  
for  their  socio-­economic  and  political  situation  in  the  late  1990s.  
In  the  beginning  of  the  al-­Aqsa  Intifada,  Israel  and  the  PA  had  tried  to  
stop   the   turmoil   through   negotiations,   with   U.S.   mediation.288  This   attempt  
could  not   reverse   the  worst   situation  as  Ariel  Sharon  was  elected  as   Israeli  
Prime   Minister   on   6th   February   2001.   Sharon   believed   that   there   was   no  
Palestinian  partner   for  negotiation  at   this  moment  until   the  elimination  of   the  
terror   in  Palestine.  That   is   to   say,   Israel  would  not  make  any  concession   to  
Palestine.   As   the  military   operation   by  Palestinian   factions   escalated,   Israel  
held  Arafat   responsible   for   failing   to   curb   the   violence.   Israel   blockaded   the  
PA   headquarters   and   almost   destroyed   all   PA   security   facilities   as   a  
punishment.289  The  PA  lost  its  function  of  maintaining  social  order,  which  gave  
Hamas  more  opportunity  to  disseminate  its  resistance  message.    
In   addition   to   the   PA’s   incapacity,   the   deteriorating   socio-­economic  
context   in   the   occupied   territories   triggered   by   Israeli   policies   encouraged  
many  Palestinians  to  reassess  the  situation.  Hence,  the  possibility  of  Hamas’  
resistance   discourse   rather   than   the   negotiation   discourse   that   the   PA   had  
engaged  in  with  Israel  emerged.  At  the  beginning  of  the  al-­Aqsa  Intifada,  the  
problems  of  unemployment,  poverty  and  the  destruction  of  normal  life  reached  
an  intolerable  level  in  Palestinian  society.  In  the  first  two  years  of  Intifada,  the  
unemployment   rate   climbed   to   an   unprecedented   level,   from  11   per   cent   in  
2000   to   over   41   per   cent   in   2002.290  The   high   unemployment   rates   were  
mainly   a   result   of   the   loss   of   employment   in   Israel,   which   the   Palestinian  
major   labour  market   relied  upon.  The  problem  of  unemployment  was   largely  
detrimental  to  the  economic  development  in  the  West  Bank  and  Gaza  Strip.291  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
287  Kim  Cragin,  Palestinian  Resistance  through  the  eyes  of  Hamas,  op.cit.,  p.  169.  
288  The   Sharm   el-­Shiekh   Summit   held   in   October   2000   and   the   Taba   Negotiation   held   in  
January  2001.  
289  Anthony  Cordesman,  The  Israeli-­Palestinian  war:  Escalating  to  nowhere  (Westport:  Center  
for  Strategic  and  International  studies,  2005),  pp.169-­171.  
290  Salem   Ajluni,   ‘The   Palestinian   Economy   and   the   Second   Intifada,’   Journal   of   Palestine  
Studies,  op.cit.,  p.69.  
291  Sara  Roy,  Failing  Peace:  Gaza  and  the  Palestinian-­Israeli  conflict,  op.cit.,  pp.258-­260.  
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The   loss   of   employment   and   the   Israeli   policy   led   to   the   increase   of  
impoverishment.   According   to   a  World  Bank   survey,   the   poverty   rate   in   the  
Palestinian  population  had  risen  to  60  percent,  which  was  an  unprecedented  
high   in  modern  Palestinian   history.292  In   addition,   questions   arising   from   the  
Oslo   period   such   as   the   Israeli   closure   policy,   the   construction   of   Israeli  
settlements   and   fragmentation   of   territory   exacerbated   the   hardship   of  
Palestinians  and  affected  the  devastated  economy   in   the  al-­Aqsa  Intifada.293  
The   degree   of   impoverishment   in   the   population   radicalized   the   young   and  
inspired  them  to  embrace  Hamas’  resistance  discourse.294  
It   could   be   argued   that   as   well   as   the   severe   economic   situation,  
Israel’s   military   operations   and   its   collective   punishment   policy   tended   to  
validate  Hamas’  resistance  discourse  among  Palestinians.  In  the  beginning  of  
the   al-­Aqsa   Intifada   (2000-­2001),   it   is   estimated   that   there   were   1,781  
Palestinian   deaths   and   20,455   injuries. 295   The   demolition   of   houses   and  
farmland,  the  detention  of  prisoners  and  large  casualties  led  to  psychological  
traumas   amongst   Palestinians   and   to   retaliation,   in   terms   of   suicide  
bombings.296  In   this   context,   the   resistance   discourse   that   Hamas   adopted  
sounded  persuasive   to  many  Palestinians.  Hamas  believed   that   the  al-­Aqsa  
Intifada   created   an   opportunity   for   the   oppressed   Palestinians297  to   liberate  
Palestine  and  restore  freedom  and  rights.298    
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
292  Salem   Ajluni,   ‘The   Palestinian   Economy   and   the   Second   Intifada,’   Journal   of   Palestine  
Studies,  op.cit.,  p.69  
293  Sara  Roy,  ‘The  Palestinian-­Israeli  conflict  and  Palestinian  Socioeconomic  decline:  A  place  
denied,’op.cit.,p.372.   Jad   Isaac   and   Owen   Powell,   ‘The   transformation   of   the   Palestinian  
environment,’   in   Jamil   Hila   (ed.),  Where   Now   for   Palestine?   The   Demise   of   the   two-­state  
solution  (London:  Zed  Books,  2007),  p.169.  
294  Salem   Ajluni,   ‘The   Palestinian   Economy   and   the   Second   Intifada,’   Journal   of   Palestine  
Studies,  op.cit.,  p.72.  
295  Sara  Roy,  Failing  Peace:  Gaza  and  the  Palestinian-­Israeli  conflict,  op.cit.,  p.292.  
296  Laetitia  Bucaille,  Anthony  Roberts  (transl.),  Growing  up  Palestinian  Israeli  occupation  and  
the  intifada  generation  (Princeton:  Princeton  University  Press,  2004),  pp.136-­139.  
297   The   Palestinian   Information   Center,   ‘Interview   with   al-­Zahar,’   (13   November   2003).  
<http://web.archive.org/web/20110226095830/http://www.palestine-­
info.com/arabic/hamas/hewar/zahaar22.htm>  (accessed  on  4  October  2013).    
298  The  Palestinian   Information  Center,   ‘The  Speech  of  Khalid  Mishal’,   (16  October  2002).  <  
http://web.archive.org/web/20051028032752/http://www.palestine-­
info.com/arabic/hamas/mashal.htm  >  (accessed  on  4  October  2013).  Palestinian  Information  
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As  mentioned  above,  Hamas  firmly  believed  that  armed  resistance  was  
the   only   effective  means   to   end   the   Israeli   occupation;;   however   it   is   worth  
noting   that   Hamas’   concept   of   resistance   was   not   restricted   merely   to   the  
military   dimension   during   the   al-­Aqsa   Intifada.   Rather,   Hamas   had  
incrementally   constructed   the   concept   of   resistance   into   a   holistic   project  
known   as   the   ‘resistance   project’   in   association   with   an   Islamic   reference.  
Since   this   project   was   the   guideline   for   Hamas’   political   transformation  
between   2003   and   2006   as   well   as   its   political   engagement   between   2006  
and  2013,  it   is  necessary  to  understand  the  content  of  the  resistance  project  
and  its  relation  to  the  Islamic  reference.  
2.  The  content  of  the  resistance  project  and  its  relation  to  the  
Islamic  reference  
The  resistance  project  does  not  refer  to  an  actual  project  or  document  
like  Hamas’  Charter   and  official   statements;;   rather,   it   is   a   specific   term  and  
concept  which  Hamas  often  highlighted  the  implications  of  resistance  in  public  
during   the   al-­Aqsa   Intifada   and   after   being   a   government.   According   to  
research  carried  out  by  Dr.  Wael  Abdelal,   the   term,   ‘resistance  project’  was  
first  used  by  Hamas’  political   leader  Abdel  Aziz  Rantisi   in   late-­2002.299  In  an  
article   entitled,   ‘Protection   of   the   resistance   project,’   Rantisi   did   not   specify  
what   the  resistance  project  was,  but  he  stressed   the  necessity  of   resistance  
work   as   ‘Palestinians   compromised   78   per   cent   of   lands   with   Israel   by  
negotiation….therefore,  for  the  Palestinian  negotiators,  they  have  two  choices,  
either   ignore   the   right   of   people  or   adhere   to   resistance.’300  Since   then,   this  
term  has  been  frequently  adopted  by  Hamas   leaders   in  public,  and   later   the  
concept   was   gradually   developed   and   finally   embodied   in   the   electoral  
programme  in  2006.  
According   to   Hamas’   narrative   in   the   resistance   project,   Israel   is   a  
usurper   that   built   its   country   on   Palestinian   territory   at   the   expense   of  	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info.com/arabic/hamas/hewar/rantese.htm>  (accessed  on  4  October  2013).    299   Wael   Abdelal,   From   the   Mosque   to   Satellite   Broadcasting:   A   historical   perspective   of  
Hamas  Media  Strategy,  op.cit.,  P.76.  300  Abdel  Aziz  Rantisi,   ‘Protection   of   the   resistance  project,’   Ikhwan  Wiki,   (28   July   2002).   <  
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Palestinian  rights;;  therefore,  resistance  would  never  cease  until  the  end  of  the  
occupation.301  That   is   to  say,   the  resistance  had  emerged  precisely  because  
of  the  Israeli  occupation.  During  the  Al-­Aqsa  Intifada,  due  to  the  Israeli  arrests,  
assassinations   and   reoccupation   of   Palestinian   cities,  Hamas   assumed   that  
psychologically,   under   Sharon’s   leadership,   Israel   was   in   love   with   murder  
without  a  political  solution302  and  that  it  was  intent  on  breaking  the  spirit  of  the  
Palestinian  armed  resistance.303    
Development  of  resistance  tactics  during  the  al-­Aqsa  Intifada    
Before   the   al-­Aqsa   Intifada,   Hamas   did   not   further   elaborate   the  
concept  of  the  resistance  to  the  public  while  the  context  of  the  al-­Aqsa  Intifada  
provided   the   moment   that   enabled   Hamas   to   articulate   its   resistance  
messages.  During   the  al-­Aqsa   Intifada,  Hamas   incrementally   constructed   its  
resistance  project.  This  project  did  not  vow  to  destroy  Israel  nor  did  it  promote  
a   slogan   promising   to   throw   the   Jews   into   the   seas,   which   is   the   general  
impression   given   by   reports   in   the  Western  media.   Rather,   Hamas   leaders  
talked   about   the   necessity   of   resistance   as   the   only   strategy   by   which   to  
restore  the  rights  of  Palestinians  in  the  West  Bank  and  Gaza  Strip  as  well  as  
the  diaspora  who  were  expelled  from  Palestine  in  1948.304  
According   to   Hamas’   resistance   strategy,   the   ultimate   goal   was   the  
liberation   of   all   Palestinian   land,   the   establishment   of   an   independent  
Palestinian  state  with  Jerusalem  as   the  capital  and   the  right  of   return.305  But  
learning  from  history  that  the  Crusade  occupied  Palestine  and  the  Great  Syria  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
301  The  Palestinian  Information  Center,  ‘Haniyeh:  Hamas  has  many  leaders  and  our  operation  
is   in   the   context   of   liberalization   instead   of   reaction   and   revenge,’   (20   April   2004).  
<http://web.archive.org/web/20110226095553/http://www.palestine-­
info.com/arabic/hamas/hewar/2004/haneyah.htm>  (accessed  on  6  October  2013).  
302  The  Palestinian  Information  Center,  ‘Interview  with  Abdel  Aziz  Rantisi,’  (9  January  2003).  <  
http://web.archive.org/web/20041220222230/http://www.palestine-­
info.com/arabic/hamas/hewar/rantesi.htm>  (accessed  on  6  October  2013).  
303  The  Palestinian  Information  Center,  ‘Sheikh  Ahmed  Yassin,  the  founder  of  Hamas,’  (2  
August  2002).  <http://web.archive.org/web/20050322134510/http://www.palestine-­
info.com/arabic/palestoday/reports/mokablat02/yasen.htm>  (accessed  on  6  October  2013).  
304  The  Palestinian  Information  Center,  ‘Khalid  Mishal,  interview  by  Hayat  newspaper,’  (9  
December  2003).  <http://web.archive.org/web/20040830104610/http://www.palestine-­
info.com/arabic/hamas/hewar/meshaal5.htm>  (accessed  on  7  October  2013).    
305  The  Palestinian  Information  Center,  ‘Interview  with  Sheikh  Ahmed  Yassin,’  (15  December  
2002).  <http://web.archive.org/web/20041220222825/http://www.palestine-­
info.com/arabic/hamas/hewar/yaseen.htm>  (accessed  on  7  October  2013).    
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for   two  hundred  years,  Hamas   realized   that   the   liberation  of  Palestine  could  
not   be   achieved   overnight. 306   To   reach   this   aspiration,   Hamas   developed  
multiple   tactics  and  also  required  the  cooperation  and  support  of  all  sides  of  
Palestinian   society   against   the   Israeli   occupation,   that   is,   Arab,   Muslim  
countries  and  even  the  West.    
When   Palestinian   casualties   increased   as   a   result   of   the   Israeli  
invasion,   Hamas   focused   on   the   military   tactic.   This   included   the   use   of:  
Molotov  cocktail,  the  ticking  bomb,  suicide  bombing,  mortar  and  rocket.307  The  
military  confrontation  is  derived  from  the  philosophy  of  resistance.  Hamas  was  
not  convinced  that  the  restoration  of  rights  could  be  achieved  by  negotiation;;  
and   to   overcome   the  occupation,   resistance   seemed   to   be   the   right   path   to  
fulfil   its  goal.  Hamas  legitimated  the  use  of  weapons  as  a  natural  right  in  the  
defense   of   Palestinians308  and   aimed   to   destabilize   Israeli   security,   exhaust  
Israel   in  a  long-­term  conflict  and  finally,  render  Israel   incapable  of  sustaining  
the  occupation.309  However,  carrying  out  the  military  operation  definitely  led  to  
the   loss  of  Palestinians  and  Hamas   is  aware  of   this  high  price.  But  Hamas’  
leaders   argued   that   Palestinians   had,   relatively,   managed   a   military  
achievement   in   comparison   to   the   liberation   war   in   Vietnam.   The   rate   of  
casualties   amongst   Israelis   and  Palestinians  was  1:3   lower   than   the   rate   of  
1:47  amongst  Americans  and  the  Vietnamese.310    
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
306  The  Palestinian  Information  Center,  ‘Khalid  Mishal,  interview  by  Hayat  newspaper,’  (9  
December  2003).  <  http://web.archive.org/web/20040830104610/http://www.palestine-­
info.com/arabic/hamas/hewar/meshaal5.htm>  (accessed  on  7  October  2013).    
307  The  Palestinian  Information  Centre,  ‘Interview  with  Sheikh  Ahmed  Yassin,’  (15  December  
2002).<http://web.archive.org/web/20041220222825/http://www.palestine-­
info.com/arabic/hamas/hewar/yaseen.htm>  (accessed  on  7  October  2013).    
308  The  Palestinian  Information  Center,  ‘A  meeting  with  Rafat  Nasif,  Hamas’  representative  in  
Tulkarem,’  (8  June  2003).  
<http://web.archive.org/web/20050208181024/http://www.palestine-­
info.com/arabic/hamas/hewar/nasef.htm>  (accessed  on  7  October  2013).    
309  The  Palestinian  Information  Center,  ‘The  text  of  the  interview  with  Khalid  Mishal  in  the  Al-­
Manar  Channel,’  (12  March  2003).  
<http://web.archive.org/web/20041220222421/http://www.palestine-­
info.com/arabic/hamas/hewar/mashal_manar.htm>  (accessed  on  7  October  2013).    
310  The  Palestinian  Information  Center,  ‘Khalid  Mishal:  A  letter  to  students  in  the  Palestinian  
universities,  the  fifteenth  anniversary  of  Hamas,’  (14  December  2002).  
<http://web.archive.org/web/20051109184925/http://www.palestine-­
info.com/arabic/hamas/statements/interviews/resalah_mashal.htm>  (accessed  on  7  October  
2013).  
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  Apart  from  the  reality  of  occupation,  as  an  Islamic  movement,  Hamas  
quoted   several   Qur’anic   verses   to   validate   the   legitimacy   of   the   military  
operation.  
‘Permission   to   fight   (against  disbelievers)   is  given   to   those  (believers)  
who  are  fought  against,  because  they  have  been  wronged;;  and  surely,  
Allah  is  able  to  give  them  (believers)  victory’.311    
‘Then   whoever   transgresses   the   prohibition   against   you,   you  
transgresses  the  prohibition  against  you’.312    
In   the  military  dimension,   it   seems   that  Hamas  maintained  a   resolute  
attitude   towards   Israel   during   the   al-­Aqsa   intifada;;   however   Hamas   did   not  
always  place  the  military  aspect  as  its  first  priority.  At  times  when  the  situation  
was   unfavourable   to   Hamas   in   2004,   its   military   resistance   was   less  
emphasized.  After   the  U.S.   invasion  of   Iraq,   the   implementation  of   the  Road  
Map,  and  the  initiative  of  the  disengagement  plan  by  Sharon,  Hamas  reduced  
its  military  operations  and  considered  the  possibility  of  political   integration   to  
the  PA.  Given  this  situation,  Hamas’   leaders   justified  the  decision  to  halt   the  
military   operation.   They   clarified   that   the   strategy   of   resistance   for   the  
liberation  of  Palestine  had  not  changed  but  the  tactics  could  be  varied  for  the  
protection  of  the  interests  of  Hamas  and  Palestinians.313      
On   a   political   level,   Hamas   firmly   believed   that   Palestinian   national  
consensus  and  unity  are   the   foundations  of   the  resistance.  Although  Hamas  
disagreed  with   the   option   of   political   settlement:   that   the   PA   and   Fatah   co-­
operated  with   Israel   in   the  political  and  security   issues  which  contradicts   the  
resistance,  Hamas  guaranteed   that   it  would  not   incite  strife  with   the  PA  and  
would   not   criticize   specific   Palestinian   individuals.314   Hamas   regarded   the  
PA’s  leadership  as  brothers  and  not  the  enemy,  despite  the  fact  that  they  had  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
311   Qur’an   (22:39)   See   The   Noble   Qur’an:   English   translation   of   the   meanings   and  
commentary,  (Madinah,  King  Fahd  Complex,  1999),  p.448.  
312  Qur’an  (2:194),  Ibid.,  p.41.  
313  The  Palestinian  Information  Center,   ‘Interview  with  Ismail  Haniyeh,’  (31  December  2003).  
<http://web.archive.org/web/20041220222358/http://www.palestine-­
info.com/arabic/hamas/hewar/haneya3.htm>  (accessed  on  8  October  2013).    
314  The  Palestinian  Information  Center,  A  meeting  with  Rafat  Nasif,  Hamas’  representative  in  
Tulkarem,’  (8  June  2003).  
<http://web.archive.org/web/20050208181024/http://www.palestine-­
info.com/arabic/hamas/hewar/nasef.htm  >  (accessed  on  8  October  2013).    
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different   opinions   toward  Palestinian   issues.   In  order   to   keep   the   resistance  
intact  and  serve  the  national  interest,  the  continuous  dialogue  with  Fatah  and  
the  PA  officials  was  a  necessary  step   for  Hamas.  315  But   this  principle  of   the  
unity  was  broken  when  Hamas  took  over  Gaza  in  June  2007.  The  reason  why  
Hamas  did  this  will  be  explained  later  in  Chapter  Four.  
On   the   other   hand,   Hamas   often   raises   the   significance   of   solidarity  
and  the  concept  of  unity  to  the  Arab  and  Muslim  community  (ummah).  That  is  
to   say,   seeking   support   and   understanding   from   the   Arab   and   Muslim  
countries   is   another   of   Hamas’   tactics.   In   the   early   period   of   the   1990s,  
Hamas  started  communicating  with  the  Arab  and  Muslim  countries  and  parties.  
This   emphasis   on   relationships   is   based   on   the   principle   of   ummah,   which  
means   that  every  Arab  and  Muslim  country   is  one   family;;  Palestine   is  under  
this  roof  and  the  centre  of  the  unification  of  ummah.  Therefore,  Hamas  looked  
forward   to   the   mobilization   of   the   Islamic   community   to   stop   Israeli  
aggression. 316   In   reality,   this   tactic   was   unsuccessful   during   the   al-­Aqsa  
Intifada.   Only   Syria   and   Iran   were   willing   to   provide   essential   political   and  
financial  support.  Hamas’  resistance  message  could  not  move  the  majority  of  
Arab  and  Muslim  countries,  particularly  the  Egyptian  authority  who  has  played  
a   crucial   role   in   Palestinian   issues.   As   a   long-­term   supporter   of   the   peace  
process  and  negotiation,  it  was  expected  that  Egypt  would  not  be  interested  in  
this   resistance  message.  Hamas  was  not   naïve   about   the   political   reality.   It  
was  cautious  and  patient  in  dealing  with  Egypt  and  expected  that  Egypt  would  
only  understand  or  accept  its  resistance  position  in  terms  of  dialogue.  317      
The   dialogue   is   not   restricted   to   the   PA   and   Arab   countries.   Hamas  
leaders  claimed  that   they  were  willing  to  talk   to  any  countries   in   the  world318  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
315  The  Palestinian  Information  Center,   ‘Dialogue  with  Abdel  Aziz  Rantisi,’   (9  January  2003).  
<http://web.archive.org/web/20041220222230/http://www.palestine-­
info.com/arabic/hamas/hewar/rantesi.htm>  (accessed  on  10  October  2013).    
316  The   Palestinian   Information   Center,   ‘Khalid   Mishal,   interview   by   Hayat   newspaper,’   (10  
December   2003).   <http://web.archive.org/web/20040830104557/http://www.palestine-­
info.com/arabic/hamas/hewar/meshaal6.htm>  (accessed  on  10  October  2013).    
317  The   Palestinian   Information   Center,   ‘Interview   with   Khalid   Mishal   by   Quds   Press,’   (19  
February   2004).   <http://web.archive.org/web/20041220221937/http://www.palestine-­
info.com/arabic/hamas/hewar/mesh3al.htm>  (accessed  on  10  October  2013).    
318  The  Palestinian   Information  Center,   ‘Dialogue  with  Muhammad  Nazzal,  a  member  of   the  
Political   Bureau   of   Hamas’,   (16   October   2002).  
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particularly  to  Western  countries.  Hamas  hoped  that  Western  countries  would  
relieve   Palestinian   suffering   and   understand   why   Hamas   adopted   its  
resistance  option.  The  effort  to  conduct  a  dialogue  with  the  West  did  not  work  
due  to  the  notorious  record  of  suicide  bombings.  The  United  States  refused  to  
talk  to  Hamas  and  asked  Hamas  to  disarm.  As  for  the  European  Union,  before  
Hamas  was   listed  as  a  terrorist  organization   in  2003,  several  meetings  were  
held  between  Hamas  and  EU  officials.  During  these  meeting,  Hamas  leaders  
asserted  that  the  EU  delegates  realized  that  the  problem  was  not  Hamas  but  
the   Israeli   occupation. 319   However,   with   the   resumption   of   the   suicide  
bombings  in  Jerusalem  on  20th  August  2003  in  violation  of  the  ceasefire,  the  
EU  officials  cut  off  communication  with  Hamas.  
The   resistance   also   required   support   within   Palestinian   society  
particularly   since   social   service   is   a   cornerstone   issue   for   Hamas   and  
assistance   to   needy   people   is   one   of   Hamas’   tactics   for   sustaining   the  
resistance.   The   facilities   of   social   services   such   as   hospitals,   mosques,  
schools,   nurseries   and   sports   clubs   relieved   suffering   and   boosted   the  
confidence   of   Palestinians   amidst   Israeli   aggression. 320   But   the   financial  
sources   from   overseas   such   as   Syria,   Iran   and   even   the   United   States   to  
those  Islamic  civil   institutions  were  suspicious  to  the  U.S  administration.  The  
U.S  officials  believed  that  these  donations  were  not  for  local  charities  but  were  
meant  for  Hamas’  military  use.  In  this  regard,  the  money  from  overseas  was  
cut.   In   addition,   the  PA  was  under   pressure   from   the  U.S   to   shut   down   the  
Islamic  civil   institutions.  Hamas  rejected   the  accusation  and  appealed   to   the  
West   and   the   PA   not   to   freeze   the   assets   of   the   charities.   It   claimed   that  
closing  down  charities  would  not  have  affected  Hamas’  operation  but  would  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
<http://web.archive.org/web/20050208181334/http://www.palestine-­
info.com/arabic/hamas/hewar/nazal.htm  >  (accessed  on  10  October  2013).  
319  The   Palestinian   Information   Center,   ‘Khalid   Mishal,   interview   by   Hayat   newspaper,’   (8  
December   2003).   <http://web.archive.org/web/20040830104748/http://www.palestine-­
info.com/arabic/hamas/hewar/meshaal4.htm>  (accessed  on  10  October  2013).    
320  The   Palestinian   Information   Center,   ‘Khalid   Mishal,   interview   by   Hayat   newspaper,’   (10  
December   2003).   <http://web.archive.org/web/20110226195031/http://www.palestine-­
info.com/arabic/hamas/hewar/meshaal6.htm>  (accessed  on  11  October  2013).    
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have  had  a  negative   impact  on  vulnerable  people  such  as  orphans,  and   the  
families  of  the  martyrs.321  
The  resistance  and  its  relation  to  Islamic  reference  
Hamas  was   aware   that   the   liberation   of  Palestine  was   an   impossible  
task   during   the   al-­Aqsa   Intifada   since   the   existing   political   and   economic  
structure  was   in   favour   of   the  Peace  Process.   Israel   and   the  United  States  
insisted  that  the  PA  has  to  disarm  Hamas;;  on  the  other  hand,  the  resistance  
option   was   unacceptable   to   the   EU   and   Egypt.   But   Hamas   had   never  
abandoned   the   resistance   and   was   confident   that   ultimately,   Palestinian  
would  achieve  victory.322    
In  order  to  elucidate  the  resistance  and  Hamas’s  conviction,  we  ought  
to   consider   the   Islamic   reference   since   it   could   be  argued   that   it   empowers  
Hamas’  inspiration  and  its  insistence  on  resistance.  As  an  Islamic  movement,  
Hamas  considers  itself  in  the  right  path  of  God,  serving  the  people  instead  of  
obtaining  political  gain  or  privilege.323  Hamas  regards  Islam  as  a  way  of  life324  
which   gives   a   clear   guideline   for   Muslim   individuals   and   organizations.  
Muslims  believe  that  when  they  encounter  difficulties,  both  the  Qur’an,  which  
is  from  God’s  revelation  and  Sunna,  the  teaching  and  practices  of  the  Prophet  
Muhammad   guide   Muslims   to   break   through   their   predicaments.325  Hamas  
recognized   that   the   loss   of   life   and   the   demolition   of   homes   were   painful  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
321  The  Palestinian   Information  Center,   ‘Interview  with  Mahmud  al-­Zahar,’   (30  August  2003).  
<http://web.archive.org/web/20041220222311/http://www.palestine-­
info.com/arabic/hamas/hewar/zahaar.htm>  (accessed  on  11  October  2013).    
322  The   Palestinian   Information   Center,   ‘The   speech   from   the   chairman   of   political   bureau  
Brother   Khalid   Mishal   in   the   16   anniversary   of   Hamas   in   Beirut,’   (21   December   2003).        
<http://web.archive.org/web/20041220222436/http://www.palestine-­
info.com/arabic/hamas/hewar/mashall22.htm>  (accessed  on  11  October  2013).  
  
323  The  Palestinian  Information  Center,  ‘The  text  of  the  interview  with  Khalid  Mishal  in  the  Al-­
Manar  Channel,’  (12  March  2003).  
<http://web.archive.org/web/20041220222421/http://www.palestine-­
info.com/arabic/hamas/hewar/mashal_manar.htm>  (accessed  on  12  October  2013).    
324  The  Palestinian  Information  Center,  ‘Sheikh  Ahmed  Yassin  gives  his  views  with  the  
Palestinian  Information  Center,’  (16  January  2004)  
<http://web.archive.org/web/20041220222829/http://www.palestine-­
info.com/arabic/hamas/hewar/yaseen3.htm>  (accessed  on  12  October  2013).    
325   The   Palestinian   Information   Center,   ‘Interview   with   al-­Zahar,’   (13   November   2003).  
<http://web.archive.org/web/20041220222431/http://www.palestine-­
info.com/arabic/hamas/hewar/zahaar22.htm>  (accessed  on  15  October  2013).  
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experiences.  The  massive  pressure   from   the  PA  and   the  United  States  was  
also  an  obstacle  to  the  resistance.  However,  Hamas  was  firmly  convinced  that  
this   was   inevitable   in   the   process   of   liberation.   Based   on   this   conviction,  
Hamas’   leadership   inspired   people   in   distress   not   to   lose   hope.   Patience,  
steadfastness,   determination   and   sacrifice   were   often   highlighted   to  
Palestinians,  particularly  in  the  context  of  the  Israeli  reoccupation  of  the  West  
Bank  and  the  strike  on  the  Gaza  Strip.  This  invisible  factor  played  an  integral  
part   in   upholding   the   resistance.   In   a   public   speech   that   Khalid   Mishal  
addressed   to   supporters   he   said   that  God  would   be   on   their   side,   provided  
that  they  were  patient  and  believed  in  God.326  
‘If  you   remain  patient  and  become  pious,  not   the   least  harm  will   their  
cunning  do  to  you.  Surely,  God  surrounds  all  that  they  do.’  327  
‘Truly,   God   defends   those   who   believe.   Verily,   Allah   likes   not   any  
treacherous  ingrate  to  God’.  328  
‘Verily  God  will  help  those  who  help  his  cause.  Truly  God  is  all-­strong,  
all-­mighty.’329  
To   a   large   extent,   Hamas’   view   in   the   Israeli-­Palestinian   conflict   is  
based  on  its  understanding  of  the  Qur’an  and  other  Islamic  reference.  During  
the   al-­Aqsa   Intifada,   Hamas’   leadership   naturally   recited   Qur’anic   verses  
when   they   were   interviewed   and   gave   speeches   to   its   audiences.330  The  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
326  The   Palestinian   Information   Center,   ‘The   Speech   of   Khalid   Mishal’,   (16   October   2002)  
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info.com/arabic/hamas/hewar/nazal.htm  >  (accessed  on  15  October  2013).      
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op.cit,  p.91.  
328  Qur’an  (22:38),  Ibid.,  p.448.  
329  Qur’an  (22:40),  Ibid.,  p.449.  
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Palestinian  Authority,’  (25  August  2003).    
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info.com/arabic/hamas/hewar/kalide.htm>  (accessed  on  15  October  2013).  The  Palestine  
Information  Center,  ‘Interview  with  Ahmed  Yassin,’  (28  August  2003).    
<http://web.archive.org/web/20041220222021/http://www.palestine-­
info.com/arabic/hamas/hewar/yaseen2.htm>  (accessed  on  15  October  2013).  The  Palestinian  
Information  Center  ‘Interview  with  Usama  Hamdan,’  (11  September  2003).  
<http://web.archive.org/web/20041220222615/http://www.palestine-­
info.com/arabic/hamas/hewar/hamdan_1.htm>  (accessed  on  15  October  2013).  The  
Palestinian  Information  Center,  ‘Speech  from  Muhammad  Nazzal,  the  member  of  the  political  
bureau  of  Hamas,’  (14  December  2003).  
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following  are  the  verses  that  the  Hamas  leadership  usually  quoted  during  the  
al-­Aqsa  Intifada.  
The  verses  regarding  the  legitimacy  of  resistance  
‘Whoever   transgresses   the   prohibition   against   you,   you   transgress  
likewise  against  him’.331  
‘Allah  does  not   like   that   the  evil  should  be  uttered   in  public  except  by  
him  who  has  been  wronged’.332  
‘O   you   who   believe!   Answer   Allah   (by   obeying   Him)   and   (His)  
Messenger  when  he  calls  you  to  that  which  will  give  you  life’.333  
‘Permission   to   fight   (against  disbelievers)   is  given   to   those  (believers)  
who  are  fought  against,  because  they  have  been  wronged;;  and  surely,  
Allah  is  able  to  give  them  (believers)  victory’.334  
‘The  way  (of  blame)  is  only  against  those  who  oppress  men  and  rebel  
in  the  earth  without  justification’.335  
  The  verses  regarding  confidence  and  victory  
‘Allah  is  All-­Sufficient  for  you.  He  it  is  who  has  supported  you  with  His  
Help  and  with  the  believers’.336  
‘So  do  not  become  weak  (against  you  enemy),  nor  be  sad,  and  you  will  
be  superior  (in  victory)  if  you  are  indeed  believers’.337  
‘They  never  lost  heart  for  that  which  did  befall  them  in  Allah’s  way,  nor  
did   they   weaken   nor   degrade   themselves.   And   Allah   loves   the  
patience’.338  	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resistance  movement,’  (14  December  2003).  
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info.com/arabic/hamas/hewar/kalemt_meshal.htm>  (accessed  on  15  October  2013).  The  
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info.com/arabic/hamas/hewar/mesh3al.htm>  (accessed  on  15  October  2013).    The  
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op.cit,  p.41.  
332  Qur’an  (4:148),  Ibid.,  p.135.  
333  Qur’an  (8:24),  Ibid.,  p.234.  
334  Qur’an  (22:39),  Ibid.,  p.448.  
335  Qur’an  (42:42),  Ibid.,  p.658.  
336  Qur’an  (8:62),  Ibid.,  p.240.  
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‘Don’t   be   weak   in   the   pursuit   of   the   enemy;;   if   you   are   suffering  
(hardships)  then  surely,  they  (too)  are  suffering  (hardships)  as  you  are  
suffering,  but  you  have  a  hope  from  Allah  (for  the  reward)  that  for  which  
they  hope  not;;  and  Allah  is  Ever  All-­Knowing,  All-­Wise’.339  
  The  verses  regarding  the  martyrdom  operation  
‘Verily,  you  will  find  them  the  greediest  of  mankind  for  life.340  
     Allah  may  take  martyrs  from  among  you’.341  
‘Verily,   Allah   has   purchased   of   the   believers   their   lives   and   their  
properties  for  (the  price)  that  theirs  shall  be  the  Paradise.  They  fight  in  
Allah’s  Cause,  so  they  kill  (others)  and  are  killed’.342  
‘Among   the   believers   are  men  who  have  been   true   to   their   covenant  
with  Allah,   and   showed   not   their   backs   to   the   (disbelievers);;   of   them  
some  have  fulfilled  their  obligations’.343  
The  verse  regarding  the  possibility  of  peace  
‘If  they  incline  to  peace,  you  also  incline  to  it’.344  
Judging  by  the  above  excerpts  it   is  obvious  that  Hamas’  interpretation  
of   the  Qur’an  relates  to   its  resistance  and  sacrifice   in  response  to  the  Israeli  
occupation   throughout   the   al-­Aqsa   Intifada.   In   other  words,   in   order   to   gain  
legitimacy   and   inspiration   when   constructing   the   resistance   project,   Hamas  
leaders  resorted  to  Islamic  references.  However,  it   is  noted  that  the  way  that  
Hamas  reads  the  Qur’an  is  different  from  Salafists,  another  Islamists’  trend.  In  
their  interpretation  of  the  Qur’an,  Salafists  are  usually  literalists,  and  often  fail  
to   consider   the  whole   social   and  political   context.  A  Salafist   leader   in  Gaza  
claims   that   the  conditions  of  Jihad  have  not  yet  been   fulfilled  as   there   is  no  
army  and  no  leader.345  Khaled  Hroub  observes  that  Salafists  in  Palestine  tend  
to   detach   themselves   from   the   Palestinian   national   struggle   and   stresses  
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University  Press,  2009),  p.229.  
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utopian  religious  abstractions  in  daily  life.346  In  this  sense,  Salafist  in  Palestine  
tends  to  neglect  the  concept  of  ‘liberation  of  Palestine’  and  the  ‘Jihad  against  
Israel.’  347    
However  Hamas   leaders   interpreted   the  Qur’anic   texts   in  a  wider  and  
specific  context,  which  in  this  case,  was  the  Israeli  occupation  and  aggression.  
That   is   to   say,   when   the   escalation   increased,   it   was   natural   that   Hamas  
quoted  these  types  of  verses  from  Qur’an  to  correspond  to  the  tense  situation.  
For  example,  Abdel  Aziz  Rantisi  was  asked  why  Hamas  rejected  a  ceasefire  
early   in   2003.   In   response,   he   stated   that   Israel   kept   killing   Palestinian  
civilians  and  demolishing  their  houses.348  Then  he  immediately  cited  Qur’anic  
verses  ‘so  do  not  weaken  and  call  for  peace  while  you  are  superior;;  and  Allah  
is  with  you  and  will  never  deprive  you  of  your  deeds349’  and  ‘If  they  incline  to  
peace,  you  also  incline  to  it’.350  In  this  sense,  viewing  the  context  of  the  Israeli  
occupation,  Rantisi  who  seemed   to  master  Qur’an  knew  which  verses  could  
appropriately   be   applied   to   a   certain   scenario.   On   the   other   hand,   some  
Qur’anic   verses   that   Hamas   adopted   do   not   refer   to   the   military   message.  
Khalid   Mishal   argued   that   Hamas   was   willing   to   have   dialogue   with   other  
nations  and  civilizations.  He  quoted  a  verse:  ‘We  have  sent  you  (Muhammad)  
not  but  as  a  mercy   for   the  mankind’,351  indicating   that   the   Islamic  civilization  
has   the   character   of   a   universal   value   and   is   open   to   other   nations   and  
civilizations.352  
In  addition   to   the  application  of   the  Qur’anic   text   in   the  context  of   the  
Israeli  occupation,  it  could  be  argued  that  Hamas’  view  on  Israel  and  the  PA  
could   correspond   to   the   Islamic   jurisprudence.   For   Israel,   Hamas   often  	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stresses  that  resistance  is  the  only  way  to  the  path  of  liberation  even  though  it  
faced  disproportional  attacks  by  Israel.  According  to  the  Islamic  jurisprudence,  
Abu   Hamid   al-­Ghazali   (1058-­1111),   the   influential   Muslim   jurist   in   Islamic  
history,  provided  the  definition  of  maslaha  (the  common  good)  which  means,  
‘to   seek   something   beneficial   or   avoid   something   harmful’.353  The   goal   of  
maslaha   is   to   protect   religion   (din),   life   (nafs),   intellect   (‘aql),   lineage   (nasl)  
and   property   (amwal).   354   According   to   these   standards,   Israel   deprived  
Palestinians  of   these   five   fundamental  elements  during   the  al-­Aqsa   Intifada;;  
thus  it  is  the  duty  of  an  Islamic  movement  to  restore  these  rights.    
On  the  other  hand,  Hamas’  view  of  the  PA  is  based  on  the  principle  of  
avoiding   internal   strife.  Clearly,   the   resistance  project   that  Hamas  promoted  
aimed  to  bring  about  changes  to  the  structure  of  the  peace  process.  The  PA  
was  suspicious  of   this  and  condemned   the   tactic  of   a  martyrdom  operation,  
which  it  saw  as  an  obstacle  to  peace  and  political  reform.  Hamas  worried  that  
the   security   co-­operation   between   the   PA   and   Israel   was   harmful   to   the  
resistance   project.   The   tension   between   the  PA   and  Hamas   indeed   existed  
while  Hamas   leaders  declared   that   they  would  not  cross   the   red   line   to  civil  
war  with  the  PA.  Khalid  Mishal  provided  a  metaphor  that  Palestinians  were  in  
the  same  boat.  Any  action  that  damaged  this  boat  would  drown  everyone.355  
From  the  Sunni  perspective,  revolt  against  the  political  authority  requires  strict  
standards.   Firstly,   the   ruler   has   to   have   a   clear   and   undisputed   disbelief   in  
Islam.  Secondly,  the  use  of  force  should  ensure  that  change  and  reform  would  
not  result  in  a  state  of  chaos.356  Therefore,  revolt  against  the  political  authority  
is  not  the  proper  approach  to  bring  about  change  and  reform.  Hamas’  political  
integration   from   2004   could   be   observed   from   this   angle.   Based   on   this  
principle,   Khalid   Mishal   stated   that   Hamas   would   maintain   a   peaceful  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
353  Tariq  Ramadan,  ‘Ijtihad  and  maslaha:  The  Foundations  of  Governance’  in  Muqtedar  Khan  
(ed.),  Islamic  Democratic  Discourse  (Lanham:  Lexington  Books,  2006),  p.5.  
354  Ibid.,  p.5.  
355  The  Palestinian  Information  Center,  ‘Interview  with  Khalid  Mishal  by  Al-­hayat,’  (28  July  
2004).  <http://web.archive.org/web/20041220222141/http://www.palestine-­
info.com/arabic/hamas/hewar/2004/mishal.htm>  (accessed  on  17  October  2013).    
356  Mansoor  Jassem  Alshamsi,  Islam  and  political  reform  in  Saudi  Arabia:  The  quest  for  
political  change  and  reform  (New  York:  Routledge,  2011),  p.45.  
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approach   in   dealing   with   internal   Palestinian   affairs   even   though   they   have  
different  political  opinions.357    
Overall   the   resistance   project   can   be   seen   as   an   alternative   option  
throughout   the   al-­Aqsa   Intifada.   Even   though  Hamas   suspended   its  military  
operation   in   2003   and   considered   the   possibility   of   political   integration,   the  
foundation  of  the  resistance  was  not  shaken.  The  resistance  project  could  be  
seen  to  be  the  guideline  for  Hamas’  political   transition.  The  following  section  
will   trace   and   analyze   how   Hamas   constructed   the   resistance   project  
interrelated  with  its  political  transformation  between  2003  and  2006.  
3.  From  the  ceasefire  to  a  call  for  Political  reform    
In   the   first   two   years   of   the   al-­Aqsa   Intifada,   the   armed   resistance  
formed   Hamas’   major   tactic   within   its   resistance   project.   Unlike   the   PA,  
Hamas   entirely   rejected   the   political   settlement   and   diplomatic   negotiation  
with   Israel.   Instead,  Hamas  highlighted   that   the  military  operation   is   the  only  
path   to   end   the   Israeli   occupation.   This   position   was   changed   with   the  
appointment  of  the  first  prime  minister   in  the  PA  and  the  launch  of  the  Road  
Map  in  mid-­2003.  Hamas  accepted  a  ceasefire  with  the  mediation  of  Egypt  for  
the  first  time  since  the  outbreak  of  the  al-­Aqsa  Intifada.  Further,  as  the  Israeli  
Prime  Minister  Ariel  Sharon  proposed  the   idea  of  disengagement   from  Gaza  
in   December   2003,   Hamas   swiftly   adjusted   its   discourse   from   military  
confrontation  against  Israel  to  Palestinian  political  reform  and  the  participation  
in  elections  in  2004.  This  section  will  trace  and  analyze  how  Hamas  changed  
its  tactics  from  the  ceasefire  to  a  call  for  political  reform.  
3.1  The  ceasefire  in  2003    
To   escape   from   the   quagmire   of   deterioration   in   the   socio-­economic  
situation  in  Palestine  and  the  intensity  of  suicide  bombing  in  Israel,  the  appeal  
to   reform   propelled   by   the   United   States   was   encouraged   in   Palestinian  
society.  On  15th  May  2002,  Arafat  proposed  a  plan   for   the  restructure  of   the  
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2004).  <http://web.archive.org/web/20041220222141/http://www.palestine-­
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PA  administration  and  a  new  election.358  Hamas  did  not   reject   this   idea  but,  
based   on   Hamas’   resistance   principle,   ending   the   occupation   was   the   first  
priority   rather   than  holding  an  election  as  a  precondition.  Hamas  considered  
that  the  proposal  for  election  reflected  the  notion  of  the  Oslo  Process  359  and  
criticized   the  PA  saying   that   the   reform  and   the  election   it   suggested  would  
serve  the  interests  of  Israel  and  the  United  States.360    
The  PA  seemed  to  have  been  in  a  dilemma.  In  addition  to  the  criticism  
from  Hamas,   the   PA   also   lost   the   United   States’   trust.   On   24th   June   2002,  
President   George   Bush   delivered   a   speech361  that   placed   emphasis   on   the  
necessity   of   eradicating   terrorism,   electing   new   Palestinian   leaders,   and  
proposing  reform  to  Palestinians.  In  this  speech  President  Bush  criticized  the  
PA   for   encouraging   terrorism,   which   was   unacceptable   to   the   US  
administration.  Therefore,  to  reach  the  peace  so  that  Palestinians  and  Israelis  
could   live   side   by   side,   Palestinians   should   not   compromise   with   terror.  362  
This   speech   later   became   the   blueprint   of   the  Road  Map   in  April   2003.  On  
analysis,   it   suggests   that   ostensibly,   Bush   was   dissatisfied   with   Arafat’s  
passive   attitude   since   he   did   not   curb  Palestinian   violence;;   and   the   speech  
implied   that   a   change   of   leadership   in   Palestine   was   a   necessary   step   for  
Palestinian  reform.363    
The   necessity   of   reform   in   Palestine,   and   the   termination   of   conflict  
between  Israel  and  Palestine,  were  the  core  issues  that  concerned  all  parties,  
but  there  were  fundamental  differences  in  the  concept  of  what  reform  meant  
to  them.  For  the  United  States,  the  key  to  reaching  political  reform  in  Palestine  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
358   Nathan   Brown,   Palestinian   Politics   after   the   Oslo   Accords   (Berkeley:   University   of  
California  Press,  2003),  p.250.  
359  The  Palestinian  Information  Center,  ‘Interview  with  Mahmud  al-­Zahar,  the  member  of  the  
political  bureau  of  Hamas,’  (3  December  2002).  
<http://web.archive.org/web/20050208181801/http://www.palestine-­
info.com/arabic/hamas/hewar/zaha.htm>  (accessed  on  18  October  2013).    
360  ‘Hamas’  Sheikh  Yassin:  Reform  according  to  Israeli  criteria  becomes  corruption,’  Mideast  
Mirror,  (22  May,  2002).  
361  ‘President  Bush  calls  for  new  Palestinian  Leadership,’  The  White  House  (24  June  2002)    <  
http://georgewbush-­whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2002/06/20020624-­3.html>  
(accessed  on  18  October  2013).  
362  Ibid.  
363  Ibid.  
	   102	  
was   fighting   terrorism,   a   term   which   referred   to   the   suicide   bombings  
undertaken  by  Hamas,  the  Islamic  Jihad  and  al-­Aqsa  Martyrs’  Brigades.  If  the  
PA  were  incapable  of  combating  terror,  the  United  States  would  not  assist  the  
PA  in  building  a  democratic  Palestinian  state.  In  other  words,  from  the  United  
States’  perspective   this   type  of   reform  and  democracy   in  Palestine   is  based  
on  the  precondition  of  elimination  of  parties  who  were  hostile  to  Israeli  security  
and  the  national  interest  of  the  United  States.364    
Unlike  the  United  States,  which  always  considers  security  and  the  war  
on   terror   as   the  major   agenda,   for   Hamas,   reform   should   be   based   on   the  
foundation   of   resistance.   Before   the   formation   of   the   new   Palestinian  
government,   the   PA   offered   six   seats   in   the   Cabinet   to   Hamas   but   Hamas  
rejected   this.365  Khalid  Mishal  explained   that  Hamas  was  not  stubborn  about  
political   integration   but   this   offer   was   in   the   structure   of   the   Oslo   Process,  
which  was  not  in  Palestinian  interests.366  For  Hamas,  the  political  project  and  
reform   should   be   based   on   the   national   consensus   to   end   the   occupation,  
restore   Palestinian   rights   and   bring   justice   to   the   oppressed   people.367   It  
should  be  realized  that  this  reform  was  pursuant  to  the  resistance  cause.  That  
is  to  say,  as  a  precondition,  Israel  has  to  cease  aggression;;  only  then  would  
Hamas  suspend  its  military  resistance.    
Under   pressure   from   the   United   States,   Arafat   eventually   appointed  
Mahmud   Abbas   as   the   first   Prime   Minister   on   19th   March   2003,   which  
conformed  to  the  United  States’  anticipation  and  the  initiative  of  the  Road  Map.  
Afterwards,  the  negotiations  regarding  the  peace  proposal  were  initiated.  The  
Road  Map  was  officially  announced  on  30th  April  2003.  According  to  the  first  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
364  Nathan  Brown  describes   that   the   reform   for   the  United  States   is   to  weaken  Arafat.   See  
Nathan   Brown,   ‘Requiem   for   Palestinian  Reform:   Clear   Lessons   from   a   troubled   record’   in  
Marina  Ottaway  and  Julia  Choucair-­Vizoso  (ed.),  Beyond  the  Façade:  Political  Reform  in  the  
Arab  world  (Washington:  Carnegie  Endowment  for  International  peace,  2008),  p.  109-­110.  
365  The  Palestinian  Information  Center,  ‘The  text  of  the  interview  with  Khalid  Mishal  in  the  Al-­
Manar  Channel,’  (12  March  2003)  
<http://web.archive.org/web/20041220222421/http://www.palestine-­
info.com/arabic/hamas/hewar/mashal_manar.htm>  (accessed  on  19  October  2013).  
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stage   of   the   Road   Map,   which   called,   ‘for   an   immediate   and   unconditional  
ceasefire   to   end   armed   activity   and   all   acts   of   violence   against   Israelis  
anywhere,’368  the  Palestinian   leader  would   have   to   take   the   responsibility   in  
combating  Palestinian  militias.   In   this  scenario,  a  series  of  diplomatic  efforts  
were  undertaken.  On  4th  June,  the  Israeli  Prime  Minister  Ariel  Sharon  and  the  
Palestinian  Prime  Minister  Mahmud  Abbas  met   in  Aqaba,  Jordan,   to  discuss  
ending   the   conflict.   Facing   this   abrupt   change,  Hamas   cut   off   dialogue  with  
the  PA.  Hamas’  leadership  was  convinced  that  the  negotiations  and  summits  
in   the   framework   of   the  Road  Map   ensured   Israeli   legitimacy   of   occupation  
and   terminated   the   Intifada  and   the   resistance.369  At   the   same   time,  Hamas  
made  a  critical  response  to  the  PA’s  compliance  with  the  ‘dictate’  of  Israel  and  
the  United  States,  claiming  that  the  military  resistance  was  still  the  necessary  
approach  in  the  defense  of  Palestinians  in  order  to  end  Israeli  occupation.370  
However,   on   Egypt’s   intervention,   Hamas   changed   its   tone   and   began   to  
consider   the   Egyptian   ceasefire   proposal.371  Eventually,   Egypt   managed   to  
persuade   Hamas   to   declare   a   three-­month   ceasefire   with   other   Palestinian  
factions  on  27th  June.372    
The   2003   ceasefire   not   only   fulfilled   the   International   society’s  
expectations  but  it  also  symbolized  that  Hamas  was  willing  to  compromise  its  
search   for   an   alternative  way   out   of   the   suicide   bombings   under   the   Israeli  
occupation.   A   number   of   external   factors   such   as   the   war   on   terror   in  
Afghanistan  and   Iraq   led  by   the  United  States  determined  Hamas’s  decision  
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to  halt  the  military  operation.373  When  the  U.S.  invaded  Iraq,  Hamas  inspired  
Palestinians  with  a  spirit   of   sacrifice  similar   to   that  of   the   Iraqi  people  when  
they   resisted   the   U.S.   invasion;; 374   while   after   the   war,   with   the   U.S.  
occupation   of   Iraq   Hamas   found   that   the   regional   and   International  
environment   had   changed   and   was   against   its   resistance   strategy.   For  
example,   the   summit   conference   held   in   June   discredited   Hamas’   military  
resistance   option.   In   the   eyes   of   the   United   States,   the   essence   of   Hamas  
was   no   different   than   Al-­Qaeda’s   who   launched   the   suicide   attacks   on  
Western   countries.   Even   though   Hamas   rejected   the   brand   of   terrorism,  
denied  a  connection  with  Al-­Qaeda  and   justified   resistance  as   the  means  of  
protecting   its   people   from   Israeli   attacks,375  in   reality   this   kind   of   operation  
certainly   caused   losses   of   Israeli   civilians   and   validated   the   general  
impression   that   Hamas   was   doing   the   same   sort   of   terrorist   attack   as   Al-­
Qaeda.    
In  addition,  public  opinion  often  played  a  crucial  role  in  shifting  Hamas’  
decision-­making.  According  to  a  survey,  56.1  per  cent  of  Palestinians  felt  that  
the  war   on   Iraq   had   a   negative   effect   on   the  Palestinian   situation.376  Khalid  
Mishal   confessed   that   the   occupation   of   Iraq   by   the   United   States   put  
tremendous   pressure   on   the   Palestinian   and   Arab   sides. 377   Another   poll  
indicates  that  before  the  announcement  of  the  ceasefire  in  June  2003,  73  per  
cent  of  Palestinians  supported  a  ceasefire  with  Israel  under  the  condition  that  
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Israel   would   stop   attacking   the   Palestinians.378  Hamas  was   sensitive   to   this  
change  of  public  opinion  and  therefore  considered  the  option  of  a  ceasefire.    
The  war  on  terror  campaign  and  the  shift  in  Palestinian  opinions  could  
be  the  reason  why  Hamas  announced  the  unilateral  ceasefire  along  with  other  
Palestinian  factions.  But   from  another  angle,   this  ceasefire  may  be  regarded  
as   a   tactic   within   the   resistance   project.   Resistance   had   always   been   the  
central   issue  ever  since   the   inception  of  Hamas   in  1987.  During   the  al-­Aqsa  
intifada,   Hamas   strengthened   its   military   dimension   when   Israel   launched  
military   operations   in   Palestinian   cities.   But   the   change   in   the   external  
situation,  such  as  the  result  of  the  Iraq  war,  the  initiative  of  the  Road  Map  and  
the  negotiation  between  the  PA  and  Israel  led  to  the  predicament  of  its  military  
tactic.  Thus,  Hamas  accommodated   the  ceasefire   into   its   resistance  project.  
Hamas  did  not  recognize  that   it  was  under  pressure  to  accept   the  ceasefire.  
On   the  contrary,  Hamas  stated   that   the  ceasefire  arose  out  of  consideration  
for  protecting  resistance  and  the  unity  of  Palestinian  factions.379  Abu  Shanab,  
a   key   figure   in   Hamas’   leadership   and   a   man   who   was   engaged   in   the  
ceasefire   talks   in   2003   defended   the   position   of   the   ceasefire,   ‘There   is   no  
change   in   Hamas’   strategy,   that   is   based   on   resistance,   but   the   resistance  
takes   different   tactics   and   methods,   and   the   method   of   the   resistance   are  
varied’. 380   The   motivation   for   accepting   the   ceasefire   was   that   Hamas  
demonstrated   to   the   world   that   it   had   an   agenda   for   halting   violence   but   it  
believed  that  due  to  the  Israeli  position,  the  ceasefire  would  not  last  long  and  
the  ‘ceasefire  will  also  make  it  possible  to  tear  the  mask  off  the  Road  Map,  to  
prove  that  it  is  a  security  arrangement  and  not  a  peace  plan’.381  
Seemingly,  Abu  Shanab’s  assumptions  had  come   true.  The  expected  
three-­month   ceasefire   that   only   lasted   for   six   weeks   was   renounced   by  
Hamas  after  the  assassination  of  Abu  Shanab  on  21st  August.  Abu  Shanab’s  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
378  See  Palestinian  Center  for  policy  and  survey  Research,  ‘PSR  Survey  Research  Unit:  
Results  of  Poll  8,’  (19-­22  June  2003).  <http://www.pcpsr.org/en/node/247>  (accessed  on  21  
October  2013).    
379  ‘Texts:  Palestinian  truce,’  BBC,  (29  June  2003).  
<http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/middle_east/3030480.stm>.    
380  ‘Ismail  Abu  Shanab,  Member  of  Hamas  political  Bureau,’  Al-­Jazeera  (23  July  2002).  
381  ‘Interview  with  Hamas’s  Abd  Al-­‘Aziz  Rantisi  and  Ismail  Abu  Shanab,’  Journal  of  Palestine  
Studies,  Vol.  33,  No.1  (Fall  2003),  p.167.  
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death  was  due  to   the   Israeli   reprisals   for   the  suicide  bombings   in  Jerusalem  
by  a  Palestinian  on  20th  August.  This  individual  incident  was  not  authorized  by  
Hamas   officials,   but   Khalid   Mishal   defended   this   operation   as   a   natural  
response.   He   pointed   the   finger   at   Israel   in   violation   of   the   ceasefire  
beforehand;;  Israel  had  not  abided  by  the  ceasefire  to  stop  aggression  and  to  
release   Palestinian   prisoners,   but   continued   killing   Palestinians   and  
demolishing  Palestinians’  houses  during  the  period  of  ceasefire.  382      
The  breakdown  of  the  ceasefire  discredited  the  Road  Map  and  seemed  
to   result   in   a   vicious   circle:   Prime  Minister  Mahmud   Abbas   resigned,   Israel  
vowed   to   assassinate   the   Hamas   political   leaders,   Hamas   returned   to   its  
original   uncompromising   military   discourse.   In   spite   of   this   statistically,   the  
number  of  Israeli  deaths  in  suicide  bombings  were  dramatically  decreased  in  
comparison  with  the  period  2000  to  2003.383    Apart  from  two  suicide  bombings  
in  September,  there  was  no  record  of  a  suicide  bombing  being  carried  out  by  
Hamas  until  14th  January  2004.384    
After   the   collapse   of   the   ceasefire,   Hamas   continued   to   reiterate   the  
significance   of   resistance   and   rejected   any   peace   initiative   to   the   public.   In  
October,   the   track   two   channel   which   is   the   non-­official   diplomacy,   was  
established  between   Israel  and  Palestine.  A  new  peace   initiative  called  The  
Geneva  Accord  was  launched  in  December.  However,  neither  Israeli  officials  
nor   Palestinian   factions   such   as   Hamas   and   Islamic   Jihad   accepted   it.385  It  
seemed  that  Hamas  had  returned  to  the  old  path  before  the  ceasefire  in  June  
2003;;  however  it  could  be  argued  that  Hamas  was  more  active  in  Palestinian  
domestic  affairs  than  in  military  resistance  at  the  end  of  2003.  Hamas  tried  to  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
382  The  Palestinian  Information  Center,  ‘Khalid  Mishal  speaks  about  the  relationship  between  
Hamas  and  the  Palestinian  Authority,’  (August  25  2003).  
<http://web.archive.org/web/20041220222417/http://www.palestine-­
info.com/arabic/hamas/hewar/kalide.htm>  (accessed  on  21  October  2013).    
383  Israel  Ministry  of  Foreign  Affairs,  ‘Suicide  and  other  bombing  attacks  in  Israel  since  the  
declaration  of  Palestine  (Septmber  1993),’  
<http://www.mfa.gov.il/mfa/foreignpolicy/terrorism/palestinian/pages/suicide%20and%20other
%20bombing%20attacks%20in%20israel%20since.aspx>  (accessed  on  21  October  2013).  
384  See  Rashmi  Singh,  Appendix  B   in  Hamas  and   suicide   terrorism,  Multi-­causal   and  multi-­
level  approaches,  op.cit,  pp.138-­142.  
385  Meital   Yoram,  Peace   in   Tatters:   Israel,   Palestine,   and   the  Middle   East   (London:   Lynne  
Rienner,  2006),  pp.171-­174.    
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persuade   Fatah   and   the   PA   officials   not   to   adhere   to   the   framework   of   the  
Oslo  Process.  By  doing  this,  the  Hamas  leadership  had  dialogue  with  the  new  
Prime  Minister  Ahmed  Qurei  and  also  had  a  meeting  with  Fatah   in  Cairo   in  
December.  During  this  period,  Qurei  proposed  a  political  reform  including  the  
planned   presidential,   municipal   and   legislative   elections;;   Egypt   also  
persuaded  Hamas   to   accept   a   new   ceasefire.  Hamas  was   not   interested   in  
this   appeal.  Rather,  Hamas  wanted   to   raise   a   brand-­new  political   project   in  
order   to   get   rid   of   the   shackle  of   the  Road  Map  and   the  Oslo  Process.  For  
Hamas,   the   principle   of   the   political   project   should   not   sell   out   Palestinian  
rights.  Thus,  Hamas  was  very  attentive   to   the   issues  of  corruption,  security,  
the  national  unity  and  reform  in  Palestine.386  It  is  noted  that  Hamas  started  to  
question  the  organizational  structure  of  the  PLO  that  could  not  reflect  a  reality  
of   Palestinian   politics   and   it   also   criticized   the   PA’s   inability.   It   seems   that  
Hamas  regarded  itself  as  an  alternative  to  Palestinian  politics  after  the  failure  
of  the  ceasefire  in  June  2003.387    
3.2.    A  call  for  political  reform  in  response  to  the  initiative  of  Israeli  
disengagement  plan  
  
The  ceasefire   in  2003   lasted   for  only  six  weeks.  However,   this  period  
could  be  regarded  as  the  initial  stage  in  Hamas’s  search  for  a  solution  within  
itself,   in   order   to   effect   Palestinian   reform   rather   than   stressing   armed  
resistance   against   Israel.   This   trend   became   clearer   in   early   2004   since  
Hamas   did   not   emphasize   the   necessity   of   sacrifice   and   the   martyrdom  
operation.  Instead,  in  January,  Hamas’  leadership  offered  a  10-­year  truce  in  a  
proposal  of  co-­existence  with  Israel.  Rantisi  stated  that,  ‘We  accept  a  state  in  
the  West  Bank,   including  Jerusalem,  and   the  Gaza  Strip.  We  propose  a  10-­
year  truce  in  return  for  Israel’s  withdrawal  and  the  establishment  of  a  state.’  388    
The  10-­year  truce  known  as  hudna  in  Arabic  has  a  religious  implication.  
In   Islamic   history,   Muslim   leaders   called   hudna   for   opponents   when   the  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
386   The   Palestinian   Information   Center,   ‘Interview   with   al-­Zahar,’   (13   November   2003).  
<http://web.archive.org/web/20041220222431/http://www.palestine-­
info.com/arabic/hamas/hewar/zahaar22.htm>(accessed  on  1  December  2013).    
387  Ibid.  
388  ‘Israel   summarily   rejects   Hamas   offer   of   10-­year   truce,’   The   Independent,   (27   January  
2004).  
	   108	  
balance   of   power   was   on   the   opponents’   side.   The   classic   example   is   the  
Hudabiyya  Treaty  in  the  7th  century  between  the  Prophet  Muhammad  and  the  
Quraysh  tribe  of  Mecca  when  Muhammad  attempted  to  perform  a  pilgrimage  
there.389   Nowadays,   Islamists   adhere   to   this   concept   when   they   are   in   a  
defensive   position.   The   hudna   is   considered   sacred   and   a   commitment   to  
seek  co-­existence  with  the  opponent.  Azzam  Tamimi  states  that  theoretically,  
once   each   hostile   party   reaches   the   hudna,   a   Muslim   should   take   it   as   a  
religious  duty  and   fulfill   the  commitment,  otherwise   from   the  Muslim  point  of  
view   that   is,   in  accordance  with   Islamic   faith,  breaking   the  hudna   is  a  grave  
sin  in  the  Islamic  jurisprudence.390  On  the  other  hand,  the  application  of  hunda  
is  not   rigid.  According   to   the  various  contexts,   flexible   interpretations  can  be  
allowed.  391  Usually,   the  average  duration  of  hudna   is  10  years.392  When   the  
hudna  has  expired,  it  can  be  renewed  by  mutual  consent.393      
The   principle   of   hudna   is   the   one   that   Hamas   presented   as   an  
alternative   solution   to   the   existing   conflict.   394   hudna   is   another   option   to  
armed  resistance   in  order   to  obtain  Palestinian  basic   rights  and   freedoms   in  
the   West   Bank   and   Gaza.   But   the   proposal   is   unlike   the   existing   Peace  
Process  which  is  based  on  the  concept  of  a  two-­state  solution.  Even  if  Israel  
withdraw   to   the   1967   border,   the   recognition   of   Israel   would   never   be   the  
acceptable  option  due  to  the  insistence  of  Islamic  faith  that  the  ownership  of  
Palestine  belongs  to  God  as  well  as  the  historical  memory  that  Israel  usurped  
Palestinian  land  in  1948.      	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
389  Alastair  Crooke  and  Beverley  Milton-­Edwards,  ‘Waving,  not  drowning:  Strategic  
Dimensions  of  Ceasefires  and  Islamic  Movements,’  Security  Dialogue,  op.cit.,  p.295.  
390  Tamimi,  Azzam,  Hamas,  Unwritten  Chapters,  op.cit.,  p.  159.  
391  Paul   Scham  and  Osama  Abu-­Irshaid,   ‘Hamas’   ideological   rigidity   and   political   flexibility’,  
Special   Report   224   (Washington:   United   State   Institute   of   Peace,   2009),   p.7.  
<http://www.usip.org/files/resources/Special%20Report%20224_Hamas.pdf>   (accessed   on   3  
December  2013).  
392  Mustafa   Abu   Sway,   ‘The   Concept   of   Hudna   in   Islamic   sources,’   Palestinian   Academic  
Society   for   the   study   of   International   affairs   (PASSIA),   (6   August   2006).  
<http://web.archive.org/web/20070105070236/http://www.passia.org/meetings/2006/Hudna.d
oc>  (accessed  on  3  December  2013).  
393  Ibid.,  p.159.  
394  The  Palestine  Information  Center,  ‘Interview  with  Secretary-­General  of  the  Islamic  Group  
in  Lebanon,’  (30  January  2004).  
<http://web.archive.org/web/20041220222550/http://www.palestine-­
info.com/arabic/hamas/hewar/mawlawy.htm>  (accessed  on  3  December  2013).     
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This  is  not  the  first  time  that  Hamas  proposed  a  10-­year  truce  to  Israel.  
Hamas  leaders  had  called  for  this  initiative  in  early  1988  and  again  in  1994.395  
However,   Israel  was   suspicious   and   rejected  Hamas’   initiative.  Once   again,  
Israel  regarded  Hamas’  truce  proposal  as  a  ‘smokescreen’  for  a  new  round  of  
military  preparations.396    
Apart   from   the   truce   proposal,   Hamas   focused   more   on   political  
elections   and   reform   agendas   than   on  military   rhetoric   even   though  Hamas  
lost  two  significant  political   leaders,  Ahmed  Yassin  on  22nd  March  and  Abdel  
Aziz  Rantisi  on  17th  April  due  to  the  Israeli  assassinations.  This  abrupt  change  
could  be  attributed  to  the  effect  of  the  unilateral  disengagement  plan  proposed  
by   the   Sharon   government.   The   disengagement   plan   had   been   a   decisive  
factor   in   Hamas’   change   of   discourse   since   Israel’s   Prime   Minister   Ariel  
Sharon   disclosed   this   plan   at   the   annual  Herzliya  Conference   in  December  
2003.  
As  for  Israel,  settlers  and  members  inside  the  Likud  opposed  the  plan.  
In  order  to  carry  out  his  unilateral  plan,  Sharon  aligned  with  the  Labour  party  
to  obtain  majority  support   in   the  Cabinet.  Besides,   the  majority  of   the   Israeli  
population  supported  this  plan,  which  gave  credit  to  Sharon.397  The  plan  was  
to  withdraw  all   settlements   in  Gaza  and   four   settlements   in   the  West  Bank;;  
and   the   initiative  was   crystalized  and  approved  by   the   Israeli   cabinet   on  6th  
June   2004   and   was   implemented   in   August   2005.   The   unilateral   plan   was  
seen  as  a  breakthrough  in  the  dilemma  of  Israeli-­Palestinian  conflict,  however,  
scrutiny  of  the  motivation  behind  it,  shows  it  to  be  conflict  management  rather  
than   a   peace   offer. 398   Since   the   outbreak   of   the   al-­Aqsa   Intifada,   Israel  
distrusted   the   PA   as   a   reliable   partner   in   negotiation.   At   the   same   time,  
several   Israeli   military   operations   and   the   policy   of   assassination   were  	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396  ‘Israel   summarily   rejects   Hamas   offer   of   10-­year   truce,’   The   Independent,   (27   January  
2004).  
397  Galia  Golan,   Israel   and  Palestine:   peace   plans   from  Oslo   to   disengagement   (Princeton:  
Markus  Wiener  Publishers,  2007),  p.125.  
398  Yaacov   Bar-­Siman-­Tov,   Ephraim   Lavie,   Kobi   Michael,   and   Daniel   Bar-­Tal,   ‘The   Israeli-­
Palestinian  violent  confrontation:  an  Israeli  perspective,’  in  Yaacov  Bar-­Siman-­Tov  (ed.),  The  
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Palgrave  Macmillan,  2007),  pp.261-­263.  
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insufficient   to   curb   the   violence   and   activity   of   Palestinian   militias.   In   this  
context,  all   Israeli  strategies  seemed  to  have  failed.  Therefore,   the  unilateral  
disengagement   plan   seemed   to   offer   an   alternative   in   managing   the  
conflict.399  
The   problem   with   this   plan   however   was   the   term   ‘unilateral’   which  
meant  that  Israel  would  complete  the  mission  without  negotiating  with  the  PA.  
Furthermore,   the   wall   of   separation   was   being   constructed   along   with   the  
expansion   of   the   Jewish   settlements   in   the  West   Bank.   In   this   respect,   the  
plan   hindered   the   Road   Map   which   specified,   an   ‘independent,   democratic  
and  viable  Palestine’  based  on  the  1967  borders.400  To  settle  this  controversy,  
Sharon   sought   an   understanding   from   the   U.S   administration.   In   April,  
President   Bush   met   Sharon   in   the   White   House,   endorsing   this   unilateral  
disengagement   plan   in   accordance   with   the   principle   of   the   Road   Map.401  
From  this  point  of  view,  it  seems  that  the  plan  might  end  the  Israeli-­Palestinian  
conflict.   But   in   an   interview   with   Haaretz,   Dov   Weisglass,   Sharon’s   senior  
adviser   and   an   initiator   of   the   plan,   indicated   that   it,   ‘is   the   freezing   of   the  
Peace  Process’,402  which  is  clearly  against  the  spirit  of  the  two-­state  solution  
promoted  by  the  United  States.  
Regarding   the   disengagement   plan,   Hamas   considered   that   Sharon  
had  not  made  a  concession   to  Palestinians  and   the   real  problem,   that   is,  of  
occupation,   had   not   been   addressed.   Hamas   believed   that   Sharon   only  
wanted  to  find  an  exit  that  disposed  of  the  security  burden  in  Gaza  due  to  the  
Palestinian   resistance  and   later,   to   intensify   Israel’s   domination  of   the  West  
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(New  York:  Columbia  University  Press,  2008),  p.264.  
400  ‘The  Roadmap:  full  text’,  BBC,  (30  April,  2003).  
<http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/middle_east/2989783.stm>  (accessed  on  5  December  
2013).  
401  Bush  asserts,   ‘the  plan  will  mark  real  progress  toward  realizing  my  June  24,  2002  vision,  
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all  states  and  parties  of  their  own  obligations  under  the  roadmap.’  See  ‘Letter  from  President  
Bush   to   Prime   Ministe   Sharon,’   The   White   House,   (14   April   2004).   <http://georgewbush-­
whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2004/04/20040414-­3.html>   (accessed   on   5  
December  2013).    
402  ‘Top  PM  aide:  Gaza  plan  aims   to   freeze   the  peace  process,’  Haaretz,   (6  October  2004).  
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Bank.403  On  the  other  hand,  Hamas  also  worried  that  this  disengagement  plan  
might   create   a   power   vacuum   in   Gaza   and   accelerate   Palestinian   internal  
division.  This   concern   seemed   to  have  materialized  with   the  power   struggle  
within   Fatah   and   the   PA.   The   internal   clash   within   Fatah   and   the   trend   of  
opposition   to   the   PA   was   a   serious   challenge   for   Palestinian   society   as   a  
whole  before  the  death  of  Arafat.  Apart  from  the  appeal  to  reform,  Palestinian  
factions  were  dissatisfied  with  Arafat’s  nepotism  and  the  corruption  of  the  PA.  
From  16th  July  2004  for  over   two  weeks,  discontent   turned   into  violence;;  PA  
officials  were  abducted,  a  police  station  was  burned  and  the  governor’s  office  
in  Khan  Yunis  was,  for  a  brief  time,  controlled  by  an  armed  group.404  Hamas  
took  a  neutral   stance  on   this  deteriorating   situation,   but   called   for   unity  and  
dialogue.  Khalid  Mishal  stated   that   internal   fighting   that  was  bound  to  drown  
the  Palestinian  national  ship  was  not  permissible.  At  the  same  time,  the  Israeli  
unilateral  disengagement  plan  ought  to  be  blamed  for  the  internal  chaos  that  
benefited  Israel  itself.405    
It  could  be  seen   that  since   the   initiative  of   the  disengagement  plan   in  
December  2003,  Hamas  gradually  changed  its  discourse  discernibly,  from  an  
uncompromising  military  resistance  to  a  concern  about  domestic  affairs.  Even  
though   Israel   continued   targeting   Hamas   leaders   and   stormed   Palestinian  
areas,  Hamas   restrained  military   reprisal   and   suicide  bombings.  During  14th  
May   to   20th   2004,   nearly   40   Palestinians   were   killed   by   the   Israeli   army   in  
Rafah,  causing  outrage  amongst  Palestinian  society.406  However,  from  May  to  
August,  no  suicide  bombing  was  reported.407  In  2004   it  seems  that   the  need  
for  political  integration  had  overwhelmed  the  suicide  bombings.  In  an  interview  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
403  The   Palestinian   Information   Center,   ‘Interview   with   Khalid   Mishal   by   Quds   Press,’   (19  
February   2004).   <http://web.archive.org/web/20041220221937/http://www.palestine-­
info.com/arabic/hamas/hewar/mesh3al.htm>  (accessed  on  7  December  2013).    
404  Jonathan  D.  Halevi,   ‘The  Palestinian  Rebellion   in  Fatah:  Foreshaowing  the  politics  of   the  
Post-­Arafat   era,’   Jerusalem   Center   for   Public   Affairs,   (2   August   2004).   <  
http://www.jcpa.org/brief/brief3-­30.htm>  (accessed  on  7  December  2013).  
405  The  Palestine  Information  Center,  ‘Interview  with  Khalid  Mishal,  the  Jordanian  newspaper  
Glory,’   (26   July   2004).   <http://web.archive.org/web/20051109164133/http://www.palestine-­
info.com/arabic/hamas/statements/2004/26_7_04.htm>  (accessed  on  8  December  2013).  
406   Ramzy   Baroud,   The   Second   Palestinian   Intifada:   A   chronicle   of   a   People’s   struggle  
(London:  Pluto  Press,  2006),  pp.99-­100.  
407  Rashmi   Singh,     Hamas   and   suicide   terrorism,   Multi-­causal   and   multi-­level   approaches,  
Appendix  B,  p.142.  
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in   June   2004,   Ismail   Haniyeh,   one   of   political   leaders   of   Hamas   in   Gaza  
stated   that  Palestinians   should   not   sacrifice   their   blood  and  Hamas’  military  
group  would  decide  when  to  respond  to  Israeli  attacks  in  due  course.408  
It   is   noted   that   apart   from   the   ceasefire   in   June   2003,   the   Israeli  
unilateral   disengagement   plan   played   a   crucial   role   in   determining   Hamas’  
attitude   toward  Palestinian  national  unity  and  political   integration.  The   Israeli  
unilateral   disengagement   plan   that   emerged   from   an   initiative   in   December  
2003   to   the  actual   implementation   in  August  2005   took   twenty  months.  This  
interval  gave  Hamas  more   time  and  space   for   the  consideration  of   the  next  
step   in   dealing   with   the   reality   of   the   occupation   as   well   as   Palestinian  
domestic  affairs.  To  a  large  extent,  the  plan  affected  Hamas’  order  of  priority.  
Hamas  saw   that   the  disengagement   plan  would  either   bring  hope  or   trigger  
uncertainty   in   Gaza.   In   order   to   cope   with   the   possible   scenarios   after   the  
Israeli  withdrawal   from  Gaza,  Hamas  appealed   to   other  Palestinian   factions  
with  suggestions  of  how  to  manage  it.  For  the  first  time  since  the  outbreak  of  
the  al-­Aqsa   Intifada,  Hamas  stated   that   it  was  preparing   to  participate   in   the  
municipal  elections  and  articulated  the  political  project  that  seemed  not  to  be  
just  an  empty  slogan  as  it  was  in  the  first  two  years  of  the  al-­Aqsa  Intifada.  In  
spite  of  the  fact  that  the  disengagement  plan  was  considered  to  be  a  trap  and  
that  Gaza  would  be  a   large  detention  camp  monitored  by   Israel,409  it  can  be  
argued   that   ironically,   the   plan   changed  Hamas’   tactics   from   its   focus   on   a  
military   dimension   to   political   engagement.   In   mid-­2004,   Hamas   made   a  
strong  attempt   to   integrate  Palestinian  politics,  and  by  raising  the  concept  of  
reform,   Hamas   can   be   seen   to   have   been   replacing   Fatah   in   the   political  
arena.    
When   it   decided   to   participate   in   the   elections   in   mid-­2004   Hamas’  
main  goal  was  to  fight  corruption.  That  is  to  say  that  the  purpose  of  the  reform  
was   to   remove   the   widespread   corruption   that   was   a   chronic   problem   in  
Palestinian  society.   In  several   interviews,  Khalid  Mishal  diagnosed  prevalent  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
408  The  Palestinian  Information  Center,  ‘Haniyeh:  The  withdrawal  plan  is  a  big  deception,’  (10  
June   2004).   <http://web.archive.org/web/20041220222934/http://www.palestine-­
info.com/arabic/hamas/hewar/2004/haneyah1.htm>  (accessed  on  9  December  2013).    
409  The  Palestinian  Information  Center,  ‘Sheikh  Raed  Salah  speaks  from  the  prison,’  (27  
October  2004).  <http://web.archive.org/web/20110226095352/http://www.palestine-­
info.com/arabic/hamas/hewar/2004/sala7.htm>  (accessed  on  9  December  2013).  
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corruptions   in   Palestinian   society   and   he   mentioned   several,   on   different  
levels.  As   far  as  moral   corruption  was  concerned,  Palestinian  steadfastness  
had  been  weakened  by  Israel.  As  for  financial  corruption,  it  was  no  secret  that  
it   had   existed   in   the   PA   since   the   Oslo   Process.410  Mishal   mentioned   that  
there   were   clear   indications   of   corruption   in   the   flour   trade,   which   was   the  
staple  food  of  the  poor,  and  in  the  cement  business  which  was  involved  in  the  
Israeli   separation   wall.411  Regarding   political   corruption,   Fatah   monopolized  
decision-­making,   rejecting   other   participations,   which   posed   a   problem   for  
moving   forward.   Finally,   as   far   as   security   corruption  was   concerned,  many  
Palestinian   fighters   were   assassinated   or   arrested   by   the   co-­operation  
between   the   PA   and   Israel. 412   All   these   kinds   of   corruptions   hindered  
Palestinians’   capacity  of   resisting   the   Israeli   occupation.  On   the  other  hand,  
the   internal   conflict   among   Palestinians   was   dangerous   to   this   process   of  
reform.   In   order   to   address   these   problems   and   put   Palestine   on   the   right  
track,  Mishal  further  elucidated  the  principles  of  reform.  Firstly,  reform  should  
be   comprehensive   instead   of   focusing   on   one   side   or   another.   Secondly,  
reform  should  come  from  the  wishes  of  Palestinians  instead  of  intervention  by  
foreign   forces   such   as   the   United   States   and   Israel.   Thirdly,   all   Palestinian  
factions   should   participate   in   the   reform   against   corruption.   Fourthly,   the  
approach  to  reform  should  be  peaceful  and  not  violent.  Finally,  reform  should  
build   a   unified   national   leadership   from   all   Palestinian   factions   through   the  
democratic  approach.413    
The  emphasis  of  reform  from  mid-­2004  is  a  clear  indication  that  Hamas  
was   inclined   towards  political   integration.   It  should  be  noted   that   this  shift   to  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
410  The  Palestinian  Information  Center,  ‘Interview  with  Khalid  Mishal  by  Al-­Hayat,’  (28  July  
2004).  <http://web.archive.org/web/20041220222141/http://www.palestine-­
info.com/arabic/hamas/hewar/2004/mishal.htm>  (accessed  on  10  December  2013).    
411  The  Palestine  Information  Center,  ‘Interview  with  Khalid  Mishal,  the  Jordanian  newspaper  
Glory,’   (26   July   2004).   <   http://web.archive.org/web/20051109164133/http://www.palestine-­
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412  The  Palestinian  Information  Center,  ‘Interview  with  Khalid  Mishal  by  Al-­Hayat,’  (28  July  
2004).  <  http://web.archive.org/web/20041220222141/http://www.palestine-­
info.com/arabic/hamas/hewar/2004/mishal.htm  >  (accessed  on  10  December  2013).    
413  The  Palestine  Information  Center,  ‘Khalid  Mishal:  Reform  must  be  a  comprehensive  reform,  
including  financial,  security,  political  reform  and  stop  the  monopoly  of  Palestinian  decision,’  
(28  July  2004).  <http://web.archive.org/web/20041220222511/http://www.palestine-­
info.com/arabic/hamas/hewar/2004/mishal1.htm>  (accessed  on  1  February  2014).    
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reform   was   for   the   sake   of   resistance   and   Hamas   had   no   intention   of  
abandoning  its  military  means  when  it  entered  the  political  domain.414  Instead,  
Hamas  looked  forward  to  political   integration  and  democratic  elections  as  an  
opportunity  to  reach  national  consensus  and  the  restoration  of  social  order  for  
the   protection   of   its   resistance   work.   However,   Hamas   had   not   decided  
whether   it  would  participate   in  the  PLC  election  which  was  the  design  of   the  
Oslo  Process.  Until  the  death  of  Yasser  Arafat  in  November  2004,  the  change  
of   the   political   landscape   in   Palestine   accelerated   Hamas’   final   decision   to  
integrate  politically.  
4.  The  path  to  political  integration    
Two   events   appear   to   have   played   major   parts   in   Hamas’  
determination   to   participate   in   the   PLC   election   in   2006.   The   first   was   the  
initiative  of   the   Israeli   disengagement  plan   in  December  2003   that   triggered  
Hamas  to  consider  the  possibility  of  a  political  integration  as  mentioned  in  the  
last   section.   The   second   event   was   the   death   of   Yasser   Arafat   on   14th  
November   2004  which  made  Hamas’   political   integration   irreversible.   In   the  
post-­Arafat   era,   even   though  Hamas  had  no   intention  of   abandoning  armed  
resistance,  it  could  be  said  that  Hamas’  political  stance  was  more  subtle  than  
before.  This  section  will  analyze  the  implications  of  Arafat’s  death  for  Hamas’  
political   integration,   and   how   Hamas   prepared   and   participated   in   the  
elections  in  accordance  with  its  resistance  project.      
4.1   The   implications   of   the   post-­Arafat   era   for   Hamas’   political  
integration    
Arafat’s  death,  on  14th  November  2004   left  a  power  vacuum;;  and  this  
could   be   seen   as   the   turning   point   for   Palestine.   A   few   days   later,   Khalid  
Mishal  when   interviewed  by  a  Jordanian  newspaper  stated   that  after  Arafat,  
Palestinians  were  entering  a  new  stage.  However  Mishal  strongly  doubted  the  
cause  of  the  death  of  Arafat;;  and  he  argued  that  Israel  was  to  be  blamed  for  
poisoning  Arafat.415  Reflecting  on  the  post-­Arafat  era  scenario,  Mishal  warned  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
414   The   Palestinian   Information   Center,   ‘(Israeli)   withdrawal   pretexts,’   (11   October   2004).  
<http://web.archive.org/web/20110226095400/http://www.palestine-­
info.com/arabic/hamas/hewar/2004/siam.htm>(accessed  on  1  February  2014).    
415  The   Palestine   Information   Center,   ‘Khalid   Mishal’s   statement   in   Jordanian   Newspaper  
Glory   about   the   death   of   Abu   Ammar,’   (22   November   2004).  
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that   in   their   own   interests   the   United   States   and   Israel   would   seize   the  
opportunity  to  end  the  al-­Aqsa  Intifada  and  stop  resistance  in  terms  of  seeking  
new  Palestinian  partners.416  To  prevent  this  eventuality,  national  unity  against  
the  Israeli  occupation  and  aggression  was  required.  To  reach  this  goal,  Mishal  
suggested   that   a   free,   fair   and   comprehensive   democratic   election  was   the  
way  to  appointing  a  unified  national  leadership.417  It  could  be  argued  that  this  
statement  seemed  to  have  become  the  guideline  for  the  ensuing  period  during  
which  Hamas  integrated  into  Palestinian  politics.    
In   the   post-­Arafat   era,   shaping   a   new  Palestinian   leadership   became  
the  priority   for  Palestine  as  well  as   for   international  society.  Mahmud  Abbas  
was   expected   to   be   the   next   PA   president   and   was   later   elected   on   9th  
January   2005.   Hamas   declared   that   this   election   was   meant   to   match   the  
expectation   of   the  United  States   and   Israel   while   it   could   not   represent   the  
legitimacy  of  a  Palestinian  representative  including  the  diaspora;;  and  also  that  
the  election  accorded  with  the  occupation  which  continued  restrictions  on  the  
Palestinians. 418   In   spite   of   this   criticism,   the   role   of   Abbas   seemed   to  
accelerate   the   process   of   Hamas’   political   integration   although   Hamas   was  
fully  aware  that  the  United  States  and  Israel  wanted  to  pressurize  Abbas  into  
disarming  Hamas.  
After   Arafat’s   death,   the   relations   between   Israel   and   Palestinian  
Authority  made  a  breakthrough.  The  summit  held   in  Sharm  el-­Sheikh  on  8th  
February  symbolized  the  end  of  the  mutual  confrontation  between  Israel  and  
Palestine.   Ariel   Sharon   stated   that,   ‘Israel   will   cease   all   its   military   activity  
against   all  Palestinians  anywhere’   and  Palestinians  and   Israelis   should,   ‘act  
together,  determinedly,  to  dismantle  the  terrorist  infrastructure,  to  disarm  and  
subdue  it  once  and  for  all.  Only  by  crushing  terror  and  violence  will  we  build  
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416  Ibid.  
417  Ibid.  
418  The  Palestine  Information  Center,  ‘Speech  from  Muhammad  Nazzal  in  the  ninth  
anniversary  for  martyrdom  Engineer  Yahya  Ayyash,’  (7  January  2005).  
<http://web.archive.org/web/20110226095251/http://www.palestine-­
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peace.’  419  It  is  obvious  that  Sharon  was  suggesting  that  those  terrorists  were  
Hamas   and   other   Palestinian  militants.  On   the   other   hand,   Abbas   said   that  
this   summit,   ‘is   also   an   important   step   representing   a   new   chance   for   the  
peace   process   to   regain   momentum   and   to   get   back   on   track,   so   that   the  
Palestinian   and   Israeli   peoples   might   regain   hope   in   the   possibility   of  
achieving   peace.’   Furthermore,   Abbas   also   implied   that   the   PA   had   the  
authority  to  collect  weapons  from  Hamas  in  this  summit.  420  
Hamas  had  mixed  feelings  about  this  summit.  It  argued  that  the  summit  
had  repeated  the  same  mistake  of  the  previous  talks  with  Israel  and  indicated  
the   defeat   of   Palestinians.   But   evaluating   the   whole   situation   Hamas  made  
compromises  by  offering  a  temporary  ceasefire  (tahdiya).421  Unlike  the  hunda  
(ceasefire)  in  June  2003,  this  time,  Hamas  used  the  term,  ‘tahdiya’  to  cool  off  
its   armed   resistance   provided   that   Israel   stopped   its   military   operation.   For  
this  reason,  Hamas  stated  that  if  Israel  continued  targeting  Palestinians,  they  
would  respond  in  the  same  way,  although   tahdiya  had  been  offered.  In  spite  
of   this   uncompromising   position   toward   Israel,   it   is   noted   that   Hamas   had  
more  options  and  flexibility  in  articulating  its  resistance  discourse  in  the  post-­
Arafat   era.   Abu   Marzuq,   the   deputy   chairman   of   Hamas’   political   bureau,  
explained   why   Hamas   accepted   the   tahdiya   and   political   integration   at   this  
moment.   Arafat’s   death   was   the   crucial   factor   that   had   changed   the  
Palestinian   internal  structure  and  motivated  Hamas  to  adopt  broader  options  
such   as   the   participation   of   the   municipal   and   PLC   elections   to   protect   its  
resistance  work.422  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
419  ‘Full  text  of  Sharon  declaration,’  BBC,  (8  February  2005).  
<http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/middle_east/4247233.stm>  (accessed  on  2  February  2014).    
420   ‘Full   text   of   Abbas   declaration:   The   full   text   of   Palestinian   leader   Mahmud   Abbas’s  
declaration  of  a  ceasefire  with  the  Israelis  at  the  Sharm  al-­Sheikh  summit,’  BBC,  (8  February  
2005).  <http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/middle_east/4247327.stm>  (accessed  on  2  February  
2014).  
421The  Palestine  Information  Center,‘  Interview  with  Muhammad  Ghazal,’  (11  February  2005).  
<http://web.archive.org/web/20110226095251/http://www.palestine-­
info.com/arabic/hamas/hewar/2005/nzaal.htm>  (accessed  on  2  February  2014).  
422  The  Palestinian  Information  Center,  ‘Dr.  Moussa  Abu  Marzuq,  dialogue  with  the  
Palestinian  Information  Center,’  (14  June  2005).  
<http://web.archive.org/web/20110226095148/http://www.palestine-­
info.com/arabic/hamas/hewar/2005/mousa.htm>  (accessed  on  2  February  2014).    
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As   well   as   refraining   from   armed   resistance,   Hamas   also   sought  
national   consensus   regarding   its   bid   to   participate   in   elections.  Through   the  
coordination   and   the   mediation   of   both   Abbas   and   Egypt,   the   ‘Cairo  
declaration’  was  agreed  ultimately  by  a  consensus  of  13  Palestinian  factions  
and  announced  on  17th  March  2005.  This   declaration   is   considered   to   be  a  
breakthrough  for  the  later  development  of  Palestine.  One  of  its  achievements  
was   that  after   the  breakdown  of   the  ceasefire   in  August  2003  all  Palestinian  
factions  had  agreed  to  halt  armed  resistance  against  Israel.  Secondly,  Hamas  
had  been  willing  to  integrate  with  the  PLO  and  participate  in  the  PLC  election  
for  the  first  time.  In  terms  of  this  declaration,  President  Abbas  hoped  that  the  
tension  between  Palestine  and   Israel  would  calm  down   to  enable   the  PA   to  
resume  its  negotiations  with  Israel.423  
Many   believed   that   Hamas’   acceptance   of   the   Cairo   declaration  
indicated   its   pragmatic   and   moderate   approach   to   adapt   to   a   new   reality.  
Some  argue  that  this  declaration  marked  the  evolvement  of  a  ‘New  Hamas’.424    
Others   state   that  Hamas  made  a   leap   towards  a   political   role   rather   than  a  
military  one.425  Indeed,  Hamas  had  committed  to  reduce  its  military  option  as  
well   as   veering   away   from   the   military   rhetoric   when   it   determined   to  
participate   in  political   integration.  But   the  question   is  whether   this  behaviour  
change   really   meant   that   Hamas   had   already   compromised   its   principle   of  
resistance  or  had  gradually  become  distant   from   its  goal  of   the   liberation  of  
Palestine.  
As  for  Hamas  itself,  the  Cairo  declaration  had  another  implication.  To  a  
large  extent,  the  Cairo  declaration  favoured  Hamas  rather  than  Fatah  due  to  
the   fact   that   Hamas   did   not   need   to   compromise   its   principle. 426   On  
scrutinizing   the   contents   of   this   declaration   it   appears   that,   ‘the   right   of  
resistance’   was   guaranteed   as  well   as:   the   formation   of   a   Palestinian   state  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
423  Graham  Usher,   ‘The  Palestinians  after  Arafat,’  Journal  of  Palestine  Studies,  Vol.34,  No.3  
(Spring  2005),  p.49.  
424  Chrystic  Flournoy,   Ideological   and  Behavioural  metamorphose:  A  new  charter   for   a   new  
Hamas,  Master  of  Philosophy  thesis,  University  of  Oxford,  2007,  p.16.  
425  Khaled  Hroub,  ‘Hamas  in  and  out  of  power,’  EuroMesco  Papper,  65,  January  2008,  p.6.  
426  Also  many  Fatah  members  believed  that  Abbas  made  too  much  compromise  with  Hamas.  
See   Graham   Usher,   ‘The   democratic   resistance:   Hamas,   Fatah,   and   the   Palestinian  
Elections,’  Journal  of  Palestine  Studies,  Vol.35,  No.3  (Spring  2006),  p.24.  
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with  full  sovereignty  with  Jerusalem  as  its  capital  and  the  right  of  refugees  to  
return.427  The   other   issues   such   as:   the   danger   of   Jewish   settlement,   the  
separation   wall,   release   of   Palestinian   prisoners,   the   reconstruction   of   the  
PLO,  the  democratic  elections  and  the  forbidden  Palestinians’  internal  conflict  
also   matched   Hamas’   anticipation.   In   other   words,   this   declaration   did   not  
contradict  Hamas’s  resistance  work  at  all.    
It   can   be   said   that   the   Cairo   declaration   legitimated   the   right   to  
resistance  against   the   Israeli  occupation,  which  was  Hamas’  priority  when   it  
came   to   political   integration.   Prior   to   this   Cairo   declaration,   Hamas   had  
agreed   to  halt   the  military  attack  on   Israel  while  at   the  same  time   it  was  not  
willing   to   abandon   a  military   tactic.   Khalid  Mishal   restated   the   reasons  why  
Hamas  would  not  give  up  its  armed  resistance  and  further  elaborated  on  the  
principle   of   the   resistance,   describing   it   as   a   strategic   option   of   a   political  
integration.  The  main  content  was  as  follows:428  
1.  Even  though  Hamas  had  committed  to  a  reduction  in  the  amount  of  
military   resistance   at   that   moment,   Palestine   was   still   under   Israeli  
occupation   and   aggression;;   Palestinians   were   being   targeted.  
Therefore  the  military  resistance  was  without  doubt,  legitimate.  
2.  Armed  resistance  was  not  everyone’s  duty.  Israeli  aggression  comes  
in  many  forms  in  terms  of  the  occupation  of  lands  and  the  demolition  of  
Palestinian   culture   and   spirit.   In   response   to   this   comprehensive  
aggression,  the  resistance  should  be  integrated  into  daily  life  and  ought  
to  be  comprehensive  forms  including  peaceful  resistance.  
3.  People  should  remain  steadfast,  a  characteristic  which  comes  from  
the  trust  of  God  in  facing  a  long-­term  battle.    
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
427   MIFTAH,   ‘Text   of   the   (Cairo)   Declaration   by   Palestinians,’   (21   March   2005).  
<http://www.miftah.org/Display.cfm?DocId=6938&CategoryId=5>   (accessed   on   3   February  
2014).  
428  The  Palestine  Information  Center,  ‘Speech  from  Khalid  Mishal,  the  chairman  of  the  political  
bureau  of  Hamas  in  the  opening  of  the  conference  of  the  Global  Campaign  for  resisting  the  
aggression,’  (28  February  2005).  
<http://web.archive.org/web/20110226095234/http://www.palestine-­
info.com/arabic/hamas/hewar/2005/mesh3al05.htm>  (accessed  on  3  February  2014).  
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4.   The  most   dangerous   thing   would   be   that   the   ethos   of   Palestinian  
resistance  was  defeated  by  the  enemy;;  however  this  would  not  happen.  
Gaza  was   a  model   of   successful   due   to   the   fact   that   resistance   and  
sacrifice  forced  the  enemy  out  of  Gaza.    
5.   Resistance   was   a   strategic   choice   which   aimed   at   liberation,  
freedom,   pride   and   dignity.   By   declaring   tahdiya   (calm),   Palestinian  
fighters   could   take   a   breath   in   the   preparation   for   the   enemy’s  
aggression.  
6.   Palestinian   resistance  was   not   a   problem   for   international   society.  
Rather,   it   was   a   problem   for   Sharon   and   Zionism.   As   long   as   the  
occupation  existed,  Palestinians  had  no  choice  but  to  resist.  
From   this   statement,   one   can   see   that   resistance   was   always   the  
principle  that  Hamas  addressed  to  the  public.  From  this  perspective,  the  Cairo  
declaration   could   be   seen   as   consistent   with,   and   an   extension   of,   its  
resistance  discourse  since  2002.    
Indeed,  the  Cairo  declaration  symbolizes  the  starting  point  from  where  
Hamas  officially  declared   its   intention   to  participate   in   the  PLC  election.  The  
decision  to  participate  in  the  PLC  election  came  after  deep  deliberation,  since  
it  took  more  than  four  months  of  discussion  and  debate  within  Hamas’s  circle.  
One   of   the   political   leaders,   Usama  Hamdan,   stated   that   around   25-­30   per  
cent  of  members  were  against  political  integration  while  the  final  decision  was  
taken  by  the  majority  through  the  Consultative  (Shura)  Council.429  In  fact,  the  
sign  of  Hamas’s  joining  in  the  PLC  election  could  be  traced  back  to  the  middle  
of   2004.   After   Sharon’s   announcement   of   the   disengagement,   Hamas’s  
leadership  had  intensive  discussions  about  the  future  of  management  in  Gaza  
and  worried  about  the  disorder  within  Palestinian  factions.  Therefore,  in  view  
of   the   forthcoming   elections,   a   call   for   a   comprehensive   reform   and   the  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
429   ‘Hamas   Foreign   Minister   Usama   Hamdan   talks   about   National   Reconciliation,   Arafat,  
Reform  and  Hamas’s  presence  in  London,’  Journal  of  Palestine  Studies,  Vol.40,  No.3  (Spring  
2011),  pp.64-­65.  
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establishment  of  a  unified  government  was  required.430  But  the  decision  to  the  
participation  of  the  PLC  election  was  finalized  after  the  death  of  Arafat.  
4.2  Participations  in  the  municipal  and  the  PLC  elections  
In  the  post-­Arafat  era,  Hamas’  discourse  had  obviously  tended  to  focus  
on  the  Palestinian  domestic  affairs,  particularly   the   issues  of  democracy,   the  
election   and   a   united   national   leadership.   It   seemed   that   the   military  
confrontation  had  been  prolonged.  The  context  of  Palestine  in  2005  had  been  
quite   different   from   the   period   between   2002   and   2004.   In   particular,   the  
Israeli   disengagement   plan   that   was   implemented   in   August   2005   boosted  
Hamas’  confidence  and  determination  to  integrate  politically.  For  Hamas,  the  
Israeli   withdrawal   from   Gaza   symbolized   the   defeat   of   Zionism   over   the  
occupation   of   Palestine.   It   also   reinforced   the   impression   that   the  
disengagement   plan   generated   by   Palestinian   resistance   was   seen   as   a  
victory   and   achievement   for   all   Palestinians.   431   A   Palestinian   public   poll  
conducted   before   the   eve   of   the   Israeli   withdrawal   from  Gaza   reflected   this  
atmosphere.  The  overwhelming  majority  (84  per  cent)  believed  that  an  Israeli  
withdrawal  from  Gaza  represented  a  victory  for  the  armed  resistance;;  Hamas  
also   received   credit   from   40   per   cent   of   the   Palestinians   for   its  
achievement.432  In   this  sense,  Hamas  highly  expected   that  Gaza  could  be  a  
role   model   of   resistance   for   the   rest   of   the   occupied   territories   to   the  
completion  of  liberation  and  the  restoration  of  Palestinian  rights.433    
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
430  The  Palestinian  Information  Center,  ‘Interview  with  Khalid  Mishal  by  Al-­Hayat,’  (28  July  
2004).  <http://web.archive.org/web/20041220222141/http://www.palestine-­
info.com/arabic/hamas/hewar/2004/mishal.htm>  (accessed  on  4  February  2014).  
431   The   Palestinian   Information   Center,   ‘Chairman   of   the   political   bureau   of   Hamas,   an  
interview   with   the   newspaper   "The   way"’,   (20   August   2005).  
<http://web.archive.org/web/20110226094458/http://www.palestine-­
info.com/arabic/hamas/hewar/2005/mesh3aal.htm>  (accessed  on  4  February  2014).    
432  Palestinian  Center  for  Policy  and  Survey  research,  ‘Palestinian  Public  Opinion  Poll  17,’  (7-­
9  September  2005).  <http://www.pcpsr.org/en/node/438>  (accessed  on  4  February  2014).    
433  The  Palestinian  Information  Center,  ‘Interview  with  Dr.  Abu  Marzuq  after  the  meeting  with  
the  PA  Prime  Minister,’  (22  August  2005).  
<http://web.archive.org/web/20110226094205/http://www.palestine-­
info.com/arabic/hamas/hewar/2005/marzooq.htm><http://www.pcpsr.org/en/node/438>  
(accessed  on  5  February  2014).  
	   121	  
However   the   poll   also   showed   that   the  majority   (around  60  per   cent)  
were  worried  about  Palestinian   infighting.434  Hamas  was  aware  of   the  public  
expectation   after   the   Israeli   withdrawal   from   Gaza   and   was   afraid   that   the  
constant   internal   conflict   within   Fatah   could   pose   a   threat   to   Palestinian  
society   and   was   destructive   to   its   resistance   project.   Therefore   Hamas  
prioritized  the  order  in  its  resistance  project:  the  management  of  Palestine,  the  
prevention   of   social   chaos,   the   issues   of   democracy,   and   pluralism. 435  
Fighting  Israel  was  not  the  first  pressing  concern  at  the  moment.  
Although   Hamas   and   the   Palestinians   were   celebrating   the   Israeli  
withdrawal   from   Gaza,   Hamas   was   mindful   of   the   motivation   behind   the  
disengagement  plan.  On  several  occasions,  Khalid  Mishal  warned  that  it  was  
a   tactic   and   a   deception   and   that   Sharon   was   covering   up   his   failure   to  
destroy   the  will  of  Palestinian   resistance.  436  On   the  other  hand,  Sharon  had  
intensified   his   control   of   the   West   Bank   in   terms   of   the   Judaization   of  
Jerusalem,   the  expansion  of   Jewish  settlements  and   the  construction  of   the  
wall  of  separation.  Furthermore,  the  disengagement  plan  was  not  exhaustive.  
Gaza   looked   like   a   big   prison   that   was   going   to   be   monitored   by   Israel   in  
airspace  and  territorial  waters  after  the  withdrawal.437  The  metaphor  that  Gaza  
looks   like   a   prison   is   not   an   exaggeration.   Gaza   could   also   be   seen   as   a  
laboratory   as  Darryl   Li   argues.   In   his   article   ‘The  Gaza  Strip   as  Laboratory:  
Notes   in   the   wake   of   disengagement,’   he   observes   that   the   Israeli  
experiments   on   Gaza   has   three   main   features:   closure,   buffer   and   use   of  
airpower.  These  experiments  on  Gaza  are  for  the  management  of  conflict  with  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
434  Ibid.  
435  The  Palestinian  Information  Center,  ‘Interview  with  Sami  Khater,  Member  of  the  Political  
Bureau  of  Hamas,’  (11  August  2005).  
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436   The   Palestinian   Information   Center,   ‘Speech   from   Khalid   Mishal,   Islamic   Resistance  
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Palestinians,   as   well   as   affording   time   for   further   colonization   of   the   West  
Bank.438        
Indeed,   Israel   had   taken  a  new  approach   in  dominating  Gaza;;   it  was  
watching  any  hostile  act  there.  In  response  to  mortars  launched  from  Gaza  in  
September,   Israel   dispatched   aircraft   attacking   a   school   building   in   the  
residential   area   of   Gaza   and   returned   to   the   policy   of   assassinations   on  
Palestinians   after   the   disengagement   plan.439  In   spite   of   the   Israeli   military  
attacks,   it   is   noted   that   retaliation   was   not   Hamas’   major   concern.   The  
formation  of  a  national   consensus  and  managing  Gaza  were  more  pressing  
issue  than  the  option  of  armed  resistance  since  participation  in  the  municipal  
and  the  PLC  elections  preoccupied  Hamas  at  that  time.  
4.2.1  Municipal  elections  and  disputes  
2005  could  be  seen  to  be  the  decisive  year  for  Hamas’  preparation  of  
elections.   The   municipal   elections   were   the   first   trial,   testing   Hamas’  
popularity  in  the  political  arena.  There  were  four  stages  of  the  elections:  23rd  
December   2004,   5th   May   2005,   29th   September   2005   and   15th   December  
2005.  In  the  first  round  of  the  municipal  election,  Hamas  did  well,  winning  7  of  
9  councils  in  the  Gaza  Strip  and  7  of  26  against  12  for  Fatah  in  the  West  Bank.  
In  the  second  round  in  May,  Hamas  captured  most  seats  in  major  cities  such  
as  Qalqilya  and  Bethlehem  and  other  refugee  camps,440  which  indicated  that  
Hamas  had   the  ability   to  end   the  Fatah   rule.441  The   third   round  of  municipal  
election   held   on   29th   September   seemed   to   reflect   Hamas’   popularity   and  
lifted   its   spirit,   although  Fatah   claimed   that   they   had   also  won.   In   the  West  
Bank,  Hamas  declared  its  victory,  winning  more  than  40  municipal  councils  in  
the  West  Bank.442  In   the   final   round  on  15th  December,  Hamas  captured   the  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
438  Darryl  Li,   ‘The  Gaza  Strip  as  laboratory:  notes  in  the  wake  of  disengagement,’  Journal  of  
Palestine,  Vol.35,  No.2  (Winter  2006),  pp.38-­39.  
439  Tanya  Reinhart,  The  Road  Map  to  nowhere:   Israel/Palestine  since  2003   (London:  Verso,  
2006),  pp.  138-­140.  
440  International  Crisis  Group,   ‘Enter  Hamas:  The  Challenges  of  political   integration,’  op.cit.,  
p.8.  
441  As’ad   Ghanem,  Palestinian   politics   after   Arafat   (Bloomington:   Indiana   University   Press,  
2010),  p.117.  
442   The   Palestinian   Information   Center,   ‘Sheikh   Yasser   Mansour,   leader   of   the   Islamic  
Resistance   Movement   (Hamas)   in   the   West   Bank,’   (5   October   2005).  
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Fatah’s  traditional  basement  in  the  West  Bank,  such  as  Nablus,  Jenin  and  El  
Bireh.443    
Throughout  the  several  rounds  of  the  municipal  elections,  it  seems  that  
Hamas   became  more   confident   regarding   participation   in   the   PLC   election.  
Managing   Palestinian   affairs   in   terms   of   the   participation   of   the   democratic  
elections  was  one  of  Hamas’   tactics.  Particularly   after   the   Israeli  withdrawal  
from  Gaza,  it  is  estimated  that  for  Hamas,  elections  did  more  good  than  harm.  
With  the  changing  political  environment  in  2005,  the  intensity  of  confrontation  
between   Israel   and   Palestinians   had   dramatically   dropped.   The   majority   of  
Palestinians  did  not  want   to  get  entangled  with   this  endless  conflict.  On   the  
other  hand,  municipal  and  legislative  campaigns  were  under  way.  For  Hamas,  
its  previous  slogan  of  sacrifice  and  armed  resistance  gradually  lost  its  market  
since   the   majority   of   Palestinians   sought   calm.   Hamas   was   afraid   that   its  
resistance  project  might  not  be  fulfilled  and  that   it  would   lose   its   influence   in  
Palestinian  society  if  it  did  not  participate  in  the  process  of  political  integration.  
Thus,  the  best  way  to  protect  its  resistance  project  seemed  to  be  via  elections.  
Hamas’s  good  performance   in   the  municipal  elections  worried  others.  
Hamas  was  accused  of  either  attempting  to  replace  Fatah  in  self-­interest  or  of  
plotting   a   coup   against   the   PA.   Facing   this   pressure,   Hamas   leadership  
clarified  its  position  that  pursuing  power  was  not  its  goal  and  that  participation  
in   elections   satisfied   God,   served   people,   and   improved   the   political  
atmosphere   since   it   aimed   to   fight   corruption   and   correct   the   long-­term  
monopoly   of   decision-­making   by   Fatah.444  Hamas   hoped   that   through   the  
democratic   elections   a   national   consensus   could   be   reached   and   the  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
<http://web.archive.org/web/20110226093844/http://www.palestine-­
info.com/arabic/hamas/hewar/2005/mansoor.htm>  (accessed  on  6  February  2014).  
443  International  Crisis  Group,   ‘Enter  Hamas:  The  Challenges  of  political   integration,’  op.cit.,  
p.8.  
444  The  Palestinian  Information  Center,  ‘Said  Siyam,  a  member  of  the  political  leadership  of  
Hamas,’  (19  December  2005).  
<http://web.archive.org/web/20110226093559/http://www.palestine-­
info.com/arabic/hamas/hewar/2005/seyaam.htm>  (accessed  on  6  February  2014).  Palestinian  
Information  Center,  ‘Speech  from  leader  Khalid  Mishal,  Chairman  of  the  political  bureau  of  
Hamas,’  (2  January  2006).  
<http://web.archive.org/web/20110226093345/http://www.palestine-­
info.com/arabic/hamas/hewar/2006/khalid_meshel/khalid1.htm>  (accessed  on  6  February  
2014).  
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resistance   project   could   be   guaranteed   as   well.   At   the   same   time,   Hamas  
hoped   to   insert   itself   into   the  political   arena   in   order   to   serve  people,   share  
political   responsibility   and   strengthen   its   resistance   foundation   to   end   the  
Israeli  occupation  in  the  long  run.445    
For   many   observers,   another   concern   was   that   that   Hamas   would  
impose   its   ‘Islamized  agenda’   in  politics  after   the  elections.  This   is  because  
during   the   elections,   the   issues   of   Islamization   and   the   formation   of   the  
‘Islamic   state’   had   been   contentious   debates.   The   terms   ‘Talibanism’   and  
‘Islamization’  were  often  used  by  critics  to  describe  Hamas’  character.  Some  
Palestinians   even   feared   that   they   might   be   deprived   of   their   personal  
freedom   if   Hamas   held   political   power.   For   example,   the   Palestinian   poet  
Mahmud   Darwish   criticized   the   ban   on   the   music   and   dance   festival   in  
Hamas-­ruled   Qalqiliya   as,   ‘signs   of   Talibanism   and   dangerous   indications  
against   the   educated   classes   and   the   artists.’   446   Another   Palestinian  
columnist,  Mohammed  Abd  Al-­Hamid  was  worried  that  the  future  of  Palestine  
would   follow   the   Algerian   and   Afghani   model:   and   that,   ‘religious   fanatics  
destroyed  every  cultural  symbol,  shattered  statues  and  rare  works  of  art  and  
liquidated   intellectuals  and  artists,   reporters  and  authors,  ballet  dancers  and  
singers.’447  Beverley   Milton-­Edwards   who   has   researched   Hamas   over   two  
decades   implied   that   Hamas   might   enforce   its   Islamic   version   upon  
Palestinians   due   to   past   experience   when   Hamas   clashed   with   Palestinian  
secularists  and   imposed  cultural   codes   in  Gaza   throughout   the  early  1980s.  
These   included   the   closure   of   cinemas   and   liquor   stores   and   strict   dress  
codes. 448   These   arguments,   to   some   extent,   reflect   the   tension   between  
secularism   and   Islamism   in   Palestine.   But   the   real   question   is   whether  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
445  The  Palestinian  Information  Center,  ‘Chairman  of  the  political  bureau  of  Hamas,  an  
interview  with  the  newspaper  "The  way"’,  (20  August  2005).  
<http://web.archive.org/web/20110226094458/http://www.palestine-­
info.com/arabic/hamas/hewar/2005/mesh3aal.htm>  (accessed  on  7  February  2014).  
446  Zvi  Bar’el,  ‘Afghanistan  in  Palestine,’  Haaretz,  (26  July  2005).  
<http://www.haaretz.com/israel-­news/culture/leisure/afghanistan-­in-­palestine-­1.165006>  
(accessed  on  7  February  2014).    
447  Ibid.  
448  Beverley   Milton-­Edwards,   ‘Prepared   for   power:   Hamas,   Governance   and   Conflict,’  Civil  
Wars,  Vol.7,  No.4  (Winter  2005),  p.  325.  
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Palestinian  society  could  be  clearly  classified  as   the  dichotomy  between   the  
secular  and  Islamist  trends.  
Loren   Lybarger   argues   that   the   term   ‘Islamization’   is   too   simplistic   a  
description   and   the   dichotomy   of   secularism   and   Islamism   does   not   neatly  
apply   to   Palestinian   society.449  He   added   that   Palestinian   identity   is,   ‘highly  
fluid,  hybrid  and  multiplex,  open  to  diverse  horizons.’  In  this  context,  it  is  likely  
that   Hamas   will   not   enforce   its   version   upon   other   Palestinians   even   if   it  
reiterates   Islamic  message   to   the  public.450  Indeed   from   the  1980s  onwards,  
the  majority  of  women   in  Palestine,  particularly   in  Gaza,  have  conformed   to  
the  Islamic  dress  code  as  a  sign  of  Islamization.  However  this  trend  could  be  
seen  as  a  natural  process  in  Gaza  instead  of  an  enforced  policy.  Inevitably,  as  
a  contemporary  Islamic  movement,   it   is  natural  that  Hamas  appeals  to  Islam  
as   a   motivation   for   unifying   and   awakening   Palestinians   against   Israeli  
occupation.  The  revival  of  Islam  is  the  consistent  theme  in  the  perspective  of  
Palestinian   Islamists   but   the   way   to   revive   Islam   is   not   by   government  
enforcement  and  Shari’a  legislation.  Hamas’s  ultimate  goal  is  the  liberation  of  
Palestine.  To  reach  the  goal,   the  most   important   thing   is   to   lift  one’s  spirit   in  
relation   to   God   as   a   first   step   to   resist   the   Israeli   occupation.   A   Hamas  
supporter   said,   ‘This   neglect   of   Islam  was   the   root   of  Palestinian  weakness  
and   suffering.   If   Palestinians   had   been   true  Muslims,   then   they  would   have  
been   powerful   and   this   disaster   of   Israel.   But   very   few   Palestinians   really  
knew  what  Islam  was  really  practiced  it.’451    
Criticism  of  Hamas   regarding   the   issue   of   ‘Islamization’  was   not   only  
restricted   to   the  Palestinian   circle  but   it   had  also   spread   in   the   international  
community.   Many   believed   that   Hamas’   ultimate   goal   was   to   destroy   Israel  
and  to  establish  an  Islamic  state  or  theocracy  according  to  its  charter.  That  is  
to   say,   that   if   Hamas   had   power,   Palestine   would   turn   into   a   country   that  
discriminated  between  the  non-­Muslim  resident  and  non-­affiliated  Palestinians.  
As   a   matter   of   fact,   the   ‘Islamic   state’   or   theocracy   is   a   rather   ambiguous  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
449  Loren   Lybarger,   Identity   and   religion   in   Palestine:   The   struggle   between   Islamism   and  
Secularism  in  the  occupied  territories  (Princeton:  Princeton  University  Press,  2007),  p.236.  
450  Ibid.,  pp.234-­245.  
451  Quoted  from  Loren  Lybarger.  Ibid.,  p.210.  
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concept   that   could   not   exactly   correspond   with   Hamas   thoughts.   Although  
Hamas’   charter   is   often   criticized   as   anti-­semitism   when   Hamas   involve   in  
political  elections,  by  scrutinizing  its  clauses  the  charter  could  be  considered  
to  be  a  pre-­modern  idea  dating  back  to  the  history  of  Palestine  under  Muslim  
rule   for  over  a   thousand  years.   In  article  6  of   this  charter,   ‘Hamas  strives   to  
raise   the   banner   of  God   over   every   inch   of   Palestine’   and   ‘In   the   shade   of  
Islam   it   is  possible   for  all   followers  of  different   religions   to   live   in  peace  and  
security   in   their   person,   property,   and   rights.’   452   This   then   reflects   the  
traditional  Muslim  view  of  a  Muslim-­led  state  rather  than  the  modern  concept  
of  the  nation-­state.453  Furthermore,  Hamas  did  not  resort  to  its  charter  for  the  
political  mobilization.   Ahmed  Yousef,   a   political   advisor   to   the   former  Prime  
Minister   Ismail   Haniyeh,   claims   that   the   charter   was   drafted   in   the   specific  
context  of   the  early  days  of   the   first   Intifada.  He  adds   that  not  every  Hamas  
member  endorses  this  charter.  The  charter   is  only  an  inspirational  document  
but   was   never   to   be   a   guideline   for   Hamas’   political   vision. 454  A   scholar,  
Khaled  Hroub,  made  a  similar  observation.  Indeed  there  are  several  sections  
in  this  charter  referring  to  ‘anti-­Jewish’  sentiment  but  he  stated  that  the  charter  
was  written   by   an   individual   in   1988  without   obtaining  Hamas’   consultation,  
revision  and  consensus.455  Due  to  the  fact  that  charter  contains  anti-­semitism  
phrases,   Hamas   leaders   have   been   aware   that   these   phrases   may   hinder  
their   work   or   cause   confusion   to   the   West;;   therefore   from   1990   onwards,  
Hamas   leaders   and   spokespeople   have   seldom  mentioned   the   charter   and  
quoted  from  it.456  
Before  the  election,  Hamas  had  elaborated  the  concept  of   the  Islamic  
state  in  an  effort  to  clarify  the  West’s  misunderstanding  of  Islam.  For  example,  
in  an   interview   in  2003,  Ahmed  Yassin  shed   light  on   that   Islam   is  not   just  a  
religion   but   also   a   system,   ‘Islam   is   an   ideal   and   practical   system   that  was  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
452  ‘The   Hamas   Charter,’   quoted   in   Khaled   Hroub,   Hamas:   Political   thought   and   practice,  
op.cit.,  p.270.  
453  See  Ahmed  Yousef,  ‘Judge  Hamas  on  the  measures  it  takes  for  its  people,’  The  Guardian,  
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455  Khaled  Hroub,    Hamas:  A  Beginner’s  Guide  (London:  Pluto  Press,  2006),  p.33.  
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implemented  and  applied  for  hundreds  of  years  through  Prophet  Mohammed,  
his   caliphs,   the  Umayyad   Islamic   state,   and   then   the  Abbasid   Islamic   state.  
History  has  proven  Islam  as  a  successful  system  at  building  and  maintaining  
good   societies,   the   system   that   succeeds   once   can   succeed   many   more  
time.’457  Therefore  should  an  Islamic  state  be  established,  non-­Muslims  would  
be  free  to  worship  and  their  private  rights  would  not  be   interfered  with,  as   in  
Islamic  history.458    
In  spite  of  holding  the  concept  of  an  Islamic  state,  Hamas  leaders  did  
not   ostensibly   inform   the   public   about   it   during   the   al-­Aqsa   Intifada   and   the  
electoral  campaign.  In  practice,  Hamas  is  open  to  the  topic  of  an  Islamic  state.  
Ahmed   Yassin   said   that   being   an   Islamic   state   ‘should   be   left   for   the  
democratic  process.  Let   the  people  select   the  kind  of  state  they  want,   in   the  
same  way   that   the  United  States   is  a  state   for  all   its  people  and   they  solve  
their  differences  democratically  as  equals.’  459  Furthermore,  it  is  noted  that  as  
Hamas  engaged  in  political  elections,  the  language  it  used  disclosed  a  more  
modern   viewpoint   than   the   traditional   Islamic   one.   Hamas   leaders   often  
elaborated   the  value  of  democracy,  citizenship  and  considered  rectifying   the  
charter   in   response   to   the   prospect   of   the   international   community.460  This  
move  which  came  closer  to  the  Western  standard  without  harming  its  principle  
of   resistance   demonstrates   Hamas’   pragmatism.   It   can   be   said   that  
‘Islamization’   and   the   ‘Islamic   state’   were   still   marginal   issues   in   Hamas’  
resistance  project.  All  Hamas  had  to  do  was  to  raise  Palestinian  awareness  of  
resistance  against  the  Israeli  occupation.  
Following   Hamas’s   good   performance   in   the  municipal   elections   and  
since   the   PLC   election   was   approaching,   Israel   became   anxious   about   the  
advance   of  Hamas’   political   integration.   Israel   took   a   series   of  measures   to  
disrupt  the  process  of  the  elections.  Prior  to  the  implementation  of  the  Israeli  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
457  ‘An   Interview  with  Ahmad  Yassin:  Human  misery  comes   from  human  mistakes,’   (31  July  
2003).  Bitterlemons,   <http://www.bitterlemons-­international.org/inside.php?id=13>   (accessed  
on  10  February  2014).  
458  Ibid.  
459  Roger  Gaess,  ‘Interviews  from  Gaza:  What  Hamas  wants,’  Middle  East  Policy,  Vol.9,  No.4  
(Dec  2002),  pp.106-­107.    
460  Azzam  Tamimi,  Hamas,  Unwritten  Chapters,  op.cit.,  pp.148-­149.  
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disengagement  from  Gaza  there  was  an  indication  that  Sharon  was  preparing  
another   military   operation   in   Gaza   in   July.   But   this   potential   scenario   was  
interrupted  by   the  U.S.   Israel  was  asked,   ‘to  continue  humanitarian  gestures  
toward  the  Palestinians  …  to  fulfil  its  commitments  made  at  Sharm  el-­Sheikh  
on  8th  February.’461  Eventually,  with  pressure  from  the  U.S.  Israel  gave  up  and  
carried  out  the  disengagement  plan  in  August.462  But  Israel  was  not  satisfied  
with   the   position   of   the   U.S.   Sharon   had   shown   his   intention   to   exclude  
Hamas’  participation  in  the  PLC  election.  From  September  to  October,  around  
700  Palestinians  were  arrested,  including  elected  candidates,  Imams  of  local  
mosques,   journalists,   school   personnel   and   civil   servants.463  In   spite   of   this,  
the  U.S  administration  wanted  this  election  held  as  scheduled  without   Israeli  
intervention.464  It  seems  that  the  U.S’s  role  helped  to  facilitate  Hamas’  political  
integration.   The   U.S   was   in   no   hurry   to   demand   the   PA   to   disarm   Hamas  
before   the   election.465  Regarding   the   shift   of   the   U.S,   Tanya   Reinhart,   an  
Israeli  scholar,  had  an  explanation.  She  highlighted   that  due   to   the  negative  
effect   of   the  war   on   Iraq   and   the   increasing   sympathy   in   the  world   towards  
Palestine,   the  Bush  administration  changed   its   tone   from  outright  support  of  
the  Israeli  policy  to  the  encouragement  of  the  Palestinian  election.466    
4.2.2  Hamas  and  the  PLC  election    
As  mentioned  above,  Hamas’   determination   to  participate   in   the  PLC  
election  was  its  commitment  to  the  Cairo  declaration  on  17th  March  2005.  But  
on  many  occasions,  Hamas  leaders  were  asked  why  they  did  not  participate  
in  the  PLC  election  in  1996.  In  response  to  this  question,  Abu  Marzuq  stated  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
461  Tanya  Reinhart,  The  Road  Map   to  nowhere:   Israel/Palestine  since  2003,  op.cit.,  pp.102-­
104.  
462  Ibid.,pp.  124-­130.  
463  The  Palestinian  Information  Center,  ‘Sheikh  Jamal  Tawil,  the  extension  of  administrative  
detention  or  deportation  from  Palestine,’  (18  October  2005).  
<http://web.archive.org/web/20110226093741/http://www.palestine-­
info.com/arabic/hamas/hewar/2005/taweel.htm>  (accessed  on  10  February  2014).  
464   On   3rd   January   2006   before   the   three   weeks   of   the   elections,   the   US   administration  
reminded  that  Israel  should  not  bar  Palestinians  from  voting  in  East  Jerusalem  and  reaffirmed  
that  Palestinians  have  the  right  to  vote.  See  Arnon  Regular,  ‘U.S  pushes  for  PA  election  to  be  
held  on  schedule,’  Ha’aretz,  (4  January  2006).  <http://www.haaretz.com/print-­edition/news/u-­
s-­pushes-­for-­pa-­election-­to-­be-­held-­on-­schedule-­1.61799>  (accessed  on  10  February  2014).    
465  Tanya  Reinhart,  The  Road  Map  to  nowhere:  Israel/Palestine  since  2003,  op.cit.,  p.104.  
466  Ibid.,  pp.111-­114.  
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that   Hamas   did   not   reject   the   concept   of   election   in   principle   but   the   PLC  
election   in   1996   under   the   framework   of   the   Oslo   Peace   Process   was   in  
violation   of   Palestinian   interests.467  Said   Siyam   also   added   that   the   Peace  
Process   was   removed   due   to   the   outbreak   of   the   Al-­Aqsa   Intifada   so   that  
Hamas’   participation   in   elections   did   not   contradict   the   principle   of   the  
resistance   project;;   rather,   political   integration   could   fulfil   it   and   serve  
people. 468   It   could   be   said   that   Hamas   always   connected   its   resistance  
concept  to  its  participation  in  the  PLC  election.  For  Hamas,  participation  in  the  
PLC   election   was   aimed   at   the   removal   of   the   Israeli   occupation   and   the  
restoration  of  all  Palestinian  rights  such  as:   the  Palestinian  refugees’  right   to  
return,   the   release  of  Palestinian  prisoners,   the  status  of  Jerusalem  and   the  
elimination  of  the  Jewish  settlements.469    
Hamas  leaders  realized  that  after  the  election,  they  would  meet  several  
challenges  such  as  the  pressure  of  demilitarization,  the  negotiation  with  Israel,  
the   security   coordination   between   the   Palestinian   security   apparatuses   and  
Israel,   and   possible   cuts   of   foreign   aid.   In   spite   of   these   foreseeable  
challenges,   Hamas   was   optimistic   that   its   resistance   project   would   lift  
Palestinian  society  out  of  crisis  without  partnership  with  Israel.  One  of  Hamas  
political  leaders  Mahmud  al-­Zahar  stated  that  Hamas  would  draw  a  new  map,  
the  map   of   liberation,   to   replace   the  Road  Map.470  Hamas’   rhetoric   strongly  
opposed   any   foreign   intervention   and   declared   that   it   would   not   extend   the  
ceasefire  due  to  the  fact  that  many  Israeli  violations  against  Palestinians  had  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
467  The  Palestinian  Information  Center,  ‘Dr.  Moussa  Abu  Marzuq,  dialogue  with  the  
Palestinian  Information  Center,’  (14  June  2005).  
<http://web.archive.org/web/20110226095148/http://www.palestine-­
info.com/arabic/hamas/hewar/2005/mousa.htm>  (accessed  on  11  February  2014).  
468  The  Palestinian  Information  Center,  ‘Said  Siyam,  a  member  of  the  political  leadership  of  
Hamas,’  (19  December  2005).  
<http://web.archive.org/web/20110226093559/http://www.palestine-­
info.com/arabic/hamas/hewar/2005/seyaam.htm>  (accessed  on  10  February  2014).    
469  The  Palestinian  Information  Center,  ‘Ismail  Haniyeh:  Questions  before  the  Zionist  defeat?’  
(3   August   2005).   <http://web.archive.org/web/20110226094946/http://www.palestine-­
info.com/arabic/hamas/hewar/2005/haneyah.htm>  (accessed  on  10  February  2014).  
470  The  Palestinian  Information  Center,  ‘Mahmud  al-­Zahar,  a  member  of  the  political  
leadership  of  the  movement  (Hamas).  One  of  the  candidates  of  the  legislative  elections  on  
the  list,’  (15  January  2006).  
<http://web.archive.org/web/20110226044722/http://www.palestine-­
info.com/arabic/hamas/hewar/2006/zahar/15_1_06.htm>  (accessed  on  11  February  2014).    
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been  recorded.471  al-­Zahar’s  statement  looked  tough.  As  a  matter  of  fact,  this  
statement   could   be   considered   to   be   an   electoral   tactic.   On   the   one   hand,  
Hamas  kept  its  promise  to  its  die-­hard  supporters,  indicating  that  there  was  no  
contradiction   between   politics   and   resistance.   On   the   other   hand,   Hamas  
showed   its   pragmatism   in   trying   to   convince  non-­Hamas  constituencies   that  
the   resistance  project  was  a   feasible  alternative   since   it  was   in   the  national  
interest  and  it  was  instrumental  in  obtaining  lost  rights.  By  doing  this,  Hamas  
had  an  informal  alliance  with  Christian  and  independent  candidates.  al-­Zahar  
elucidated   that   this   alliance  was  not   tactical   but   based  on  past   political   and  
historical   heritage. 472   He   added   that   Muslims   had   experienced   good  
relationships  with  non-­Muslims   in  Egypt,  Spain  and  other   places   throughout  
Islamic   history.   In   addition,   in   the   case   of   Palestine,   Hamas   itself   had  
experiences  of  cooperating  with  Palestinian  Christians  in  the  civil  association  
and  municipal  elections.473  The  make-­up  of  the  list  of  candidates  was  another  
indication  of  Hamas’  pragmatism.  Most  of   its  candidates  were  not   traditional  
religious  scholars  but  professionals  in  various  fields  such  as:  charity,  culture,  
social   and   educational   institutions,   and   the   media. 474   Women   were   not  
excluded   from   this   list   of   candidates.   Of   sixty-­six   candidates   in   the   list   of  
proportional   representation,   thirteen   were   women,   a   move   which   could   be  
viewed  as  pragmatic.475  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
471  The  Palestinian  Information  Center,  ‘Speech  from  Muhammed  Nazzal,  a  member  of  the  
Political  Bureau  of  Islamic  Resistance  Movement  (Hamas)’  in  honoring  martyr  Engineer  
Yahya  Ayyash  in  his  tenth  anniversary,’  (6  January  2006).  
<http://web.archive.org/web/20110226044734/http://www.palestine-­
info.com/arabic/hamas/hewar/2006/nazzal.htm>  (accessed  on  12  February  2014).    
472  The  Palestinian  Information  Center,  ‘"Mahmud  al-­Zahar,"  a  member  of  the  political  
leadership  of  the  movement  (Hamas).  One  of  the  candidates  of  the  legislative  elections  on  
the  list,’  (15  January  2006).  
<http://web.archive.org/web/20110226044722/http://www.palestine-­
info.com/arabic/hamas/hewar/2006/zahar/15_1_06.htm>  (accessed  on  12  February  2014).  
473  Ibid.  
474  The  Palestinian  Information  Center,  ‘"Mahmud  al-­Zahar,"  a  member  of  the  political  
leadership  of  the  movement  (Hamas).  One  of  the  candidates  of  the  legislative  elections  on  
the  list,’  (15  January  2006).  
<http://web.archive.org/web/20110226044722/http://www.palestine-­
info.com/arabic/hamas/hewar/2006/zahar/15_1_06.htm>  (accessed  on  12  February  2014).  
Jeroen  Gunning,  Hamas  in  politics:  Democracy,  Religion,  Violence,  op.cit.,  pp.162-­163.  
475  Khaled  Hroub,  A  Beginner’s  Guide,  op.cit.,pp.75-­77.  
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Before  the  twelve  days  of  the  PLC  election,  on  14th  January,  2006,  the  
electoral   programme  was   published.   The   electoral   programme   could   reflect  
how   Hamas   interpreted   its   resistance   work   in   the   context   of   Palestine   and  
how  it  presented  its  vision  toward  the  economic,  political,  social,  cultural,  and  
educational  fields.  Hamas  believed  that  the  electoral  programme,  ‘is  a  means  
to  rebuild  the  society  that  has  been  destroyed  by  occupation  and  to  protect  its  
resistance.’   It   also   believed   that,   ‘this   programme   is   a   course   toward  
bolstering  Islamic-­national  unity  along  the  path  of  full  liberation.’476  For  Hamas,  
this  electoral   programme  was  workable  and   that   it  would   reform  Palestinian  
society  due  to  their  experience  in  the  municipal  councils.477  
The  electoral  programme  seemed  to  relieve  foreign  observers’  anxiety.  
Some   believed   that   Hamas   had   experienced   a   process   of   ideological  
transformation   towards   moderation   and   de-­radicalization.478   Khaled   Hroub,  
who  is  believed  to  be  the  first  scholar  to  undertake  an  exhaustive  analysis  of  
this   electoral   programme   argued   that   Hamas   stressed   the   comprehensive  
issue  of  governance  including  the  rule  of  law  and  the  fight  against  corruption.  
The   language  referring  to   the   ‘destruction  of   Israel’  and  the  establishment  of  
an  Islamic  state  in  Palestine,  had  no  place  in  this  programme.479  It  is  true  that  
Hamas   avoided   language   that   included   religious   and   military   phrases   and  
pragmatically   addressed   various   issues.   Yet,   scrutinizing   the   details   in   the  
programme,   it   could   be   argued   that   it   is   based   on   Hamas’   concept   of  
resistance,  which  has  been  neglected  by  scholarly  literature.  
That  is  to  say,  this  electoral  programme  could  be  seen  as  a  synthesis  
of  Hamas’  resistance  project  but  it  was  expressed  in  a  moderate  form.  In  this  
way,   the  electoral  programme  could  be  analyzed   in   four  dimensions.  Firstly,  
Hamas’   principle   had   never   been   changed   or   compromised.   The   electoral  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
476   ‘Change   and   Reform   List:   Electoral   programme   for   the   elections   of   the   Palestinian  
Legislative  Council  2006,’  translation  from  Azzam  Tamimi,  Unwritten  Chapters,  Appendix  VI,  
p.316.  
477  The  Palestinian  Information  Center,  ‘Said  Siyam,  a  member  of  the  political  leadership  of  
Hamas,’  (19  December  2005).  
<http://web.archive.org/web/20110226093559/http://www.palestine-­
info.com/arabic/hamas/hewar/2005/seyaam.htm>  (accessed  on  12  February  2014).    
478  Are  Hovdenak,  ‘Hamas  in  transition:  the  failure  of  sanctions,’  Democratization,Vol.16.  No.1  
(February  2009)  p.62.  
479  Khaled  Hroub,  Hamas:  A  Beginner’s  Guide,  op.cit.,  p.  141-­142.  
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programme  did  not  refer  to  the  establishment  of  an  Islamic  state;;  however,  the  
participation   in   the   PLC   election   was   for   the   sake   of,   ‘the   liberation   of  
Palestine,  the  return  of  the  Palestinian  people  to  their  lands  and  homes,  and  
the   establishment   of   the   Palestinian   independent   state   with   Jerusalem   its  
capital.’  480  Therefore  this  programme  could  still  be  viewed  as  the  continuation  
of   the   resistance  project,  which  aimed   to  end   the  occupation.  Secondly,   this  
programme  was  firmly  founded  in  the  Islamic  reference  that  says,  ‘Islam  as  a  
way  of   life  and   religious  guidance  with  all   its  political,  economic,  social,  and  
legal   dimensions’.   Islam   is   the   fundamental   motivation   and   inspiration   for  
Hamas’  political  campaign.481  Thirdly,  although  Hamas  deliberately  decreased  
its  militant  tone  towards  Israel  there  is  no  indication  that  Hamas  was  inclined  
to  accept  Israel  as  a  political  partner  when  it  engaged  in  Palestinian  political  
affairs.  Finally,   since   Israel  was   treated  as  an  enemy  of  Palestine   regarding  
the   issue  of   the  security  collaboration,  and  economic  dependence  on   Israel,  
an  alternative  option  had  been  offered  to  dispose  of  Israeli  existing  domination.  
In  Hamas’  vision,   the  way   to  put  Palestine  on   the   right   track  was:   to   reform  
Palestinian  security  agencies,  to  promote  solidarity  and  support  from  the  Arab  
and   Islamic   masses   against   occupation,   to   reject   normalization   with   Israel,  
and   to  encourage   the  development  of  economic  and   trade  relations  with   the  
Arab  and  Islamic  world.482    
To   summarize,   the   electoral   programme   inherently   served   the  
resistance  against  Israeli  occupation.  To  reach  the  aim,  the  unity  of  Palestine  
was   imperative.  By  raising   the   flag  of   ‘change  and  reform’   in  addressing   the  
current   political   and   economic   dilemmas   effected   by   the   al-­Aqsa   Intifada,  
Hamas  provided  a   comprehensive  guideline   to  articulate  how   to   reform  and  
change   Palestinian   society,   particularly   in   the   aspects   of:   the   judiciary,  
education,   social   service,   media,   housing,   environment,   agriculture,   and  
economics.  On  the  other  hand,  several  articles  in  this  programme  connected  
to  the  ideas  of  modernity  that  Hamas  did  not  usually  mention  in  public  during  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
480   ‘Change   and   Reform   List:   Electoral   programme   for   the   elections   of   the   Palestinian  
Legislative  Council  2006,’  translation  from  Azzam  Tamimi,  Unwritten  Chapters,  Appendix  VI,  
p.292.  
481  Article  1  and  Article  8.  Ibid.,  p.292  and  p.303.  
482  Article  2,  3  and  Article  16.  Ibid.,  p.295,  p.297  and  p.312.    
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the   al-­Aqsa   Intifada   such   as   the   concepts   of   political   pluralism,   citizenships  
with  the  guarantee  of  the  rights  of  minorities,  the  emphasis  of  the  separation  
of  the  legislative,  the  executive  and  the  judiciary.483  Although  it  could  be  said  
that   many   articles   looked   innovative   and   creative,   as   an   Islamic   resistance  
movement,   Hamas   considered   itself   to   be   in   the   right   path   of   God.   As   this  
programme   concluded,   ‘Islam   is   the   solution’,484  which   means   that   Hamas  
was   convinced   that   they  were  doing   right   things   for   the  benefit   of  Palestine  
and  the  Islamic  ummah.  
This  electoral  programme  reflects  Hamas’  political  thought  and  its  way  
of   dealing   with   Israeli   occupation.   In   reality,   this   programme   was   hardly  
enforced  under  the  existing  structure  of  the  Palestinian  society.  That  is  to  say,  
the  principle  of   the   liberation  of  Palestine  contradicted   the  notion  of   the   two-­
state   solution   promoted   by   the   Quartet.   Furthermore,   it   did   not   allow   for  
Hamas  to  keep  its  weapons  after  the  election.  Regarding  economics,  Hamas  
aimed  to  establish  a  ‘resisting  economy’  but  it  seemed  to  be  unrealistic  in  that  
it   suggested   that   only   the   restoration   of   relations  with   the  Arab   and   Islamic  
ummah  was  a  possible  solution  for  Palestine,  which  did  not  consider  the  fact  
of  Israel’s  economic  domination  over  the  occupied  territory,  and  the  influence  
of   the  Western   countries   as   the   biggest   donor   at   the   time.   Hamas’   leaders  
were   fully   aware   of   the   reality   that  Hamas  would   not   be   allowed   to   put   this  
electoral   programme   into  practice.  As   the  electoral   programme  said,   ‘we  do  
not  claim  to  create  miracles  and  we  do  not  possess  a  magic  wand.’485  It  can  
be   argued   that   Hamas   did   not   expect   that   there   would   be   a   fundamental  
change  after  its  political  integration  but  attempted  to  turn  its  resistance  project  
into  one  of  national  consensus  in  a  gradual  way.  By  doing  this,  the  democratic  
election  and  dialogue  seemed  to  be  a  pragmatic  approach.    
At   that   time,   being   a   ruling   party   in   the   PLC   was   beyond   Hamas’  
imagination.  Hamas   leaders  only   calculated   the  possibility  of  being  a  strong  
opposition   or   part   of   the   formation   of   a   coalition   government.   Mahmud   al-­
Zahar  argued  that  after  the  election,  Hamas  would  align  with  other  factions  to  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
483  Introduction,  Article  2  and  Article  5,  Ibid.,  p.293,  p.296  and  p.  299.  
484  Conclusion,  Ibid.,  p.316.  
485  Conclusion,  Ibid.,  p.315.  
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address   the   financial,   executive   and   judicial   issues,486  while   the   outcome   of  
the   PLC   election   on   25th   January   2006   stunned   all   the   parties   concerned  
including  Hamas   itself.     Winning  74  seats  of   the   total   132  seats   in   the  PLC  
signified   that  Hamas  could   form  a  government  alone  without  a  coalition  with  
other   Palestinian   factions.   This   victory   brought   an   unexpected   development  
and  uncertainty  for  Hamas.  Before  the  evaluation  of  how  Hamas  responded  to  
this  victory  and  its  practices  after  the  PLC  election,  it  would  be  useful  to  recap  
the   implication   of   Hamas’   political   transformation   during   the   period   2003   to  
2006.  
5.  Conclusion:  The  implication  of  Hamas’  political  transformation  
during  2003  to  2006    
There   are   many   ways   of   interpreting   Hamas’   political   transformation  
from   2003   to   2006.   In   general,   this   transformation   was   based   on   the  
background   to  ways   that   Hamas   responded   to   various   challenges,   such   as  
the  launch  of  the  Road  Map,  the  Israeli  disengagement  plan  and  the  death  of  
Yasser   Arafat.  Many   articles   have   dealt   with   this   topic   from   this   angle.   But  
regarding   the,   ‘resistance   discourse’   or   the,   ‘resistance   project’   that   Hamas  
elaborated  and  constructed  during   this  period,   it  seems  that   this  perspective  
has  not  been  fully  addressed.  This  research  argues  that  the  way  that  Hamas  
addressed   resistance   to   the   public   and   constructed   the   resistance   project  
could  be  understood  as  Hamas’  justification  for  its  military  actions  and  its  later  
political  integration  during  the  al-­Aqsa  Intifada.  
Hamas’   transformation   is  not  unprecedented.  This  phenomenon  could  
be  seen  as   the  context   in  which  Hamas   resides.  To  a   large  extent,  Hamas’  
ideas  and  behaviour  might  be  grasped  in  a  specific  context.  Reviewing  history,  
it   could   be   found   that   its   predecessor,   the   Muslim   Brotherhood   in   Gaza   in  
1970s   adhered   to   a   similar   pattern.   At   that   time   the   Brotherhood   was  
incapable   of   involvement   in   an   armed   struggle.   Therefore   it   engaged   in   the  
social  movement  as   its  basis  of   resistance.  The  preaching  of   Islam  (dawah)  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
486  The  Palestinian  Information  Center,  ‘Mahmud  al-­Zahar,  a  member  of  the  political  
leadership  of  the  movement  (Hamas).  One  of  the  candidates  of  the  legislative  elections  on  
the  list,’  (15  January  2006).  
<http://web.archive.org/web/20110226044722/http://www.palestine-­
info.com/arabic/hamas/hewar/2006/zahar/15_1_06.htm>  (accessed  on  12  April  2014).  
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and  the  provision  of  social  service  was  the  Brotherhood’s  major  concern.  This  
moderation  applied  to  Hamas  in  the  late  1990s  when  it  dramatically  reduced  
the  numbers  of  suicide  bombings  and   returned   to  an  emphasis  on   its  social  
service.   However,   it   is   undeniable   that   the   end   of   the   Israeli   occupation  
remains  the  ultimate  goal  for  Hamas.    
The  construction  of  Hamas’  resistance  project  was  not  out  of  context.  It  
could   be   comprehended   under   the   background   of   the   al-­Aqsa   Intifada.   The  
failure  of   the  Peace  Process,   the  role  of  Ariel  Sharon  and   the  breakdown  of  
the   PA   fueled   and   strengthened   Hamas’   determination   in   resistance.   This  
resistance  project  could  be  considered  as  an  alternative  option  in  competition  
with  Fatah  as  well  as  an  agenda  showing  the  world  that  the  end  of  the  Israeli  
occupation   and   the   restoration   of  Palestinian   rights  were  Hamas’   irrefutable  
principles.   However   in   spite   of   this   resolute   commitment,   it   is   noted   that  
Hamas  was  willing  to  keep  a  moderate  profile  and  sought  understanding  from  
other  concerned  parties,  with  the  exception  of  Israel.    
In  general,   the   issue  of  Hamas’  armed  resistance  to   Israel  seemed  to  
be  an  overemphasis.  This  one-­way  dimension  tends  to  blur  the  whole  picture  
of  its  resistance  project.  Indeed,  armed  resistance  was  an  inseparable  part  of  
the   resistance   project.   Furthermore,   armed   resistance   was   not   a   form   of  
terrorism  but  a  means  of  self-­defense  and  the  restoration  of  Palestinian  rights  
from  Hamas’  perspective.  The  only  condition  that  would  remove  the  option  of  
armed  resistance  was  the  end  of  the  Israeli  occupation  rather  than  by  means  
of  another  external  pressure  or  threat.  In  addition  to  the  main  tactic  of  armed  
resistance,  a  large  amount  of  stress  is  given  to  addressing  the  significance  of  
dialogue  with  other  Palestinian  factions,  and  Arab  and  Western  countries.  It  is  
believed   that   to   end   the   Israeli   occupation,   Hamas   could   not   unilaterally  
implement   the   resistance   project.   Rather,   the   project   needed   to   be  
coordinated   with   the   various   parties.   With   the   changing   political   landscape  
after  the  death  of  Yasser  Arafat,  the  elections  during  2004-­2006  provided  an  
opportunity   for  Hamas   to  officially   raise   the   resistance  project   in   the  political  
arena  for  the  first  time.  In  general  it  is  considered  that  the  victory  of  the  PLC  
election   or   its   participation   in   elections   reflected   Hamas’   political  
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transformation   while   this   research   argues   that   the   transformation   was   a  
gradual  process  in  the  period  between  2003  and  2006.  
After  the  breakdown  of  the  ceasefire  in  June  2003,  rhetoric  on  military  
action   remained   strong   in   Hamas’   resistance   discourse.   There   was   no  
indication   that   political   integration   was   a   possible   option   for   Hamas.   In   late  
2003,  Hamas   leaders  were   asked  whether   they  would   participate   in   the  PA  
presidential,  municipal  and  legislative  elections.  Hamas  leaders  did  not  have  a  
positive   response   because   they   thought   there   was   no   room   for   holding  
elections  under  the  Israeli  occupation.  However  their  position  changed  around  
February   2004   as   the   issue   of   the   Israeli   disengagement   plan   from   Gaza  
became  a  heated  debate  in  Israeli  politics.  This  plan  could  be  considered  as  a  
turning   point   for   pushing  Hamas’   political   integration.  Hamas   evaluated   that  
the   Israeli   disengagement   plan   was   attributed   to   the   success   of   the  
Palestinian   resistance.   Therefore   prior   to   the   implementation   of   the  
disengagement  plan,  Hamas  leaders  had  often  highlighted  the  political  appeal  
of  managing  Gaza.  In  terms  of  the  disengagement  plan,  Hamas  leaders  called  
for   the   unity   of   Palestinian   factions   in   addressing   various   problems.487  This  
posture   seems   to   reveal   Hamas’   political   ambition.   In   other   words,   Hamas  
began   challenging   the   hegemony   of   Fatah   in   the   Palestinian   political  
landscape.  
As  the  disengagement  plan  was  approved  by  the  Israeli  cabinet  in  June  
2004,   it   could   be   noted   that   Hamas’   discourse   on   armed   resistance   was  
gradually  overlapped  by  the  discourses  of  election,  pluralism  and  democracy  
even  though  it  lost  two  significant  leaders,  Ahmad  Yassin  in  March  and  Abdel  
Aziz   Rantisi   in   April.   Hamas   had   decided   to   participate   in   the   municipal  
elections   at   that   time.   In   addition,  Hamas   raised  many   questions  within   the  
Palestinian   public   because   the   comprehensive   corruption   in   Palestinian  
society  was  an  urgent  problem  that  Hamas  wanted  to  deal  with.  Through  the  
democratic   election   and   the   establishment   of   a   unified   national   authority,   it  
seems   that  Hamas   had  wanted   to   raise   its   resistance   project   as   a   national  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
487  The  Palestinian  Information  Center,   ‘Interview  with  Khalid  Mishal  by  Quds  press  agency,’  
(19   February   2004).   <http://web.archive.org/web/20041220221937/http://www.palestine-­
info.com/arabic/hamas/hewar/mesh3al.htm>  (accessed  on  13  April  2014).    
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agenda.  But,  no  clear  response  had  yet  been  received  with  regard  to  the  PLC  
election.488  
The  process  of  Hamas’  political   integration  matured  after   the  death  of  
Yasser   Arafat.   The   Cairo   declaration   that   was   announced   in   March   2005  
reflected   that   13   Palestinian   factions   decided   to   suspend   armed   resistance  
with   Israel  and  to  rebuild  Palestinian  society,  yet,   this  declaration  seemed  to  
be   in   favour   of   Hamas’   resistance   project   rather   than   Fatah’s   traditional  
approach   of   negotiation   with   Israel.   After   that   Hamas   paid   attention   to   its  
political   campaign.   Serving   people   and   protecting   the   rights   of   Palestinians  
were   the   topics   that   Hamas   leaders   frequently   addressed   to   the   public.   By  
participation  in  elections,  Hamas  looked  forward  to  its  resistance  project  being  
an  alternative  approach  to  protect  Palestinians  and  against  Israeli  occupation.  
For  Hamas,  the  result  of   the  PLC  election  in  January  2006  might  have  been  
an  approval  of  this  conviction.  
Whilst  tracing  interviews  carried  out  with  Hamas  leaders  since  2002,  it  
is   noticeable   that   Islam,   as   a   belief   system,   inspires   Hamas’   work   on  
resistance.  As  an  Islamic  resistance  movement,  Hamas  leaders  put  their  trust  
in   God,   believing   that   the   end   of   the   occupation   would   materialize   even  
though  a  large  number  of   leaders  and  members  were  targeted  by  Israel  and  
there   was   an   absence   of   significant   leaders   during   the   al-­Aqsa   Intifada.  
Because  of   this   faith,  Hamas  believed   that   the   Israeli  withdrawal   from  Gaza  
could  be  seen  as  a   victory  blessed  by  God  and  a   sign  of   the  end  of   Israeli  
occupation.   It  might  be  difficult   to  grasp   this  conviction   in   the  modern  world,  
particularly   when   the   idea   of   the   separation   of   politics   and   religion   has  
become   ‘common  sense’.  The   idea   that  Hamas  stuck   to   its  principle,  makes  
the  liberation  of  Palestine  seem  like  an  unrealistic  expectation  but  it  could  also  
be  noted  that  Hamas  tried  to  strike  a  balance  between  the  ideal  and  the  reality.  
The  ceasefire  and  its  political   integration  could  be  considered  to  be  postures  
in  which  Hamas  demonstrated  its  resilience  in  protecting  its  resistance  project  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
488  The  Palestinian  Information  Center,  ‘Haniyeh:  The  withdrawal  plan  is  a  big  deception,’  (10  
June  2004).  <http://web.archive.org/web/20041220222934/http://www.palestine-­
info.com/arabic/hamas/hewar/2004/haneyah1.htm>  (accessed  on  13  April  2014).  The  
Palestinian  Information  Center,  ‘Interview  with  Khalid  Mishal  by  Al-­Hayat,’  (28  July  2004).  
<http://web.archive.org/web/20041220222141/http://www.palestine-­
info.com/arabic/hamas/hewar/2004/mishal.htm>  (accessed  on  13  April  2014).  
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from   the   changing   environment.   In   addition,   it   could   be   argued   that   the  
concept  of  modernity  has  been  integrated  into  Hamas’  resistance  project.  The  
adoption   of   the   language   of   democracy   and   elections   had   been   a   clear  
indication   of   its   intention   when   Hamas   began   its   political   integration   since  
2004.   The   electoral   programme   in   2006   further   demonstrated   how   Hamas  
addressed   the   issues   of   citizenship,   political   pluralism   and   the   value   of  
democracy  to  the  public.  Nevertheless,  Hamas’  discourse  on  modernity  is  not  
fully   appreciated   by   the   West   which   is   often   suspicious   of   Hamas’   illiberal  
outlook   and   its   violent   approach.   Hamas   leaders   took   a   lesson   from  
Hizbullah, 489   claiming   that   they   would   not   give   up   the   right   of   military  
resistance   until   the   end   of   the   Israeli   occupation.   Armed   resistance   against  
the   occupation   is   inspired   by   Islamic   history   and   principle.   In   short,   Islam  
empowers  Hamas’  resistance  project.  Hamas  believes  that  as  long  as  it  sticks  
to   faith,   any   difficulties   would   be   resolved,   for   example,   the   Israeli  
disengagement   from  Gaza  plan.  But   after   the   victory   in   the  PLC  election   in  
2006,   Hamas   leaders   faced   a   new   dilemma   and   unprecedented   pressures  
from  Israel  and  the  United  States.  Furthermore  its  commitment  to  the  electoral  
programme  seemed  to  be  questionable  when  it  took  over  Gaza  in  June  2007.  
In  the  next  chapter,  we  shall  see  how  Hamas  promoted  its  resistance  project  










	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
489  Israel’s   security   force   withdrew   from   South   Lebanon   in   May   2000.   Hizbullah   claimed   a  
victory   of   resistance.   This   Israeli   withdrawal   made   Hamas   believe   that   resistance   is   the  
effective   way   to   force   Israel   out   of   the   occupied   territories.   See   Kim   Cragin,   Palestinian  
Resistance  through  the  eyes  of  Hamas,  PhD  thesis,  op.  cit.,  pp  71-­72.  
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Chapter	  Four:	  Evaluation	  of	  Hamas’	  political	  engagement	  
(2006-­‐2013)	  
  
After   2006   Palestine   entered   a   new   stage.   Due   to   the   unexpected  
victory   in   the  PLC  election,  Hamas  was  no   longer   in   opposition   and   for   the  
first   time,   it  was  able   to   fulfill   its   commitment   to   resistance   in   politics.  Many  
believed  that  Hamas  had  changed  its  profile   in  response  to  huge  challenges  
imposed  by  the  international  community.  Indeed  there  was  a  new  dimension:  
In   government,  Hamas   incorporated   the   issue  of   governance   further   into   its  
resistance   project.   That   is   to   say,   Hamas’   new   strategy   after   the   electoral  
victory   in  2006  was  a  combination  of   resistance  and  governance   in  order   to  
adapt  itself  to  meet  challenges  from  Western,  Arab,  and  Muslim  countries  and  
Palestine’s  opponents.  In  order  to  explore  this  development,  Chapter  Four  will  
analyze   and   evaluate   how  Hamas  enforced   and   defended   the   necessity   for  
resistance  in  governance  from  2006  to  2013.      
1.  The  tenth  Palestinian  government  and  the  unity  government    
Hamas’  electoral  result  had  not  been  anticipated.  It  attracted  almost  60  
per  cent  of  the  votes  which  resulted  in  a  gain  of  74  seats  out  of  the  132  seats  
in   the   PLC,   which   meant   that   Hamas   had   the   capacity   to   form   a   new  
government   by   itself.   It   is   believed   that   Hamas’   victory   was   attributed   to  
corruption  in  Fatah.  However,  for  Hamas  leaders  and  supporters,  there  were  
other   implications.  The  victory  demonstrated   that   the   resistance  project  was  
workable  rather  than  acting  as  a  compromise  project  in  terms  of  negotiations  
with  Israel.490  Hamas  leaders  were  convinced  that  over  the  previous  ten  years  
Palestinians   had   gained   nothing   from   these   negotiations.   The   resistance  
project   alone   had   succeeded   in   driving   Israel   out   of   the   Gaza   Strip,   an  
achievement  that  the  negotiation  project  had  not  brought  about.  Secondly,  this  
election  was  symbolic  in  that  people  voted  for  Islam  because  Hamas’  essence  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
490  The  Palestinian   Information  Center,   ‘Newspaper   Interview  with   the  deputy  of   the  political  
bureau,   Dr.   Moussa   Abu   Marzuq,’   (2   March   2006).  
<https://web.archive.org/web/20110813113310/http://www.palestine-­
info.com/arabic/hamas/hewar/2006/marzooq.htm>  (accessed  on  3  June  2014).      
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was  based  on  an   Islamic   reference.491  One  of   the  elected  MPs,  Umm  Nidal  
Farhat   felt   that   Islam  had  been  victorious  and  the  victory  was  attributed  to  a  
desire   of   the   martyrs,   prisoners,   fighters   and   mothers   for   change   and  
reform. 492   Thirdly,   people   voted   for   Hamas   because   of   its   electoral  
programme   and   its   characteristics   such   as,   integrity   and   an   image   of  
incorruptibility.  Finally,  the  factor  that  people  sought  to  change  was  due  to  the  
long-­term  problems  of  corruption  within  Fatah  and  the  way  that  it  monopolized  
decision-­making.493    
In   spite   of   its   stunning   victory,   Hamas   did   not   intend   to   form   a   new  
government  alone  but  kept  a  low  profile  when  seeking  cooperation  with  other  
political   parties,   particularly   with   Fatah.   After   the   election   Khalid   Mishal  
proposed  the  concept  of  a  ‘national  project’  to  the  public  that  could  be  seen  as  
an   upgrade   of   Hamas’   resistance   project.   The   national   project   was   a   new  
model  that  combined  resistance  and  politics,  authorized  by  the  people.  From  
Hamas’  perspective,  the  success  of  the  national  project  would  be  based  on  a  
national  coalition  as  well  as  the  reform  of  the  PLO.494  However,  this   initiative  
seemed  to  be  unattractive  to  Fatah  and  in  the  long  run,  the  division  between  
Fatah  and  Hamas  was  inevitable.  
1.1   From   the   tenth   Palestinian   government   to   the   polarization   of  
Palestinian  politics  
Although   Hamas   believed   that   the   electoral   victory   boosted   its  
confidence   in   spreading   its   resistance   project,   it   also   paid   a   high   price   for  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
491  The  Palestinian  Information  Center,  ‘Newspaper  Interview  with  the  deputy  of  the  political  
bureau,  Dr.  Moussa  Abu  Marzuq,’  (2  March  2006).  
<https://web.archive.org/web/20110813113310/http://www.palestine-­
info.com/arabic/hamas/hewar/2006/marzooq.htm>  (accessed  on  3  June  2014).    
492  The  Palestinian  Information  Center,  ‘The  MP  Umm  Nidal  Farhat,  an  exclusive  interview  
with  the  Palestinian  Information  Center,’  (2  February  2006).  
<https://web.archive.org/web/20110226044650/http://www.palestine-­
info.com/arabic/hamas/hewar/2006/fara7at.htm>  (accessed  on  3  June  2014).    
493  The  Palestinian  Information  Center,  ‘Newspaper  Interview  with  the  deputy  of  the  political  
bureau,  Dr.  Moussa  Abu  Marzuq,’  (2  March  2006).    
<https://web.archive.org/web/20110813113310/http://www.palestine-­
info.com/arabic/hamas/hewar/2006/marzooq.htm>  (accessed  on  3  June  2014).    
494  The  Palestinian  Information  Center,  ‘Transcript  of  the  press  conference  by  Mr.  Khalid  
Mishal  in  the  Egyptian  Press  Union  Centre,  Cairo,’  (9  February  2006).  
<https://web.archive.org/web/20131123003740/http://www.palestine-­
info.com/arabic/hamas/hewar/2006/mash3al.htm>  (accessed  on  3  June  2014).    
	   141	  
being  a  new  government.  The  major  challenge  was  that  Israel  and  the  Quartet  
considered   Hamas’   victory   as   a   threat   to   peace.   Israel   announced   that   it  
would  not  negotiate  with  a  new  government  that  called  for,  ‘the  destruction  of  
the  State  of   Israel’.495  On  the  other  hand  the  Quartet  set   three  preconditions  
for  dealing  with   it:   the   renunciation  of  violence,   the   recognition  of   Israel  and  
the  acceptance  of  previous  agreements  signed  by  the  PA.  
Among  the  three  preconditions,   the  recognition  of   Israel  was  a  pivotal  
one.  During  the  al-­Aqsa  Intifada,  Hamas  had  been  in  communication  with  the  
European   Union   but   with   the   resumption   of   suicide   bombings   in   2003,   this  
connection  was  suspended.  After   the  PLC  election,  Hamas’  political   leaders  
grasped   the   opportunity   to   express   their   views   in   the   influential   western  
newspapers   such   as   The   Washington   Post496  and   The   Guardian.497  These  
arguments   stressed   the   reasons   why   the   recognition   of   Israel   was   not   an  
option   for   Hamas.   It   is   interesting   to   note   that   Hamas   tried   to   eschew  
controversial   language   to   the   Western   audience.   This   behaviour   could   be  
considered  as  Hamas’  tactic  in  an  effort  to  seek  understanding  from  the  West.  
Therefore,   instead   of   focusing   its   discourse   on   resistance   and   liberation,   it  
highlighted   the   reality   of   Palestinian   society   on   the   ground.  Hamas’   leaders  
made   two   points   to   the   West.   Firstly,   the   people   had   chosen   Hamas   in   a  
democratic   election;;   therefore,   Western   countries   should   not   intervene   or  
ignore   the   people’s   decisions. 498   Secondly,   it   was   unreasonable   to   force  
Hamas  to  recognize  Israel  when  Palestinians  were  under  attack  and  deprived  
of  their  rights.499  The  only  possible  scenario  for  the  recognition  of  Israel  would  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
495   Milton-­Edward   &   Farrell   Stephen,   Hamas:   The   Islamic   Resistance   Movement,   op.cit.,  
p.261.  
496  Mousa  Abu  Marzook,   ‘What  Hamas   is   seeking,’  Washington  Post   (31  January  2006).   ‘A  
conversation  with  Ismail  Haniyeh,  ‘’We  do  not  wish  to  throw  them  into  the  sea,’’  Washington  
Post  (26  February  26  2006).  
497  Khaled  Mish’al,  ‘We  will  not  sell  our  people  or  principles  for  foreign  aid’,  The  Guardian  (31  
January  2006).    
498  Ibid.  
499   ‘A   conversation   with   Ismail   Haniyeh,   ‘’We   do   not   wish   to   throw   them   into   the   sea,’’  
Washington  Post  (26  February  2006).  
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be  that  Israel  acknowledged  the  Palestinian  people’s  rights  and  then  allowed  
Palestinians  to  establish  their  country  within  the  1967  borders.500            
Indeed,   being   in   government   had   huge   repercussions   for   Hamas.   Its  
rejection  of  Israel  put  Hamas  in  an  awkward  situation.  The  only  possible  way  
for  Hamas  to  deal  with  the  impasse  was  to  form  the  national  unity  government.  
In   response   to   international   pressure   and   the   Palestinians’   expectations,  
Hamas  adopted  the  slogan  of,   ‘building  with  one  hand  and  resisting  with  the  
other.’   (yad   tabnī  wa  yad   tuqāwim).  501  To  put   it  another  way,   the   ideal  unity  
government  was  based  on  a   combination  of   politics   and   resistance.  Politics  
and  governance  did  not  contravene  the  principle  of  resistance  since  this  was  
a   strategic   option   that   underwrote   the   aim   of   liberating   Palestinians   and  
restoring   their   rights.   In   Hamas’   vision,   the   unity   government   had   to   take  
responsibility   for  changing  and   reforming  Palestinian  society   for   the  purpose  
of   resistance.   This   concept   corresponded   to   Hamas’   resistance   project   but  
Fatah  was  not   interested   in   it  due  to  division  within  Fatah’s  ranks  as  well  as  
pressure  from  the  U.S  government.502  
Hamas  formed  a  new  government  without  Fatah’s  participation,  and  on  
29th   March,   the   tenth   Palestinian   government   was   sworn   in.   Before   the  
inauguration   on   27th   March,   Prime   Minister   Ismail   Haniyeh   addressed   the  
cabinet   platform.   This   platform   indicated   several   challenges   that   the   new  
government  would   tackle   such  as:   the   problem  of   occupation,   the   issues  of  
security,  economy,  and   financial  and  administrative   reform.   In  order   to   seek  
the   support   of   the   international   community,   this   platform   was   distinct   from  
Hamas’   previous   electoral   programme.   The   terminology,   ‘the   liberation   of  
Palestine’   and   ‘armed   resistance’   were   absent   here   although   Haniyeh   still  
referred   to,   ‘the   establishment   of   an   independent   Palestinian   state   with   full  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
500  Ibid.  
501  The   Palestinian   Information   Center,   ‘Interview   with   the   Jerusalem   MP   Muhammad   Abu  
Teir,’   (2   March   2006).   <https://web.archive.org/web/20110226044321/http://www.palestine-­
info.com/arabic/hamas/hewar/2006/2_3_06.htm>  (accessed  on  4  June  2014).    
502  The   Palestinian   Information   Center,   ‘Interview   with   Prime   Minister   Ismail   Haniyeh,’   (11  
March   2006).   <https://web.archive.org/web/20110226044223/http://www.palestine-­
info.com/arabic/hamas/hewar/2006/ismael_haneya/ismael_haneya.htm>   (accessed   on   4  
June  2014).    
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sovereignty   and   with   Jerusalem   as   its   capital’.503  The   other   distinction   was  
that   Haniyeh   skirted   around   any   resistance   language   that   might   trigger   a  
reaction  from  the  international  community.  He  assured  the  West  that  ‘the  new  
Palestinian  government  will  deal  with  the  agreements  signed  by  the  PLO  and  
the  PA  in  order  to  serve  the  interests  of  Palestinian  peoples’.504  At  the  same  
time  he  appealed  to  the  international  community  not  to  cut  financial  aid  and  to  
respect  the  democratic  choice  of  the  Palestinian  people.505    
Khaled   Hroub   argues   that   the   concept   of   the   two-­state   solution   was  
implicit   in   Haniyeh’s   speech   and   the   new   government   operated   under   the  
Oslo   accords.506  Indeed   the   moderate   tone   of   this   cabinet   platform   moved  
away   from  Hamas’   unyielding   stance.   It   is   believed   that   its   purpose  was   to  
target   the  West  because   three  days   later,   resistance   language  and   the   term  
‘liberation’  re-­emerged  and  was  used  extensively   in  another  political   leader’s  
speech.   In  Beirut,  Khalid  Mishal  addressed  Arab  audiences  with  a   theme  of  
resistance  that  was  in  line  with  the  experience  of  Lebanon  and  Iraq.  He  stated  
that   Hamas   had   not   changed   its   principles   at   the   expense   of   Palestinian  
interests.  Hamas’  effort  was  aimed  at  working  on  the  liberation  of  the  land  with  
the  right  of  return,  the  demolition  of  the  separation  wall  and  settlements,  and  
the  release  of  all  prisoners  from  Israeli   jails.507  This  is  not  to  say  that  Hamas  
played   tricks   on   the   West   since   the   way   that   Hamas   dealt   with   it   was  
consistent  with  its  tactics  during  the  al-­Aqsa  Intifada.508  Hamas  did  not  expect  
the  West  to  identify  with  Palestinian  resistance  but  at  least  to  sympathize  with  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
503  The  Palestinian   Information  Center,   ‘Palestinian  Prime  Minister   Ismail  Haniyeh  delivered  
the  speech  in  the  Legislative  Council  for  confidence  in  his  new  government,’  (27  March  2006).  
<https://web.archive.org/web/20110226044042/http://www.palestine-­




506  Khaled  Hroub,  ‘A  ‘’New  Hamas‘’  through  its  new  documents’,  op.cit.,  p.22.  
507  The  Palestinian  Information  Center,  ‘Transcript  of  Khalid  Mishal  in  the  Arab  Conference  for  
supporting   the   resistance   in   Beirut,’   (30   March   2006).  
<https://web.archive.org/web/20131116102044/http://www.palestine-­
info.com/arabic/hamas/hewar/2006/khalid_meshel/mash3al30_3_06.htm>   (accessed   on   4  
June  2014).    
508  The  author’s  observation  was  confirmed  by  a  Palestinian   intellectual  who   is   familiar  with  
Hamas.    Interview  in  Exeter,  17  November,  2014.  
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the   Palestinians   since   they   were   victims   under   occupation,   rather   than  
troublemakers.  
Because   Hamas   did   not   accept   the   Quartet’s   three   conditions,   the  
international   sanctions   immediately   took   effect   on   the   tenth   Palestinian  
government.   These   international   sanctions   were   the   first   and   most   serious  
problem   that   the  Hamas-­led   government   had   to   overcome.  Hamas   realized  
that  it  would  not  be  an  easy  task  to  lead  the  new  government  but  as  usual  it  
stuck   to   the   resistance   option   and   promised   the   Palestinians   that   it   would  
bring  dignity  and   justice   to   them  without  submission   to   the   foreign   forces.509  
However,   the   international  sanctions  had  comprehensive  effects  on   the  new  
government  in  terms  of  economic,  political  and  social  aspects.  Economically,  
the   huge   financial   burden   of   a   $1.2   billion   debt   inherited   from   the   previous  
government   as   well   as   the   cut   in   foreign   aid   incapacitated   the   new  
government.   The   first   impact   was   that   approximately   one   hundred   and   fifty  
thousand   public   servants   did   not   receive   salaries, 510   which   affected  
governmental   administration.   Further,   the   approximately   $60  million   tax   that  
Israel   was   supposed   to   hand   over   to   the   Palestinian   government   was  
withheld.511  Furthermore,   the   financial   support   from   the   Arab   countries   that  
Hamas  expected  was  dropped  due  to  a  warning  from  the  United  States.  The  
economic   blockade   rapidly   led   to   an   increasing   poverty   rate   and  
unemployment  as  well  as  the  deterioration  of  social  development  and  political  
polarization.   With   the   worsening   economy,   a   sense   of   insecurity   increased  
when   robbery,   theft,   murder   and   violence   among   armed   groups   became  
prevalent.   In   order   to   bring   social   order   back   on   the   right   track,   the   Interior  
Minister,  Said  Siyam  guaranteed  that   the  government  would  enforce   the   law  
against   these   crimes.   In   April,   Siyam   created   a   new   security   force,   ‘the  
executive  force’.  
The   creation   of   an   executive   force   created   a   huge   dispute   in  
Palestinian  politics  as  it  was  considered  to  be  Hamas’  force.  Critics  said  that  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
509  Ibid.  
510  Beverley   Milton-­Edward   &   Farrell   Stephen,  Hamas:   The   Islamic   Resistance   Movement,  
op.cit.,  pp.267-­271.  
511  Ibid.,  pp.261-­262.  
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the  executive  force  was   loyal   to  Hamas  in  order   to  counter   the  expansion  of  
the  Presidential  guards  under  the  authority  of  the  PA  President  Abbas.512  But  
it  is  noted  that  unlike  the  Al-­Qasaam  Brigade,  that  is,  Hamas’  military  branch,  
the   executive   force  was   not   solely  Hamas’   force.   This   new   force   has   5,550  
members.   Apart   from   original   members   from   Hamas   (2,500),   it   was   also  
composed   of   previous   members   of   Fatah   (1,100),   the   Popular   Resistance  
Committees  (900),  and  the  Popular  Front  for  the  liberation  of  Palestine  (250),  
several  small  groups  and  unaffiliated  Palestinians  (540).513  In  order  to  defend  
the  formation  of  the  executive  force  within  the  framework  of  the  government,  
the   Interior  Minister  Said  Siyam   indicated   that   it  was   formed   to   improve   the  
security  apparatus  and  to  refrain  from  cooperating  with  Israel.  He  also  added  
that   the   formation   of   the   executive   force   was   not   to   provoke   Fatah   but   the  
problem  was   that  some  Palestinian  groups  with  a  special  agenda  supported  
by  foreign  forces  attempted  to  create  chaos,  which  was  in  violation  of  the  law  
and   Palestinian   national   interest. 514   However,   President   Abbas   did   not  
recognize   the   creation   of   the   executive   force;;   instead,   he   overruled   the  
authority   of   the   Interior   Minister   to   supervise   other   security   forces  
exclusively.515  It  was  expected   that  confrontation  between  Hamas  and  Fatah  
would   erupt   and   the   ideal   of   the   unity   government   began   to   fade   until   the  
release   of   the   ‘Prisoner   document’   on   11th   May,   by   five   Palestinian  
prisoners.516    
The   Prisoner   document   was   not   officially   authorized   by   Palestinian  
factions  but  was  signed  by  five  Palestinian  prisoners  who  had  prominent  and  
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514  The  Palestinian  Information  Center,  ‘Interview  with  the  Interior  Minister  Said  Siyam,’  (24  
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senior  roles  in  Fatah,  Hamas,  Islamic  Jihad,  PFLP  and  DFLP  respectively.517  
The  Prisoner  document  consisted  of  18  articles  that  could  be  considered  to  be  
an  attempt   to   reconcile  Hamas  and  Fatah   toward   the   formation  of   the  unity  
government  as  well   as   to   lift   the   international   sanctions.  The  main  points  of  
this   document   dealt   with   various   issues   such   as   the   establishment   of   a  
Palestinian   state   with   Jerusalem   as   its   capital   which   took   into   account   all  
territories   occupied   in   1967,   the   legitimacy   of   resistance,   the   role   of  
negotiation   by   PLO   and   the   PA   president,   the   formation   of   a   national   unity  
government,   the   right   of   return   and   reform   in   Palestinian   security   forces.518  
Initially,  Hamas  praised  this  document  but  had  reservations  about  some  of  the  
articles   such   as   the   acceptance   of   the,   ‘Arab   initiative’,   the   submission   to  
‘international  legitimacy’  and  the  recognition  of  the  PLO  as  the  ‘sole  legitimate  
representative   of   the   Palestinian   people’   which   implied   the   recognition   of  
Israel  since  this  was  not  consistent  with  its  resistance  project.519    
Hamas’   reluctance  made  President  Mahmud  Abbas   impatient.  Abbas  
asserted   that   the   new   government   should   recognize   Israel   and   cease   all  
armed   resistance.   520   On   25th   May   2006,   he   asked   Hamas   to   accept   the  
prisoner   document   within   ten   days,   otherwise   the   document   would   be  
determined   by   referendum.   Hamas   leaders   rejected   this   proposal   outright,  
claiming   that   a   referendum   was   illegal   and   against   the   new   government  
elected   by   two   thirds   of   the   people.521  By   calling   for   a   referendum,   Abbas  
hoped  to  oblige  Hamas  to  concede  in  order  to  lift  the  international  sanctions.  
Prime   Minister   Ismail   Haniyeh   stated   that   the   cause   of   the   current  
predicament  was  not  Hamas  itself  but  the  international  community  engaged  in  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
517  Marwan   Barghouti   from   Fatah,   Abdul   Khalid   al-­Natshah   from   Hamas,   Bassam   al-­Sa’di  
from  Islamic  Jihad,  Abdul  Rahim  Mallouh  from  the  PFLP  and  Mustafa  Badarnah  from  DFLP.  
Azzam  Tamimi,  Hamas,  unwritten  chapter,  op.cit.,  p.237.  
518  JMCC,   ‘The   full   text   of   the   National   Conciliation   Document   of   the   Prisoners,’   (11   May  
2006).  
<http://web.archive.org/web/20080516101156/http://www.jmcc.org/documents/prisoners.htm>  
(accessed  on  7  June  2014).    
519  Azzam  Tamimi,  Hamas,  unwritten  chapter,  op.cit.,  p.237.    
520  Graham  Usher,  ‘Hamas  risen,’  Middle  East  Report  238,  op.cit.,  pp.2-­11.  
521  JMCC,  ‘Five  factions  reject  the  referendum,’  (8  June  2006).  
<http://web.archive.org/web/20070820130528/http://jmcc.org/new/06/jun/referendum.htm>  
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thwarting  the  elected  government.522  The  dispute  concerning  the  referendum  
was   finally   settled   through   several   rounds   of   dialogue   between  Hamas   and  
Fatah   when   the   national   conciliation   document   that   had   been   based   on   a  
revision  of  the  prisoner  document  was  signed  on  25th  June.523  
Overall,  although  the  national  conciliation  document  does  not  explicitly  
meet   the   three  conditions  set  by   the  Quartet,   it   is  clear   that   for   the   first   time  
Hamas  accepted  the  clause  that  called  for  the  establishment  of  a  Palestinian  
state   on   the   1967   borders. 524      Additionally,   Hamas   agreed   to   restrict   its  
resistance  to  the  territories  occupied  in  1967.  This  indicated  that  Hamas  was  
willing  to  soften  its  tough  stance  without  violation  of  its  fundamental  principle.    
The  most  noticeable   clauses   in   this  document,   as   far  as  Hamas  was  
concerned,   was   the   formation   of   the   national   unity   government   and   the  
integration  of  Hamas  into  the  PLO  before  the  end  of  2006.  By  the  inauguration  
of  this  unity  government  and  the  reform  of  the  PLO,  Hamas  hoped  to  end  the  
current  crisis  so  that  the  resistance  project  would  be  reinforced.  However,  the  
prospect   of   a   unity   government   was   immediately   shattered   because  
Palestinian   armed   groups   had   attacked   an   Israeli   military   camp   in   Kerem  
Shalom,   resulting   in   the   death   of   two   Israeli   soldiers   and   the   abduction   of  
Corporal  Gilad  Shalit  on  25th  June.  Shalit’s  abduction  was  not  without  context.  
Before  this  incident,  the  tension  between  Hamas  and  Israel  had  increased.  On  
9th   June,   Israel   assassinated   the   chief   of   the   executive   force,   Jamal   Abu  
Samhadana  and  bombed  the  coastline  of  Gaza,  causing  the  deaths  of  seven  
in  a  family  as  well  as  the  wounding  of  a  dozen  others.  In  response,  al-­Qassam  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
522  The  Palestinian  Information  Center,  ‘Interview  with  Palestinian  Prime  Minister  Ismail  
Haniyeh,’  (4  June  2006).  
<https://web.archive.org/web/20120712091532/http://www.palestine-­
info.com/arabic/hamas/hewar/2006/ismael_haneya/haneya_4_6_06.htm>  (accessed  on  7  
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2006).  
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Brigade  had  declared   the  end  of   the  ceasefire   that  had  been   in  place  since  
March  2005  and  had  launched  rockets  into  Israeli  territory.525    
The  abduction  of  Shalit  had  two  implications  for  Hamas.  One  was  that  
it   strengthened   Hamas’   determination   to   resist   when   Israel   launched  
‘Operation  Summer  Rains’  on  28th  June.  During  the  period  between  28th  June  
and  18th  July,  one  hundred  Palestinians  and  one  Israeli  solider  were  killed.526  
Apart   from   the   attempt   to   rescue   Shalit,   it   seems   that   Israel   took   this  
opportunity  to  weaken  Hamas’  governance.  In  Gaza,  the  power  plant,  bridges  
and  government  buildings  were  bombarded.   Israel  also  arrested   thirty-­seven  
Hamas  PLC  members  in  the  West  Bank  in  order  to  disturb  the  function  of  the  
PLC.527  The   Israeli   onslaught   did   not   frustrate   Hamas.   On   the   contrary,   it  
boosted   the  ethos  of   its   resistance.  As   in   the  period  of   the  al-­Aqsa   Intifada,  
the   terminology   of   sacrifice,   steadfastness,   patience   and   the   honour   of   the  
Palestinian   fighters   again   became   the   central   points   of   Hamas’   resistance  
discourse.528  Another   factor   that   lifted   Hamas’   spirit   was   the   war   between  
Hizbullah  and  Israel  during  the  period  between  July  and  August  2006.  Hamas  
considered  that  the  loss  of  Israel  was  attributed  to  Hizubllah’s  resistance.  One  
of   Hamas’   members,   Ahmed   Bahr   praised   Hizbullah   as   a   role   model   for  
Palestinians   saying   that   faith   in   resistance   was   the   only   way   to   liberate  
Palestine.529  The   rhetoric  Hamas  addressed   to   the  public  was  similar   to   that  
used  during  the  period  of  the  al-­Aqsa  Intifada.  The  more  Israel   intensified  its  
operation,  the  more  resistance  messages  Hamas  reinforced.    
Another  implication  of  Shalit’s  abduction  for  Hamas  is  that  there  was  an  
incentive  to  elaborate  on  the  significant  prisoner  issue.  The  prisoner  issue  had  
previously   appeared   in   Hamas’   resistance   discourse   during   the   al-­Aqsa  
Intifada.   On   this   occasion,   the   abduction   of   Gilad   Shalit   enabled   Hamas   to  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
525   International   Crisis   Group,   ‘Israel/Palestine/Lebanon:   Climbing   out   of   the   Abyss,’   ICG  
Middle  East  Report  (25  July  2006),  pp.5-­6.  
526  Ibid.,  p.6.  
527   The   Palestinian   Information   Center,   ‘Interview   with   Ahmed   Bahr,’   (19   August   2006).  
<https://web.archive.org/web/20110226041408/http://www.palestine-­
info.com/arabic/hamas/hewar/2006/baher_19_8_06.htm>  (accessed  on  8  June  2014).    
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<https://web.archive.org/web/20110226041408/http://www.palestine-­
info.com/arabic/hamas/hewar/2006/baher_19_8_06.htm>  (accessed  on  8  June  2014).    
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articulate   the   issue:   Hamas   put   the   prisoner   issue   on   the   national   agenda,  
insisting  that  the  only  condition  of  Shalit’s  release  was  a  prisoner  exchange.  In  
a   press   conference,   Khalid   Mishal   complained   that   the   world   had   paid  
attention   to   the   abduction   of   one   Israeli   solider   but   had   kept   silent   about   a  
situation  in  which  ten  thousand  Palestinians  were  in  Israeli  prisons,  including  
four   hundred   children   and   one   hundred   and   twenty   women.   He   stated   that  
those  prisoners  were  heroes  and  fighters  and  Palestinian  society  yearned  for  
their  release.   ‘If  people  forget   these  prisoners,   they  are  not  Palestinians,  not  
Muslims,  not  Arabs,  not  even  humans…  Freeing  these  prisoners   is  the  topic  
agenda.’530    
The   military   expression   that   Hamas   addressed   was   less   intense   as  
Israel  reduced  its  military  operation.  Hamas  rapidly  turned  to  its  main  concern,  
that   of   forming   the   unity   government.   But   this   did   not   go   well.   Due   to   the  
Israeli   attack   on   Gaza   accompanied   by   international   isolation,   there   was   a  
question  as   to  whether  Hamas  had   the   capability   of   coordinating   resistance  
and  governance.531  On  the  other  hand,  although  Hamas  and  Fatah  came  to  a  
compromise   by   signing   the   National   conciliation   document,   and   strove   to  
minimize  mutual  discrepancies  in  the  formation  of  the  unity  government  after  
the  Israeli  attack  on  Gaza,  the  predicament  remained  due  to  the  fact  that  both  
held  entirely  different  views  in  connection  with  Israel.    
On   12th  September   2006,   Abbas   announced   that   he   had   reached   an  
agreement  with   the  Prime  Minister   Ismail  Haniyeh   to   form   the  national  unity  
government   before   he   attended   the  U.N  General   Assembly   session   in  New  
York.   The   attempt   to   form   the   new   government   was   almost   successful.  
Nevertheless,  the  expectation  rapidly  fell  when  Khalid  Mishal  stepped  in  and  
pressured  Haniyeh  to  retract  his  commitment.  The  failure  of   the  formation  of  
the  unity  government  embarrassed  Ismail  Haniyeh.  The  intervention  of  Mishal  	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seemed   to   reflect  a   rift  between  Hamas’   leadership   in  Gaza  and  abroad,  as  
critics   claimed.  The   reason  why  Hamas  prolonged   the  political   process  was  
that   it   had   not   accepted   the   Arab   peace   initiative   which   was   one   of   the  
conditions   of   forming   a   unity   government.  532  The   Arab   peace   initiative   that  
was   proposed   in   the   Arab   League   in   2002   considered   the   normalization   of  
relations  with   Israel  under  a  specific  condition:   that   Israel  withdrew   from   the  
occupied  Arab  lands,  including  the  Golan  Heights  and  an  agreement  to  form  a  
Palestinian   state   based   on   the   West   Bank   and   Gaza   Strip   with   East  
Jerusalem  as   its  capital.533  According  to  the  procedure  of  decision-­making   in  
Hamas,  major   decisions   had   to   be  made   through   the  Shura   council.   In   this  
respect,  the  Arab  peace  initiative  had  not  been  authorized  in  this  council.  Abu  
Marzuq,   the   deputy   to   Hamas’   political   bureau,   considered   that   this   peace  
initiative  had  given  the  wrong  perception  of  the  way  Arab  countries  dealt  with  
Israel.  He  added   that  compromise  with   Israel  was  harmful   to   the  Palestinian  
cause  and  Israel  itself  had  no  intention  of  accepting  this  initiative.534  
President   Mahmud   Abbas   was   disappointed   with   this   abrupt  
development.  He  expected  Hamas  to  compromise  its  resistance  project  or  at  
least   to   meet   the   Quartet’s   standards   in   exchange   for   the   lifting   of  
international  sanctions.535  However,  there  was  no  sign  of  a  change  in  Hamas’  
language  of  resistance.  Abu  Marzuq  stated  that   the  current  government  was  
based  on  resistance  with  the  aim  of  ending  the  occupation.  536  It  is  noted  that  
Hamas   did   not   want   to   monopolize   the   resistance   project   exclusively   but  	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Fatah’s  condition  to  form  a  unity  government.  See    Azzam  Tamimi,  Hamas,  unwritten  chapter,  
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wanted   to   share  with   other   Palestinian   factions.   Hamas   firmly   believed   that  
the  only  way  to  resolve  the  problems  of  social  disorder,  and  economical  and  
diplomatic   isolation   was   to   form   the   national   unity   government   instead   of  
negotiating  with  Israel.537  In  addition  to  the  issue  of  the  unity  government  and  
difficulties  between  Hamas  and  Fatah,  the  Hamas  led-­government  dealt  with  
multiple  internal  crises  in  the  period  from  September  2006  to  February  2007.  
The  government  encountered  general  strikes  by  public  servants  and  security  
forces   due   to   the   delay   in   the   payment   of   salaries.   Small-­scale   clashes  
occurred  between  the  supporters  of  Hamas  and  Fatah:  government  buildings  
were  attacked  and  Hamas  officials  were  kidnapped.    
Hamas   lost  confidence   in  President  Abbas.  On   the  one  hand,  Hamas  
considered   that  Abbas  had   violated   the  previous  agreement   due   to   the   fact  
that   he   declared   to   the   United   Nations   that   the   unity   government   would  
recognize   Israel,   which   symbolized   that   Abbas   had   retreated   from   the  
commitment   in   the   national   conciliation   document. 538   On   the   other   hand,  
Hamas   was   suspicious   of   Abba’s   intentions   and   his   ability   to   manage   the  
security  forces.  On  1st  October  2006,  members  of  the  security  force  belonging  
to   the   President   went   on   strike,   calling   for   the   dissolution   of   the   executive  
force  directed  by  the  Interior  Minister.  As  a  result,  two  people  were  killed  and  
fifteen  wounded   as  Fatah’s   security   force   confronted   the   executive   force.539  
This   clash   was   not   accidental.   It   is   noted   that   the   day   before   this   conflict,  
violence  along  with  demonstrations  had  spread   in  Gaza  and   the  West  Bank  
leaving  nine  dead  and  a  hundred  injured,  which  was  the  worst  day  since  the  
inauguration   of   the   new   government   in   March.540  The   executive   force   was  
blamed  for  these  incidents  but  Hamas  rejected  this  accusation  by  saying  that  	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<https://web.archive.org/web/20110226041225/http://www.palestine-­
info.com/arabic/hamas/hewar/2006/musa_abo_marzooq/14_9_06.htm>  (accessed  on  9  June  
2014).    
538  The  Palestinian  Information  Center,  ‘Interview  with  Usama  Hamdan,  the  representative  of  
Hamas   in   Lebanon,’   (4   October   2006).   <http://tinyurl.com/m4tw2an>   (accessed   on   9   June  
2014).    
539  Avi   Issacharoff,   ‘Two   killed   and   eighteen   hurt   in   fresh   Hamas-­Fatah   fighting   in   Gaza,’  
Haaretz,   (1   October   2006).   <http://www.haaretz.com/news/two-­killed-­and-­18-­hurt-­in-­fresh-­
hamas-­fatah-­fighting-­in-­gaza-­1.200293>  (accessed  on  10  June  2014).  
540  Ibid.  
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the   security   forces’   protest   on   the   street   was   illegal   and   President   Abbas  
should  take  full  responsibility  for  this  conflict.541    
Many  local  Palestinians  were  worried  that  the  discord  between  Hamas  
and  Fatah  would  escalate   into  a  comprehensive  confrontation  particularly   in  
the  aftermath  of  the  incident  of  the  attempted  assassination  of  Prime  Minister  
Haniyeh  in  December  and  the  call  for  an  early  election  by  President  Abbas.542  
Hamas  was  also  aware   that  a  certain  group   that  was  supported  by   the  U.S  
and  Israel  intended  to  overthrow  the  government.  It  was  unusual  for  Hamas  to  
condemn   a   specific   person   in   public.   Hamas   leader   Muhammad   Nazzal  
reprimanded   Muhammad   Dahlan,   a   senior   member   of   Fatah,   for  
assassination  attempts  and  the  failure  of  the  reconciliation  between  Fatah  and  
Hamas.543   There   is   no   evidence   that   Dahlan   was   the   mastermind   of   the  
assassination  but  he  may  be  involved  in  the  power  struggle  between  Hamas  
and   Fatah.   Beverley   Milton-­Edwards,   a   scholar   specializing   in   Hamas  
analyzed  various  sources,  indicated  that  Dahlan  was  supported  by  Israel  and  
the   United   States   financially   and   militarily   in   order   to   remove   the   elected  
Hamas-­led   government.544  There   was   also   a   report   that   the   security   forces  
under   the  PA  President  had  been  aided  by   the  United  States  since  October  
2006.   The   United   States   planned   to   give   aid   amounting   to   $26   million   to  
President  Abbas  and  its  presidential  guards.545  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
541  The  Palestinian  Information  Center,  ‘Interview  with  Usama  Hamdan,  the  representative  of  
Hamas   in   Lebanon,’   (4  October   2006).   <http://tinyurl.com/m4tw2an>   (accessed  on  10   June  
2014).    
542  On  16th  December,  Abbas  declared  to  hold  early  elections  but  Hamas  considered  this  act  
as   an  attempted   coup   toward   the   government   led   by  Hamas.  See  Azzam  Tamimi,  Hamas,  
unwritten  chapter,  op.cit.,  pp.252-­253.  
543  The   Palestinian   Information   Center,   ‘Interview   with   Muhammad   Nazzal,’   (25   September  
2006).  <http://tinyurl.com/m4tw2an>  (accessed  on  10  June  2014).    
544  Milton-­Edward  cited  a  confidential  document  obtained  from  an  American  magazine  Vanity  
Fair  that  the  U.S  President  Bush,  Secretary  of  State  Condoleezza  Rice  and  Deputy  National  
Security   Adviser   Elliott   Abrams   ‘provoke   a   Palestinian   civil   war’.   This   plan   would   be  
implemented   by   Muhammad   Dahlan   with   the   weapon   supplied   by   the   US.   See   Beverley  
Milton-­Edward  &  Farrell  Stephen,  Hamas:  The  Islamic  Resistance  Movement,  op.cit.,  pp.283.  
545  See  Steven  Erlanger,  ‘U.S.  Plan  Would  Expand  Palestinian  Leader’s  Security  Force,’  The  
New  York  Times,  (5  October  2006).  
<http://www.nytimes.com/2006/10/05/world/middleeast/05crossing.html>  (accessed  on  11  
June  2014).  
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Hamas   was   cautious   about   the   deteriorating   scenario   that   would  
possibly  collapse  the  government;;  and  since  it  was  afraid  that  the  continuous  
infighting  among  Palestinians  only  benefited  Israel   it  asserted  that   it  was  not  
against  all  Fatah  members.546  In  spite  of  the  fact  that  Hamas  leaders  claimed  
that   national   unity   was   a   pressing   matter   for   both   Hamas   and   Fatah,   the  
expansion  of  the  executive  force  planned  by  the  Interior  Minister  Said  Siyam,  
from   3,000   to   12,000   members   seemed   to   re-­trigger   Fatah. 547   The  
reconciliation  was  shaky  since  Fatah  and  Hamas  blamed  each  other.  That  is,  
Fatah  accused  Hamas  of  complicity  with  Iran  and  Syria  while  Hamas  criticized  
some  Fatah  members  of  creating  chaos  in  order  to  topple  the  government.  In  
early  2007,  it   is  estimated  that  more  than  eighty  Palestinians  were  killed  due  
to   the   social   disorder   and   the   intense   confrontation   between   Hamas   and  
Fatah.548  Many  Palestinians  sensed   that  civil  war  was   looming  but   this  crisis  
calmed  down  temporarily  due  to  Saudi  Arabia’s  mediation.  
1.2   The   Mecca   Agreement:   From   a   temporary   reconciliation   to   total  
division  
  On  8th  February  2007,  the  Saudi  royal  family  invited  Hamas  and  Fatah  
leaders   to  Mecca.  Two  days   later,  both  sides   reached  an  agreement  known  
as,   ‘The   Mecca   Agreement’. 549   Many   believed   that   this   agreement   saved  
Palestinians  from  the  brink  of  civil  war.  Some  Palestinians  compared  it  to  the  
Taif   Agreement   in   Lebanon   1989   as   it   served   the   same   function:   the  
protection   of   national   unity.550  Another   consequence   of   this   agreement   was  
that  the  national  unity  government  was  formed  for  the  first  time.  According  to  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
546  The  Palestinian  Information  Center,  ‘Interview  with  Said  Siyam,’  (31  December  2006).  
<http://tinyurl.com/oavyp7o>  (accessed  on  13  June  2014).  
547  Usama  Amer,  ‘Palestinian  Executive  Force  and  the  current  debate,’  Palestinian  
Information  Center,  (13  January  2007).  
<http://www.palinfo.com/site/pic/newsdetails.aspx?itemid=89755>  (accessed  on  13  June  
2014).  
548  International  Crisis  Group,  ‘After  Mecca:  Engaging  Hamas,’  op.cit.,  p.16.  
549  The  Mecca  Agreement  mainly  deals  with  three  major  issues:  the  forbidden  fighting  among  
Palestinians,   the   formation  of   a   national   unity   government   and   the   reform  of   the  PLO.  See  
JMCC,   ‘The   text   of   the   Mecca   Agreement,’   (9   February   2007).  
<http://web.archive.org/web/20090426090248/http://www.jmcc.org/new/07/feb/meccaagree.ht
m>  (accessed  on  13  June  2014).    
550  Rashid,  ‘Reading  the  Mecca  agreement,’  The  Palestinian  Information  Center,  (10  February  
2007).   <http://www.palinfo.com/site/pic/newsdetails.aspx?itemid=86692>   (accessed   on   13  
June  2014).  
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the  allocations  of   the  cabinet,  Hamas  obtained  nine  and  Fatah  obtained  six,  
portfolios.  Ismail  Haniyeh  remained  the  Prime  Minister  but  the  Interior  Ministry  
was  assigned  to  an  independent  figure.551  
It  seems  that  after  the  Mecca  agreement  Hamas  had  the  upper  hand.  
On   17th   March,   the   first   national   unity   government   was   formed.   The  
‘Programme  of  the  National  Unity  government’  did  not  specify  the  condition  of  
the  recognition  of  Israel.  It  confirmed  that  resistance  was  a  legitimate  right  of  
Palestinians  and  explicitly  rejected  the  concept  of  an  independent  Palestinian  
state  based  on  the  temporary  borders  referred  to  as  the  1967  borders.552  On  
the  other  hand,  regarding  the  issues  of  the  international  agreements  and  the  
negotiation,   there   was   no   indication   that   Hamas   had   to   compromise   its  
resistance   principle.   Hamas   only   expressed   its   intention   to,   ‘respect   the  
international   legitimacy   resolutions  and   the  agreements   that  were  signed  by  
the   PLO’. 553   Hamas   hoped   that   the   new   unity   government   would   lift   the  
international   sanctions   and   facilitate   its   work   on   the   resistance   project.  
Nevertheless,   the  deep  distrust  between  Hamas  and  Fatah  would  hardly  be  
resolved  via  this  document  alone.  
The   problem   of   security   issues   and   the   resentment   of   some   Fatah  
members  persisted  after  the  Mecca  agreement.  On  the  day  after  the  formation  
of   the  unity   government,  President  Abbas  appointed  Muhammad  Dahlan  as  
national   security   adviser.   This   appointment   frustrated  Hamas,   as   it   believed  
that  essentially,  Abbas  was  opposed  to  reconciliation  with  Hamas.554  By  mid-­
May,  the  national  unity  government  existed  in  name  only.  Many  people  were  
confused  and   terrified  by   the  clashes  and   insecurity   they  endured.  The  new  
Interior  Minister  Hani  Al-­Qawasmi  resigned  since  he  could  not  implement  the  
security  plan  embedded   in   the  principle  of   the  Mecca  agreement.555  In   vain,  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
551  International   Crisis   Group,   ‘After   Mecca:   Engaging   Hamas,’  Middle   East   Report   No.62,  
op.cit.,  pp.18-­19.  
552   JMCC,   ‘The   program   of   the   National   Unity   Government,’   (15   March   2007).  
<http://web.archive.org/web/20081121062336/http://www.jmcc.org/politics/pna/nationalgovpro
g.htm>  (accessed  on  14  June  2014).  
553  Ibid.  
554  International  Crisis  Group,  ‘After  Gaza,’  Middle  East  Report  No.68  (2  August  2007),  p.8.  
555  Beverley   Milton-­Edward   &   Farrell   Stephen,  Hamas:   The   Islamic   Resistance   Movement,  
op.cit.,  pp.279-­280.  
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Prime  Minister  Haniyeh  attempted   to   reconcile  with  Fatah   in   terms  of  calling  
for  ceasefires.556  Hamas’  military  wing,  al-­Qassam  Brigade  felt  humiliated  and  
was  afraid   that   its  existence  was  under   threat  by  Fatah  who   received   funds  
and  ammunition  from  the  United  States.557  On  10th  June,  Hamas’  military  wing  
initiated   an   operation   against   Fatah’s   military   force   in   Gaza.   By   14th   June,  
Hamas  had  completely  dominated  Gaza.558  President  Abbas  declared  a  state  
of   emergency   and   the   dissolution   of   the   unity   of   Government.   Since   then,  
Gaza  and  the  West  Bank  have  been  ruled  by  two  political  entities.    
1.3  Evaluations  of   the  Palestinian  government:  The  consequence  of   its  
refusal  to  recognize  Israel  and  the  dysfunction  of  the  resistance  project  
The   Hamas-­led   government   including   the   unity   government   only  
survived   for   one   year   and   two   months   with   the   end   of   the   clash   between  
Hamas   and   Fatah.   The   collapse   of   the   government   was   not   simply   due   to  
tensions  between  Hamas  and  Fatah  but  was  also  attributable  to  both  Hamas’  
refusal  to  acknowledge  Israeli  legitimacy  and  the  international  sanctions.  
Hamas   paid   a   high   price   for   refusing   to   recognize   Israel.   Some  
observers  argued  that  Hamas’  refusal  was  due  to  moral  and  religious  dogma.  
They   indicated   that   it  was  possible   that   in   the   long   run  Hamas  might   follow  
Fatah’s   footsteps   and   distance   itself   from   the   struggle   for   national  
liberation. 559   To   some   extent,   this   argument   was   valid.   The   liberation   of  
Palestine   ‘from  the  river  to  the  sea’  remains  a  dogmatic   issue.560  In  practice,  
Hamas   has   demonstrated   its   flexibility   in   dealing  with   Israel.  With   regard   to  
the  daily  issues  such  as  the  provision  of  water,  electricity  and  the  passage  of  
Palestinians,  Hamas,   as   a   government,   announced   that   it   would   coordinate  
with  the  Israeli  administration.  In  other  words,  being  in  government  restrained  
Hamas’  available  options  and  led  to  a  scenario  of  compromise  with  Israel  to  a  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
556  Paola  Caridi,  Andrea  Teti  (transl.),  Hamas  from  resistance  to  government,  op.cit.,  p.257.  
557  Ibid.,  p.256.  
558  The  5-­days  of   fighting   in  Gaza   led   to   140  deaths  and  1,000   injuries.   International  Crisis  
Group,  ‘After  Gaza,’  op.cit,  p.1.  
559  As’ad  Ghanem,  Palestinian  Politics  after  Arafat,  op.cit.,  pp.149-­150.  
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certain   extent.   Yet,   it   is   hard   to   say   that   Hamas   experienced   an   essential  
transition   from  a   resistance  movement   to  a  political   party  at   this   time   in   the  
way  that  Fatah  had.  Moreover,  the  rejection  of  any  political  engagement  with  
Israel  still  remains  Hamas’  fundamental  principle.561  The  reason  for  this  is  that  
Hamas’   resolve  was  not   just  a  dogmatic   issue,  as  many  have  argued,  but   it  
was  also  associated  with  Hamas’  resistance  project.    
Before   the   election,  Hamas   never   thought   that   it   would   be   forming   a  
new   government   by   itself.   Previously,   the   recognition   of   Israel   was   not   an  
urgent   for  Hamas,  whereas  after   the  election,   it  was  compelled   to   tackle   the  
problem   immediately.   It   should   be   noted   that   one   of   reasons   why   Hamas  
participated   in   the   elections   was   to   protect   the   resistance   as   Abu   Marzuq  
claimed   ‘we  want   to   enter   the  elections   to   keep   the   rights   of   our   people,   to  
maintain  the  resistance  option  and  to  support  the  steadfastness  of  the  people’;;  
‘the  current  negotiation  with   Israel  was  not  a   real  negotiation  but  meant   the  
surrender   of   Palestinian   rights’. 562   In   this   sense   if   Hamas   had   yielded   to  
pressure,  the  resistance  work  it  had  gradually  constructed  during  the  al-­Aqsa  
Intifada   would   have   completely   collapsed   and   this   would   have   been  
tantamount  to  political  suicide  and  harmful  to  Palestinian  national  causes.    
Furthermore,  the  Israeli  withdrawal  from  Gaza  in  2005  and  the  electoral  
victory   in  2006   reinforced  Hamas’  conviction   that   the   resistance  project  was  
the   best   option   for   Palestinians.   Thus,   Hamas   had   no   choice   but   to   reject  
Israel   as   a   legitimate   entity   in   spite   of   the   risk   of   international   sanctions.  
Another  reason  to  reject  Israel  seems  to  be  a  practical  one.  Hamas  was  afraid  
of   repeating   Fatah’s   fate   since   it   had   been   trapped   at   the   negotiation   table  
since  1993  at   the  expense  of   the   fundamental  principles  and  goals,  such  as  
Palestinian  independence  and  the  right  of  return.  Muhammad  Nazzal  foresaw  
that  Israel  and  the  United  States  would  manipulate  the  issue  of  recognition  as  
an   initial   step   to   asking   for   more   concessions   of   Hamas   as   they   had   with  
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Yasser  Arafat  and  Fatah.563  From  Hamas’  perspective,  this  form  of  negotiation  
with  Israel  was  problematic  and  had  proved  to  be  a  failure.  Israel  has  no  real  
intention  of  compromising  with  Palestinians,  therefore,  negotiation  with  Israel  
at  this  moment  could  not  be  of  benefit  to  Palestinians  since  their  rights  would  
not  be  restored.    
In  government,  Hamas  strove  to  strike  a  balance  between  governance  
and   resistance   and   it   was   proud   and   confident   that   it   would   run   the  
government  well  in  accordance  with  its  resistance  project  but  the  attempt  did  
not   reach   its   ideal   expectation.   On   the   contrary,   its   resistance   project   was  
questionable  during  period.  Firstly,  the  resistance  project  was  challenged  from  
within.   After   the   take-­over   of   Gaza   in   June   2007,   Ghazi   Hamad,   a   former  
political  advisor   to  Prime  Minister   Ismail  Haniyeh,  stated   that  Hamas  did  not  
provide,  ‘a  clear  strategic  vision’  since  their  slogan,  ‘resistance  is  its  strategy’  
was  empty.564  People   in  Gaza  also  had  mixed  feelings  about   the  Hamas-­led  
government.  Most  people  did  not  want  Hamas  to  recognize  Israel  while  they  
worried  that  the  international  sanctions  made  their  life  unbearable.565    
Secondly,  from  the  regional  perspective,  the  resistance  project  did  not  
resonate  with  Arab  and  Muslim  countries  either.  Although  Iran  and  Syria  stood  
behind   Hamas,   the   tactic   of   seeking   solidarity   with   Islamic   ummah   was  
unsuccessful  due  to  the  role  of  the  United  States  in  the  Middle  East.  The  U.S  
government   wielded   political   and   economic   influences   to   prevent   Arab  
countries   from   assisting   a   Hamas-­led   Palestinian   government.   As   far   as  
finance   was   concerned,   Arab   banks   froze   assets   related   to   the   PA  
government.566  Politically,   the   U.S   encouraged   Arab   countries   to   normalize  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
563  The   Palestinian   Information   Center,   ‘Interview   with   Muhammad   Nazzal,’   (25   September  
2006).  <http://tinyurl.com/m4tw2an>  (accessed  on  14  July  2014).  
564  Quoted   from   Paola   Caridi,   Andrea   Teti   (transl),  Hamas   from   resistance   to   government,  
op.cit,  p.263.  
565  Beverley   Milton-­Edward   &   Farrell   Stephen,  Hamas:   The   Islamic   Resistance   Movement,  
op.cit.,  pp.275-­276.  
566  For  example,  Arab  banks  in  Jordan  froze  the  PA’s  Single  Treasury  Account.  It  is  estimated  
that  $347  millions  were   frozen  by  Arab  banks.  See  International  Crisis  Group,   ‘Palestinians,  
Israel   and   the   Quartet:   Pulling   back   from   the   brink,’  Middle   East   Report   No.54,   (13   June  
2006),  pp.23-­24.        
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with   Israel.  Hamas  was  disappointed   in   the  Arab  countries’  weakness  which  
resulted  in  their  inability  to  support  the  Palestinian  cause.567  
Finally  Hamas’  attempt  to  promote  the  resistance  project  as  a  national  
agenda  led  to  the   inevitable  division  with  Fatah.   In  Hamas’  original  plan,   the  
resistance  work  also  needed  Fatah’s   cooperation  but  Hamas  was  unable   to  
provide   a   feasible   way   of   assuring   Palestinian   unity.568  Hamas   was   hoping  
that  the  purpose  of  the  national  unity  government  was  to  lift   the  international  
sanctions  but  this  was  not  achieved.  The  real  problem  was  that  Hamas  did  not  
know   how   to   persuade   Fatah   that   resistance  was   the   only   effective  way   to  
relieve  the  Palestinians’  pain.  To  make  matters  worse,  Hamas  was  accused  of  
creating  chaos  and  disorder  in  Gaza  for  the  sake  of  its  interest  but  it  is  worth  
noting   that  social  disorder  and  clashes  had  appeared  before  Hamas   formed  
the   tenth   Palestinian   government.  569  It   was   necessary   for   the   Hamas   led  
government   to  maintain   social   order;;   but   the  creation  of   the  executive   force  
did  not  achieve  this.    
In  fact,  the  decision  to  create  the  executive  force  infuriated  Fatah.  The  
breakdown  of  the  national  unity  government  in  June  2007  revolved  around  the  
controversial   security   issue.   The   executive   force   was   blamed   for   attacking  
other  security  forces  under  the  domination  of  President  Abbas  570  while  some  
unaffiliated  observers  asserted  that  this  executive  force  had,  to  some  degree,  
built  up  a  reputation  for  protecting  civilians  and  maintaining  order.571  But   it   is  
irrefutable   that   the   fighting   between   Hamas   and   Fatah   in   June   clearly  
contradicted   Hamas’   principle   that,   ‘Palestinian   blood   is   taboo   within  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
567  The  Palestinian  Information  Center,  ‘Interview  with  Dr.  Mousa  Abu  Marzuq,’  (20  May  2007).  
<http://www.palinfo.com/site/pic/newsdetails.aspx?itemid=93423>   (accessed   on   14   July  
2014).    
568  For   example,   Hamas   considered   the   reform   of   the   PLO   was   an   essential   step   for   the  
national  unity,  but  this  issue  only  existed  on  the  level  of  dialogue,  with  no  sign  of  any  concrete  
action.  The  Palestinian  Information  Center,   ‘Interview  with  Dr.  Mousa  Abu  Marzuq,’  (20  May  
2007).   <http://www.palinfo.com/site/pic/newsdetails.aspx?itemid=93423>   (accessed   on   14  
July  2014).  
569  International  Crisis  Group,  ‘After  Mecca:  Engaging  Hamas,’op.cit.,  pp.9-­10.  
570  Ibid.,  p.13.  
571  International  Crisis  Group,  ‘After  Mecca:  Engaging  Hamas,’  op.cit.,  p.11-­12.  And  Usama  
Amer,‘Palestinian  Executive  Force  and  the  current  debate,’  The  Palestinian  Information  
Center,  (13  January  2007).  <http://www.palinfo.com/site/pic/newsdetails.aspx?itemid=89755>  
(accessed  on  14  July  2014).    
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Palestinian   society’ 572   in   spite   of   the   fact   that   Hamas   leaders   had   an  
excuse.573  It   is  believed   that  Hamas’  political   leaders  had  no   idea  about   the  
pre-­emptive   strikes   made   by   its   military   wing.   Due   to   the   organizational  
structure   of   Hamas,   the   political   bureau   and   military   wing   were   sometimes  
inconsistent.  al-­Qassam  Brigade  has  not  always  abided  by  the  instructions  of  
political  leaders.  The  breakdown  of  the  ceasefire  in  August  2003  was  a  clear  
example  of  this.  In  addition,  this  conflict  did  not  reach  the  scale  of  the  civil  war  
in   Iraq  and   the  Lebanon.  Several   sources   indicated   that   confrontations   took  
place   only   between   Hamas’   military   wing   and   Fatah   forces   loyal   to  
Muhammad  Dahlan   in   acquiescence   to   the  United  States   and   Israel.  574  Not  
every  member   of   Fatah   joined   the   fighting   but   in   spite   of   this,   the   infighting  
tarnished  Hamas’  reputation  with  respect  to  its  resistance  project.    
Overall,  Hamas’  resistance  project  was  not  workable,  and  furthermore,  
Fatah  and  the  international  sanctions  imposed  during  the  period  had  thwarted  
it.  But  ironically  after  Fatah  no  longer  had  a  role  in  Gaza,  Hamas  gained  more  
space   to  elaborate  and  enforce   its   resistance  project.  This  project  seems   to  
work   and   to   stabilize   Gaza   even   under   the   international   sanctions   and   the  
Israeli  strikes.  In  the  following  three  sections,  the  way  that  Hamas  dominated  
Gaza,  reinforced  its  resistance  project  and  its  evaluation  of  the  events  will  be  
analyzed.  
2.  Governing  Gaza    
After  Hamas’  takeover  of  Gaza  as  a  result  of  infighting  between  Hamas  
and   Fatah   in   June   2007,  Gaza   and   the  West   Bank   turned   into   two   distinct  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
572   ‘Change   and   Reform   List:   Electoral   programme   for   the   elections   of   the   Palestinian  
Legislative  Council  2006,’  translation  from  Azzam  Tamimi,  Unwritten  Chapters,  Appendix  VI,  
p.295.  
573  Ahmad  Yusuf,  the  political  advisor  to  the  Prime  Minister  Haniyeh  stated  that  Hamas  did  not  
decide  to  take  over  Gaza.  It  started  to  strike  the  Fatah-­led  security  forces  because  there  was  
information   that   Fatah   was   prepared   to   do   something’.   Another   Hamas  member   Ismail   al-­
Ashqar   shared   the   same  view;;   however,   he   spoke   frankly   that  Hamas’s   take  over   of  Gaza  
‘was  not   its   choice  but   there  was  no  other   choice.’  Quoted   from   International  Crisis  Group,  
‘After  Gaza,’  op.cit,  p.13.  And  quoted  from  Beverley  Milton-­Edward  &  Farrell  Stephen,  Hamas:  
The  Islamic  Resistance  Movement,  op.cit.,  p.  289.  
574  Paola  Caridi,  Andrea  Teti  (transl.),  Hamas  from  resistance  to  government,  op.cit,  pp.255-­
257.   Azzam   Tamimi,   Hamas,   unwritten   chapter,   op.cit.,   p.264.   International   Crisis   Group,  
‘After   Gaza,’   op.cit,   p.14.   Beverley   Milton-­Edward   &   Farrell   Stephen,  Hamas:   The   Islamic  
Resistance  Movement,  op.cit.,  p.287.  
	   160	  
models.  Hamas’  prospects   for  promoting   its   resistance  project  as  a  national  
consensus   failed   in   the  West  Bank  when   the  PA  President  Mahmud  Abbas  
declared   a   state   of   emergency   and   dismissed   the   Prime   Minister   Ismail  
Haniyeh   by   appointing   Salam   Fayyad   as   head   of   an   emergency   cabinet  
without   PLC   endorsement.575  On   the   other   hand  Hamas   reshaped  Gaza   on  
the  basis  of   its   resistance  project  which  sustained  adverse  conditions  of   the  
intensification  of  the  blockade  and  Israeli  military  bombardment.  This  section  
analyzes  how  Hamas  institutionalized  its  resistance  project  in  Gaza  as  well  as  
the  reasons  why  this  project  seemed  to  work  from  June  2007  to  the  outbreak  
of  the  ‘Arab  Spring’  in  December  2010.  Before  this  analysis  we  shall  deal  with  
Hamas’  reflections  on  the  takeover  of  Gaza  and  the  development  of  the  West  
Bank.          
2.1  Hamas’  reflections  on  the  takeover  of  Gaza  
After  its  takeover  of  Gaza,  Hamas  faced  a  perilous  situation.  There  was  
no   optimistic   view   of   Hamas’   domination   of   Gaza   as   the   international  
sanctions   on   Gaza   intensified.576  In   addition,   Hamas’   organization   and   its  
people   in   the  West  Bank  encountered  comprehensive  repression  by   the  PA.  
There   was   no   place   for   Hamas   to   wield   its   considerable   political,   military,  
social   and  cultural   clout;;   and  because  of   the   takeover,   the  political   disputes  
and  stalemate  between  Hamas  and  Fatah  were  deepened.  There  seemed  to  
be   no   resolution   to   achieve   mutual   reconciliation   as   the   new   rounds   of  
negotiations   began   between   Israel   and   the   PA.   President   Abbas   who   was  
infuriated  by  the  unprecedented  takeover  thought  Hamas’  action  constituted  a  
coup  and  asked  it  to  apologize  for  what  it  had  done  during  the  infighting  and  
to  restore  the  status  quo.  However,  Hamas’  leadership  contended  that  it  was  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
575  International  Crisis  Group,  ‘Ruling  Palestine  II:  The  West  Bank  Model,’  Middle  East  Report,  
No.79  (17  July  2008),  p.1.  576	  International  Crisis  Group   indicates   that  apart   from   the   Israeli   closure  of  Gaza,   the  West  
Bank-­based   Palestinian   Authority   also   attempted   to   undermine   Hamas’   ruling   in   Gaza.  
International   Crisis   Group,   ‘Ruling   Palestine   I:   Gaza   under   Hamas,’   Middle   East   Report,  
No.73  (19  March  2008),  pp.1-­15.    
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not   a   coup   against   Abbas   but   an   anti-­coup   against   the   people   who   had  
terrorized  Gaza  in  the  name  of  Fatah.577  
On  reflection,  the  takeover  could  be  understood  as  the  preservation  of  
the  resistance  project.  Hamas’  leaders  detailed  the  reasons  why  it  reluctantly  
took  over  Gaza  in  June  2007  and  justified  the  action.  They  argued  that  some  
Palestinians  who  were  enraged  by  Hamas’  electoral  election  had  planned  to  
topple   the   Hamas-­led   government   from   the   outset.   Hamas’   MPs   and  
supporters   were   intimidated   and   targeted   by   those   people   while   Hamas  
demonstrated   great   flexibility   and   compromise   in   spite   of   the   skirmishes.578  
Sami  Khater  stressed  that  Hamas  was  willing  to  cooperate  with  other  political  
partners  for  the  sake  of  national  unity  against  Israeli  occupation.  Nevertheless,  
the   people   who   were   afraid   of   national   unity   at   the   expense   of   their   own  
interests  grabbed  the  interval  of  the  Mecca  agreement  in  order  to  prepare  to  
spoil   it.  579  As   for   people   who  wanted   to   topple   the  Hamas-­led   government,  
Khater   clearly   pointed   out   that   Muhammad   Dahlan   and   Abu   Shabak   were  
responsible  for  this  coup.  In  particular,  Abu  Shabak  without  authorization  from  
the  Interior  Minister  and  President  Abbas,  deployed  his  security  force  in  Gaza  
by   targeting  Hamas’   fighters,  civilians,  PA  and  various   institutions  during   the  
dialogue   between   Ismail   Haniyeh   and  Mahmud  Abbas.   To   stop   this   vicious  
circle,  Hamas  had  no  choice  but  to  fight  back  to  save  people  from  danger  and  
restore   order   in   Gaza. 580   Despite   this   apology,   Hamas   members   were  
accused  of   using  excessive   force  against   opponents  during   the   infighting.   It  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
577  Azzam  Tamimi,  Hamas,  unwritten  chapter,  op.cit.,  p.264.  Palestine  Information  Center,  
‘Interview  with  Sami  Khater,’  (24  June  2007).  
<http://www.palinfo.com/site/pic/newsdetails.aspx?itemid=93424>  (accessed  on  10  
September  2014).  
578  The  Palestine  Information  Center,  ‘Interview  with  Hamas  leader  Muhammad  Nasr,’  (14  
July  2007).  <http://www.palinfo.com/site/pic/newsdetails.aspx?itemid=93460>  (accessed  on  
10  September  2014).  Palestine  Information  Center,  ‘Interview  with  Abu  Marzuq  about  the  
Palestinian  development  and  the  conference  in  Autumn,’  (29  October  2007).  
<http://www.palinfo.com/site/pic/newsdetails.aspx?itemid=93428>  (accessed  on  10  
September  2014).  
579  The  Palestine  Information  Center,  ‘Interview  with  Sami  Khater,’  (24  June  2007).  
<http://www.palinfo.com/site/pic/newsdetails.aspx?itemid=93424>  (accessed  on  10  
September  2014).    
580  Ibid.  
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was   reported   that   some   Fatah   members   were   executed   and   mutilated.581  
Hamas  leaders  apologized  for  this  abuse  and  insisted  that  this  behaviour  was  
exceptional  and  perpetrated  by  individuals  who  did  not  share  Hamas’  values  
and  ethics.582    
From  Hamas’  perception,   the  anti-­coup  campaign  was   in   response   to  
the   American-­Zionist   plot. 583   Khater   indicated   that   Muhammad   Dahlan  
masterminded   the   coup   in   coordination   with   the   foreign   forces   in   order   to  
remove  Hamas   from  government.584  Furthermore   the  blockade  of  Gaza  and  
the  boycott  of   the  Hamas-­led  government  could  be  seen  as  an  extension  of  
an  American-­Zionist   conspiracy585  designed   to  pressurize  Hamas   into  giving  
up  the  principle  of  resistance  and  military  operations.  Hamas  blamed  the  U.S  
General   Keith  Dayton   for   pushing   this   coup.   Dayton  was   appointed   as  U.S  
security   coordinator   for   the   Palestinians   in   November   2005.   According   to  
Palestine   Papers   leaked   by   Al-­Jazeera,586  Dayton   considered   Hamas’   new  
government  to  be  a  threat  to  the  regional  stability;;  therefore  on  2  April  2007,  
Dayton  chaired  a  meeting  with  delegations  from  Israel,  Palestine  and  Egypt  to  
discuss   the   possibility   of   weakening   Hamas’   military   capacity   in   Gaza. 587  
Dayton’s   aim   was   to   restructure   Palestinian   security   apparatus   and  
marginalize  Hamas.  During  the  period  of  the  Hamas-­led  government  and  later,  
the   national   unity   government,   Dayton   had   intensive   meetings   with   Dahlan  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
581   Milton-­Edward   &   Farrell   Stephen,   Hamas:   The   Islamic   Resistance   Movement,   op.cit.,  
p.290.  
582   The   Palestine   Information   Center,   ‘Interview   with   Sami   Khater,’   (24   June   2007).  




585  Ibid.  586	  The  Palestine  Papers  leaked  by  Al-­Jazeera  is  a  collection  of  confidential  documents  
related  to  the  Israeli-­Palestinian  negotiations.  The  Palestine  Papers  includes  thousands  of  
pages  of  diplomatic  documents  from  1999  to  2010.  For  the  details  of  the  Palestine  Papers,  
please  refer  to  Al  Jazeera,  <http://www.aljazeera.com/palestinepapers/>  (accessed  on  1  
September  2015).  587	  ‘Meeting  Minutes:  2nd  Quadrilateral  security  meeting,’  Palestine  Papers  (2  April  2007).  
<http://transparency.aljazeera.net/en/projects/thepalestinepapers/20121822533171669.htm>  
(accessed  on  1  September  2015).  
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who   seemed   to   be   the   appropriate   person   to   carry   out   this   mission. 588  
Ostensibly  this  plan  was  contrary  to  Hamas’  resistance  project.  From  Hamas’  
perspective   the   reform   of   the   Palestinian   security   apparatus   was   meant   to  
resist   Israel   while   Dayton’s   plan   was   just   the   opposite,   that   is,   to   eliminate  
Hamas  from  the  security  apparatus.  This  was  unacceptable  as  it  jeopardized  
Hamas’  resistance  project.  In  this  context,  it  was  only  a  matter  of  time  before  
there  was  a  showdown  between  Hamas  and  Fatah.    
2.2  The  setback  to  the  resistance  project  in  the  West  Bank  
Regarding  the  takeover  of  Gaza,  Hamas  leaders  felt  confident  that  this  
political   dispute   was   temporary   and   that   normalcy   would   return   through  
dialogue  with  Fatah.  Hamas  adopted  a  cautious  approach  to  avoid  provoking  
Abbas   and   Fatah.   On   the   one   hand   Hamas   honoured   President   Abbas’s  
legitimacy   and   asked   him   to   return   a   national   dialogue   on   the   basis   of   the  
Cairo  Agreement  in  2005,  the  National  conciliation  document  in  2006  and  the  
Mecca   agreement   in   2007.589  On   the   other   hand,   Hamas   made   diplomatic  
efforts   by   requesting   Arab   states   such   as   Egypt,   Saudi   Arabia,   Qatar   and  
Syria  to  mediate  disputes  between  Hamas  and  Fatah.590    
Hamas  was  eager  to  seek  reconciliation  with  Fatah  due  to  the  fact  that  
national  unity  is  an  indispensable  step  toward  national  liberation.  However,  it  
seemed  that  Abbas  had  no  interest  in  listening  to  what  Hamas  had  to  say.  For  
Abbas,  the  takeover  of  Gaza  symbolized  the  failure  of  co-­option.  When  Abbas  
was   elected   in   2005,   he   expected   that   co-­option   would   lead   to   Hamas’  
disarmament   in   accordance  with   the  Oslo   framework  and   the  Road  Map.591  
But   the   unanticipated   electoral   outcome   disrupted   his   plan.   There   was   no  
indication   that   Hamas   was   committed   to   disarmament.   On   the   contrary,  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
588  David  Rose,  ‘The  Gaza  Bombshell,’  Vanity  Fair  (April  2008).  
<http://www.vanityfair.com/politics/features/2008/04/gaza200804>  (accessed  on  13  
September  2014).  
589  The   Palestine   Information   Center,   ‘Interview   with   Hamas   leader   Muhammad   Nasr,’   (14  
July   2007).   <http://www.palinfo.com/site/pic/newsdetails.aspx?itemid=93460>   (accessed   on  
13  September  2014).    
590   The   Palestine   Information   Center,   ‘Interview   with   Sami   Khater,’   (24   June   2007).  
<http://www.palinfo.com/site/pic/newsdetails.aspx?itemid=93424>   (accessed   on   13  
September  2014).  
591  Alvaro   de   Soto,   ‘End   of   Mission   Report,’   (May   2007).   <http://image.guardian.co.uk/sys-­
files/Guardian/documents/2007/06/12/DeSotoReport.pdf>  (accessed  on  13  September  2014).    
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boosted   by   its   electoral   victory,   Hamas   argued   that   the   majority   of  
Palestinians  chose  its  resistance  project  rather  than  negotiation,  as  proposed  
by   Fatah.   This   is   not   to   say   that  Hamas   attempted   to   dominate  Palestinian  
politics  according  to  its  political  vision  or  excluded  Fatah  and  other  Palestinian  
factions.   Although   the   Hamas-­led   government   created   the   executive   force,  
which  was  considered  to  be  a  most  controversial  policy,  dialogue  was  always  
necessary   for   Hamas   in   its   efforts   to   convince   other   Palestinian   factions   to  
accept   its   resistance  project  as  a  national  agenda.  The  National  conciliation  
and   the  Mecca  agreement   could   be   considered   to   be  a   compromise   in   that  
Hamas  was  willing  to  share  power  with  Fatah  in  order  to  lift   the  international  
blockade   as   well   as   reach   a   national   consensus.   However   its   takeover   of  
Gaza  put  Hamas  in  an  awkward  position,  and  strengthened  the  image  that  it  
was  more  eager  to  monopolize  politics  than  to  serve  resistance.        
The   dismissal   of   the   national   unity   government   seemed   to   give  
President  Abbas  a   free  hand   to  practice  his  original  plan   in   the  West  Bank.  
Salam  Fayyad  was  appointed  as  Prime  Minister   in  charge  of  security  reform  
and  economic  development  and  Abbas  himself  was  to  engage  in  negotiations  
with  Israel.  The  situation  in  the  West  Bank  looked  stable  and  on  the  right  track.  
As   far  as  Hamas  was  concerned   it  was  no  such   thing.  Worst  of   all,  Hamas  
members   and   sympathizers   were   arrested   and   also   a   large   number   of   its  
affiliated   civil   institutions   were   banned   or  monitored   in   the  West   Bank.   The  
reconciliation  stalled  as  new  rounds  of  peace  talks  between  Israel  and  the  PA  
were   launched.   For   Hamas,   this   was   an   unprecedented   setback   to   its  
resistance  project.  The  next  section  will  analyze  ways  in  which  Hamas  viewed  
Abbas  and  the  Fayyad-­led  government  as  obstacles   to   its   resistance  project  
in  respect  of  security  issues  and  negotiation.  
2.2.1  Security  reform  
The  security  situation  in  the  West  Bank  had  improved  under  the  Salam  
Fayyad-­led   government   since   the   restoration   of   law   and   order   was   Salam  
Fayyad’s  first  concern.  Within  a  short  time,  militia  activity  declined  and  public  
order   was   rebuilt.   Many   were   glad   to   see   this   change,   including   Hamas  
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members. 592   With   U.S.   financial   and   technical   assistance,   Fayyad  
implemented   a   security   reform,   aiming   to   transform   security   into   a  
professional,   de-­factionalized   and   national   force.593  Hamas  was   not   pleased  
with   this,  particularly   regarding   the  crackdown  on  Hamas   in   the  West  Bank;;  
and   it  considered   this   to  be  a  heavy  blow   to   its   resistance  project.   It  can  be  
said  that  this  crackdown  was  far-­reaching.  Hamas’  activities  were  prohibited.  
Fatah  and  the  PA  security  force  dismantled  Hamas’  armed  cells  and  arrested  
affiliated  members.594  It   is   estimated   that   from   14th   June   to   30th   September  
2007,  around  1,500  Hamas  members  and  sympathizers  were  under  arrest.595  
The   Human   Rights   group   said   that   many   arrests   were   in   violation   of  
Palestinian  basic  law  and  without  a  court  order.  There  were  also  accounts  of  
torture  and  ill-­treatment  of  these  suspects.596  Furthermore,  this  crackdown  not  
only  targeted  Hamas  but  also  aimed  at  civil  institutions  that  may  have  direct  or  
indirect  connection  with  Hamas.  In  terms  of  enforcing  a  new  law,  around  150  
people   in   charge   of   NGOs   and   charities   were   dismissed   by   the   interior  
minister.597  Mosques   and   other   religious   organizations   were   also   regulated.  
Preachers   and   staff   had   to   have   licenses   from   the   PA   and   their   speech   in  
Friday  sermons  had  to  be  checked.598        
This  crackdown  reminded  Hamas  of  a  similar  painful  experience  during  
the  Oslo  Process.  In  mid-­1990s  Hamas’  members  were  imprisoned  and  their  
weapons   collected   by   the  PA.  However,   the   Islamic   civil   institutions   did   not  
face   this   type   of   clampdown.   This   time,   unlike   during   the   Oslo   period,   the  
crackdown   on   Hamas   in   the   West   Bank   was   comprehensive   and  
unprecedented.  Hamas  leaders  were  frustrated  with  their  severe  suppression  
in   the  West   Bank.   Some   leaders  were   angry   and   said   that   the   people  who  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
592   International   Crisis   Group,   ‘Squaring   the   circle:   Palestinian   Security   Reform   under  
occupation,’  Middle  East  Report,  No.  98  (7  September  2010),  p.8.  
593  Ibid.,  p.3.  
594  Ibid.,  p.6.  
595  International  Crisis  Group,  ‘Ruling  Palestine  II:  The  West  Bank  model,’op.cit.,  p.2.  
596   International   Crisis   Group,   ‘Squaring   the   circle:   Palestinian   Security   Reform   under  
occupation,’  op.cit.,  p.30.  
597  International  Crisis  Group,  ‘Ruling  Palestine  II:  The  West  Bank  model,’  op.cit.,  p.25.  
598   International   Crisis   Group,   ‘Squaring   the   circle:   Palestinian   Security   Reform   under  
occupation,’  op.cit,  pp.29-­30.  
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planned   a   coup   in  Gaza   had  moved   to   the  West   Bank,   killing   their   people,  
storming  their  houses  and  burning  institutions  and  charities  to  indicate  war  on  
Hamas.599  Other  leaders  argued  that  this  crackdown  on  Hamas  indicated  that  
the  Fayyad-­led  government  dictated  by  Zionist-­American  strategy  criminalized  
the  armed  resistance  and  dismantled  the  structure  of  resistance.  600    
Abu   Marzuq,   the   deputy   of   Hamas’   political   bureau,   observed   this  
excessive   crackdown   on   Hamas   from   two   angles.   The   crackdown   was   in  
accordance  with  the  first  stage  of  the  Road  Map,  ‘ending  terror  and  violence,  
normalizing   Palestinian   life,’   in   order   to   start   negotiation   with   Israel.601  By  
getting  rid  of  the  burden  of  Hamas,  the  PA  could  freely  engage  with  Israel  on  
negotiation  and  security  cooperation.  Secondly,  the  closure  of  civil  institutions  
that   used   to   play   an   important   role   in   sustaining   Israeli   aggression   led   to  
another  type  of  siege  for  Palestinians  in  the  West  Bank.  People  did  not  enjoy  
real   freedom  and  could  not  seek  moral  and  material  support   from  those  civil  
institutions. 602   It   is   noted   that   even   though   Hamas   was   annoyed   at   the  
situation   in   the   West   Bank,   fighting   with   the   PA   was   not   an   option   for  
Hamas. 603   Conversely,   Hamas’   leaders   felt   confident   that   this   crackdown  
would   not   crush   Hamas   but   would   strengthen   its   popularity   and   its  
commitment  to  resistance.604      
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
599   The   Palestine   Information   Center,   ‘Interview   with   Sami   Khater,’   (24   June   2007).  
<http://www.palinfo.com/site/pic/newsdetails.aspx?itemid=93424>   (accessed   on   15  
September  2014).  
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Palestine,’  (2  September  2007).  
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restraining  ourselves  from  a  position  of  strength,  not  weakness,  so  as  to  avoid  a  conflict  with  
the   PA   that   would   create   chaos   and   weaken   Hamas   as   a   movement’.   Quoted   from  
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2.2.2  Negotiation  
Apart   from   the   crackdown   on   Hamas   in   the   West   Bank,   President  
Abbas  was  also  eager  to  carry  out  his  initial  negotiation  approach  encouraged  
by  the  U.S  administration.  The  negotiations  between  Israel  and  the  PA  started  
again  in  the  shape  of  the  Annapolis  Conference  held  on  27th  November  with  
an   attendance   of   representatives   from   49   countries   and   international  
organizations. 605   During   this   conference,   President   Abbas   and   the   Israeli  
Prime  Minister  Ehud  Olmert  signed  a  ‘Joint  Understanding’  that  specified  that  
by  the  end  of  2008  Israel  and  Palestine  would  conclude  a  peace  treaty  to  end  
the   mutual   hostility   on   a   basis   of   a   two-­state   solution. 606   Prior   to   this  
conference,  Abbas  had  intensive  meetings  with  Olmert  to  discuss  final  status  
issues   such   as   Jerusalem,   borders,   settlements,   refugees,   security   and  
water.607  In   view   of   this   negotiation   process,   Hamas   was   disappointed   with  
Abbas’s  pursuit  of  negotiations  with  Israel,  which  contradicted  the  principle  of  
national   consensus.   Khalid   Mishal   said,   ‘No   one   is   authorized   to   offer   any  
concessions  or  downside  the  Palestinian  national  stand  that  was  agreed  upon  
by   Hamas   and   Fatah   in   2006.   The   message   is   clear…   in   the   light   of   the  
Palestinian   division,   the   absence   of   national   accord   and   the   role   of   the  
legitimate   Palestinian   institutions,   no   one   in   the   Palestinian   arena   is  
authorized  to  run  negotiations  of  this  type.’608  
There   was   a   sense   of   anxiety   among   Hamas   leaders   during   the  
resumption  of  the  negotiations  between  Israel  and  the  PA.  They  were  worried  
that   if   these   negotiations   were   ongoing,   there   would   be   negative  
consequences   for   the  Palestinian   national   cause.  Usama  Hamdan   saw   that  
the   rapprochement  between   Israel   and   the  PA  would  not   help   reconciliation  	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between  Hamas  and  Fatah  but  it  would  be  at  the  expense  of  the  Palestinian  
national  project,   including  the   liberation  of  Palestine,   the  restoration  of   rights  
and   the   establishment   of   the   state.   Furthermore,   he   was   afraid   that   Israel  
would  ask  more  concessions  of  Abbas.  In  that  case,  Palestinians  would  face  a  
disaster  worse  than  that  after  the  Oslo  Peace  Process.609    
In   short,   the   crackdown   on   Hamas   in   the   West   Bank   and   the  
resumption  of  negotiation  between  Fatah  and  Israel  was  a  big  blow  to  Hamas.  
Meanwhile   many   foresaw   that   Hamas   could   not   tolerate   the   unbearable  
circumstances   in   Gaza   with   the   intensified   closures   and   Israeli   strikes.  
However,   quite   the   opposite   occurred;;   to   a   large   extent,   in   reality   Hamas  
stabilized  Gaza  and  incrementally  institutionalized  the  resistance  project  that  it  
had  not  been  able  to  materialize  during  the  period  between  2006  and  2007.    
2.3  Towards  an  institutionalized  resistance  project  in  Gaza  
Since   Hamas’   takeover   of   Gaza,   the   U.S,   Israel,   the   PA   and   Egypt  
attempted  to  undermine  Hamas’  rule  with  the  strategy  of  isolation.  They  were  
hoping   that   people   in   Gaza   who   had   suffered   and   were   frustrated   by   the  
economic  blockade  would  stand  up  against  Hamas.610  However,  this  scenario  
did  not  take  place  even  though  the  closures  and  the  Israeli  irregular  strikes  did  
deepen   their  hardship  and  cause  high  unemployment   rates   in  Gaza.  On   the  
contrary,  Hamas  had  shown   its   capacity   to   survive  and   to   institutionalize   its  
resistance  project,  which  seemed   to  stabilize  Gaza  as  a  quasi-­state,  a  quite  
different  model   in  comparison  to  the  PA  in  the  West  Bank.  To  a  large  extent  
the  institutionalization  of  the  resistance  project  was  precipitated  by  challenges  
from  outside  and  within;;  and  this  could  be  observed  from  the  security,  social,  
media,  economic  and  diplomatic  aspects.  
2.3.1  Security  and  social  aspects:  For  the  sake  of  stability  
Like   the  Abbas  and  Salam  Fayyad-­led  government   in   the  West  Bank,  
the  first  priority  for  the  Ismail  Haniyeh-­led  government  was  to  restore  law  and  	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order  after  the  takeover  of  Gaza.  al-­Qassam  Brigades  and  the  executive  force  
campaigned  against  militias  and  criminal  acts  such  as  drug-­dealing,   immoral  
activities   and   weapon-­smuggling.611  It   is   worth   noting   that   for   the   sake   of  
stability,  Hamas  started   to  collect  weapons   from   individuals  and  banned   the  
public  display  of  weapons.  One  Hamas  security  force  said,  ‘anyone  who  fires  
a   weapon   will   be   arrested,   and   his   weapon   removed.   We   will   impose   a  
solution  for  Gaza’s  chaos  by  force.  This  is  the  age  of  sovereignty  and  law.’  612  
Indeed,   in   a   short   period,   apart   from   sporadic   clashes  with   clans   or   radical  
Salafists,   the   crime   rate   in   Gaza   had   been   rapidly   reduced.   The   public  
welcomed  this   improved  security.613  It  could  be  argued  that   for   the  first   time,  
Hamas  was  free  to  manage  its  resistance  force  without  hindrance.614        
With   order   restored,  Hamas   became   involved  with   security   reform.  A  
renowned   scholar,   Sayigh   Yezid   commented   that   the   Gaza   security   forces  
imposed   by   Islamized   policy   had   undergone   a   considerable   evolution.615  To  
be  precise,  Hamas  indeed  enforced  its  Islamic  version  in  the  issue  of  security  
but   this   Islamized  policy  was   to   serve   its   resistance  project.  The  concept  of  
security  reform  basically  abided  by  its  electoral  programme  in  January  2006:  
‘correcting  and  rationalizing  the  role  of  the  security  agencies  in  protecting  the  
security   of   the   citizen,   ending   erroneous   and   arbitrary   practice’. 616   The  
‘Security   collaboration  with   the   occupation   is   a   crime   against   the   homeland  
and   against   religion;;   it   should   be   severely   punished’617  and   ‘protecting   the  
resistance  and  vitalizing  its  role  in  resisting  the  occupation  and  accomplishing  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
611  International  Crisis  Group,  ‘Inside  Gaza:  The  challenge  of  clans  and  families,’  op.cit.,  p.13.  
612  Qutoe  from  International  Crisis  Group,  ‘Inside  Gaza:  The  challenge  of  clans  and  families,’  
op.cit.,  p.15  
613  Ibid.,  p.20.  
614  The  Palestine  Information  Center,  ‘Interview  with  Usama  Hamdan  about  the  recent  
Palestine,’  (2  September  2007).  
<http://www.palinfo.com/site/pic/newsdetails.aspx?itemid=93488>  (accessed  on  17  
September  2014).  Palestine  Information  Center,  ‘Interview  with  Siyam,’  (26  November  2007).  
<http://www.palinfo.com/site/pic/newsdetails.aspx?itemid=93485>  (accessed  on  17  
September  2014).    
615  Sayigh   Yezid,   ‘We   serve   the   people:   Hamas   policing   in   Gaza,’  Crown   Paper   5   (Crown  
Center  for  Middle  East  Studies,  April  2011),  p.6  and  pp.90-­94.  
616   ‘Change   and   Reform   List:   Electoral   programme   for   the   elections   of   the   Palestinian  
Legislative   Council   2006,’   translated   by   Azzam   Tamimi,  Unwritten   Chapters,   Appendix   VI,  
p.295.  
617  Ibid.,  p.295.  
	   170	  
the  mission  of  liberation.’618  Based  on  this  principle,  this  security  reform  could  
be   attributed   to   two  main   characteristics.   Firstly,   unlike   the   PA   in   the  West  
Bank   that   only   possessed   partial   ownership   of   security,   operated   freely   in  
certain   cities   and   had   to   share   information   with   the   Israeli   force,619  Hamas  
enjoyed  a  great  autonomy  in  managing  and  constructing  its  forces  and  Hamas  
was   proud   of   this   achievement.   Even   under   limited   resources   and   closure,  
Hamas   was   still   able   to   implement   its   vision   with   levels   of   coordination,  
information   sharing   and   mutual   support.620   al-­Qassam   Brigades   had   been  
transformed   from  being  an  underground  group   to  a  uniformed  military   force.  
As  for  the  executive  force,  it  was  divided  into  three  branches:  the  civil  police,  
the  internal  security  force  and  the  national  security  force.621  Another  feature  of  
Hamas’  security  reform  was  its  Islamic  training,  that  is,  Hamas  instilled  Islamic  
values  into  its  security  forces.  For  example,  members  of  security  forces  were  
requested  to  memorize  the  Qur’an,  learn  Islamic  history,  practice  daily  prayers  
and  attend  Islamic  scholars’  lectures.  Given  these  Islamic  values,  the  security  
forces  had  molded  into  a  cohesive  unity.622    
Obviously,   Hamas’   security   reforms   were   not   without   obstacles   and  
challenges.  The  policy  also  incurred  criticisms  and  clashes  in  Gaza  and  from  
outside.  Clans  and  Salafists  were  both  major  challenges   that  Hamas  had   to  
deal   with.   Before   the   PLC   election   in   2006,   clans   in   Gaza   had   common  
interests   with   Hamas.   Both   rejected   the  monopoly   of   the   PA   on   the   use   of  
force  as  well  as   the  collection  of  weapons623  while  after  Hamas’   takeover  of  
Gaza   and   the   enforced   security   reforms,   the   tensions   between  Hamas   and  
some   of   the   large   clans   emerged.   In   early   August   2008,   in   response   to   a  
bomb   explosion   the   week   before,   which   had   led   to   the   deaths   of   five   of  
Hamas’  military   leaders,   Hamas   launched   a  massive   campaign   against   the  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
618  Ibid.,  p.295.  
619  Some  Palestinian  security  officer   in  the  West  Bank  confessed  that  a  security  cooperation  
with  Israel  was  the  asymmetric  relationship  and  furthered  the  image  of  a  ‘form  of  collaboration.  
See   International   Crisis   Group,   ‘Squaring   the   circle:   Palestinian   Security   Reform   under  
occupation,’  op.  cit.,  p.23.  
620  Sayigh  Yezid,  ‘Hamas  rule  in  Gaza:  Three  years  on,’  op.cit.,  p.2.    
621  International  Crisis  Group,  ‘Ruling  Palestine  I:  Gaza  under  Hamas,‘  op.cit.,  pp.6-­9.  
622  Sayigh  Yezid,  ‘We  serve  the  people:  Hamas  policing  in  Gaza,’  op.cit.,  p.91.  
623  International  Crisis  Group,  ‘Inside  Gaza:  The  challenge  of  clans  and  families,’op.cit.,  p.13.  
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Hillis   family  which  was  affiliated  with  Fatah.  One  Hamas   leader  claimed   that  
this  operation  was  to  put  an  end  to  the  family  rule.  Twelve  of  the  Hills  family,  
and  two  members  of  al-­Qassam  Brigades  were  killed  and  over  one  hundred  
people  were  wounded  in  this  incident.624    
As   for   radical  Salafists   in  Gaza,  Hamas  had  an   intensive   fight  with  a  
Salafist  group,  ‘Jund  Ansar  Allah’  on  11th  August  2009,  ending  in  the  death  of  
twenty-­eight  and  more  than  one  hundred  injured  when  the  group  declared  an  
Islamic   Emirate   in   Palestine   and   defiantly   rejected   Hamas’   order   of  
surrendering   guns.625  In   general,  most  Salafists   in  Gaza  were   apolitical   and  
undertook  missionary  work.626  The  emergence  of   the   radical  Salafists  with  a  
revolutionary   vision   was   the   result   of   their   disillusion   with   Hamas.   Some  
individuals  were  defectors  from  al-­Qassam.  They  condemned  Hamas  for  their  
participation   in   the  PLC  election   in  2006,   the   failure   to  apply  sharia   in  Gaza  
and   a   unilateral   ceasefire   with   Israel. 627   Regarding   this   incident,   Ismail  
Haniyeh’s  legal  advisor  Mazen  Haniyeh  argued  that  this  group  was  a  form  of  
extremism,  which  became  a  phenomenon   in   this   region  and  was  a   threat   to  
the   Islamic  ummah.   He   said   this   kind   of   ignorant   extremist   who  was   full   of  
hatred   misunderstood   and  misused   sharia   by   blowing   up   the   Internet   Café  
and  targeting  a  wedding  party.628  He  compared  this  group  to  the  Khawarij  who  
assassinated   Caliph   Ali   in   early   Islamic   history   and   stressed   that   only  
moderation,   the   principle   of   Islam,   was   the   only   way   to   treat   this   type   of  
extremism.629  
Ostensibly,   Hamas’   urgent   concern   was   the   stability   of   social   order  
after  the  takeover  of  Gaza  but  its  way  of  governing  Gaza  was  described  as  an  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
624  International  Crisis  Group,  ‘Round  Two  in  Gaza,’  Middle  East  Briefing,  op.cit.,  p.2.    
625  International  Crisis  Group,  ‘Radical  Islam  in  Gaza,’  Middle  East  Report,  No.104  (29  March,  
2011),  pp.12-­13.    
626  Khaled  Hroub,  ‘Salafi  formations  in  Palestine:  The  Limits  of  a  de-­Palestinianized  Milieu,’  in  
Meijer  Roel   (ed.),  Global  Salafism:   Islam’s  New  Religious  Movement   (New  York:  Columbia  
University  Press,  2009),  pp.227-­232.    
627  International  Crisis  Group,  ‘Radical  Islam  in  Gaza,’  Middle  East  Report,  op.cit,  p.19.  
628  The  Palestine  Information  Center,’  Dr.  Haniyeh:  Extremism  factor  is  the  internal  weakness,  
which   is   the  most   destructive   threat   to   the   nation   than   external   factors,’   (25  August   2009).  
<http://www.palinfo.com/site/pic/newsdetails.aspx?itemid=70418>   (accessed   on   18  
September  2014).    
629  Ibid.  
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authoritarian  rule.630  This  form  of  the  authoritarian  rule  could  be  characterized  
as  a  crisis  management  of  the  public  services  and  consolidation  of  its  political  
power   in   Gaza.   Regarding   the   crisis   management,   after   the   takeover,   the  
division   between   Hamas   and   Fatah   also   extended   to   the   public   sectors   in  
Gaza.   Many   staff   from   the   educational,   health   and   judicial   sectors   who  
received   orders   from   the   PA   in   Ramallah   launched   prolonged   strikes   and  
stayed  at  home  in  protest  against  Hamas’  takeover  of  Gaza.631  To  prevent  the  
public   services   from  collapsing,  Hamas   took  a   reactive  measure   in   terms  of  
hiring   new   staff   loyal   to  Hamas.   In   this  way,   the   education,   health,   finance,  
water   and   judicial   aspects  were   under  Hamas’   dominance.632  No  group  and  
factions  had  the  ability  to  challenge  Hamas.    
Regarding   the  consolidation  of   its  political  power,  Hamas   faced  many  
criticisms   from  within  and  outside  of  Gaza.   It  seemed   that  personal   freedom  
was  restricted.  Civil  police  patrolling  public  places  such  as  beaches  and  cafes  
cautioned   against   the   mixing   of   males   and   females   and   smoking. 633  
Regarding   this   trend,   Mahmud   al-­Zahar   had   an   explanation.   He   said   that  
freedom,  based  on  lies,  misinformation  and  fabrication  was  not  allowed.  As  for  
the  patrol  on  the  beaches,  he  argued  that   it  was  a  mechanism  for  protection  
from   thieves   and   transgressors.634  Another   criticism   of   Hamas’   authoritarian  
rule  was  its  violation  of  human  rights.  Some  Fatah  members  were  arrested  in  
Gaza.   Humanitarian   organizations   documented   many   violations   of   human  
rights   and   abuses   by   the   Hamas   police. 635   Regarding   this   dispute,   Abu  
Marzuq   provided   a   different   account.   He   argued   that   Fatah   enjoyed   full  
freedom  in  Gaza  unlike  Hamas’  situation  of  repression  in  the  West  Bank.  The  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
630  Sayigh  Yezid,  ‘Hamas  rule  in  Gaza:  Three  years  on,’  op.cit.,  p.3.  
631   Are   Hovdenak,   ‘Hamas   in   Gaza   preparing   for   long-­term   control,’   PRIO   Policy   Brief  
(November  2011),  pp.1-­3.  
632  International  Crisis  Group,  ‘Round  Two  in  Gaza,’  Middle  East  Briefing,  op.cit.,  pp.8-­11.  
633  Nicolas  Pelham,   ‘Ideology  and  practice:  The   legal   system   in  Gaza  under  Hamas,’   (June  
2010).  
<https://www.academia.edu/2984906/Ideology_and_Practice_The_Legal_System_in_Gaza_u
nder_Hamas>  (accessed  on  18  September  2014).    
634  The  Palestine  Information  Center,  ‘Interview  with  Dr.  Mahmud  al-­Zahar  in  Al-­Jazeera  Talk,’  
(11  June  2007).  <http://tinyurl.com/q4hf98b>  (accessed  on  17  September  2014).    
635   Palestinian   Centre   for   Human   Rights,   ‘Annual   Report   2008,’  
<http://www.pchrgaza.org/files/Reports/English/pdf_annual/annual2008-­E.pdf   >   (accessd   on  
6  November  2014).  
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arrest  and  detention  of  people  with  an  affinity  to  Fatah  in  Gaza  was  because  
of  their  criminal  acts  rather  than  their  political  affiliations.636        
The   other   dispute   regarding   Hamas’   authoritarian   rule   was   whether  
Hamas  imposed  its  vision  of  Islamization  in  Gaza,  that  is,  the  implementation  
of  sharia  or  the  creation  of  ‘Talibanization’  in  Gaza  away  from  the  domination  
of  the  PA  in  Ramallah;;  also  this  Islamization  was  considered  to  be  the  major  
cause  of   the  violation  of  human  rights  and  a   form  of  oppression.  637  al-­Zahar  
did  not  agree  with  the  descriptions  of,  ‘Islamization’  or  ‘Islamic  emirate’  as  he  
stated  that,   ‘We  are  not  in  need  of  an  Islamic  emirate.  We  live  in  the  Islamic  
reality   since   centuries   ago.   This   is   not   a   coup   for   secularism   and   for  
Christians.’  638  Mazen  Haniyeh  further  stressed  that  sharia  was  not  connected  
with   blood  or   a   tool   of   punishment   for   people.  On   the   contrary,  sharia   as   a  
way  of   life  and  mercy  protects  human   rights  and   their   interests.639  It   can  be  
said  that  Hamas  leaders  did  not  consider  sharia  to  be,  as  described  by  critics,  
negative   or   having   evil   implications.   According   to   some   researchers’  
observations,  Hamas  did  enforce  sharia   in  Gaza  and  there  were  incidents   in  
which   female  students  were  asked   to  wear  hijab   in  school.640  But,   to  a   large  
extent  Hamas  did  not  revolutionize  the  rule  of  law  when  it  practiced  sharia  in  
the   public   domain.   Nicolas   Pelham   indicates   that   the   way   that   the   Hamas  
government   in   Gaza   constructed   Islamic   legal   applications   in   executive,  
judicial   and   legislative   branches   conformed   to   the   existing   PA   system.   In  
addition   to   this,   formal   sectors,   and   informal   sectors   such   as   conciliation  
committees,   the  Muslim  scholars   league,  and  mosques  also  supplement   the  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
636   The   Palestine   Information   Center,   ‘Interview   with   Abu   Marzuq,’   (14   January   2008).  
<http://www.palinfo.com/site/pic/newsdetails.aspx?itemid=93477>   (accessed   on   18  
September  2014).  
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legitimacy   of   Hamas’   ruling   and   mitigated   social   unrest   in   Gaza. 641   Are  
Hovdenak  also  has  a  similar  observation.  He  concludes   that  Hamas  did  not  
design   a   grand   blueprint   of   Islamization   in   governmental   institutions   in  
association  with  Islamic  principles  although  there  were  Islamic  manifestations  
such  as  Islamic  dress  and  the  segregation  of  the  sexes  in  some  schools  and  
public   institutions. 642   Overall,   Hamas   continued   the   structure   of   the  
governmental   institutions,   adhered   to   the   Palestinian   basic   law   and  
coordinated  with  the  PA  in  Ramallah  in  non-­political  levels,  such  as  education,  
health  and  other  daily  issues.643  
Regarding   ‘Islamization’   or   the   act   of   the   implementation   of   sharia,  
these  topics  seldom  appeared  or  were  highlighted  in  Hamas’  public  speaking  
and  interviews.  This  thesis  argues  that  in  an  analysis  of  Gaza’s  situation  after  
its   takeover,   Islamization   was   not   Hamas’   focus.   Islam,   essentially,   is   an  
intrinsic   value   which   inspires   and   guides   Hamas   and   many   Palestinians.  
Hamas   practiced   Islam   based   on   its   understanding   of   the   social   context   of  
Palestine.  Dr.  Nafez  Al-­Madhoun  stated  that  most  Palestinian  laws  have  been  
compatible  with  Islamic  law.  He  did  not  see  a  radical  change  of  laws  imposed  
by   Hamas. 644   Therefore,   the   focus   should   be   on   how   and   why   Hamas  
constructed  its  political  agenda  in  Gaza  instead  of   the   intensive  and  endless  
debates   as   to   whether   the   essence   of   ‘Islamized   policy’   carried   with   it  
intolerant  or  brutal  implications,  which  misses  the  point.    
It  can  be  argued  that  the  way  that  the  Hamas  consolidated  its  presence  
and  governance  was  basically  according   to   its  electoral  programme   in  early  
2006.  The  aim  of   the  electoral  programme  was   to  provide  a  comprehensive  
approach   for   ‘the   liberation   and   the   establishment   of   the   Palestinian  
independent   state   with   Jerusalem   its   capital’.645  Initially   Hamas   hoped   that  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
641  Ibid.,pp.  12-­17.  
642  Are   Hovdenak   (ed.),   The   Public   Services   under   Hamas   in   Gaza:   Islamic   Revolution   or  
Crisis  Management?,  op.cit.,  p.5.  
643  Ibid.,  p.71.  
644  Hani   Albasoos,   ‘Case   study   I:   The   Judicial   Sector,’   in   Are   Hovdenak   (ed.),   The   Public  
Services  under  Hamas  in  Gaza:  Islamic  Revolution  or  Crisis  Management?,  op.cit.,    p.42.  
645   ‘Change   and   Reform   List:   Electoral   programme   for   the   elections   of   the   Palestinian  
Legislative  Council  2006,’  translation  from  Azzam  Tamimi,  Unwritten  Chapters,  Appendix  VI,  
p.292.  
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sharing  power  with  other  Palestinian   factions,  particularly  Fatah,  would  work  
towards  a  phase  of  liberation.  But  with  the  political  divisions  and  the  siege  of  
Gaza,   Hamas   had   no   choice   but   to   advance   its   political   project   early.   For  
Hamas,  the  integration  of  politics  was  irreversible  as  this  electoral  programme  
notes,  ‘this  participation  (of  the  election)  is  intended  to  be  an  act  of  support  for  
the   programme  of   resistance  and   intifada   to  which   our   people   have  happily  
resorted  as  a  strategic  option  to  end  the  occupation.’646  Lacking  a  trustworthy  
political   partnership   and   in   protection   of   its   political   programme,   Hamas  
unwillingly   retreated   from   its   political   achievement   since   2006   and  
consolidated  Gaza  by  institutionalizing  its  resistance  project.    
2.3.2  The  Media  aspect:  A  transmitter  of  the  resistance  message  
In  addition  to  the  security  and  social  arenas,  the  media  also  facilitated  
Hamas’   governance   and   served   to   transmit   its   resistant   message.   When  
Hamas  won  the  PLC  election  in  2006,  the  state-­owned  TV  did  not  obey  and  it  
even   attacked   the   Hamas-­led   government.   Therefore,   Hamas   decided   to  
create  its  own  media  in  terms  of  transmitting  its  resistance  message  after  the  
takeover   of   Gaza.  647  Hamas’   media   included   two   satellite   channels,   a   TV  
station,   radios,  media  production  companies  and  electronic  online  media.  648  
In   the  deteriorating  situation,   these  media  played  a   crucial   role   in  mitigating  
the  negative  image  of  Hamas  as  well  as  its  policy  failure  in  Gaza.  One  of  the  
most  remarkable  aspects  of  the  media  was  al-­Aqsa  TV,  which  was  the  second  
most  watched  in  Gaza  after  Al-­Jazeera.649    
Al-­Aqsa   TV   broadcasts   regular   programmes   that   discuss  
comprehensive  social  issues  such  as:  poverty,  unemployment,  education  and  
political  corruption.650  Hamas  officials  or  pro-­Hamas  guests  were  invited  to  Al-­
Aqsa   TV   to   reflect   their   views   and   to   justify   why   Hamas   could   not   fulfil   its  
policy  and  did  not  meet  the  demands  of  the  people  as  the  siege  of  Gaza  and  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
646  Ibid,  pp.292-­293.  
647  Wael   Abdelal,   From   the   Mosque   to   Statellite   Broadcasting:   A   historical   perspective   of  
Hamas  media  strategy,  op.cit.,  pp.183-­184.  
648  Ibid.,  p.5  
649  Ibid.,  p.179.  
650  Ibid,  p.148.  
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the  occupation  were  often  blamed   for  Hamas’   inability   to  apply   its  policy.  651    
This   is   not   to   say   that   al-­Aqsa   TV   always   defended   Hamas.   Sometimes,   it  
criticized  Hamas  for  wrong  practices  and  policies.652  Furthermore,  al-­Aqsa  TV  
could  be  regarded  as  a  resistance  media  for  the  purpose  of  national  liberation  
since   Hamas   believed   that   resistance   was   the   only   way   out   of   the   Israeli  
occupation.  As  analyzed  in  Chapter  Three,  Hamas  incrementally  constructed  
its   resistance   project   during   the   al-­Aqsa   Intifada.   This   project   had   a   holistic  
perspective  towards  national  liberation.  Armed  resistance  was  only  part  of  this  
project.  The  founder  of  the  al-­Aqsa  media  network  Fathi  Hamad  described  the  
role   of   al-­Aqsa   TV   as   being   to   promote   culture,   Jihad   and   resistance.653  In  
other   words,   an   invisible   element   of   resistance   could   be   shaped   and  
reinforced  through  Hamas  owned  media  network.      
2.3.3   The   Economic   and  Diplomatic   aspect:   A  means   to  withstand   the  
siege  of  Gaza  
Although   Hamas   could   effectively   stabilize   Gaza   by   exploiting   its  
security,  administration  and  media  means,  Hamas  was  unable  to  lift  the  siege.  
After   the   takeover   of   Gaza,   Israel   treated   it   as   a   hostile   entity   and   closed  
crossings  along   Israeli   borders.  On   the  other  hand,   the  Rafah  crossing  was  
closed  by  Egypt.  Gaza  looked  like  a  large  prison  with  no  access  to  the  outside  
world.   In   January   2008,   Gaza   faced   fuel   shortages   and   a   looming  
humanitarian   crisis.   To   cope   with   the   severe   economic   decline   and   high  
unemployment   rate   under   the   siege,  Hamas   looked   for   alternatives   through  
economic  and  diplomatic  efforts.  
Hamas  sought  various  ways  of  alleviating  the  huge  economic  burden,  
such  as   tax  deduction  and   the  creation  of   job  opportunities654  as  well  as  aid  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
651  Ibid,  pp.188-­190.  
652  Ibid,  pp.191-­192.  
653  The  Palestine  Information  Center,  ‘An  exclusive  interview  with  Fathi  Hamad,  Hamas  leader,  
and   the   head   of   al-­Aqsa   media   network,’   (14   December   2007).  
<http://www.palinfo.com/site/pic/newsdetails.aspx?itemid=70498>   (accessed   on   21  
September  2014).    
654   The   Palestine   Information   Center,   ‘Interview   with   Bardawil,’   (9   December   2007).  
<http://www.palinfo.com/site/pic/newsdetails.aspx?itemid=93451>   (accessed   on   21  
September  2014).    
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from  Arab  and  other  Muslim  countries.655  But  in  reality  these  measures  did  not  
help.   The   siege   almost   suffocated   the  Gazan   economy.  Under   this   context,  
Hamas   looked   to   the   tunnel   as   an   alternative.  Although   the  U.S.   Israel   and  
Egypt  regarded  the  tunnels  as  a  means  of  arms  smuggling,  to  a  large  extent,  
the  tunnel  was  a  lifeboat  that  sustained  the  economy  and  Hamas’  rule  and  as  
the  siege   tightened,  Hamas  relied  on   the   tunnel  more   intensely.  The  Tunnel  
Affairs  Commission   (TAC)  as  an  official   institution  was   set   up   for   regulating  
and  monitoring   the   tunnel   trade.   By   2010,   it   was   estimated   that   there  were  
5,000  tunnel  owners  and  25,000  workers   in  tunnels.656  The  tunnel  became  a  
new   growing   industry   in  Gaza.   By   taking   a   series   of  measures   and   issuing  
guidelines,  TAC  formalized  the  tunnel  trade  such  as  the  regulation  of  working  
conditions,   the   issuing   of   tunnel-­licenses,   the   establishment   of   arbitration  
system   and   tax   collection. 657   Most   importantly,   as   far   as   Hamas   was  
concerned,   the  tunnel  economy  brought  considerable  revenues  and  reduced  
prices  of  goods  in  the  market.  It  can  be  said  that  under  the  siege  the  role  of  
the  tunnel  economy  in  Gaza  partially  corresponded  to  Hamas’  commitment  to  
its  economic  policy:  ‘economic  independence  and  disengagement  with  Israel’  
and   ‘endeavour   to   establish   a   resisting   economy   and   encourage   self-­
dependency’.658  Hamas  was  gradually  less  dependent  on  the  Israeli  economy  
and  created  an  informal  new  market  with  Egypt  but  it  realized  that  the  tunnel  
economy  was  not   the  ultimate   remedy   for  Gaza  development.  659  As   long  as  
the   siege   continued,   the   economic   problem  was   hardly   resolved.   Therefore  
Hamas  hoped  that  a  diplomatic  approach  was  the  way  to  ease  the  siege.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
655  The  Palestine   Information  Center,   ‘Interview  with   the  Prime  Minister   Ismail  Haniyeh,’   (10  
June  2008).  <http://tinyurl.com/n9w5tpv>  (accessed  on  21  September  2014).    
656  Nicolas  Pelham,  ‘Gaza’s  tunnel  phenomenon:  The  unintended  Dynamics  of  Israel’s  siege,’  
op.cit.,  p.18.    
657  Ibid,  p.11.  
658   ‘Change   and   Reform   List:   Electoral   programme   for   the   elections   of   the   Palestinian  
Legislative  Council  2006,’  translation  from  Azzam  Tamimi,  Unwritten  Chapters,  Appendix  VI,  
p.312.  
659   In   spite   of   the   fact   that   Gaza   has   informal   trade   with   Egypt,   the   Egyptian   authority  
considered  the  tunnels  to  be  a  threat  to  its  national  security  and  planned  to  destroy  them.  See  
Nicolas   Pelham,   ‘Gaza’s   tunnel   phenomenon:   The   unintended   Dynamics   of   Israel’s   siege,’  
op.cit.,  pp.22-­24.  
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Hamas  leaders  always  hoped  that  the  Palestinian  cause  would  be  the  
focal  point  of   the   Islamic  ummah,  and  sought  understanding   from   the  West.  
Prior   to   the   takeover   of   Gaza,   this   tactic   had   proved   to   be   a   failure.   The  
resistance  message  had  hardly  been  conveyed  to  the  region  and  international  
society   due   to   Hamas’   political   dispute   with   Fatah   and   the   international  
blockade.  Nevertheless,  when  Hamas  controlled  Gaza,   it   gradually  obtained  
solidarity  and  moral  support  from  Arab  and  Muslim  countries  such  as  Yemen  
and  Turkey   that   traditionally,  had  not  been   involved   in   the  Palestinian   issue.  
Yemen   attempted   to   mediate   the   dispute   between   Fatah   and   Hamas   by  
proposing,   ‘The   Sanaa   declaration’   on   March   2008.660  On   the   other   hand,  
Turkey  rebuked  the  Israeli  strikes  on  Gaza  in  late  December  2008  and  froze  
its   official   relationship  with   Israel   due   to   the  Mavi  Marmara   incident   in  May  
2010. 661   These   acts   of   solidarity   did   not   really   help   to   ease   Gaza,   but  
diplomatically,  it  boosted  Hamas’  confidence  in  its  resistance  approach.  As  for  
Egypt,   which   is   considered   to   be   the  most   important   strategic   player   in   the  
Palestinian  cause,  Hamas  had  no  intention  of  provoking  it.  In  spite  of  the  fact  
that  Egypt  closed  the  Rafah  crossing  Hamas  leaders  refrained  from  showing  
its   displeasure   and   officially   applauded   Egypt’s   indispensable   role   in   the  
mediation   effort   between  Hamas  and  Fatah662  as  well   as   the   ceasefire   deal  
between  Hamas  and  Israel  in  mid-­2008.663  It  can  be  said  that  Hamas  adopted  
a   neutral   position   towards   Arab   and   Muslim   countries   in   order   to   obtain   a  
comprehensive  diplomatic  support.664        	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
660  The  Sanna  declaration  was  an  initiative  by  Yemen  Ali  Abdullah  Salih.  This  declaration  was  
accepted   by   Hamas   and   Fatah   ‘as   a   framework   to   resume   dialogue   and   to   return   the  
Palestinian   situation   to   what   it   was   before   the   Gaza   incidents.’   International   Crisis   Group,  
‘Palestine  Divided,’  Middle  East  Briefing,  No.25  (December  17  2008),  p.5.  
661   Carol   Migdalovitz,   ‘Israel’s   blockade   of   Gaza,   the   Mavi   Marmara   Incident,   and   its  
aftermath,’   in  Samuel  Wilkes  and  Cynthia  Jackson  (ed.),  Hamas  in  the  Middle  East  a  closer  
look  (New  York:  Nova  Science  Publishers,  2001),  pp.79-­97.  
662  The   Palestine   Information   Center,   ‘Interview   with   Hamas   leader   Muhammad   Nasr,’   (14  
July   2007).   <http://www.palinfo.com/site/pic/newsdetails.aspx?itemid=93460>   (accessed   on  
21  September  2014).    
663  The  Palestine  Information  Center,  ‘Interview  with  a  member  of  the  political  bureau  of  
Hamas,  Muhammad  Nazzal,’  (17  December  2008).  
<http://www.palinfo.com/site/pic/newsdetails.aspx?itemid=70396>  (accessed  on  21  
September  2014).    
664  The  Palestine  Information  Center,  ‘al-­Zahar  in  the  21st  anniversary  of  Hamas:  Hamas  
succeeded  the  balance  between  the  government  and  the  resistance  and  became  the  national  
hope,’  (11  December,  2008).  
	   179	  
As   for   relations  with   the  West,  due   to   its  view  of   Israel  and   its  violent  
record  against  Israeli  civilians,  Hamas  was  listed  as  a  terrorist  group  officially  
forbidden   to   talk   to   the   West.   In   spite   of   this,   there   were   several   secret  
meetings  between  Hamas  and  European  countries  that  were  not  covered  by  
the   media.665  It   was   reported   that   Mahmud   al-­Zahar   visited   Switzerland   in  
June   2009   and   met   the   Minister   of   Foreign   Affairs   but   there   was   no   clear  
information  about  this  meeting.666  It   is  also  interesting  to  note  that  the  former  
U.S.  President  Jimmy  Carter  met  Hamas  leaders  in  Gaza  and  Damascus  after  
2008  and  appealed   to   the  U.S  administration   to  engage  with  Hamas.  Carter  
believed  that  dialogue,  not  isolation,  would  moderate  Hamas  and  that  it  would  
silence  the  emerging  radical  Islamists  in  Gaza.667  Hamas  appreciated  Carter’s  
effort   and  his   active   role.668  As   for   its   view  on   the  U.S  administration,  when  
Barack  Obama  was  elected,  Hamas  changed  its  previous  hostile  tone.  Hamas  
did  not  deliberately  emphasize  the  complicity  of  Israel  and  the  U.S  on  Gaza.  
Muhammad   Nazzal   expected   that   President   Obama   would   change   the  
negative   image   of   the   U.S   in   the   Middle   East   created   by   the   Bush  
administration.669    
On  the  whole,  under  the  siege  of  Gaza,  Hamas  illustrated  that  it  could  
withstand   internal   and   external   challenges   by   institutionalizing   its   security,  
social,  media,   economic   and   diplomatic   aspects.   To   a   large   extent,   Hamas  	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had   committed   to   these   policies   in   its   electoral   programme   in   early   2006  
which   indicates   that   Hamas   did   not   deviate   from   its   fundamental   principle.  
That   is   to   say,   all   actions   served   its   resistance   project.   However,   an  
unexpected   incident,   Operation   Cast   Lead,   the   biggest   trial   for   Hamas’  
governance  had  a  great  impact  on  its  resistance  effort.  
2.4  A  trial  of  the  resistance  project:  Operation  Cast  Lead  
As  analyzed  above,  Hamas  attempted   to  break   the  siege  of  Gaza  by  
economic   and   diplomatic   efforts   but   in   reality   the   siege   remained.   On   the  
other   hand,   the   hostility   between   Israel   and   Hamas   was   still   high.   Hamas  
intensified   its   rocket   attacks   on   Israel   as   the   main   tactic   in   its   resistance  
project;;  and  Israel  also   targeted  Palestinians.  From  July  2007  to  June  2008,  
Hamas  launched  around  400  rockets  and  mortars  per  month.670  This  tactic  did  
not   cause   huge   fatalities   in   Israel,   but   Israeli   society   was   horrified.671   By  
contrast,   during   this   period,   Israeli   targeting   of   Palestinians   caused   high  
fatalities,   of   up   to   590   Palestinian   deaths.   672   To   avoid   the   escalation   of  
casualties,  a  ceasefire  seemed   to  be  a  plausible  option   for  Hamas  and  with  
Egypt’s  mediation  Hamas  reached  a  ceasefire  with   Israel   in  19th  June  2008.  
According   to   the  ceasefire,  both  sides  had   immediately   to  cease  any  hostile  
action   and   Israel   should   allow   the   opening   of   the   crossing   for   materials  
entering  Gaza.673  Hamas  had  longed  for  the  ceasefire  and  committed  to   it   in  
exchange  for  the  ease  of  Gaza  but  it  also  warned  that  if  Israel  did  not  abide  by  
it  and  continued  to  target  Palestinians,  Hamas  felt  no  obligation  to  refrain  from  
armed  resistance.674  
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2009),  p.3.  
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Prior   to   November   2008,   the   ceasefire   effectively   reduced   tensions  
between  Hamas  and  Israel.  To  a  large  extent,  Palestinians  were  free  from  the  
Israeli  military  strikes.  On  the  other  hand,  with  the  commitment  of  this  deal,  it  
was   reported   that   Hamas   suppressed   non-­Hamas   militias   for   attacking  
Israel.675  Statistically,  rockets  from  Gaza  to  Israel  dramatically  dropped  by  97  
per   cent.676  In   spite   of   this   relative   calm,   Hamas   was   disappointed   that   the  
ceasefire  did  not  achieve  its  aspiration  for  the  ease  of  the  blockade.  Although  
some  goods  were   imported   to  Gaza,   the  quantities  were   far  below   the   level  
before  Hamas’  takeover  of  Gaza.677  Khalid  Mishal  blamed  Israel  for  its  partial  
commitment   to   the   ceasefire.   The   condition   of   siege   did   not   improve.   Less  
than   10   per   cent   of   basic   needs   were   allowed   to   pass   through   the  
crossings.678  In  November,  the  relations  between  Hamas  and  Israel  worsened  
and   15   Palestinians   died   in   an   Israeli   attack. 679   In   response,   Hamas  
intensified  the  numbers  of  its  rockets  and  declared  the  end  of  the  ceasefire  on  
19th   November. 680   On   the   days   of   24th   and   25th   December,   Hamas  
accelerated  the  rocket  attacks  on  Israel.  From  the  beginning  of  27th  December,  
Israel   launched   a   three-­week   military   operation   known   as   Operation   Cast  
Lead.681            
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2009).   <http://www.newstatesman.com/middle-­east/2009/09/israel-­palestinian-­hamas>  
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(Diagram  for  ‘import  of  goods  into  Gaza  and  Rockets  and  mortars  fired  from  Gaza,’  Source:  




Compared   to  previous  confrontations  between  Hamas  and   Israel,   the  
war   on   Gaza   had   distinguishing   features   and   impacts.   Firstly,   Israeli   and  
Palestinian  casualties  were  extremely  disproportionate.  13  Israelis  were  killed  
and   523  were  wounded,682  while   on   the  Palestinian   side,   1,417  were   killed,  
5,303   wounded.683  The   ratio   of   fatalities   between   Israelis   and   Palestinians  
were   around   1:100,   far  more   than   1:3   in   the   period   of   the   al-­Aqsa   Intifada.  
Israel   launched   this   military   operation   in   two   stages.   From   27th   December  
2008   to   3rd   January   2009,   Israel   struck   Gaza   by   air.   Israeli   air   strikes  
accelerated  the  number  of  Palestinian  fatalities  in  a  short  period.  Abu  Ubayda,  
a   spokesman   for   al-­Qassam   Brigade,   said   that   Israel   intended   to   create   a  
large  number  of   losses  of  civilians.   In   the   first   five  minutes  of   the  war,  more  
than   200   Palestinians   were   killed   by   Israeli   air   strikes. 684   Within   8   days,  
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683  Sara  Roy,  Hamas  and  Civil   society   in  Gaza:  Engaging   the   Islamist   social   sector,  op.cit.,  
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Palestinian   casualties   reached   to   430   killed   and   2,000   injured.   From   3rd  
January  2009,  with  backing  from  the  majority  of  Israelis  and  politicians,  Israel  
launched   a   ground   operation   on   Gaza.   685   With   the   intensive   strikes   and  
military  operations,  many  people  in  Gaza  realized  that  this  war  did  not  target  
Hamas  alone  but  was  a  collective  punishment  to  Gazan  society  as  a  whole.686    
The   second   feature   is   that   the   Israeli   attack   on   Gaza   was  
indiscriminate.  Around  50  per  cent  of  casualties  were  civilians.687  It  was  hard  
for  Gazan  ambulance  crews   to   take  wounded  people   to  hospitals  and  more  
than  20  employees  died  because  of  the  Israeli  fire.688  Apart  from  the  losses  in  
the   population,   Israel   targeted   civilian   houses,   mosques,   schools,   radio  
stations   and   tombs.  Hamas  Minister   of  Awqaf  Dr.   Taleb  Abu  Shu’ar   argues  
that  Israel  committed  a  war  crime,  which  disclosed  ‘the  real  face  of  the  Zionist  
entity.’ 689   He   added   that   during   this   war,   45   mosques   were   completely  
destroyed;;   50   mosques   were   partially   damaged. 690   Mosques   played   an  
invaluable  role  in  Gazan  society  for  the  preservation  of  faith,  for  education  and  
as   a   place   for   enhancing   steadfastness   of   Palestinians   against   the   Israeli  
occupation.  Therefore,  the  Israeli  attacks  on  mosques  symbolized  a  religious  
war  against  Islam  and  Muslims.691  As  for  the  Israeli  accusation  that  mosques  
were  places  for  storing  weapons  and  hiding  fighters  Abu  Shu’ar  said  this  was  
a   lie   which   lacked   evidence.   Mosques   were   places   of   refuge   for   women,  	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children  and  the  elderly  when  their  houses  were  bombed  by  Israel.692  Facing  
this  systematic  attack,  Gaza  seemed  to  be  a  laboratory  or  a  prison.  Compared  
to  the  West  Bank  where  Israel  could  easily  control,  Gaza  was  regarded  as  a  
hostile  and  dangerous  place.  It  could  be  said  that  the  Israeli  military  operation  
in  Gaza  was  not  a   random  act.   In  2004,  a  dummy  city   in   the  Negev  desert  
was  constructed  by  the  Israeli  army  for  a  possible  military  preparation.693  The  
Operation  Cast  Lead   reflected   this   idea.   In  violation  of   the   international   law,  
Israel   used   new   and   experimental   weapons   in   the   battlefield,   particularly  
shells   containing   white   phosphorus   and   toxic   elements   against   Palestinian  
civilians.694    
Israel’s   indiscriminate   killing   resulted   in   large   scale   global  
demonstrations.   A   scholar,   Norman   Finkelstein   observed   that   the   Israeli  
invasion   of  Gaza  marked   a   turning   point   in   public   opinion.695  Solidarity   with  
Palestine  had  resonated  with  the  civil  society  of  the  West.  Unlike  the  Western  
governments,  many  people  in  the  West  do  not  take  a  neutral  stance  or  stand  
with   Israel   during   this   war.   On   the   contrary,   they   condemned   the   Israeli  
carnage  in  Gaza  and  raised  public  awareness  of  the  reality  of  Gaza  under  the  
blockade.   In   addition   to   this   unprecedented   solidarity   from   the  West,   there  
were  also  massive  demonstrations,  sit-­ins  and  other  types  of  solidarity  in  Arab  
and   Muslim   countries.   There   were   strong   demands   from   the   streets   and  
parliaments  in  Jordan  and  Egypt  to  halt  economic  cooperation  with  Israel  and  
to  expel  Israeli  ambassadors.696  Furthermore,  Turkey’s  Prime  Minister  Recep  
Tayyip  Erdogan  came  into  the  spotlight  and  was  portrayed  as  a  new  ‘hero’  in  	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the   Muslim   world   when   he   rejected   a   claim   of   ‘self-­defense’   by   the   Israeli  
President   Shimon  Peres   in   the  World  Economic   Forum,   at  Davos.697  In   this  
seemingly  global  solidarity  movement  and  moral  support  from  Muslim  political  
leaders,  Hamas  paid  tribute  to  those  people  who  stood  with  Gaza  and  felt  that  
Palestinians  were  not  alone  in  their  journey  toward  victory  and  liberation.698    
This   war   had   devastated   Gazan   society   and   Hamas   itself.   Israel  
considered   the   war   on  Gaza   had   been   a   successful   victory.699  Surprisingly,  
Hamas  also  claimed  that  it  won  the  greatest  military  victory  even  though  it  lost  
thousands   of   lives   and   suffered   the   destruction   of   its   homeland.   Hamas  
leaders   argued   that   the   victory   was   due   to   the   fact   that   Israel   could   not  
achieve   the   following   objectives   through   war:   the   overthrow   of   the   Hamas  
government  in  Gaza,  the  rescue  of  Gilad  Shalit,  the  prevention  of  rockets  fired  
from  Gaza  and  the  smuggling  of  arms.700  That  is  to  say,  a  victory  for  Hamas  
was  measured  by  whether  or  not  its  resistance  project  was  damaged.  One  of  
Hamas’   leaders   Salah   Bardawi   argues   that   victory   was   the   preservation   of  
Hamas’   resilience   and   reliability   as   it   did   not   succumb   to   Israeli   military  
power.701  To  a  certain  extent,  Hamas’  argument  makes  sense.  Gaza  gained  a  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
697   ‘Turkish   PM   given   hero’s   welcome,’   BBC,   (30   January   2009).  
<http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/business/davos/7859815.stm>  (accessed  on  28  September  2014).    
698  The   Palestine   Information   Center,   ‘Abu   Ubayda   speaks   for   "the   Palestinian   Information  
Center   about   "Criterion"   battle   and   beyond,’   (8   February,   2009).  
<http://www.palinfo.com/site/pic/newsdetails.aspx?itemid=70496>   (accessed   on   28  
September   2014).   Palestine   Information   Center,   ‘Bahar:   The   Zionist   aggression   on   Gaza  
failed   and   the   resistance   prevailed.   Our   resolution   will   not   be   broken,   and   dismissed,’   (18  
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on  28  September  2014).    
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happened  recently  in  Gaza  was  a  clear  military  victory.  It  must  be  an  investment  in  achieving  
political  victory,’  (5  February  2009).  
<http://www.palinfo.com/site/pic/newsdetails.aspx?itemid=70289>  (accessed  on  28  
September  2014).    
701  The  Palestine  Information  Center,  ‘Al-­Bardawil:  Resistance  is  our  choice  and  "Hamas"  has  
become   stronger   after   ''the   Criterion   battle,"’   (24   December   2009).  
<http://www.palinfo.com/site/pic/newsdetails.aspx?itemid=70342>   (accessed   on   29  
September  2014).    
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certain  amount  of  public  sympathy  globally.  The  fact  that  Western  delegations  
met   Hamas   leaders   together   with   the   scale   of   the   international   solidarity  
movement   was   an   indication   that   the   oppression   of   Palestinians   and   the  
adverse  conditions  of  the  siege  of  Gaza  had  been  heard.  But  it  is  not  the  case  
that  western  civil  society  fully  endorsed  Hamas’  resistance  project,  particularly  
armed  resistance.  Moreover,  this  war  seemed  to  unite  the  circle  of  Arab  and  
Muslim  countries.  As  a  matter  of  fact,  the  support  for  Hamas  was  on  a  moral  
level   as  well.  Turkey   froze   its  official   relationship  with   Israel   but   this  did  not  
mean  that  Turkey  unconditionally  supported  Hamas’  resistance.  As  for  Egypt,  
after   the   war,   the   Rafah   crossing   remained   closed   only   for   an   exceptional  
case  of  allowing  patients  and  humanitarian  workers  in.702    
Overall   the  war  on  Gaza  tested  Hamas’  capacity   to  resist  and  govern  
and   it   did   not   shake   its   determination   to   carry   out   its   resistance   project.   In  
addition,   international   solidarity   and   the  moral   support   from  many  Arab   and  
Muslim   countries   made   Hamas   confident   of   its   commitment   to   resistance.  
Hamas’   rule   in  Gaza  was  still   intact  after   the  war.   In   terms  of   the  ceasefire,  
Hamas   exploited   its   advantage   of   ministerial   coordination   in   reconstruction  
and   relief  work   for   those   people  who   lost   homes,   families,   and   business.703  
Prime  Minister  Ismail  Haniyeh  raised  a  slogan,  ‘partners  in  the  reconstruction  
and   partners   in   steadfastness,’   by   stressing   that   the   reconstruction   was   an  
urgent   need   of   Gazan   society.704  Even   under   siege,   the   economy   in   Gaza  
recovered  with  the  function  of  the  tunnel  economy.  By  October  2011,  Hamas  
claimed  that  half  of   the  destroyed  factories  returned  to  production.  The  price  
of  most  goods  fell  to  the  level  before  the  siege  by  Israel.705  In  other  words,  the  	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<http://www.palestinechronicle.com/egypt-­reseals-­rafah-­crossing-­with-­gaza/#.Uxjp0-­d_tS4>  
(accessed  on  29  September  2014).  
703  The  Palestine  Information  Center,  ‘Haniyah  speaks  to  "Fatah":  There  is  no  solution  except  
through  dialogue.  Our  compass  is  for  Jerusalem,  Al-­Aqsa  and  the  rights  of  the  Palestinian  
people,’  (12  July  2009).  
<https://web.archive.org/web/20140713021522/http://www.palinfo.com/site/pic/newsdetails.as
px?itemid=93473>  (accessed  on  29  September  2014).    
704  The  Palestine   Information  Center,   ‘Haniyeh:  National  dialogue   is  a  way   for   salvage.   It   is  
not   just   a   political   tactic   and   our   priority   is   to   achieve   reconciliation,’   (26   February   2009).  
<http://www.palinfo.com/site/pic/newsdetails.aspx?itemid=70455>   (accessed   on   29  
September  2014).    
705  Pelham,  Nicolas,  ‘Gaza’s  tunnel  phenomenon:  the  unintended  dynamics  of  Israel’s  siege,’  
Journal  of  Palestine  Studies,  op.cit.,  p.16.    
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war   on   Gaza   did   not   weaken   Hamas’   governance   but   reflected   its  
sustainability  and  reliability.    
After  the  postwar  period  the  scenario  in  Palestine  had  slightly  changed  
in  favour  of  Hamas.  Fatah  and  Hamas  began  their  official  dialogue  under  the  
auspices   of   Egypt.   The   national   dialogue  was   ongoing.   In   November   2010,  
the  process  of  reconciliation  had  largely   improved  although  both  Hamas  and  
Fatah   could   not   reach   a   final   agreement   on   the   election,   the   PLO   and   the  
security  issues.706  At  any  rate,  Hamas  gradually  emerged  as  an  indispensable  
non-­state  actor  in  the  region.  Resistance  for  Hamas  was  not  only  a  slogan  or  
vision   but   a   practice   and   model   in   Gaza.   As   Ismail   Haniyeh   said,   ‘the  
resistance  is  not  just  a  gun  or  an  explosive  device  but  is  the  thought,  culture  
and   identity.’ 707   Khalid   Mishal   argued   that   during   the   three   years   of   the  
takeover   of  Gaza,  Hamas   gained   new   experiences   in   getting   to   know  what  
people  needed  under  the  occupation;;  and  it  also  looked  at  the  political  reality  
of  how  to  deal  with  other  countries,  without  losing  its  principle.  He  added  the  
combination   of   resistance  and  governance  was   tough   for  Hamas  but   it  was  
optimistic   that   its   resistance  project  was  going   to  be  popular   in   the   future.708  
Mishal   further   foresaw   that   the   Middle   East   would   experience   a   positive  
change   to   the   benefit   of   Islamic  ummah   within   five   years.709  This   prediction  
was  partially  true.  With  the  outbreak  of  the  ‘Arab  Spring,’  Hamas  sensed  that  
a  new  scenario,  in  Hamas’  favour,  appeared  in  the  region.  The  opening  of  the  
Rafah   crossing,   the   prevailing   Islamic   parties   in   Tunisia   and   Egypt,   the  
prisoner  exchange  deal  and  the  active  roles  of  Qatar  and  Turkey  greatly  lifted  
Hamas’  spirit  but  with  the  ousting  of  the  Egyptian  President  Muhammad  Mursi  
in   July   2013,   the   high   expectation   rapidly   declined.   The   next   section   will  	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analyze  how  Hamas  perceives  the  overall   impact  of  the  Arab  Spring  and  the  
evaluation  of  its  resistance  project.  
3.  The  repercussions  of  the  Arab  Spring    
The  Arab  Spring  had  a  huge  impact  on  Hamas.  Following  the  fall  of  the  
authoritarian   regime   and   the   rise   of   Islamists   in   Tunisia   and   Egypt,   Hamas  
sensed  that  the  structure  of  the  Middle  East  had  gradually  changed  and  was  
now   in   favour   of   its   resistance   project.   Indeed,   during   this   period,   several  
events  such  as  the  reconciliation  deal,  the  prisoner  exchange  and  the  easing  
of  the  Gaza  blockade  boosted  Hamas’  faith  in  resistance  and  the  Palestinian  
cause  in  a  remarkable  way.  On  the  other  hand,  an  informal  alliance  appeared;;  
Egypt,   Turkey   and   Qatar   provided   moral   or   financial   support   to   Hamas’  
governance   in   Gaza.   These   countries   also   played   a   significant   role   in  
mediating   the   Israeli   war   on   Gaza   in   November   2012.   For   the   first   time,  
Hamas  felt  that  it  had  achieved  the  aspiration  that  it  had  held  for  a  long  time  
that  Palestine  would  become  the  centre  of  the  Islamic  ummah.  However  this  
sense   of   optimism   did   not   last   long.   After   President  Muhammad  Mursi   was  
ousted  from  Egypt  in  July  2013,  Hamas  faced  an  unprecedented  predicament.  
With   the   return  of   the  authoritarian   regime   in  Egypt,  Hamas’  aspiration   for  a  
change   in   this   region   failed.  Everything  seemed   to  be  back   to   the  old  order  
that  had  been  in  place  before  the  Arab  Spring.  Gaza’s  isolation  continued  and  
was  intensified.  To  make  matters  worse,  Hamas  was  treated  as  an  enemy  by  
Egypt   because   of   the   accusation   of   having   collaborated   with   the   Muslim  
Brotherhood   and   threatening   its   stability.   The   national   unity  with   Fatah  was  
also  suspended  because  Hamas  blamed  Fatah  for  provoking  the  disturbance  
in  Gaza.  
Since   it  had  degenerated  from  high  expectation   to  complete   loss,   this  
period   proved   to   be   a   roller-­coaster   ride   for   Hamas.   To   grasp   this   intricate  
process,   three   topics  must   be  addressed.  Firstly,   in   the   context   of   the  Arab  
Spring   we   should   examine   Hamas’   satisfaction   with   the   political   change.  
Secondly,   we   shall   analyze   the   positive   and   negative   impacts   of   the   Arab  
Spring  on  Hamas  and  its  governance  in  Gaza.  Finally,  the  resistance  project  
espoused  by  Hamas  during  this  period  shall  be  evaluated.  
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3.1  The  context  of  the  Arab  Spring  and  its  features  
The   eruption   of   the   Arab   Spring   came   from   an   incident   of   self-­
immolation   of   a   street   vendor,   Mohamed   Bouazizi,   in   Tunisia   on   17th  
December  2010,  which  unexpectedly,  triggered  nationwide  mass  protest  and  
caused  the  exile  of  President  Ben  Ali  who  had  ruled  Tunisia  for  24  years.  The  
wave   of   revolution   promptly   spread   to   the   rest   of   the   Arab   countries,  
especially  Egypt.  President  Hosni  Mubarak’s  29-­year  rule  had  ended  by  11th  
February  2011.  The  fall  of  the  authoritarian  regime  and  the  people’s  aspiration  
for   freedom,  dignity  and  social   justice  became   the  distinguishing   features  at  
the   beginning   of   the   revolution.   Since   the   Tunisian   revolution   in   December  
2010   many   have   used   the   terminology   ‘Arab   Spring’,   and   some,   the   ‘Arab  
awakening’,  or  the  ‘Arab  uprising’  to  describe  or  analyze  the  phenomenon  of  
uprising.   This   section   does   not   interrogate   the   implications   of   these  
terminologies;;   it   only   adopts   the   phrase,   ‘Arab   Spring’   since   the   Hamas  
leadership  often  referred  this  term  during  this  period.  
Furthermore,   this   section   does   not   delve   into   the   deep   and   complex  
cause   and   effect   of   the  Arab  Spring   as   this   has   been  much   discussed   and  
debated.  It  only  provides  a  framework  for  a  discussion  of:  why  it  happened,  its  
main  features,  and  how  Hamas  responded  to  dramatic  changes  in  this  region.  
The   span   of   the   Arab   Spring   is   calculated   from   the   Tunisian   revolution   in  
December  2010  to  the  ousting  of  President  Muhammad  Mursi  in  June  2013.    
3.1.1  The  context  of  the  Arab  Spring    
It   is   hard   to   explain  why   the   revolution   initially   took   place   in   Tunisia,  
and   Egypt,   which   used   to   be   considered   a   successful   model   of   economic  
reform710  and  also,   its   success   in   overthrowing   the   authoritarian   regimes,   at  
least   in   the   short   term.   Many   explanations   for   the   outbreak   of   these   mass  
demonstrations   and   the   reasons   why   they   toppled   the   regime   came   as   an  
afterthought.   In   spite   of   this,   two   main   features   of   the   revolution   may   be  
observed.   One   is   the   repressive   and   violent   character   of   the   authoritarian  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
710  Hamed  El-­Said  and  Jane  Harrigan,  ‘Globalization,  International  finance,  and  political  Islam  
in  the  Arab  world,’  Middle  East  Journal,  Vol.  60,  No.3  (Summer  2006),  p.446.  Shadi  Hamid,  
‘Tunisia,  Birthplace  of  the  revolution,’  in  Keeneth  Pollack  (ed.),  The  Arab  awakening:  America  
and   the   transformation   of   the   Middle   East   (Washington.   D.C:   Brookings   Institution   press,  
2011),  p.111.  
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regime.711  The   repression  of   individual   liberties,   the  prevalence  of  corruption  
and   nepotism   had   been   long-­term   political   and   social   problems   before   the  
revolution.   Another   is   the   economic   deterioration.   The   authoritarian   regime  
failed  to  meet  the  basic  needs  of  the  people.  The  rising  food  prices  and  high  
unemployment  rate,  especially  among  the  young  who  made  up  around  65  per  
cent   of   the   total   population   caused   social   grievance   and   anxiety. 712   The  
slogan   chanted   by   people   on   the   streets   during   the   revolution,   ‘Bread,  
Freedom,   social   justice  and  human  dignity’,   reflects   their   disillusion  with   the  
status.  The  elements  for  revolution  were  there,  so  that  a  single  incident  could  
instantly  ignite  the  flame  of  uprising  across  the  region.      
The   nature   of   an   authoritarian   regime   and   social   and   economic  
grievances   were   common   features   in   these   countries.   Nevertheless,   the  
revolution  in  each  Arab  country  has  a  specific  context  and  therefore  the  wave  
of   each   revolution   should   be   examined   on   a   case-­by-­case   basis. 713   For  
example,   Tunisia   and   Egypt   shared   similar   experiences   of   revolutions   but  
each  revolution’s  success  had  a  specific  context.714  On  the  other  hand,  other  
Arab   countries,   such   as   Libya,   Yemen,  Bahrain   and  Syria,   shared   common  
traits  with  Tunisia  and  Egypt  but  their  revolutions  turned  into  large  scale  riots,  
civil  wars  or  were  quelled  by  the  regime.  In  other  words,  we  can  identify  that  
people  in  the  Middle  East  were  asking  for  change  in  politics,  economics  and  
society  but   the  wave  of   revolution   in  each  country  presented  differently;;  and  
depending  on  the  specific  domestic  scenario,  ended  mainly  in  uncertainty.        
3.1.2  The  features  of  the  Arab  Spring:  The  rise  of  Islamists    
There  are  many  distinctive  features  in  the  post-­revolution  of  the  Middle  
East.  One  of   the  most  striking  of   the  discussions  and  debates  concerns   the  
rise   of   Islamists   in   the   region.   Here,   the   term   Islamists   refers   to   the  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
711   Kamal   Eldin   Osman   Salih,   ‘The   roots   and   causes   of   the   2011   Arab   uprisings,’   Arab  
Studies  Quarterly,  Vol.35,  No.2,  p.184.  
712  Ibid.,  p.187.  
713  Tariq  Ramadan,  The  Arab  Awakening:  Islam  and  the  New  Middle  East,  op.cit.,  p.31.  
714  Ibid.,  pp.189-­191.  Lisa  Anderson,   ‘Demystifying   the  Arab  Spring:  Parsing   the  differences  
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mainstream   Islamist   movement   associated   with   the   ideas   of   the   Muslim  
Brotherhood.715  After  the  collapse  of  the  authoritarian  regime,  Islamists,  such  
as   the  Muslim  Brotherhood   in  Egypt  and  al-­Nahda   in  Tunisia  won   land-­side  
victories   in   the   elections.   Both   obtained  most   of   the   seats   in   parliament.   In  
May  2012,  Muhammad  Mursi  was  elected  as  the  first  Egyptian  President  after  
the  revolution.  The  media  called  Mursi  the  first  elected  ‘Islamist  President’   in  
Egyptian  history.716  Afterwards,   the  rise  of   Islamists  or   the  threat  of   Islamists  
was  a  highly  contentious  topic  in  the  Western  media  as  well  as  for  academics.  
The   arguments   surrounding   ‘Islamization’,   ‘the   restriction   of   freedom’,   ‘the  
oppression  of  minorities’  and  the  ‘security  threat’  to  Israel  and  the  interests  of  
the  U.S  in  this  region  seem  to  have  become  the  dominant  narrative  when  the  
western  media  described   the  phenomenon  of   the   rise  of   Islamists.  So,  what  
do  we  make  of  the  emerging  Islamism  and  its  features  in  the  post-­revolution?  
And   how   did   Hamas   evaluate   this   growing   trend?   Both   questions   are  
addressed  in  the  following  section.  
      It  should  be  noted  that  the  Islamists  did  not  play  a  prominent  role  at  
the   beginning   of   the   revolution.   In   Egypt   and   Tunisia,   Islamists   did   not  
dominate   the   streets.   On   the   contrary,   the  mass   demonstrations   were   of   a  
rather   secular   or   non-­religious   orientation.   The   Brotherhood   leaders   were  
cautious  about   this  massive  protest  and  the  uncertainty  of   the  revolution  but  
its   young  members,   against   the   advice   of   the   senior   leadership   took   to   the  
streets,  and  worked  together  with  the  liberal,  leftist,  Coptic  minority.717    
The  rise  of   the   Islamists  became  an   issue  when  they  won  a  series  of  
victories   in   the   elections.   In   Egypt,   the   Brotherhood   won   five   successive  
elections  between  2011  and  2012.718  In  Tunisia,   the  al-­Nahda  that  had  been  
eradicated  by  Ben  Ali   in   the  early  1990s  participated   in   the  election   in  early  
2011.  They  won  the  election  by  37  per  cent  of  votes  which  was  more  than  the  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
715  Shadi  Hamid,  ‘The  rise  of  the  Islamists:  how  Islamists  will  change  politics,  and  vice  versa,’  
Foreign  affair,  Vol.90,  No.3  (May/June  2011),  p.41.  
716   ‘Profile:   Egypt’s   Mohammed   Morsi,’   BBC,   (18   December   2013).  
<http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-­middle-­east-­18371427>  (accessed  on  2  November  2014).  
717  Tariq  Ramadan,  The  Arab  Awakening:  Islam  and  the  New  Middle  East,  op.cit.,  p.10.  
718   Nicholas   Wade,   ‘Egypt:   What   poll   results   reveal   about   Brotherhood’s   popularity,’   (13  
August  2013).  BBC,  <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-­middle-­east-­23846680>  (accessed  on  
2  November  2014).    
	   192	  
second  largest  party,  Congress  for  the  Republic  which  had  obtained  only  8.7  
per  cent  of  the  votes.719                  
There  are  multiple  interpretations  as  to  why  Islamists  won  a  land-­slide  
victory  in  the  elections.  Pragmatism  could  be  considered  to  be  the  main  cause  
of   their   prominence   in   the   political   arena.   Before   the   revolution,   the  
Brotherhood   in   Egypt   kept   a   low   profile   and   refrained   from   provoking   the  
government   even   though   they   were   repressed.   To   keep   the   organization  
intact,   they   demonstrated   an   image   of   moderation,   showing   that   they   were  
ready   to   embrace   the   value   of   democracy,   freedom   and   pluralism. 720  
Moreover,  in  spite  of  the  fact  that  the  ideology  of  Islamists  remained  firm  and  
in   public,   they   believed   that   Islam   and   sharia   were   crucial,   in   practice   they  
were  flexible,  not  radical  and  did  not  impose  their  will  on  others.  Realistically,  
they  addressed   issues  such  as:  good  governance,  economic  reform  and  the  
fight  against  corruption  during  the  election  campaign  rather  than  pursuing  an  
ideal  Islamic  state.721    
The  rise  of  Islamism  is  also  attributed  to   its  strong  social  network  and  
mobilization   in   terms   of   its   sustainable   social   welfare   service.   On   the   other  
hand,  there  is  no  denying  that  the  local  social  structure,  which  is  conservative  
and   religious,   may   also   contribute   to   the   rise   of   the   Islamists   after   the  
revolution.  Compared   to   the   rest  of   the  world,  Arab  society   is  quite   religious  
and  people  believe  that  religion  should  play  a  role  in  politics  even  when  they  
are   not   affiliated   with   these   Islamist   groups.722   A   survey   reveals   that   the  
majority  of  Egyptians  prefer  Islamic  law  to  be  the  principle  or  the  only  source  
of   legislation.   In   addition,   they   are   also   in   favour   of   the   application   of   the  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
719  Shadi   Hamid,  Temptations   of   power:   Islamists   and   illiberal   democracy   in   a   new  Middle  
East,  op.cit.,  p.28.  
720  Shadi  Hamid  observed  that  when  Arab  regimes  increasingly  called  for  a  crackdown  on  the  
mainstream  Islamists   in  1990s,   these   Islamists  did  not   restore   to  violence  or  be  radicalized.  
Instead,   they   were   inclined   to   moderation   for   the   sake   of   survival.   See   Shadi   Hamid,  
Temptations  of  power:  Islamists  and  illiberal  democracy  in  a  new  Middle  East,  op.cit.,  pp.38-­
60.  
721  Khalil   Al-­Anani,   ‘Islamist   parties   post-­Arab   Spring,’  Mediterranean   politics,   Vol.17,   No.3  
(November  2012),  p.469.    
722  Shadi   Hamid,   ‘Islamists   and   the   brotherhood:   Political   Islam   and   the   Arab   Spring,’   in  
Kenneth  Pollack   (ed.),  The  Arab   awakening:  America   and   the   transformation   of   the  Middle  
East,  op.cit.,  p.30.    
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hudud,  the  Islamic  criminal  law  that  is  a  highly  controversial  to  the  West.723  In  
this  respect,  the  prominence  of  Islamists  could  be  seen  as  a  natural  aspiration  
of  society.    
The   rise   of   the   Islamists   not   only   shaped   a   new   outlook   of   politics  
across   the   region   but   it   also   brought   uncertainty.   The   real   pressing   issues  
such  as  economic  reform,  democratic  transition  and  social  justice  seemed  to  
have   been  marginalized   by   a   contentious   dispute   surrounding   ‘Islamization’  
and  the  polarization  between  Islamism  and  secularism  in  Egypt  and  Tunisia.  
Strikingly,   this   type   of   debate   rapidly   faded   after   the   coup   d’état   in   Egypt,  
which  indicated  the  fall  of  Islamism.    
3.1.3  Hamas’  perception  of  the  Arab  Spring  and  the  rise  of  Islamists  
After   the   fall  of   the  authoritarian  regime   in  Tunisia  and  Egypt,   it  could  
be  said  that  Hamas  highly  expected  that  the  change  would  be  in  favour  of  the  
Palestinian  cause  and  it  believed  that  the  fall  of  the  dictatorship  was  a  natural  
consequence. 724   Abu   Marzuq   argued   that   the   Arab   Spring   reflected   the  
people’s  determination  against  corruption,  dictatorship  and  tyranny  as  well  as  
their   aspiration   for   democracy,   human   rights   and   freedom   of   expression.725  
Khalid  Mishal   stressed   that   the,   ‘Arab  Spring   is   the   choice   of   the   people   in  
favour  of  Palestine  and  the  people  of  the  ummah.  It  is  the  renaissance  of  the  
ummah  at  all  levels.’726  Hamas’  perception  of  the  change  in  this  region  stems  
from   the   traditional   concept   of   the   ummah   (the   Islamic   community).   As  
Chapter  Three  mentioned,  seeking  solidarity   from   the  ummah  was  always  a  
main  feature  of  Hamas’  resistance  project.  Prior  to  the  Arab  Spring,  although  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
723  Shadi   Hamid,  Temptations   of   power:   Islamists   and   illiberal   democracy   in   a   new  Middle  
East,  op.cit.,  p.17.      
724  The  Palestine   Information  Center,   ‘Interview  with   the  Youth,  Sport   and  Culture  Minister,’  
(29   March   2011).   <http://www.palinfo.com/site/pic/newsdetails.aspx?itemid=70390>  
(accessed  on  2  November  2014).    
725  The  Palestine  Information  Center,  ‘Abu  Marzuq:  Zionist  war  on  Gaza  and  the  inevitability  
of  revenge,’  (3  February  2011).  
<http://www.palinfo.com/site/pic/newsdetails.aspx?itemid=70395>  (accessed  on  2  November  
2014).    The  Palestine  Information  Center,  ‘Mishal:  Reconciliation  is  necessary  and  national  
and  we  want  a  state  without  occupation,’  (11  May  2011).  <http://tinyurl.com/opqswvc>  
(accessed  on  2  November  2014).    
726  The  Palestine  Information  Center,  Mishal:  It  is  a  duty  to  work  together  in  common  spaces  
and   to   serve   the   country   within   the   national   agenda,   (5   August   2012).  
<http://tinyurl.com/l87ppbh>  (accessed  on  2  November  2014).    
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Hamas  sometimes  complained  about   the  Arab  countries’   passive  attitude   to  
the   Palestinian   cause,   it   still   reiterated   the   significance   of   the   ummah   in  
relation  to  its  resistance  project.  Khalid  Mishal  said  that  the,  ‘Palestinian  issue  
is   not   merely   conflict   between   Palestinians   and   Israelis   but   is   the   conflict  
between   ummah   and   the   Zionist   project   that   targets   the   whole   ummah.  
Therefore  the  danger  is  not  limited  to  Palestine  alone.’727  For  Hamas,  the  fall  
of   the  dictatorship  and   the  rise  of   the   Islamists  symbolized  a  major  strategic  
change   in   this   region   in   helping  Palestinians  against   the  Zionist   project   and  
towards  the  liberation  of  Palestine.728    
Among   the   Arab   countries   that   broke   up   the   revolution,   Egypt   has  
significant   implications   for   Hamas.   Geographically,   Egypt   is   of   strategic  
importance  to  Palestine  and  it  has  been  a  key  player  in  the  Palestinian-­Israeli  
conflict.   However,   to   a   certain   degree,   prior   to   the   revolution   the   Egyptian  
authority  had  been  hostile  to  Gaza,  where  Hamas  had  dominated  since  2007.  
Egypt’s  closure  of  the  Rafah  crossing  aggravated  the  suffering  of  Palestinians  
in  Gaza  and  in  addition,  Egypt  used  to  be  part  of  the  ‘axis  of  Arab  moderates’,  
sharing   a   common   interest   with   Israel   and   the   United   States   against   Iran,  
Syria,  Hamas  and  Hizbullah.729  But  this  scenario  seemed  to  change  after  the  
fall  of  Mubarak  and  was  followed  by  the  rise  of  the  Brotherhood.  
Hamas   sensed   a   change   in   Egypt.   Ismail   Haniyeh   stated   that,   ‘The  
revolution   in   Egypt   is   a   glimmer   of   hope.   It   is   a   historical   turning   point   that  
Egypt   restored   its   role   (in   this   region).  Very   soon   the   liberation  of  Palestine  
and  Jerusalem  is  getting  closer.  And  the  revolution  reflected  the  reality  of  the  
ummah…It  has  a  positive   impact  on  Palestinians.’730  When   the  Brotherhood  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
727   The   Palestine   Information   Center,   ‘Interview   with   Khalid   Mishal,’   (2   August   2010).  
<http://tinyurl.com/osqmlyo>  (accessed  on  2  November  2014).    
728  Khalid  Mishal,   ‘Political   thought   and   strategies   of   Hamas   in   light   of   the   Arab   uprisings,’  
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729  ‘Strengthening  the  moderate,’  Haaretz,  (25  October  2006).  <http://www.haaretz.com/print-­
edition/opinion/strengthening-­the-­moderate-­axis-­1.203391>  (accessed  on  2  November  2014).    
730  The   Palestine   Information   Center,   ‘Haniyeh:   Hamas   carried   out   experiments   in   a   very  
complex   and   dangerous   situation   and   Egypt's   Revolution   brings   hope,’   (5   July   2011).  
<http://tinyurl.com/pmxw4uy>  (accessed  on  7  November  2014).  
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won  a  land-­slide  victory  in  the  parliamentary  and  presidential  election,  Hamas  
felt  boosted  by  the  overwhelming  wave  of  Islamists  that  might  change  policy-­
making   in  Egypt   towards  Gaza  and   facilitate   the  unity  of  Palestinians.731  For  
Hamas,  Egypt  played  a  crucial  role  in  deciding  the  future  direction  of  Palestine  
and  other  Arab  countries.  Another  Hamas  leader,  Ahmed  Bahr  stressed  that,  
‘The  strength  of  Egypt   is   the  strength  of   the  Arab  and   Islamic  ummah  while  
the  weakness  of  Egypt  is  the  weakness  of  the  Arab  and  Islamic  ummah.’732            
  Ostensibly,  Hamas  had  high  expectations  of  Egypt  and  also  aspired  to  
see   the   ascendancy   of   Islamists   across   the   region.   For   Hamas,   the  
prominence  of  Islamists  is  a  natural  phenomenon  or  a  return  to  normality,  and  
it  is  a  demonstration  of  the  popular  choice.733  Indeed  in  the  early  period  of  the  
post-­revolution,  the  overall  structure  of  the  Arab  Spring  was  inclined  towards  
the   direction   that   Hamas   expected.   It   seems   that   ultimately,   the   resistance  
project  it  espoused  had  been  fruitful.        
3.2  The  repercussions  of  the  Arab  Spring  on  Hamas  
The  early  development  of  the  Arab  Spring  made  Hamas  confident  that  
the   Middle   East   region   was   shifting   in   favour   of   the   Palestinian   cause.  
Nevertheless,   in   less   than   three   years   from   the   eruption   of   the   Tunisian  
revolution   to   the   ousting   of   Mursi   in   Egypt   the   ethos   of   the   revolution   had  
evaporated.   This   period   brought   unprecedented   opportunities   and  
predicaments  for  Hamas’  work  on  resistance.  
3.2.1  The  Opportunities    
Reconciliation   between   Fatah   and   Hamas   seemed   to   be   the   first  
breakthrough   for   Hamas   in   the   early   period   of   the   Arab   Spring.   Since   the  
takeover  of  Gaza  in  June  2007,  reconciliation  had  been  the  main  agenda  that  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
731  The  Palestine   Information  Center,   ‘Abu  Marzuq:  Firmly  ending   the  division  and   "Hamas"  
will  be  more  pleased  with  the  changes  in  Egypt,’  (5  June  2012).  <http://tinyurl.com/peyyfag>  
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Hamas  leaders  often  addressed,  but  under  the  siege  of  Gaza,  the  resumption  
of  negotiations  between  Israel  and  Fatah  as  well  as  the  crackdown  on  Hamas  
in  the  West  Bank  hindered  attempts  to  reconcile.  The  revolution  in  Egypt  and  
the  stalled  negotiations  between  Israel  and  Fatah  changed  this  impasse.  With  
Egypt’s  mediation  Hamas   reached   reconciliation  with  Fatah  on  4  May  2011,  
symbolizing   the   end   of   the   four-­year   political   division.   Although   this  
reconciliation  was  regarded  as  a  symbolic  gesture  since  Hamas  and  Fatah  did  
not  compromise  on  crucial  issues  such  as  security,  election  and  the  formation  
of   the   unity   government, 734   Hamas   leaders   were   convinced   that   the  
reconciliation  deal  was  a  necessary  and  sustainable  step  in  corresponding  to  
the  new  development  across  the  region.735    
Another  event  that  boosted  Hamas  was  the  exchange  of  prisoners.  The  
release  of  Gilad  Shalit  was   in  exchange   for   the   release  of  1,027  Palestinian  
Prisoners   on   18th   October   2011.   Hamas   claimed   that   this   was   another  
significant   achievement   and   victory.736  When   Shalit   had   been   abducted   in  
June  2006,  Hamas  had  asserted  that  the  release  of  the  Palestinian  prisoners,  
as  a  national  agenda,  was  the  only  condition  for  his  release.  The  negotiations  
for   the   prisoner   exchange   was   a   long   process   mediated   by   Egypt   and  
Germany. 737   There   had   been   no   positive   result   and   the   mediations   were  
suspended  several  times.  After  the  outbreak  of  the  revolution  in  Egypt  in  2011,  
work   on   the   prisoner   exchange   was   accelerated.   This   deal   further  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
734   International   Crisis   Group,   ‘Palestinian   Reconciliation:   Plus   ça   change…’   Middle   East  
Report,  No.  110  (20  July  2011),  p.23.  
735  The  Palestine   Information  Center,   ‘Mishal:   Reconciliation   is   necessary   and   national   and  
we  want  a  state  without  occupation,’  (11  May  2011).  <http://tinyurl.com/opqswvc>  (accessed  
on   8   November   2014).   Palestine   Information   Center,   ‘Haniyeh:   Hamas   succeeded   in   the  
balance   between   resistance   and   governance   and   wage   the   largest   war,’   (11   May   2011).  
<http://tinyurl.com/o7s4mfe>  (accessed  on  8  November  2014).    
736  The   Palestine   Information   Center,   ‘Hamdan:   Abbas   call   for   the   release   prisoners   in   the  
exchange  deal  is  flawed  and  unacceptable,’  (23  October  2011).  <http://tinyurl.com/npz8v54>  
(accessed  on  8  November  2014).    
737  The  Palestine   Information  Center,   ‘Hayat:  The  deal  had  been   renounced  because  of   the  
Israeli   intransigence   and   its   response   to   the   resistance   condition,’   (17   October   2011).  
<http://tinyurl.com/karppmh>  (accessed  on  8  November  2014).  
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strengthened  Hamas’  conviction  that  its  insistence  on  resistance  was  capable  
of  restoring  Palestinian  rights  in  a  way  that  negotiation  could  not  achieve.  738  
Hamas  not   only   effected   the   prisoner   exchange  deal   but   its   relations  
with   other   Arab   and   Muslim   countries   had   also   been   improved   and  
strengthened,   although   there   was   no   denying   that   Hamas’   relationship   with  
Syria   and   Iran   was   strained.   From   late   2011   to   early   2012,   Prime  Minister  
Ismail   Haniyeh   paid   an   official   visit   to   the   Arab   and   Muslim   countries.   In  
particular,   the   UAE   that   used   to   support   Hamas’   opponent   Muhammad  
Dahlan  with  money  and  weapons  welcomed  Haniyeh’s   visit.739  On   the  other  
hand,  with  the  mediation  of  Qatar,  Khalid  Mishal  visited  Jordan  and  met  King  
Abdullah   in   January   2012.   This   could   be   regarded   as   a   symbolic  
rapprochement   between   Jordan   and   Hamas   since   Hamas’   political   leaders  
were   expelled   from   Jordan   in   1999.740  The   countries   such   as   the   UAE   and  
Jordan   that   did   not   have   an   official   connection   or   who   had   been   hostile   to  
Hamas  started   to  pay  attention   to   its   activities   in   the  post-­revolutionary  era.  
More   importantly,   Qatar,   Egypt   and   Turkey   seemed   to   form   a   new   alliance  
with   Hamas   by   replacing   the   traditional   ‘resistance   axis’:   Iran,   Syria   and  
Hizbullah.  Qatar  and  Turkey  who  already  had  a  good  relationship  with  Hamas  
provided   further   financial   aid   and   moral   support   after   the   revolution.741   In  
October  2012,  the  Qatari  Emir,  Sheikh  Hamad,  visited  Gaza  for  the  first  time.  
He  pledged  to  donate  $400  million  for  the  reconstruction  of  and  investment  in,  
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exchange  deal  is  flawed  and  unacceptable,’  (23  October  2011).  <http://tinyurl.com/npz8v54>  
(accessed  on  8  November  2014).    
739   International   Crisis   Group,   ‘Light   at   the   end   of   their   tunnels?’   Hamas   and   the   Arab  
uprisings,  Middle  East  Report,  op.cit.,  p.4.  
740   ‘Jordan’s   king   receives   Hamas   leader,’   Al-­Jazeera,   (30   January   2012).   <	  
http://www.aljazeera.com/news/middleeast/2012/01/2012129133314758190.html>   (accessed  
on  8  November  2014).  
741   International   Crisis   Group,   ‘Light   at   the   end   of   their   tunnels?’   Hamas   and   the   Arab  
uprisings,  Middle   East   Report,   op.cit.,   p.4;;   Khalid   Hroub,   ‘Qatar   and   the   Arab   Spring,’   in  
Jenan  Amin  (ed.),  Qatar:  Aspirations  and  realities  (Heinrich  Böll  foundation  2012),  p.36.  
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Gaza.742  This   diplomatic   engagement   symbolizing  Hamas’   rule   in  Gaza  was  
recognized  and  legitimated.743          
Another   observation   of   the  way   that   this   new   alliance   interacted  with  
Hamas  was  the  outbreak  of  the  Israeli  war  on  Gaza  in  November  2012  shortly  
after  the  Qatari  Emir’s  visit  to  Gaza.  The  cause  of  the  conflict  between  Israel  
and  Hamas  was  similar  to  the  Operation  Cast  Lead  in  late  2008.  Prior  to  this  
conflict,  there  were  low-­scale  confrontations  on  the  Gaza-­Israel  border744  until  
the   assassination   of   Ahmed   al-­Jabari   on   14th   November,   which   triggered  
Hamas’  intensive  retaliation  by  launching  rockets  towards  Israel.  In  response,  
Israel  launched  air  strikes  on  Gaza.  The  Israeli  strike  could  be  regarded  as  a  
signal   to   Hamas   or   other   Arab   countries   that   Israel   was   not   afraid   of   the  
effects   of   the   regime   change   in   the   Arab   countries   followed   by   the  
ascendancy  of  Islamists.745    
Unlike  the  Operation  Cast  Lead,  from  late  2008  to  early  2009,  this  war  
embarrassed  Israel.  The  result  was  not  what  Israel  expected.  Although  during  
the   Israeli  war   on  Gaza,   there  were  162  Palestinian  deaths  and  over   1,000  
injuries, 746   Hamas’   governance   in   Gaza   remained   intact   and   it   attracted  
unprecedented  attention   from   the  Arab  and  Muslim   countries.   The  Egyptian  
Prime   Minister   and   the   Tunisian   foreign   minister   respectively   visited   Gaza  
during  the  war,  demonstrating  solidarity  with  Palestinians  and  condemning  the  
Israeli  aggression.747  More  than  that,  for  the  first  time,  the  Qatari  and  Turkish  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
742   ‘Qatar   emir   calls   for   Palestinian   unity   on   visit   to   Gaza,’   BBC,   (23   October   2012).  
<http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-­middle-­east-­20037203>  (accessed  on  9  November  2014).    
743  Beverley  Milton-­Edwards,  ‘Hamas  and  the  Arab  Spring  strategic  shifts?’  Middle  East  policy,  
Vol.XX,  No.3  (Fall  2013),  p.  67.  
744  International  Crisis  Group,   ‘Israel  and  Hamas:  Fire  and  ceasefire   in  a  new  Middle  East’,  
Middle  East  report,  No.  133  (22  November  2012),  p.1.  
745  International  Crisis  Group,   ‘Israel  and  Hamas:  Fire  and  ceasefire   in  a  new  Middle  East’,  
Middle  East  report,  No.  133,  op.cit.,  p.i.  746	  Palestinian  Centre  for  Human  Rights,  ‘The  total  numbers  of  victims  of  the  Israeli  offensive  
on  the  Gaza  Strip,’  (24  November  2012).  
<http://www.pchrgaza.org/portal/en/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=9052:1&
catid=145:in-­focus>  (accessed  on  9  November  2014).	  
747  ‘Egypt  PM  decries  Israeli  aggression  on  Gaza,’  Al-­Jazeera,  (16  November  2012).  
<http://www.aljazeera.com/news/middleeast/2012/11/201211166273719642.html>  (accessed  
on  9  November  2014).    ‘Foreign  Affairs  Minister  denounces  attack  on  Tunisian  school  in  
Gaza,’  Tunisialive,  (19  November  2012).  <http://www.tunisia-­live.net/2012/11/19/foreign-­
minister-­denounces-­attack-­on-­tunisian-­school-­in-­gaza/>  (accessed  on  9  November  2014).    
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leaders   gathered   in   Cairo   with   the   Egyptian   President  Mursi   to   discuss   the  
war   on  Gaza   and   to   attempt   to   stop   the   confrontation   between  Hamas   and  
Israel.748  Because  of  this  solidarity  and  the  prompt  reaction  from  the  Arab  and  
Muslim  countries,  Hamas  was  full  of  confidence  and  contentment.  Unlike  the  
past  when   the  Arab  countries  had  been   indifferent   to   Israeli  aggression,   this  
time,   Hamas’   leaders   were   highly   appreciative   of   the   Arab   countries’   and  
Turkey’s   efforts   to   stand   with   Palestinians.   Hamas   also   hoped   that   these  
countries  would   take   the   further   step  of   reconsidering   their   relationship  with  
Israel   and   support   Palestinian   resistance   at   financial,   military   and   political  
levels.749        
Under  Egyptian  mediation,   Israel   and  Hamas   reached  a   ceasefire  on  
21st   November.   Hamas   leaders   claimed   that   the   ceasefire   was   a   victory  
because   it   would   stipulate   the   opening   of   the   crossing   and   the   stop   of   the  
Israeli  aggression  via   land,  sea  and  air.   In  other  words,   the  closure  of  Gaza  
that   lasted   for  over  5  years  seemed   to  be   lifted.  People   in  Gaza  were   joyful  
and   celebrated   this   victory   on   the   street.  750  Indeed,   after   the   8-­day   war   on  
Gaza,   it   seemed   that   Hamas   was   at   the   peak   of   its   popularity   and   it   was  
aware   that   the   Middle   East   region   was   gradually   inclined   to   accept   its  
resistance  principle.  The  exiled  Hamas’  political  leader,  Khalid  Mishal’s  visit  to  
Gaza   on   7th   December   created   a   sense   of   excitement   and   aspiration   for  
national  unity.  This  visit  was  also  considered  to  be  an  indication  of  the  right  of  
return.   Another   Hamas   leader,   Izzat   al-­Rishq   said   that   ‘The   return   of   the  
Hamas  leadership  in  the  light  of  the  victory  paved  the  way  for  the  activation  of  
the  right  of  return,  for  the  return  of  all  Palestinian  refugees  to  their  towns  and  
villages….  Today  we  are  in  the  freed  Gaza.  Tomorrow  will  be  Jerusalem  and  
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750  International  Crisis  Group,   ‘Israel  and  Hamas:  Fire  and  ceasefire   in  a  new  Middle  East’,  
Middle  East  report,  No.  133,  op.cit.,  p.20.  
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the   day   after   tomorrow   will   be   in   Haifa   and   Jaffa.’ 751   However,   this   high  
expectation  was  ephemeral.  With  the  deteriorating  situation  of  the  civil  war  in  
Syria,  the  polarized  politics  in  Egypt  and  the  instability  of  Sinai,  it  was  hard  for  
Hamas  to  cope  with  the  uncertain  scenario  in  the  late  Arab  Spring.  
3.2.2  The  Predicaments    
Hamas’  high  expectation  that  the  Palestinian  cause  would  come  to  the  
fore   in   the   Middle   East   gradually   faded   as   Arab   countries   became  
preoccupied  by  domestic  affairs.752  The  aspiration  to  ease  the  Gaza  blockage  
did  not  materialize  due   to   the   fact   that  Egypt  did  not  dramatically  change   its  
policy   regarding   Palestine   in   the   post-­revolution   era.   The   Egyptian   policy  
towards   the   border   issue   with   Gaza   was   cautious   and   conservative.753  The  
number  of  Palestinian  passengers  through  the  Rafah  crossing  increased  while  
there  were  strict  regulations  and  restrictions  for  their  movement.754  Apart  from  
that,   the   tunnels   that   sustained   livelihoods   in  Gaza  were  demolished  by   the  
Egyptian   security   force,   for   the  management   of   security   in   Sinai.755  Overall,  
essentially,   the  economy   in  Gaza  did  not   improve.  The  movement  of  goods,  
people  and  humanitarian  aids  were  still  under  restriction.  To  Hamas’  leaders  it  
was  clear  that  the  Palestinian  issue  had  been  sidelined  and  diverted  because  
other   Arab   authorities   were   preoccupied   with   their   internal   affairs   but   they  
believed  that  this  was  a  temporary  phenomenon.756    	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in  the  world  with  the  exception  of  "Israel"  and  reconciliation  is  a  priority  and  necessary  for  us,’  
(11  December  2012).  <http://tinyurl.com/pqxgd8q>  (accessed  on  9  November  2014).    
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753   Rashid   Khalidi,   ‘The   Palestine   question   amid   regional   transformations,’   Journal   of  
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Hamas   seeks   free   trade   zone,’   Al-­Monitor,   (2   October   2012).   <http://www.al-­
monitor.com/pulse/politics/2012/10/egypts-­demolition-­of-­gaza-­tunnels-­worse-­than-­under-­
mubarak.html>  (accessed  on  9  November  2014).    
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project   as   soon   as   possible   for   our   people   and   our   cause,’   (24   November   2011).  
<http://tinyurl.com/oddk5x7>   (accessed   on   9   November   2014).      Khalid   Mishal,   ‘political  
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April   2013).   <http://www.amec.org.za/articles-­presentations/palestineisrael/452-­real-­targets-­
	   201	  
During   the   Arab   Spring   Hamas   reaffirmed   its   position   that   it   did   not  
intervene  in  the  domestic  affairs  of  any  Arab  countries.  However  the  policy  of  
neutrality  that  Hamas  espoused  seemed  to  be  defunct.  The  civil  war  in  Syria  
was  a  discernible  case.  Hamas’  exiled  political  leaders  that  had  been  situated  
in  Damascus  since  2001  faced  a  dilemma  during  the  outbreak  of  revolution  in  
Syria.   As   a   long-­term   ally   of   Syria,   Hamas   leaders   were   cautious   not   to  
directly   take   sides   with   the   people   or   the   regime   in   public.   Hamas’   leaders  
officially   claimed   that   the   bloodbath   needed   to   be   stopped   but   they   did   not  
explicitly  condemn   the  Syrian   regime.757  This  ambiguous   language  gradually  
changed  in  February  2012  when  Hamas’  exiled  political  leaders  left  Syria  and  
Ismail   Haniyeh   addressed   a   speech   in   the   Al-­Azhar   mosque   in   Cairo,   that  
praised,   ‘the   heroic   Syrian   people’.758  Furthermore   the   time   was   difficult   for  
the  exiled  Hamas  leaders  living  in  Syria  as  the  number  of  casualties  increased  
and   people   were   displaced   or   massacred,   including   Palestinian   refugees.  
Khalid  Mishal   asserted   that   they  appreciated   the  Syrian   regime’s   support   in  
the  past  but   it  did  not  mean  that  Hamas  was   loyal   to   this   regime.  He  added  
that   ‘what  was   happening   in   Syria  was   a   big   crime   against   the   people   and  
country,’759  and   ‘Hamas  were  with  people   in  Syria  who  aspired   for   freedom,  
dignity,  reform  and  democracy’.760        
The   crisis   in   Syria   affected   Hamas’   other   allies   in   the   ‘axis   of  
resistance,’   Iran   and   Hizbullah.   In   particular,   because   of   its   support   of   the  
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Haniyeh   talked   to  masses   in  Al-­Azhar  mosque,   ‘I   salute   the  heroic  Syrian  people,  who  are  
striving   for   freedom,   democracy   and   reform.’   The   masses   responded   that   ‘No   Iran,   No  
Hizbullah,   Syria   is   Islamic’   and   ‘Leave,   Leave   Bashar.   Leave,   leave   Butcher.’   Quoted   in  
International  Crisis  Group,  ‘Light  at  the  end  of  their  tunnels?’  Hamas  and  the  Arab  uprisings,  
Middle  East  Report,  No.129,  op.cit.,  pp.11-­12.  
759  The  Palestine  Information  Center,  ‘Called  for  unified  Arab  strategy.  Mishal:  the  big  weight  
for   President  Mursi   is   to   enhances   the   chances   to   the   reconciliation   success,’   (29   January  
2013).  <http://tinyurl.com/oomutkt>  (accessed  on  9  November  2014).    
760  The   Palestine   Information   Center,   ‘Khalid   Mishal   talks   to   "the   Monitor",‘   (5   May   2013).  
<http://web.archive.org/web/20130507181530/http://www.palinfo.com/site/pic/newsdetails.asp
x?itemid=134241>  (accessed  on  9  November  2014).    
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Syrian  revolution,   Iran  suspended  $23  million  aid   to  Hamas  as  a  warning.761  
But  this  did  not  indicate  that  Hamas  had  fundamentally  broken  its  relationship  
with  Iran.  As  Mishal  clarified,  although  Hamas  held  a  different  view  from  Iran  
and  Hizbullah  on  the  crisis  of  Syria,  it  still  maintained  relationships  with  them  
based   on   the   principle   of   resistance   against   the   Zionist   occupier.762  On   the  
whole,   the   axis   of   resistance   did   not   work   during   the   Arab   Spring.   On   the  
contrary,   as   noted   before,   a   new   alliance   with   Turkey,   Qatar   and   Egypt  
seemed  to  emerge  for  the  Palestinian  cause.  Hamas  attempted  to  seek  these  
countries’   support   in  compensation   for   the   loss  of   the  axis  of   resistance  but  
this  aspiration  was  obscured  by  Egyptian  domestic  politics.  
Traditionally,  Egypt  had  been  more  of  a  key-­actor  in  Palestinian  issues  
than   any   other   Arab   countries.   For   example,   since   late   1995,   Egypt   had  
mediated   the   dispute   between   Fatah   and   Hamas. 763   During   the   al-­Aqsa  
Intifada,  Egypt  made  efforts  to  deal  with  Hamas  and  other  Palestinian  factions  
for  a  ceasefire  in  2003  and  the  Palestinian  unity  in  2005.  However,  Egypt  was  
more   concerned   with   its   national   security   than   Hamas’   resistance   project.  
After   the  division  between  Hamas  and  Fatah   in  2007,   the  Egyptian  authority  
deemed   Hamas’   governance   in   Gaza   was   a   potential   threat   to   its   national  
interest.  Hamas  did  not  want  to  provoke  Egypt  but  only  reaffirmed  its  position  
of  neutrality  concerning  Egyptian  affairs.  But  the  Egyptian  authorities  seemed  
to   ignore   this  call;;   it   intensified   the  closure  of   the  Rafah  crossing  and  took  a  
passive  stance  on  the  Israeli  war  on  Gaza.    
With   the   outbreak   of   the   revolution   in   Egypt   and   the   fall   of   Hosni  
Mubarak,  Hamas  was  confident  that  the  Palestinian  cause  would  be  central  to  
Egypt,   especially   when   the   Brotherhood  won   the   consecutive   elections   and  
Muhammad  Mursi  was  elected  as  Egypt’s  president.  As  a  matter  of   fact,   the  
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762  The   Palestine   Information   Center,   ‘Khalid   Mishal   talks   to   "the   Monitor",‘   (5   May   2013).  
<https://web.archive.org/web/20130507181530/http://www.palinfo.com/site/pic/newsdetails.as
px?itemid=134241>  (accessed  on  10  November  2014).    
763  Mohsen  Moh’d  Saleh,  ‘Egypt  and  Hamas  (1/2):  The  nature  and  development  of  their  
relation,’  Al-­Zaytouna  Centre  for  studies  and  consultations,  
<https://eng.alzaytouna.net/2009/01/15/egypt-­and-­hamas-­12-­the-­nature-­and-­development-­of-­
their-­relation/>  (accessed  on  24  May  2014).    
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rise   of   the   Brotherhood   would   not   truly   benefit   Hamas.   President   Mursi  
reaffirmed   that   Egypt   would   abide   by   the   peace   treaty   with   Israel 764   and  
maintained  its  relationship  with  the  US.  Although  during  the  Israeli  8-­day  war  
on  Gaza  Mursi   had  mediated   the   confrontation   between   Israel   and  Hamas,  
there   was   no   indication   that   Egyptian   foreign   policy   had   been   dramatically  
changed   in   favour   of   Hamas.   During   Mursi’s   term   the   Egyptian   authority  
demolished  parts  of   the   tunnels  and   restricted   the  movement  of  people  and  
goods  through  the  Rafah  crossing.  
          Furthermore,   after   the   revolution   and   the   Brotherhood’s   victory   in  
the   elections,   the   Egyptian   media   was   suspicious   of   Hamas’   special  
relationship  with  the  Brotherhood  by  portraying  Hamas  as  its  overseas  branch.  
In  response  to  this  allegation,  Hamas  claimed  that  they  were  not  affiliated  with  
the   Brotherhood   in   Egypt   but   they   did   not   deny   that   Hamas’   thought   was  
inherited   from   the   school   of   the   Brotherhood. 765   To   make   a   distinction  
between  Hamas  and   the  Brotherhood   in  Egypt,  Hamas’  political   leader,  Abu  
Marzuq   articulated   that   Hamas   was   the   Palestinian   national   liberation  
movement  operating  within  Palestinian   territory  only.   In  other  words,  Hamas  
did  not  intend  to  become  involved  in  Egyptian  internal  affairs.766    
The  Egyptian  media’s  allegations  against  Hamas  intensified,  along  with  
the   polarization   of   secularism   and   Islamization   in   Egyptian   politics.   Hamas  
was  blamed   for:   the   turmoil   in  Egyptian  society,   including   the  attacks  on   the  
Egyptian  soldiers  in  Sinai,  assistance  to  the  Brotherhood  members’  jail-­break  
during   the   revolution,   funding   Mursi,   the   smuggling   of   oil   from   Egypt,   the  
attacks  on  Egyptian  Christians  and  the  sending  of  al-­Qassam  fighters  to  Egypt.  
Hamas  could  not  accept  this  series  of  charges  and  felt  that  a  certain  party  and  
the   media   had   deliberately   disseminated   inaccurate   information   in   order   to  
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that-­peace-­treaty-­is-­safe-­1.461123>  (accessed  on  10  November  2014)  .    
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complex   and   dangerous   situation   and   Egypt's   Revolution   brings   hope,’   (5   July   2011).  
<http://tinyurl.com/pmxw4uy>  (accessed  on  10  November  2014).  
766  The  Palestine  Information  Center,  ‘Abu  Marzuq:  We  expect  the  revolution  on  25  January.  
At  least  it  can  break  the  siege,’  (18  August  2011).  <http://tinyurl.com/p6hbxz5>  (accessed  on  
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discredit   Hamas. 767   Hamas   underpinned   its   policy   of   neutrality,   that   is,   it  
respected   Egyptian   politics   and   did   not   become   involved   in   the   dispute  
between   the   Brotherhood   and   the   opposition   parties. 768   However,   this  
assertion  did  not  convince  the  Egyptian  media  and  the  opposition.    
After  the  ousting  of  the  President  Mursi,  the  Egyptian  authority  shaped  
an   atmosphere   of   anti-­Brotherhood   through   the   media.   Initially,   Hamas  
reiterated   that   its   relationship   with   Egypt   would   not   be   affected   by   Mursi’s  
fall. 769 However,   when   the   Brotherhood   was   described   as   a   terrorist  
organization  and  the  Egyptian  authority  cracked  down,  Hamas  was  faced  with  
a  crisis  in  its  governance  of  Gaza  that  was  unprecedented  since  the  division  
with  Fatah  in  2007.  According  to  Egyptian  media’s  coverage,  Hamas  became  
a   national   enemy   of   Egypt. 770   The   Egyptian   authority   closed   the   Rafah  
crossing   and   systematically   demolished   the   tunnels,   severely   affecting  
livelihoods  in  Gaza.771  The  numbers  of  exits  and  entrances  of  people  via  the  
Rafah  crossing  dramatically  dropped  by  70  per   cent   in   July  2013.772  Hamas  
did   not   explicitly   condemn   the   Egyptian   authority   but   blamed   Fatah   for  
providing   false   information   to   the   Egyptian   media   and   provoking   a   coup  
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February   2013).   <http://tinyurl.com/mxh6owd>   (accessed   on   11   November   2014).   The  
Palestine   Information   Center,   ‘Abu   Marzuq:   There   is   no   conflict   within   Hamas.   Israel   is  
interested  in  deepening  the  Palestinian  division,’  (13  April  2013).  <http://tinyurl.com/oqcsdpz>  
(accessed  on  11  November  2014).    
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Authority   in  Ramallah   and   Israel   is   "a   risk  without   calculation."   Hamas   is   committed   to   the  
Palestinian   reconciliation,’   (27   July   2013).   <http://tinyurl.com/qdqumtw>   (accessed   on   11  
November  2014).    
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2013).  <http://www.al-­monitor.com/pulse/originals/2013/07/egypt-­media-­incitement-­
palestinians.html#ixzz2ZPp1tgQ7>  (accessed  on  11  November  2014).    
771  Lena  Odgaard   and   Lazar   Simeonov,   ‘Wasting   away   in   the  Gaza   Strip,’  Al-­Jazeera,   (20  
November   2013).   <http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/features/2013/11/wasting-­away-­gaza-­
strip-­2013112093312839916.html>  (accessed  on  11  November  2014).    
772  In  June  2013,  55,995  people  were  via  the  Rafah  crossing  for  the  exits  and  entrances  but  in  
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Gisha,  <http://gisha.org/graph/2399>  (accessed  on  27  May  2014).  
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against  Hamas.773  The  aspiration  of  Palestinian  unity  declined  as  the  coup  in  
Egypt  created  a  rift  between  Fatah  and  Hamas.  
The  failure  of  national  unity  was  not  simply  the  dispute  between  Fatah  
and  Hamas.   Tensions  within  Hamas’   leadership  were   another   factor   for   the  
postponement  of  the  reconciliation  deal  from  May  2011.774  The  tension  within  
Hamas  seemed  to  widen  when  Khalid  Mishal  unilaterally  reached  a  new  deal  
with  Abbas   in  Doha   in  February  2012.  Leaders   in  Gaza  were  surprised   that  
Abbas  was  to  take  the  position  of  the  Prime  Minister  in  the  future  technocratic  
government;;775  and  they  criticized  Mishal  for  not  consulting  with  other  leaders  
beforehand.   This   tension   is   often   described   as   a   competition   between  
hardliner   and   moderate   leaders. 776   To   be   precise,   there   were   different  
calculations  among  Hamas’  leadership  regarding  the  reconciliation  deal.    
There  can  be  no  doubt  that  Hamas’  leaders  in  the  occupied  territories  
and  abroad  all  supported  national  unity  but  the  question  that  taxed  them  was  
the   timing  of   the   reconciliation.  Hamas   leaders   in  Gaza   considered   that   the  
Arab  Spring  had  gradually  changed   the   regional  structure   in   favour  of  Gaza  
and  weakened   the   PA   in   the  West   Bank.   As   a   result,   there  was   no   urgent  
need  to  reach  a  reconciliation  at  that  moment.777  In  contrast,  Hamas’  leaders  
in   exile   took   another   view,   considering   that   Egypt   would   not   provide  
sustainable   financial   and   political   support   for   Hamas   in   the   short-­term   as  
Mursi  and  the  Brotherhood  were  preoccupied  with  domestic  issues.  Therefore  
they  thought  it  would  be  better  to  have  reached  reconciliation  in  the  first  place.  
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uprisings,’  op.cit.,  p.27.  
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For   the  exiled   leaders,  simply  waiting   for   things   to  change   in  Hamas’   favour  
seemed  passive  and  unrealistic.  778  
Hamas’   internal   disagreement   concerning   reconciliation   remained  
unresolved.   Apart   from   that,   Hamas   members   in   the   West   Bank   were   not  
allowed  to  hold  activities  in  public,  which  hindered  the  reconciliation  as  well.779  
In   February   2013,   Abu   Marzuq   conceded   that   the   schedule   for   the  
reconciliation   deal  was   only   30   per   cent   complete.780  After   four  months,   the  
ousting   of   Mursi   and   the   fall   of   the   Brotherhood   made   the   reconciliation  
impossible.  Hamas’  aspiration  that   the  siege  of  Gaza  would  be   lifted  and  for  
national   unity,   had   failed   again.   For   the   time   being,   it   seemed   that   the  
resistance  project  that  Hamas  firmly  espoused  was  in  question.  
3.3  Has  the  resistance  project  failed?    
The  Arab  Spring  had  offered  hope  and  opportunities  for  Hamas.  Since  
the   collapse   of   the   authoritarian   regime   and   the   rise   of   Islamism,   Hamas  
believed  that  the  Middle  East  was  going  in  the  right  direction,  that  is,  in  favour  
of  Palestine.  But  Hamas  and  many  others  could  not   imagine   that   the  rise  of  
Islamists  across   the   region  would  be  short-­lived;;  and   they  could  not   foresee  
that   the   fall   of   the   Brotherhood   in   Egypt   would   have   a   far-­reaching   and  
negative  impact  on  Hamas.    
It   could   be   said   that   essentially,   the   Arab   Spring   did   not   change   the  
structure  of   the  Middle  East.   Instead,   the   Islamic  ummah   that  Hamas  hoped  
would  support  the  Palestinian  cause  was  more  fragmented  and  polarized  than  
it  had  been  before  the  revolution.  Hamas  seemed  to  be  in  total  isolation  in  this  
region.  Despite  the  fact  that  it  reiterated  its  non-­interventionist  policy,  because  
of   the   ideas   it   inherited   from   the   Brotherhood,   some   Arab   countries   firmly  
believed   that   Hamas   was   part   of   the   Brotherhood   in   Egypt.   Through   the  
coverage   of   certain   parts   of   the   media,   Hamas   was   not   described   as   a  	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movement  resisting  the  Israeli  occupation  but  as  an  enemy  or  a  ‘terrorist’  that  
threatened  national  security  in  Arab  countries.781    
Furthermore,   an   anti-­Brotherhood   or   anti-­revolution   trend   spreading  
across  the  region  shattered  Hamas’  aspiration  of  the  unity  of  Islamic  ummah.  
In   Egypt,   the   Brotherhood   experienced   an   unprecedented   crackdown.  Most  
leaders  were  arrested  and  a  large  number  of  members  that  protested  against  
the  military  coup  were  killed  on  the  street.  The  affiliated  civil  institutions  were  
closed  as  the  Egyptian  authority’s  policy  seemed  to  eradicate  the  roots  of  the  
Brotherhood.782  As   for   the   Gulf   countries,   the   U.A.E.   arrested   hundreds   of  
citizens  that  claimed  to  be  members  of  the  Brotherhood;;783  Saudi  Arabia  fully  
supported   the   Egyptian   authority   in   its   fight   against   ‘terrorism’784  as   well   as  
providing   funds   of   $5   billion   to   Egypt.785  The   fall   of   the   Brotherhood   also  
created  tensions  between  Qatar  and  Saudi  Arabia.  Saudi  Arabia  withdrew  its  
ambassador  from  Qatar  in  March  2014  as  a  sign  of  the  deterioration  between  
the  two  sides.  786  As  for  Qatar  and  Turkey,  even  though  they  sympathized  with  
Hamas   and   attempted   to   alleviate   the   blockade   of   Gaza,   since   they   were  
allies  of  the  United  States  in  this  region,  it  was  impossible  for  them  to  do  what  	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784  ‘Saudi  King  Abdullah  declares  support  for  Egypt  against  terrorism,’  Al-­Arabiya,  (16  August  
2013).   <http://english.alarabiya.net/en/News/middle-­east/2013/08/16/Saudi-­King-­Abdullah-­
declares-­support-­of-­Egypt-­against-­terrorism.html>  (accessed  on  12  November  2014).        
785  Patrick  Werr,‘UAE  offers  Egypt  $3  billion  support,  Saudis  $  5  billion,’  Reuters,  (9  July  
2013).  <http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/07/09/us-­egypt-­protests-­loan-­
idUSBRE9680H020130709>  (accessed  on  12  November  2014).    
786   Madawi   Al-­Rasheed,   ‘Saudi-­Qatar   tensions   divide   GCC,’   Al-­Monitor,   (6   March   2014).  
<http://www.al-­monitor.com/pulse/originals/2014/03/saudi-­qatar-­gcc-­tensions-­islamist.html>  
(accessed  on  12  November  2014).  ‘Saudi,  UAE,  Bahrain  withdraw  Qatar  enyoys,’  Al-­Jazeera,  
(6   March   2014).   <http://www.aljazeera.com/news/middleeast/2014/03/saudi-­uae-­bahrain-­
withdraw-­qatar-­envoys-­20143591141945753.html>  (accessed  on  12  November  2014).    
	   208	  
Hamas  expected:   to  end   their  diplomatic   relationship  with   Israel  and   to  offer  
unconditional  support  for  the  resistance  project.          
It  can  be  said   that,   fundamentally,  Hamas’   resistance  strategy  had   its  
limitations.   The   struggle   to   uphold   the   Palestinian   cause   needs,   as   a  
prerequisite,   the   unity   of   the   Islamic   ummah.   But   in   reality,   Arab   countries  
were  concerned  about  their  domestic  affairs  and  national  interests  more  than  
the  Palestinian  cause  during  this  period.  As  we  can  see  from  the  way  that  the  
Arab   countries   actively   competed   in   the   issue   of   the   Brotherhood   and  
intervened   in   the   civil   war   in   Syria,   it   was   inevitable   that   Palestine   was  
marginalized.  However,  even  under  these  adverse  circumstances,  Hamas  still  
waited   for   the   appearance   of   a   strong   ummah,   a   crucial   factor   in   the  
facilitation  of  its  resistance  project  even  though  many  claimed  ‘the  end  of  the  
political   Islam’   after   the   coup   in   Egypt.787  In   October   2013,   Ismail   Haniyeh  
delivered  a  speech  calling  for  reconciliation  with  Fatah,  stressing  the  message  
of  liberation  from  the  Zionist  occupation  and  appealing  for  the  support  of  Arab  
and   Muslim   countries.788  It   can   be   argued   that   Hamas   would   not   alter   its  
insistence  on  a  resistance  project  because  Fatah’s  adoption  of  a  negotiation  
approach   did   not   restore   Palestinians’   rights,   alleviate   the   Palestinians’  
suffering   and   stop   the   expansion  of   the   Jewish   settlements.   In   this   respect,  
Hamas  still  believed   that   the   resistance  project  was   the   raison  d’être   for   the  
Palestinian  cause  regardless  of  different  scenarios  in  the  future.    
Overall,   the   concept   of   resistance   remained   a   central   theme   that  
Hamas   highlighted   during   the   Arab   Spring.   Hamas   kept   this   principle   for  
seeking   support   from   Arab   and   Muslim   countries   as   well   as   responding   to  
various   incidents.   It   is  noted   that  compared  to   the  period  between  2003  and  
2006,  Hamas  articulated   its   resistance  project   further  with  a   level  of  nuance  
on:   the  condition  of  negotiation,   the   reason   for   the   rejection  of   the   two-­state  	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solution  and   its   relations  with   Israel.  The   final   section  will   address   this   topic  
and  an  overall  evaluation  of  Hamas’  political  transformation  from  2006  to  2013  
will  be  provided.    
4.  Conclusion:  The  Overall  evaluation  of  Hamas’  political  
engagement  
Following  the  PLC  election  in  January  2006  Hamas  further  engaged  in  
politics  and  became  an  indispensable  actor  in  Palestine,  and  in  the  rest  of  the  
region   as   well,   that   is,   in   terms   of   its   participation   with   the   PA.   However,  
throughout  this  period,  although  Hamas  experienced  many  setbacks  such  as  
the  political  division  in  Gaza  and  the  West  Bank,  the  closure  of  Gaza,  and  the  
Israeli  wars  on  Gaza,  Hamas  leaders  did  not  regret  this  political  engagement.  
Khalid  Mishal  argued  that  the  participation  of  the  PA  was  not  at  the  expense  
of   Hamas’   resistance   project;;   on   the   contrary,   their   experience   in   the   PA  
enhanced   and   protected   this   project.   He   added   that   if   Hamas   did   not  
participate  in  the  PA,  the  resistance  project  would  be  at  risk  in  the  same  way  
that  had  occurred  in  the  West  Bank  when  Hamas’  force  was  suppressed  and  
stopped  by  Abbas  and   Israel  after   the  political  division   in  June  2007.789  The  
participation   of   the   PA   was   definitely   a   new   experiment   for   Hamas   for  
example,   in   its   formation  of   the  Palestinian  government,   its   rule   in  Gaza  as  
well  as  its  positive  diplomatic  relations  with  Qatar  and  Turkey.  Mishal  admitted  
that   Hamas   made   some   mistakes   in   its   participation   with   the   PA   but   he  
stressed   that   this  political  engagement  provided  Hamas  with   the  opportunity  
to  further  realize  the  people’s  needs  under  the  Israeli  occupation.790  
It   should   be   noted   that   Hamas’   participation   in   the   PA   is   not   at   the  
expense   of   its   ideology;;   nevertheless   it   is   true   that   Hamas’   behaviour  
underwent  a  remarkable  change  in  comparison  with  its  practice  in  the  period  
of   the  al-­Aqsa   Intifada   (2000-­2005).  The  suicide  bombings  had  disappeared  
and  Hamas  leaders  seldom  called  for  sacrifice  after  2006.  But  the  vision  of  the  
‘liberation   of   Palestine’   still   pervaded   Hamas’   discourse.   For   Hamas,   the  
participation  of  the  PA  was  to  protect  its  vision  and  political  ideas  such  as,  the  	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restoration  of  Palestinian  rights,   the  right  of  return  and  Jerusalem  as  capital.  
Prior  to  2004,  Hamas  did  not  consider  participating  in  the  PA.  As  Abdel  Aziz  
al-­Rantisi  stated,   ‘it   is  not   the  time  to  have  ministries   in   the  PA.  It   is   time  for  
liberation  and   resistance’.791  But   since  2004,  Hamas  had  gradually   changed  
its  rhetoric  regarding  political  participation  because  of  the  effects  of  the  Israeli  
disengagement   plan.   Hamas   sensed   that   the   Israeli   evacuation   from   Gaza  
created   an   unprecedented   possibility   of   their   participation   in   Palestinian  
politics.   Afterwards,  Hamas   actively   stressed   the   necessity   of   the   elections,  
political  reform  and  democracy.    
  Hamas’   participation   in   the   PA   could   be   understood   against   this  
background.   Its   political   agenda   was   straightforward:   the   end   of   the  
occupation.   By   doing   this,   Hamas   called   for:   political   partnership,  
comprehensive  reform  in  the  PA  and  the  restructuring  of  the  PLO,  and  Hamas’  
electoral  manifest  and   the  cabinet  platform  had  articulated  details  of  how   to  
proceed.   Through   the   participation   of   the   PA   it   hoped   to   promote   the  
resistance   project   for   inclusion   in   the   national   agenda.   However   the  
combination   of   resistance   and   governance   was   a   new   trial   for   Hamas   that  
raises  questions  such  as:  to  what  extent  had  Hamas  fulfilled  its  commitments  
when   in   government?   Was   Hamas’s   resistance   project   really   applicable   or  
was   it   harmful   to   the   Palestinian   cause?   Would   Hamas   compromise   with  
Israel  in  the  foreseeable  future?  
It   is   possible   to   evaluate   Hamas’   experiment   of   balancing   resistance  
and   governance   in   two   phases.   The   first   phase,   when   Hamas   formed   the  
tenth  Palestinian  government   independently  and  then  cooperated  with  Fatah  
in   the   unity   government   before   the   political   division   in   June   2007,   was  
unsuccessful.   At   this   stage,   the   Hamas-­led   government   was   under  
international  sanction  from  the  outset.  It  was  extremely  difficult   for  a  Hamas-­
led  government  to  implement  its  political  programme.  The  Quartet,  mainly  led  
by   the   U.S.   asked   Hamas   to   recognize   the   legitimacy   of   Israel   as   a  
precondition  for  the  lifting  of  the  international  sanction.  It  was  unimaginable  for  	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Hamas  to  accept  this  condition  because  it  would  be  political  suicide;;  and  also  
the  resistance  project  that  it  had  been  constructing  since  2002  would  collapse  
overnight.   In   addition,   Fatah’s   political   agenda   that   was   in   fundamental  
contradiction  with  Hamas  was   incompatible  with  Hamas’   expectation   for   the  
unity   government.   Abbas  was   hoping   that  Hamas   had   been   distanced   from  
armed  resistance  and  able  to  accept  the  principle  of  negotiation  with  Israel.  As  
for  Hamas,   to   accept  Abbas’   request  was   also   against   the   foundation   of   its  
resistance  project.  In  spite  of  this,  Hamas  attempted  to  persuade  Abbas  and  
Fatah  of   the  significance  of   the  Palestinian  unity  but   the  executive  force  that  
the  Hamas-­led  government  created  had  caused  huge  controversy  and  paved  
the  way  for  the  division  between  Hamas  and  Fatah  later,  in  June  2007.  At  this  
stage,  Hamas  was  unable   to  promote   its   resistance  project   into   the  national  
agenda  as  it  had  expected  and  what  was  worse  for  Hamas  was  that  it  broke  
its  commitment  not  to  fight  with  Fatah.  
The   second   phase   was   the   period   when   Hamas   ruled   Gaza  
independently,   as   the   Palestinian   national   unity   had   been   shattered.  
Compared  to  the  PA’s  governance  in  the  West  Bank,  Hamas  had  created  an  
alternative   model   in   Gaza.   The   institutionalized   resistance   project   was   the  
main   feature   of   Hamas’   government   in   Gaza.   In   the   absence   of   a   political  
partner,   for   the   first   time  Hamas   had   partially  materialized   its   commitments  
according   to   its  political  programme   in  2006.   In   terms  of  security,  unlike   the  
PA   in   the  West   Bank   that   had   to   cooperate   with   Israel,   Hamas   had   a   free  
hand   to   reform  and   to  manage  security  affairs.  As   for   the  economic  aspect,  
Hamas  also  partially  sustained  economic   independence  in  Gaza  through  the  
‘tunnel   economy’.   Overall,   Hamas   stabilized   Gaza   and   kept   its   governance  
intact  even  under   the  blockade  and  during   the   Israeli  war  on  Gaza.  But   this  
form   of   governance   did   not   reflect   the   spirit   of   its   political   programme:  
democracy,   freedom  and  pluralism.  Hamas’   rule  of  Gaza  was  based  on   the  
soft  authoritarianism  that  allowed  opposition,  with  certain  limitations.792  
At  any  rate,  there  is  no  denying  that  since  it  had  governed  Gaza  alone,  
what  made  a  huge  difference  for  Hamas  was  that  it  had  gradually  become  a  	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significant  actor  in  Palestine  and  the  Middle  East.  In  particular,  it  incrementally  
played   an   influential   role   in   the   outbreak   of   the   ‘Arab   Spring’   from   the   late  
2010  to  mid-­2013.  As  the  authoritarian  regime  in  Tunisia  and  Egypt  collapsed  
and   there  was  a  prevalence  of   Islamists   in  politics,  Hamas  was   thrilled  with  
the  new  phenomenon  and  felt  for  the  first  time,  that  the  tide  was  turning  in  its  
favour.  Hamas  was  convinced  that  the  Arab  and  Muslim  countries  would  unite  
in   the  Palestinian  cause.  The   Israeli  war  on  Gaza   in  November  2012  was  a  
clear   indication   of   this   as  Egypt,   Turkey   and  Qatar   actively   coordinated   the  
ceasefire.   However,   the   phenomenon   was   transient.   The   coup   in   Egypt  
shattered   Hamas’   aspiration.   Hamas’   governance   in   Gaza   was   severely  
affected  by  the  repercussion  of   the  breakdown  of  the  Muslim  Brotherhood  in  
Egypt.   In   spite   of   this,   it   was   expected   that   Hamas   would   adhere   to   its  
principle  of  resistance  and  call  for  reconciliation  and  national  unity  as  a  priority,  
irrespective  of  any  circumstance.  
It   is   hard   to   believe   that   Hamas   would   renounce   resistance   or  
recognize   Israel   in   the   foreseeable   future.   It   is   clear   that   after   Hamas’  
participation   with   the   PA,   its   view   and   reaction   to   various   incidents   and  
challenges  did  not  derail  the  ideal  of  the  resistance  project.  Hamas’  response  
to   popular   resistance   raised   by   the   PA   president   Abbas   is   an   example.   In  
2011,  Abbas  called  for  popular  resistance,  stressing  that  it  must  be,  ‘unarmed  
popular   resistance   so   that   nobody  misunderstands   us.’  793  Hamas   accepted  
this   but   it   claimed   that   popular   resistance   should   not   be   at   the   expense   of  
armed  resistance  since,  in  a  state  of  occupation,  it  is  indispensable.794    
A   response   to   the   two-­state   solution   is   another   typical   example.   At  
present,  the  two-­state  solution  is  still  considered  to  be  a  supportive  option  for  
the   West   for   ending   the   Israeli-­Palestinian   conflict.   Before   its   political  
participation  in  the  PA,  Hamas  was  not  interested  in  a  discussion  as  to  why  it  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
793  ‘Abbas   tells  Palestinians:  Step   up  Arab  Spring-­style   protest   against   Israel,’  Haaretz,   (27  
July   2011).   <http://www.haaretz.com/news/diplomacy-­defense/abbas-­tells-­palestinians-­step-­
up-­arab-­spring-­style-­protests-­against-­israel-­1.375589>  (accessed  on  15  November  2014).  
794  The  Palestinian  Information  Center,  ‘The  armed  resistance  is  the  pivotal  pillar  for  Hamas,’  
(27   November   2011).   <http://tinyurl.com/n93b9fc>   (accessed   on   14   November   2014).  
Palestine  Information  Center,  ‘Rishq:  Hamas  was  ready  to  dialogue  with  any  countries  in  the  
world  with  the  exception  of  "Israel"  and  reconciliation   is  a  priority  and  necessary  for  us,’   (11  
December  2012).  <http://tinyurl.com/pqxgd8q>  (accessed  on  15  November  2014).  
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did  not  accept  the  two-­state  solution.  It  often  argued  that  liberation  comes  first  
and   the   state   second   while   after   the   political   engagement   in   2006,   Hamas  
further   elaborated   on   why   the   two-­state   solution   is   not   a   possible   option.  
Although   Hamas   offered   its   agenda   for   peace   to   Israel:   the   creation   of   the  
Palestinian  state  within  the  1967  borders  based  on  a  ten-­year  truce,  there  was  
no  sign  that  Hamas  was  willing  to  recognize  Israel’s  legitimacy.  The  reasons  
are  as  follows.  If  Hamas  recognized  Israel,  it  would  mean  that  it  accepted  the  
reality   that   Palestinian   refugees   expelled   by   Israeli   force   in   1948   would   no  
longer  be  able  to  return  to  their  homeland.795  Another  critical  factor  for  Hamas’  
refusal  to  recognize  Israel  is  its  essence.  As  Zionism  is  the  founding  principle  
underpinning  the  creation  of  the  state  of  Israel  Hamas  leaders  consider  Israel  
as   ‘racist,   hostile   and   expansionist   based   on   murder   and   terrorism’.796  For  
Hamas   and   many   Palestinians,   Zionism   reflects   a   form   of   occupation   and  
colonization   and   not   the   ‘national   liberation   movement’   that   Zionists   claim.  
Khalid   Mishal’s   criticism   was   that   the   secular   Zionist   leaders   exploited  
Judaism  and  applied   it   to  politics.797  This  concept  corresponded  to  a  speech  
made  by  the  Israeli  historian  Ilan  Pappe  in  which  he  said,  ‘Most  Zionists  don't  
believe   that   God   exists   but   they   do   believe   that   he   promised   them  
Palestine.’798  
Here   it   is   also  worth   noting   that  Hamas’   fight   for   Israel   is   not   from  a  
purely   religious   consideration   but   mainly   from   the   conception   of   national  
liberation.   After   forming   a   government   and   ruling   Gaza   alone,   Hamas   has  
clearly  distinguished  Jew  from  Zionist.  Hamas’  charter  has  been  criticized  for  
its   anti-­Semitism   and   some   Hamas   leaders   viewed   the   Israeli-­Palestinian  
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2010).  <http://tinyurl.com/n3tw6ba>  (accessed  on  14  November  2014).    
796  Khalid  Mishal,   ‘Political   thought   and   strategies   of   Hamas   in   light   of   the   Arab   uprisings,’  
Afro-­Middle   East   Centre,   (1   April   2013)   <http://www.amec.org.za/articles-­
presentations/palestineisrael/452-­real-­targets-­of-­operation-­brother-­s-­keeper-­are-­hamas-­and-­
unity-­government>  (accessed  on  15  November  2014).  
797   The   Palestine   Information   Center,   ‘Interview   with   Khalid   Mishal,’   (2   August   2010).  
<http://tinyurl.com/osqmlyo>  (accessed  on  15  November  2014).  
798  Ilan  Pappe,  ‘From  the  ‘’Arab  Center‘’  to  the  Palestine  Solidarity  Committee:  The  Campaign  
for  Palestine  in  Britian,  1932-­1938,’  BRISME  2014  Conference,  University  of  Sussex  (16  June  
2014).  
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conflict   as   the   clash   of   civilizations.799  As   a  matter   of   fact,  most   of   the   time  
Hamas   leaders  have  reiterated   that   the  conflict   is  associated  with   the   Israeli  
occupation  and  aggression,  and  is  nothing  to  do  with  religious  conflict.  Khalid  
Mishal  stated  that,  ‘Our  struggle  against  Israelis  is  not  because  they  are  Jews,  
but   because   they   invaded   our   homeland   and   dispossessed   us.  We   do   not  
accept  that  because  the  Jews  were  once  persecuted  in  Europe  they  now  have  
the  right  to  take  our  land  and  throw  us  out.’800    
The  final  reason  why  the  two-­state  solution  is  unacceptable  to  Hamas  
is  that  Hamas  has  a  strong  conviction  that  Zionism  has  no  future  in  Palestine.  
It  seems  that  this  conviction  is  tantamount  to  a  prophecy  of  Islam.  Currently,  
Israel   remains   the  political  and  military  strength  and   the  balance  of  power   is  
on   the   Israeli   side;;   nevertheless,   what   Mishal   observed   is   that   Israel   is  
declining,   that   is,   because  of  Hamas’   resistance.  He  argued   that,   ‘the   great  
Israel   is   ended,   because   Israel   is   not   able   to   achieve   (what   it   wants)   and  
Israel   follows   the   same   path   of   the   end   of   the   racist   South   Africa   in   the  
past.’801  He  also  added   that,   ‘Now  security   is  not   the  main  concern   in   Israeli  
public  opinion  but  is  about  their  future  and  destiny.  When  the  Israeli  society  is  
doubtful  of  their  existence,  it  is  inevitable  that  the  countdown  has  begun.’802    
From   the   above   analysis,   it   is   clear   that   Hamas   definitely   would   not  
accept   the   two-­state   solution,   nor   would   it   compromise   with   Israel   in   the  
foreseeable   future.   The   concept   of   the   ‘liberation   of   Palestine’   and   the  
necessity  of  armed  resistance  has  often  been  raised  since  its  participation  in  
the   PA.   The   liberation   of   Palestine   and   its   striving   for   the   restoration   of  
Palestinian   rights   since   1948   is   still   Hamas’s   unshakeable   conviction.  
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800  Ken   Livingstone,   ‘Exclusive:   Hamas   leader   interview,’   New   Statesman,   (17   September  
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(accessed  on  15  November  2014).  
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However,   Hamas   does   not   elaborate   on   what   the   next   step   is   if   Palestine  
were  to  be  liberated,  or  what  the  character  of  the  state  would  be  in  the  future.  
At  present,  there  is  no  clear  indication  that  Hamas  is  attempting  to  transform  
Palestine   into  an   Islamic  state  as  many  argue;;  ending   the  occupation   is  still  
the  pivotal  task  for  Hamas.  Regarding  the  future  of  Palestine  and  the  essence  
of   the   state,   Mishal   says   that   Hamas   would   respect   the   decision   of   the  
majority   of   Palestinians   in   Palestine   and   abroad   even   if   the   majority   view  
contradicted  Hamas’  opinion.803    
Regarding   the   possibility   of   negotiation   with   Israel,   there   is   also   no  
indication   that   Hamas   is   willing   to   talk   to   Israel   directly   in   the   foreseeable  
future  even  though  Hamas  has  contacted  Israel  through  Egyptian  mediation  in  
the   ceasefire   in   2009   and   the   prisoner   exchange   in   2011.   Negotiation   with  
Israel   seemed   to   be   taboo   for   Hamas   before   it   formed   the   government,  
however  since  then  Hamas  has  raised  the  possibility.  In  general,  Hamas  does  
not  deny  the  concept  of  negotiation  as  Mishal  said,  ‘Negotiation  is  not  a  halal  
or  haram   issue.’804  As   to  why  Hamas   refuses   to  negotiate  with   Israel  at   this  
moment,  there  are  two  main  reasons.  Firstly,  Hamas  argues  that  currently  the  
PA   treats  negotiation  as   the  only  option,  which   is  dangerous   for  Palestinian  
unity  and  cannot  protect  Palestinian  rights.  Muhammad  Nazzal  stressed  that  
negotiation  should  be   to  end   Israeli  occupation   rather   than   to  allow   Israel   to  
stay.805  Secondly,  for  Hamas,  negotiation  itself   is  a  tactical  tool  for  managing  
the  conflict  with   Israel  not   just  a  strategy  and   it  depended  on   the  balance  of  
power.   Hamas   considers   that   nowadays,   negotiation   does   not   serve   the  
Palestinians.   In   the   light   of   the   imbalance   of   power,   Israel   exploited   the  
negotiation  as  a  tool  to  polish  its  image,  to  try  to  normalize  with  the  Arabs  and  
to   buy   time   for   the   expansion   of   the   Jewish   settlements,   the   Judaization   of  
Jerusalem   and   displacement   of   the   Palestinian   population.   In   this   context,  	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negotiation  with  Israel  is  equal  to  surrender.806  In  short,  Hamas  does  not  deny  
the  concept  of  negotiation  but  it  must  conform  to  two  conditions:  Palestinians  
should   benefit   from   it   and   the   balance   of   power   should   incline   towards   the  
Palestinians.    
To   summarize,   Hamas’   participation   with   the   PA   was   to   promote   its  
resistance  project   towards  a  national  agenda.   It  was  a  partial  success  since  
Hamas   institutionalized   its   resistance   project   in   Gaza.   In   addition,   Hamas  
gradually   played   an   important   role   in   this   region   and   attracted   the  
considerable  attention  of  the  world,  particularly  during  the  Israeli  war  on  Gaza.  
However,  Hamas  also  paid  a  high  price  at   the  expense  of   national   unity  as  
well  as  the  Israeli  blockade  and  intimidation.  In  the  future,   it   is  expected  that  
we  cannot  rule  out  the  possibility  that  Hamas  adjusts  its  practice  or  rhetoric  in  
response  to  the  Israeli  occupation  or  that  it  talks  to  Israel,  but  this  change  will  
not   contravene   its   fundamental   principle:   the   liberation   of   Palestine   and   its  
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Part	  III	  Conclusion	  
  
1.  Summary  and  Findings:    
This   research   aims   to   explore   the   process   of   Hamas'   transition   in  
politics  between  2003  and  2013.  It  also  attempts  to  interpret  the  implications  
of  the  transition.  In  general,  conventional  scholarship  on  Hamas  examines  its  
political  transition  in  terms  of  radicalism  or  moderation.  Hamas’  insistence  on  
violence   and   its   refusal   to   accept   Israel’s   legitimacy   could   be   seen   as   an  
indication  of  radicalism  while  Hamas’  political  participation   in  the  PA  and  the  
implicit   recognition   of   Israel   together   with   the   proposed   ten-­year   ceasefire  
could   be   seen   to   display   a  more  moderate   stance.   This   thesis   argues   that  
neither   the   feature  of   radicalism  nor  moderation  captures   the   implications  of  
Hamas’   political   transformation   and   engagement   over   the   ten   years   under  
discussion.   Based   on   the   analysis   of   interviews   with   Hamas   leaders   as   its  
primary   source,   the   research   discovers   that   Hamas’   political   transition   is  
related   to   its   concept   of   resistance   in   the   political   field   between   2003   and  
2013.  Hence,  the  research  employs  Hamas'  concept  of  resistance  to  examine  
Hamas’  political  transition.  
The   key   findings  and  Conclusion  of   the   research  are   summarized  as  
follows:  
1.1  Hamas’  political  transition  is  attributed  to  its  perception  of  resistance  
This  research  asserts  that  Hamas’  political  transition  can  be  attributed  
to   its  perception  of  resistance.  After  the  election  in  2006  Hamas  expected  to  
promote  the  concept  of  resistance  in  its  bid  to  put  it  on  the  national  agenda  to  
end   the   Israeli   occupation.   To   understand   Hamas’   perception   of   resistance  
one  has  to  trace  it  back  to  the  course  of  modern  history  in  Palestine.  That  is  to  
say,   the   history   of   resistance   in   the   name   of   Islam   and   the   features   of  
Palestinian   resistance   between   the   1920s   and   1987   shaped   Hamas’  
perception  of  Zionism  as  well  as   the  principle   for   the   liberation  of  Palestine.  
Since   its   inception   in   1987,   the   liberation   of   Palestine   has   been   Hamas’  
ultimate  aim.    It  is  noted  that  Hamas  does  not  indicate  its  plans  for  the  future  
of   the  Jewish  community  after   the   liberation  and   it  does  not  clearly  propose  
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the   future   of   an   ideal   Palestinian   state.   Rather,   the   liberation   of   Palestine  
could  be  seen  as  an  aspiration  that  motivates  Hamas  to  fight  for  the  deprived  
Palestinians’   rights.   The   concept   of   liberation   is   not   tantamount   to   the  
destruction  of   Israel  which   implies  hatred  and   revenge.   It   reflects  a  mood,  a  
dream,  and  the  hopes  of  Palestinians  who   lost   their   fundamental   rights  after  
1948   when   Israel   declared   independence   at   their   expense.   Hamas   firmly  
believes  that  resistance  is   the  key  to  achieving  Palestine’s   liberation  but   it   is  
cautious   about   putting   the   concept   of   resistance   into   politics.   Hamas   often  
addressed  the  topic  of  resistance  in  relation  to  non-­political  fields  in  the  1990s  
and  until   the  outbreak  of   the  al-­Aqsa   Intifada,  Hamas  had  started   to   rethink  
the  possibility  of  political  participation.  
1.2   Hamas   constructed   and   employed   the   concept   of   resistance   in   its  
resistance  project  in  the  political  field  from  2003  to  2013  
The  research  also  finds  that  the  outbreak  of  the  al-­Aqsa  Intifada  (2000-­
2006)  prompted  Hamas  to  consider  the  possibility  of  political  participation.  To  
reach   its   goal   of   liberating   Palestine,   Hamas   gradually   constructed   the  
concept   of   resistance   known   as   ‘the   resistance   project’   in   the   political   field  
between   2003   and   2006   and   employed   it   during   government   in   2006.   The  
resistance   project   was   originally   designed   to   end   the   Israeli   occupation   of  
historical   Palestine,   but   in   practice,   Hamas’   work   on   resistance   is   mainly  
restricted  to  the  West  Bank  and  Gaza.  In  addition,   the  concept  of  resistance  
does   not   always   refer   to   violence.   During   the   al-­Aqsa   Intifada,   Hamas  
changed   gradually   its   resistance   discourse   from   one   centred   on   armed  
resistance   against   the   Israeli   occupation   to   one   that   saw   the   need   for  
Palestinian   political   reform   and   integration.   Hamas   believes   that   the  
integration   of   Palestinian   politics   is   beneficial   to   its   resistance   project.  
Following  the  process  of  Hamas’  transition  in  politics,  two  events  were  crucial.  
The   first   event   was   the   Israeli   plan   to   disengage   from   Gaza   between  
December   2003   and   August   2005   which   prompted   Hamas   to   consider   the  
possibility   of   political   integration  with   the  PA.   The   second   event   that   further  
triggered   Hamas’   decision   to   participate   in   the   PLC   election   was   Yasser  
Arafat’s   death   in   November,   2004.   Hamas   sensed   that   Palestinian   politics  
was   heading   towards   a   new   stage   in   the   post-­Arafat   era.   The   Cairo  
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declaration,  launched  in  March  2005,  finalized  Hamas’  commitment  to  political  
integration.    
Boosted  by  an  overwhelming  vote  in  the  PLC  election  in  2006,  Hamas  
was   convinced   that   most   Palestinians   chose   its   political   agenda:   that  
resistance   was   better   than   negotiation   with   Israel.   However,   Hamas   faced  
difficulties  in  promoting  its  resistance  project  as  a  national  agenda  due  to  the  
international   boycott   and   the   animosity   of   certain   Fatah   members.   The  
enforcement   of   the   resistance   project,   paradoxically,   started   after   Hamas’  
takeover  of  Gaza  in  June  2007.  For  the  first  time,  Hamas  had  a  free  hand  in  
governing  Gaza  according   to   its  political  agenda.  From  2007   to  2013,  Gaza  
seemed  to  be  a  quasi-­state  under  Hamas’  tight  control  even  though  Gaza  was  
closed   and   during   the   time   when   there   were   two   major   Israeli   wars   on  
Gaza.807  Hamas   demonstrated   its   capacity   to   stabilize   Gaza   and   gradually  
became  an  indispensable  actor  in  this  region.  It  should  be  noted  that  Hamas’  
domination   of   Gaza   does   not   refer   to   the   creation   of   an   Islamic   emirate   or  
permanent   separation   from   the   PA   in   the   West   Bank.   From   Hamas’  
perspective,  resistance  is  its  fundamental  principle  as  long  as  Israel  continues  
its  occupation.  Under  the  closure  of  Gaza  and  the  failure  of  reconciliation  with  
Fatah,   Hamas   leaders   felt   they   had   no   other   choice   but   to   advance   the  
resistance   project   in  many   aspects.   The  model  Hamas  employed   to   govern  
Gaza  was  distinct  from  that  of  the  PA  in  the  West  Bank.  Hamas  expected  to  
create  a  resistant  society  in  Gaza  and  attempted  to  transfer  this  experience  to  
the  West  Bank.  
1.3  Hamas’  political  transition  represents  its  shift  in  tactics  instead  of  its  
ideology  change  
From   the   analysis   above,   the   research   confirms   that  Hamas’   political  
transition  does  not   involve  a  shift   in   its   ideology  but  a  tactical  change  that   is  
the   third   finding   of   this   thesis.   A   refusal   to   legitimize   Israel   and   to   end   the  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
807  Israel  launched  another  war  on  Gaza  between  8  July  and  26  August  2014,  which  caused  
unprecedented   destruction   and   loss   of   human   life   in  Gaza.   It   is   estimated   that   one-­third   of  
Gaza  was  destroyed  by  the  Israeli  strikes.  See  International  Crisis  Group,   ‘Toward  a   lasting  
ceasefire   in   Gaza,’   Middle   East   Briefing,   No.42   (23   October   2014),   p.4.   And   Palestinian  
Centre   for  Human  Rights,   ‘Statistics:  Victims  of   the   Israeli   offensive  on  Gaza  since  08  July  
2014,’   (16   September   2014)   <https://reliefweb.int/report/occupied-­palestinian-­
territory/statistics-­victims-­israeli-­offensive-­gaza-­08-­july-­2014>   (accessed   on   3   December  
2014).  
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Israeli   occupation   remains   Hamas’   fundamental   principles.   But,   in   order   to  
fulfill   its   commitment   to  end   the   Israeli   occupation,  Hamas  attempts   to   seek  
assistance   and   solidarity   from   various   actors.   As   far   as   the   Palestinian  
factions   are   concerned,   Hamas   emphasizes   the   necessity   of   national   unity  
and  reconciliation  as  the  key  to  strengthen  the  cause  of  resistance.  Regarding  
the  role  of   the  Muslim  communities,  Hamas  avoids   intervention   in   the  affairs  
of  any  other  Muslim  country  and  political  party  in  order  to  seek  comprehensive  
support  from  all  sides.  On  the  other  hand,  in  order  to  seek  understanding  from  
the   West,   Hamas   strives   to:   articulate   its   discourse   on   the   necessity   of  
resistance,   the   rationale   of   non-­recognition   of   Israeli   legitimacy,   the  
precondition   of   negotiation   with   Israel   and   the   distinction   between   Jew   and  
Zionist.  In  this  respect,  Hamas  sought  help  from  various  actors  in  order  to  end  
the  Israeli  occupation.  
1.4  The  overall  implications  of  political  transition  for  Hamas    
Finally  the  research  concludes  that  Hamas’  transition  aims  to  adapt  to  
changing   conditions   in   order   to   protect   its   resistance   project   and   keep   its  
organization   intact.   Although   Hamas’   political   transition   shares   common  
features  with   other   Islamists   such   as   the  Muslim  Brotherhood   in   Egypt   and  
Jordan   that   accept   the   concepts   of   modernity   and   are   inclined   towards  
political  participation,  the  main  difference  between  Hamas  and  other  Islamists  
is  that  Hamas  developed  a  specific  concept  of  resistance  as  Palestine  is  still  
under   the   Israeli   occupation.   It   is   noted   that   resistance   remains   the  
unshakable  doctrine   that  Hamas  never  compromises   in  spite  of   the   fact   that  
Hamas   has   demonstrated   its   pragmatism   in   politics.   After   the   takeover   of  
Gaza,   Hamas’   works   concerning   resistance   has   been   thwarted   by   many  
incidents   such   as   the   collapse   of   the   Muslim   Brotherhood   in   Egypt,   the  
fragmentation   of   the   Arab   states   and   the   suspense   of   the   reconciliation  
process  between  Hamas  and  Fatah.  But  it  would  have  been  hard  to  imagine  
Hamas   leaders   give   in   or   renounce   the   principle   of   resistance   in   the  
foreseeable   future   irrespective   of   any   circumstances   as   they   hold   a   strong  
belief   that   resistance   is   the   only   way   to   fight   against   the   deprivation   of   the  
rights  they  had  lost  since  1948.  Based  on  the  conviction,  Hamas’  leaders  and  
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their   constituencies   are   waiting   for   another   opportunity   to   continue   the  
resistance  work.808  
2.  Challenges  and  Limitations    
This   thesis  has  examined  how  Hamas   legitimated  and  constructed   its  
resistance  project  in  its  political  transition  over  a  period  of  ten  years.  However,  
some   specific   limitations   encountered   during   the   research   must   be  
acknowledged.  The  major   factor  was   the  geographic  and  physical  obstacles  
that  limited  the  collection  of  various  data.  Due  to  the  closure  of  Gaza  and  the  
potential   risk   to  personal   safety,   it  was  difficult   to   conduct   interviews  and   to  
personally   observe   the   situation   in   Gaza.   The   deficiency   was   partially  
resolved  by  interviews  with  Palestinian  intellectuals  in  the  UK  who  are  familiar  
with  Hamas’   resistance  discourse.   In  addition,   this  research  mainly  relied  on  
the   texts  of  Hamas   leaders’  and  members’   interviews   from  Hamas’  affiliated  
websites.   Through   the   text   analysis,   Hamas’   motivation   for   the   political  
transition  and  its  process  of  the  construction  of  the  resistance  project  could  be  
grasped.   As   for   the   second   limitation,   this   research   largely   highlighted   one  
side   of   Hamas’   resistance   project   but   the   relationship   between  Hamas   and  
other   Palestinian   factions,   such   as   Fatah,   PFLP   and   the   Islamic   Jihad   and  
independent   figures  was  beyond   the  scope  of   this   topic  and   therefore   I  was  
unable   to   elaborate   on   how   those   Palestinian   factions   and   individuals  
reflected  on  the  resistance  project  that  Hamas  promoted.  
The   third   limitation   was   that   there   is   no   adequate   information   about  
Hamas’  work  on  resistance  in  the  West  Bank.  Since  Hamas’  takeover  of  Gaza  
in  June  2007,  the  PA  in  Ramallah  prohibited  Hamas  by  every  available  means.  
Also,  due  to  the  security  cooperation  between  the  PA  and  Israel,  it  was  hard  
to   detect  Hamas’   presence   in   the  West  Bank.  Despite   these  difficulties,   the  
current   situation   in   the  West   Bank   perfectly   explains  why  Hamas   insists   on  
resistance   rather   than   negotiation.   A   fieldwork   trip   to   the   West   Bank   in  
October  2014  demonstrated  in  many  ways  how  deeply  the  Israeli  occupation  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
808  Ibrahim  Hewitt,  ‘Exclusive  Interview  with  Khaled  Meshaal,  the  head  of  the  Hamas  political  
Bureau,’  Middle  East  Monitor,  (6  November  2014).  
<https://www.middleeastmonitor.com/resources/interviews/15120-­exclusive-­interview-­with-­
khaled-­meshaal-­the-­head-­of-­the-­hamas-­political-­bureau>  (accessed  on  3  December  2014).      
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affects   every   Palestinian;;   and   how   the   PA   in   Ramallah   was   unable   to  
effectively   protect   Palestinians   from   Israeli   aggression.   As   for   the   final  
limitation,  Hamas  often  highlighted  the  role  of  ummah  in  the  Palestinian  cause  
and  its  popularity  is  strong  in  the  civil  society  across  the  Middle  East  but  this  
research  was  unable  to  obtain  statistics  and  reports  on  how  Arab  and  Muslim  
societies  supported  Hamas’  resistance  project.    
3.  Prospects  for  Future  Research  
It   has   become   clear   that   Hamas   has   built   Gaza   as   a   stronghold   for  
resistance.   It   is   impossible   for   Hamas   to   yield   military   power   to   the   PA   in  
Ramallah   either   in   the   reconciliation   process   or   under   the   pressure   of   the  
closure  of  Gaza.  Nowadays  many  Palestinians  in  Gaza  believe  that  resistance  
is  the  only  effective  way  to  defend  against  Israeli  closure  and  bombardment.  
The   recent   war   launched   by   Israel   and   the   51-­day   attacks   on   Gaza   in   the  
summer   of   2014   attests   to   this   argument.   According   to   a   poll   conducted   in  
Gaza  and  the  West  Bank  after  the  war,  Hamas’  popularity  reached  a  peak  for  
the  first  time  since  the  PLC  election  in  2006.  It  is  expected  that  if  the  new  PLC  
and   Presidential   elections   take   place,   Hamas   will   win   both. 809   It   is   also  
interesting   to   note   that   armed   resistance   as   an   effective   option   is   not   only  
popular   in   Gaza,   but   the   majority   of   Palestinians   in   the   West   Bank   also  
support  the  option  of  transferring  to  the  West  Bank.  810  However,  if  the  closure  
of   Gaza   remains   and   the   reconciliation   process   is   slow,   Hamas’   high  
popularity   and   the   overwhelming   support   for   resistance   among  Palestinians  
may  decline.  
This   is   not   to   say   that   Hamas’   work   on   resistance   has   reached   an  
impasse.   There   are   two   possible   scenarios   which   may   enhance   or   harm  
Hamas’  resistance  discourse  that  deserve  to  be  reserved  for  future  research.  
One  is  the  future  development  of  the  West  Bank.  There  is  a  call  for  the  third  
Intifada  as  the  negotiation  between  the  PA  and  Israel  has  failed  to  resolve  the  
chronic   problems  of   the   Israeli   occupation   in   the  West  Bank,   the   closure   of  
Gaza  and   the  process  of   Judaization  of   Jerusalem.  The   third   Intifada   is   not  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
809  See   Palestinian   Center   for   Policy   and   Survey   Research,   ‘Special   Gaza   War   Poll,’   (2  
September  2014),  <http://www.pcpsr.org/en/node/489>  (4  December  2014).      
810  Ibid.  
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impossible   in   the  West  Bank  and  Jerusalem  even   if   the  security  cooperation  
between   Israel   and   the   PA   prohibits   and   monitors   any   hint   of   an   armed  
struggle.  It  is  known  that  apart  from  armed  struggle,  resistance  in  many  forms  
has  already  been  exhibited  in  the  West  Bank;;  it  is  usual  for  demonstrations  to  
occur  across   the  cities  of   the  West  Bank.  Many  young  Palestinians  who  are  
tired   of   the   incompetent   PA   are   considering   the   possibility   of   an   armed  
resistance.811  Anticipation  for  the  third  Intifada  is  growing  and  the  fuel  for  the  
potential   intifada   is   ready.   If   the   third   intifada   actually   takes   place,   the  
negotiation   approach   that   Fatah   insists   on   will   collapse   and   Hamas   would  
definitely  seize  the  opportunity  to  lead  a  resistance  campaign.  
  The   second   scenario   that   may   determine   the   strength   of   Hamas’  
resistance  depends  on  the  overall  development  within  the  Arab  States  in  the  
near   future.   The   role   of   ummah   plays   the   crucial   role   in   supporting   the  
Palestinian   cause   and   Hamas’   work   on   resistance.   But   at   this   moment   the  
Arab   region   is   on   the   brink   of   disunity,   fragmentation   and   militarized  
confrontations.  Furthermore,  the  Arab  nation-­states  based  on  the  Skyes-­Picot  
agreement  have  been  threatened  by  the  rise  of  ISIS  across  Syria  and  Iraq.  In  
a  sense,  Palestine  is  not  a  major  concern  for  these  Arab  states.  The  political  
map  of  the  Arab  world  is  hurtling  towards  uncertainty.  It  is  hard  to  tell  whether  
this  uncertainty  will  lead  to  more  chaos  or  towards  unity.  Any  major  change  in  









  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
811   Adnan   Abu   Amer,   ‘Hamas   eyes   armed   resistance   from   West   Bank,’   Al-­Monitor,   (9  
September   2014)   <http://www.al-­monitor.com/pulse/originals/2014/09/gaza-­hamas-­pa-­west-­
bank-­arms-­israel.html#ixzz3D1cR5Dat>  (3  December  2014).    
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List  of  Glossary  
  
a’ayan                                                                noble  families  
al-­Mujamma’  al-­Islami                Islamic  centre  
al-­Jam’iyah  al-­Islamiyah          Islamic  society    
caliphate                                                          a  form  of  Islamic  political-­religious  leadership  
dawah                                                                  preaching  of  Islam  
haram  al-­Sharif                                      the  noble  sanctuary  
hunda                                                                    ceasefire  
hudud                                                                    limit  or  prohibition,  refers  to  Islamic  punishments  
ijtihad                                                                      independent  reasoning  
ihya’                                                                          revivification  
islah                                                                          reform  
khawarij                                                              a  group  of  Muslims  who  assassinated  Caliph  Ali  
nahda                                                                    revival    
maslaha                                                            public  interest    
mujtahid                                                            Muslim  scholars  who  have  ability  to  use  ijtihad    
tahdiya                                                                ceasefire  
tajdid                                                                      renewal  
taqlid                                                                      legal  precedent  
ummah                                                                Islamic  community    
ulama                                                                    Muslim  scholar  
waqf                                                                        charity  endowment  
wasatiyyah                                                    moderation     
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